From d44c23c66a8f2f4c3633aacc0e835da43de00602 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: CentOS Sources Date: Apr 05 2022 07:55:43 +0000 Subject: import kpatch-patch-3_10_0-1160_41_1-1-5.el7 --- diff --git a/SOURCES/CVE-2021-4028.patch b/SOURCES/CVE-2021-4028.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c672e76 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/CVE-2021-4028.patch @@ -0,0 +1,128 @@ +From 44d6b1169915913fae640dada5ed931dffff6772 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "C. Erastus Toe" +Date: Fri, 18 Feb 2022 01:09:25 -0500 +Subject: [KPATCH CVE-2021-4028] kpatch fixes for CVE-2021-4028 + +Kernels: +3.10.0-1160.21.1.el7 +3.10.0-1160.24.1.el7 +3.10.0-1160.25.1.el7 +3.10.0-1160.31.1.el7 +3.10.0-1160.36.2.el7 +3.10.0-1160.41.1.el7 +3.10.0-1160.42.2.el7 +3.10.0-1160.45.1.el7 +3.10.0-1160.49.1.el7 +3.10.0-1160.53.1.el7 + +Changes since last build: +arches: x86_64 ppc64le +cma.o: changed function: rdma_listen +--------------------------- + +Kpatch-MR: https://gitlab.com/redhat/prdsc/rhel/src/kpatch/rhel-7/-/merge_requests/25 +Approved-by: Joe Lawrence (@joe.lawrence) +Modifications: none + +commit 00225da7d36440d257a98004ee2e7f288486245b +Author: Kamal Heib +Date: Sun Jan 16 11:38:26 2022 +0200 + + RDMA/cma: Do not change route.addr.src_addr.ss_family + + Bugzilla: http://bugzilla.redhat.com/2032075 + CVE: CVE-2021-4028 + Conflicts: + The conditional statement to verify RDMA_CM_IDLE state is a + little bit different from the upstream to 7.9.z source. The commit + 732d41c545bb (RDMA/cma: Make the locking for automatic state transition + more clear) is missing from 7.9.z. So, the context has been modified. + + commit bc0bdc5afaa740d782fbf936aaeebd65e5c2921d + Author: Jason Gunthorpe + Date: Wed Sep 15 17:21:43 2021 -0300 + + RDMA/cma: Do not change route.addr.src_addr.ss_family + + If the state is not idle then rdma_bind_addr() will immediately fail and + no change to global state should happen. + + For instance if the state is already RDMA_CM_LISTEN then this will corrupt + the src_addr and would cause the test in cma_cancel_operation(): + + if (cma_any_addr(cma_src_addr(id_priv)) && !id_priv->cma_dev) + + To view a mangled src_addr, eg with a IPv6 loopback address but an IPv4 + family, failing the test. + + This would manifest as this trace from syzkaller: + + BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __list_add_valid+0x93/0xa0 lib/list_debug.c:26 + Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881546491e0 by task syz-executor.1/32204 + + CPU: 1 PID: 32204 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc8-syzkaller #0 + Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 + Call Trace: + __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:79 [inline] + dump_stack+0x141/0x1d7 lib/dump_stack.c:120 + print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0x5b/0x2f8 mm/kasan/report.c:232 + __kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:399 [inline] + kasan_report.cold+0x7c/0xd8 mm/kasan/report.c:416 + __list_add_valid+0x93/0xa0 lib/list_debug.c:26 + __list_add include/linux/list.h:67 [inline] + list_add_tail include/linux/list.h:100 [inline] + cma_listen_on_all drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c:2557 [inline] + rdma_listen+0x787/0xe00 drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c:3751 + ucma_listen+0x16a/0x210 drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c:1102 + ucma_write+0x259/0x350 drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c:1732 + vfs_write+0x28e/0xa30 fs/read_write.c:603 + ksys_write+0x1ee/0x250 fs/read_write.c:658 + do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46 + entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae + + Which is indicating that an rdma_id_private was destroyed without doing + cma_cancel_listens(). + + Instead of trying to re-use the src_addr memory to indirectly create