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From 9a2dd0a945720634b9f3608c3b3dfb99fafd4465 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Patrick Uiterwijk <patrick@puiterwijk.org>
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Date: Thu, 6 Dec 2018 10:08:45 +0100
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Subject: [PATCH] Make EFI variable copying fatal only on secureboot enabled
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systems
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I have come across systems that are unwilling to reserve enough memory for
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a MokListRT big enough for big certificates.
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This seems to be the case with firmware implementations that do not support
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secureboot, which is probably the reason they went with much lower variable
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storage.
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This patch set makes sure we can still boot on those systems, by only
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making the copy action fatal if the system has secure boot enabled, or if
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the error was anything other than EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER.
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Signed-off-by: Patrick Uiterwijk <patrick@puiterwijk.org>
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---
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shim.c | 14 +++++++++++---
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1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/shim.c b/shim.c
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index fcc11eb3..89ef0036 100644
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--- a/shim.c
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+++ b/shim.c
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@@ -2632,9 +2632,17 @@ efi_main (EFI_HANDLE passed_image_handle, EFI_SYSTEM_TABLE *passed_systab)
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die:
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console_print(L"Something has gone seriously wrong: %s: %r\n",
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msgs[msg], efi_status);
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- msleep(5000000);
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- gRT->ResetSystem(EfiResetShutdown, EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION,
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- 0, NULL);
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+ /*
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+ * Make copy failures fatal only if secure_mode is enabled, or
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+ * the error was anything else than EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER.
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+ * There are non-secureboot firmware implementations that don't
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+ * reserve enough EFI variable memory to fit the variable.
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+ */
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+ if (secure_mode() || efi_status != EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER) {
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+ msleep(5000000);
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+ gRT->ResetSystem(EfiResetShutdown, EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION,
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+ 0, NULL);
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+ }
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}
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efi_status = shim_init();
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