diff --git a/SOURCES/CVE-2021-33034.patch b/SOURCES/CVE-2021-33034.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..90984f8 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/CVE-2021-33034.patch @@ -0,0 +1,200 @@ +Changes since last build: +[x86_64]: +hci_event.o: changed function: hci_event_packet + +[ppc64le]: +hci_event.o: changed function: hci_event_packet +hci_event.o: new function: hci_resolve_name + +--------------------------- + +Kernels: +4.18.0-305.el8 +4.18.0-305.3.1.el8_4 + +Modifications: +- Remove modification of struct hci_chan and add hchan_amp + shadow variable as flag instead + +commit 418fac0a2503c7e5b310052431cecab67a0efb8f +Author: Gopal Tiwari +Date: Thu May 20 11:27:10 2021 +0530 + + Bluetooth: verify AMP hci_chan before amp_destroy + + Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/1962544 + CVE: CVE-2021-33034 + Y-Commit: 162078c99ca2f976692d81b532a9eea80332cf82 + + O-Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1962546 + + O-CVE: CVE-2021-33034 + + Testing: Verified by me with the help of reproducer. + https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1962546#c1 + + Upstream: Merged. + + commit 5c4c8c9544099bb9043a10a5318130a943e32fc3 + Author: Archie Pusaka + Date: Mon Mar 22 14:03:11 2021 +0800 + + Bluetooth: verify AMP hci_chan before amp_destroy + + hci_chan can be created in 2 places: hci_loglink_complete_evt() if + it is an AMP hci_chan, or l2cap_conn_add() otherwise. In theory, + Only AMP hci_chan should be removed by a call to + hci_disconn_loglink_complete_evt(). However, the controller might mess + up, call that function, and destroy an hci_chan which is not initiated + by hci_loglink_complete_evt(). + + This patch adds a verification that the destroyed hci_chan must have + been init'd by hci_loglink_complete_evt(). + + Example crash call trace: + Call Trace: + __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] + dump_stack+0xe3/0x144 lib/dump_stack.c:118 + print_address_description+0x67/0x22a mm/kasan/report.c:256 + kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:354 [inline] + kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:412 [inline] + kasan_report+0x251/0x28f mm/kasan/report.c:396 + hci_send_acl+0x3b/0x56e net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4072 + l2cap_send_cmd+0x5af/0x5c2 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:877 + l2cap_send_move_chan_cfm_icid+0x8e/0xb1 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:4661 + l2cap_move_fail net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:5146 [inline] + l2cap_move_channel_rsp net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:5185 [inline] + l2cap_bredr_sig_cmd net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:5464 [inline] + l2cap_sig_channel net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:5799 [inline] + l2cap_recv_frame+0x1d12/0x51aa net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7023 + l2cap_recv_acldata+0x2ea/0x693 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7596 + hci_acldata_packet net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4606 [inline] + hci_rx_work+0x2bd/0x45e net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4796 + process_one_work+0x6f8/0xb50 kernel/workqueue.c:2175 + worker_thread+0x4fc/0x670 kernel/workqueue.c:2321 + kthread+0x2f0/0x304 kernel/kthread.c:253 + ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:415 + + Allocated by task 38: + set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline] + kasan_kmalloc+0x8d/0x9a mm/kasan/kasan.c:553 + kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x102/0x129 mm/slub.c:2787 + kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:515 [inline] + kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:709 [inline] + hci_chan_create+0x86/0x26d net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:1674 + l2cap_conn_add.part.0+0x1c/0x814 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7062 + l2cap_conn_add net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7059 [inline] + l2cap_connect_cfm+0x134/0x852 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7381 + hci_connect_cfm+0x9d/0x122 include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h:1404 + hci_remote_ext_features_evt net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:4161 [inline] + hci_event_packet+0x463f/0x72fa net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:5981 + hci_rx_work+0x197/0x45e net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4791 + process_one_work+0x6f8/0xb50 kernel/workqueue.c:2175 + worker_thread+0x4fc/0x670 kernel/workqueue.c:2321 + kthread+0x2f0/0x304 kernel/kthread.c:253 + ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:415 + + Freed by task 1732: + set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline] + __kasan_slab_free mm/kasan/kasan.c:521 [inline] + __kasan_slab_free+0x106/0x128 mm/kasan/kasan.c:493 + slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1409 [inline] + slab_free_freelist_hook+0xaa/0xf6 mm/slub.c:1436 + slab_free mm/slub.c:3009 [inline] + kfree+0x182/0x21e mm/slub.c:3972 + hci_disconn_loglink_complete_evt net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:4891 [inline] + hci_event_packet+0x6a1c/0x72fa net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:6050 + hci_rx_work+0x197/0x45e net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4791 + process_one_work+0x6f8/0xb50 kernel/workqueue.c:2175 + worker_thread+0x4fc/0x670 kernel/workqueue.c:2321 + kthread+0x2f0/0x304 kernel/kthread.c:253 + ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:415 + + The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8881d7af9180 + which belongs to the cache kmalloc-128 of size 128 + The buggy address is located 24 bytes inside of + 128-byte region [ffff8881d7af9180, ffff8881d7af9200) + The buggy address belongs to the page: + page:ffffea00075ebe40 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8881da403200 index:0x0 + flags: 0x8000000000000200(slab) + raw: 8000000000000200 dead000000000100 dead000000000200 ffff8881da403200 + raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080150015 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 + page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected + + Memory state around the buggy address: + ffff8881d7af9080: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb + ffff8881d7af9100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc + >ffff8881d7af9180: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb + ^ + ffff8881d7af9200: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc + ffff8881d7af9280: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc + + Signed-off-by: Archie Pusaka + Reported-by: syzbot+98228e7407314d2d4ba2@syzkaller.appspotmail.com + Reviewed-by: Alain Michaud + Reviewed-by: Abhishek Pandit-Subedi + Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann + (cherry picked from commit 5c4c8c9544099bb9043a10a5318130a943e32fc3) + Signed-off-by: Gopal Tiwari + Signed-off-by: Jan Stancek + +Signed-off-by: Joel Savitz for v1 +Signed-off-by: Joe Lawrence +--- + +v2: +- minor code cleanup from v1, removed intermediate variables +- I tried forcing hci_resolve_name() as always_inline on ppc64le, but + this cascaded into a series of neverending inline / half inline / etc. + compiler decisions that I could never completely eliminate. + +Z-MR: https://gitlab.com/redhat/rhel/src/kernel/rhel-8/-/merge_requests/692 + +KT0 test PASS: https://beaker.engineering.redhat.com/jobs/5457381 +for kpatch-patch-4_18_0-193_1_2-1-12.el8_2 scratch build: +https://brewweb.engineering.redhat.com/brew/taskinfo?taskID=37373415 + + net/bluetooth/hci_event.c | 11 ++++++++++- + 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c +index 8a7af33b0a3e..e66687f5b701 100644 +--- a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c ++++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c +@@ -29,6 +29,9 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include ++ ++#define KLP_CVE_2021_33034_HCHAN_AMP 0x2021330340000000 + + #include "hci_request.h" + #include "hci_debugfs.h" +@@ -4929,6 +4932,11 @@ static void hci_loglink_complete_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb) + return; + + hchan->handle = le16_to_cpu(ev->handle); ++ if (!klp_shadow_get_or_alloc(hchan, KLP_CVE_2021_33034_HCHAN_AMP, ++ 0, GFP_KERNEL, NULL, NULL)) { ++ hci_chan_del(hchan); ++ return; ++ } + + BT_DBG("hcon %p mgr %p hchan %p", hcon, hcon->amp_mgr, hchan); + +@@ -4961,9 +4969,10 @@ static void hci_disconn_loglink_complete_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, + hci_dev_lock(hdev); + + hchan = hci_chan_lookup_handle(hdev, le16_to_cpu(ev->handle)); +- if (!hchan) ++ if (!hchan || !klp_shadow_get(hchan, KLP_CVE_2021_33034_HCHAN_AMP)) + goto unlock; + ++ klp_shadow_free(hchan, KLP_CVE_2021_33034_HCHAN_AMP, NULL); + amp_destroy_logical_link(hchan, ev->reason); + + unlock: +-- +2.26.3 + diff --git a/SPECS/kpatch-patch.spec b/SPECS/kpatch-patch.spec index 58c2676..9755960 100644 --- a/SPECS/kpatch-patch.spec +++ b/SPECS/kpatch-patch.spec @@ -6,13 +6,16 @@ %define kernel_ver 4.18.0-305.el8 %define kpatch_ver 0.9.3 %define rpm_ver 1 -%define rpm_rel 1 +%define rpm_rel 2 %if !%{empty_package} # Patch sources below. DO NOT REMOVE THIS LINE. # # https://bugzilla.redhat.com/1954230 Source100: KVM-VMX-Don-t-use-vcpu-run-internal.ndata-as-an-arra.patch +# +# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/1962521 +Source101: CVE-2021-33034.patch # End of patch sources. DO NOT REMOVE THIS LINE. %endif @@ -32,7 +35,7 @@ Summary: Live kernel patching module for kernel-%{kernel_ver_arch} Group: System Environment/Kernel License: GPLv2 -ExclusiveArch: x86_64 +ExclusiveArch: x86_64 ppc64le Conflicts: %{name} < %{version}-%{release} @@ -151,6 +154,9 @@ It is only a method to subscribe to the kpatch stream for kernel-%{kernel_ver}. %endif %changelog +* Thu Jun 17 2021 Yannick Cote [1-2.el8] +- kernel: use-after-free in net/bluetooth/hci_event.c when destroying an hci_chan [1962521] {CVE-2021-33034} + * Tue May 11 2021 Artem Savkov [1-1.el8] - serspace applications can misuse the KVM API to cause a write of 16 bytes at an offset up to 32 GB from vcpu->run [1954230] {CVE-2021-3501}