an + any address build one explicitly on the stack and bind to that as any + other normal flow would do. + + Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/0-v1-9fbb33f5e201+2a-cma_listen_jgg@nvidia.com + Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org + Fixes: 732d41c545bb ("RDMA/cma: Make the locking for automatic state transition more clear") + Reported-by: syzbot+6bb0528b13611047209c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com + Tested-by: Hao Sun + Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky + Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe + + Signed-off-by: Kamal Heib + +Signed-off-by: C. Erastus Toe +--- + drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c | 9 +++++++-- + 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c b/drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c +index ec473099e445..935f3979c8e2 100644 +--- a/drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c ++++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c +@@ -3467,8 +3467,13 @@ int rdma_listen(struct rdma_cm_id *id, int backlog) + + id_priv = container_of(id, struct rdma_id_private, id); + if (id_priv->state == RDMA_CM_IDLE) { +- id->route.addr.src_addr.ss_family = AF_INET; +- ret = rdma_bind_addr(id, cma_src_addr(id_priv)); ++ struct sockaddr_in any_in = { ++ .sin_family = AF_INET, ++ .sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_ANY), ++ }; ++ ++ /* For a well behaved ULP state will be RDMA_CM_IDLE */ ++ ret = rdma_bind_addr(id, (struct sockaddr *)&any_in); + if (ret) + return ret; + } +-- +2.26.3 + + diff --git a/SOURCES/CVE-2021-4083.patch b/SOURCES/CVE-2021-4083.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8905106 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/CVE-2021-4083.patch @@ -0,0 +1,496 @@ +From 80c7e812dffa734599aadde93cb8e30b34f0983d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Joe Lawrence +Date: Mon, 21 Mar 2022 15:45:03 -0400 +Subject: [KPATCH CVE-2021-4083] fget: kpatch fixes for CVE-2021-4083 + +Kernels: +3.10.0-1160.24.1.el7 +3.10.0-1160.25.1.el7 +3.10.0-1160.31.1.el7 +3.10.0-1160.36.2.el7 +3.10.0-1160.41.1.el7 +3.10.0-1160.42.2.el7 +3.10.0-1160.45.1.el7 +3.10.0-1160.49.1.el7 +3.10.0-1160.53.1.el7 +3.10.0-1160.59.1.el7 + +Changes since last build: +arches: x86_64 ppc64le +file.o: changed function: SyS_dup +file.o: changed function: dup_fd +file.o: changed function: fget +file.o: changed function: fget_light +file.o: changed function: fget_raw +file.o: changed function: fget_raw_light +file.o: changed function: put_files_struct +file.o: new function: __fget +file.o: new function: __fget_light +--------------------------- + +Kpatch-MR: https://gitlab.com/redhat/prdsc/rhel/src/kpatch/rhel-7/-/merge_requests/34 +Approved-by: Yannick Cote (@ycote1) +Modifications: +- include/linux/rcupdate.h, kernel/rcupdate.c: leave exported + rcu_my_thread_group_empty() intact +- fs/file.c: use fput() instead of fputs_many() since we skipped commit + ("fs: add fget_many() and fput_many()") +- fs/file.c: use fcheck_files() instead of files_lookup_fd_raw() since + we are skipping subsequent commit ("fget: clarify and improve + __fget_files() implementation") that provides it. +- Set __attribute__((optimize("-fno-optimize-sibling-calls"))) for + fget() and fget_raw() on ppc64le + +commit c2207a235113315ad696b06eb96ccd36d1f5fdeb +Author: Miklos Szeredi +Date: Fri Jan 21 10:22:29 2022 +0100 + + introduce __fcheck_files() to fix rcu_dereference_check_fdtable(), kill rcu_my_thread_group_empty() + + Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2032478 + Upstream status: Linus + Testing: xfstests + CVE: CVE-2021-4083 + Conflicts: + - context difference due to backport of later patch + - target file difference due to missing backport of rcu source code + move + + commit a8d4b8345e0ee48b732126d980efaf0dc373e2b0 + Author: Oleg Nesterov + Date: Sat Jan 11 19:19:32 2014 +0100 + + introduce __fcheck_files() to fix rcu_dereference_check_fdtable(), kill rcu_my_thread_group_empty() + + rcu_dereference_check_fdtable() looks very wrong, + + 1. rcu_my_thread_group_empty() was added by 844b9a8707f1 "vfs: fix + RCU-lockdep false positive due to /proc" but it doesn't really + fix the problem. A CLONE_THREAD (without CLONE_FILES) task can + hit the same race with get_files_struct(). + + And otoh rcu_my_thread_group_empty() can suppress the correct + warning if the caller is the CLONE_FILES (without CLONE_THREAD) + task. + + 2. files->count == 1 check is not really right too. Even if this + files_struct is not shared it is not safe to access it lockless + unless the caller is the owner. + + Otoh, this check is sub-optimal. files->count == 0 always means + it is safe to use it lockless even if files != current->files, + but put_files_struct() has to take rcu_read_lock(). See the next + patch. + + This patch removes the buggy checks and turns fcheck_files() into + __fcheck_files() which uses rcu_dereference_raw(), the "unshared" + callers, fget_light() and fget_raw_light(), can use it to avoid + the warning from RCU-lockdep. + + fcheck_files() is trivially reimplemented as rcu_lockdep_assert() + plus __fcheck_files(). + + Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov + Signed-off-by: Al Viro + + Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi + +commit ec06bac02991edcfdeb148ab2fe7f3e2d7d3ceaa +Author: Miklos Szeredi +Date: Fri Jan 21 10:22:30 2022 +0100 + + fs: factor out common code in fget() and fget_raw() + + Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2032478 + Upstream status: Linus + Testing: xfstests + CVE: CVE-2021-4083 + Conflicts: + - difference due to backport of later patch + + commit 1deb46e2562561255c34075825fd00f22a858bb3 + Author: Oleg Nesterov + Date: Mon Jan 13 16:48:19 2014 +0100 + + fs: factor out common code in fget() and fget_raw() + + Apart from FMODE_PATH check fget() and fget_raw() are identical, + shift the code into the new simple helper, __fget(fd, mask). Saves + 160 bytes. + + Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov + Signed-off-by: Al Viro + + Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi + +commit ac43fab520f6836e2a7d3d20dd64d6328233ccbe +Author: Miklos Szeredi +Date: Fri Jan 21 10:22:30 2022 +0100 + + fs: factor out common code in fget_light() and fget_raw_light() + + Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2032478 + Upstream status: Linus + Testing: xfstests + CVE: CVE-2021-4083 + + commit ad46183445043b562856c60b74db664668fb364b + Author: Oleg Nesterov + Date: Mon Jan 13 16:48:40 2014 +0100 + + fs: factor out common code in fget_light() and fget_raw_light() + + Apart from FMODE_PATH check fget_light() and fget_raw_light() are + identical, shift the code into the new helper, __fget_light(fd, mask). + Saves 208 bytes. + + Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov + Signed-off-by: Al Viro + + Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi + +commit 9e24c8894f5df488a336f0c848f15a7d2f78d163 +Author: Miklos Szeredi +Date: Fri Jan 21 10:22:30 2022 +0100 + + fs: __fget_light() can use __fget() in slow path + + Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2032478 + Upstream status: Linus + Testing: xfstests + CVE: CVE-2021-4083 + + commit e6ff9a9fa4e05c1c03dec63cdc6a87d6dea02755 + Author: Oleg Nesterov + Date: Mon Jan 13 16:49:06 2014 +0100 + + fs: __fget_light() can use __fget() in slow path + + The slow path in __fget_light() can use __fget() to avoid the + code duplication. Saves 232 bytes. + + Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov + Signed-off-by: Al Viro + + Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi + +commit d63fb584ae2d7d9a1620e23e59072cb6929f3833 +Author: Miklos Szeredi +Date: Fri Jan 21 10:22:30 2022 +0100 + + fs/file.c: __fget() and dup2() atomicity rules + + Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2032478 + Upstream status: Linus + Testing: xfstests + CVE: CVE-2021-4083 + + commit 5ba97d2832f87943c43bb69cb1ef86dbc59df5bc + Author: Eric Dumazet + Date: Mon Jun 29 17:10:30 2015 +0200 + + fs/file.c: __fget() and dup2() atomicity rules + + __fget() does lockless fetch of pointer from the descriptor + table, attempts to grab a reference and treats "it was already + zero" as "it's already gone from the table, we just hadn't + seen the store, let's fail". Unfortunately, that breaks the + atomicity of dup2() - __fget() might see the old pointer, + notice that it's been already dropped and treat that as + "it's closed". What we should be getting is either the + old file or new one, depending whether we come before or after + dup2(). + + Dmitry had following test failing sometimes : + + int fd; + void *Thread(void *x) { + char buf; + int n = read(fd, &buf, 1); + if (n != 1) + exit(printf("read failed: n=%d errno=%d\n", n, errno)); + return 0; + } + + int main() + { + fd = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY); + int fd2 = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY); + if (fd == -1 || fd2 == -1) + exit(printf("open failed\n")); + pthread_t th; + pthread_create(&th, 0, Thread, 0); + if (dup2(fd2, fd) == -1) + exit(printf("dup2 failed\n")); + pthread_join(th, 0); + if (close(fd) == -1) + exit(printf("close failed\n")); + if (close(fd2) == -1) + exit(printf("close failed\n")); + printf("DONE\n"); + return 0; + } + + Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet + Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov + Signed-off-by: Al Viro + + Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi + +commit bc04a10c9303dcd9a6305a0452361537257fa0c1 +Author: Miklos Szeredi +Date: Fri Jan 21 10:22:31 2022 +0100 + + fget: check that the fd still exists after getting a ref to it + + Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2032478 + Upstream status: Linus + Testing: xfstests + CVE: CVE-2021-4083 + + commit 054aa8d439b9185d4f5eb9a90282d1ce74772969 + Author: Linus Torvalds + Date: Wed Dec 1 10:06:14 2021 -0800 + + fget: check that the fd still exists after getting a ref to it + + Jann Horn points out that there is another possible race wrt Unix domain + socket garbage collection, somewhat reminiscent of the one fixed in + commit cbcf01128d0a ("af_unix: fix garbage collect vs MSG_PEEK"). + + See the extended comment about the garbage collection requirements added + to unix_peek_fds() by that commit for details. + + The race comes from how we can locklessly look up a file descriptor just + as it is in the process of being closed, and with the right artificial + timing (Jann added a few strategic 'mdelay(500)' calls to do that), the + Unix domain socket garbage collector could see the reference count + decrement of the close() happen before fget() took its reference to the + file and the file was attached onto a new file descriptor. + + This is all (intentionally) correct on the 'struct file *' side, with + RCU lookups and lockless reference counting very much part of the + design. Getting that reference count out of order isn't a problem per + se. + + But the garbage collector can get confused by seeing this situation of + having seen a file not having any remaining external references and then + seeing it being attached to an fd. + + In commit cbcf01128d0a ("af_unix: fix garbage collect vs MSG_PEEK") the + fix was to serialize the file descriptor install with the garbage + collector by taking and releasing the unix_gc_lock. + + That's not really an option here, but since this all happens when we are + in the process of looking up a file descriptor, we can instead simply + just re-check that the file hasn't been closed in the meantime, and just + re-do the lookup if we raced with a concurrent close() of the same file + descriptor. + + Reported-and-tested-by: Jann Horn + Acked-by: Miklos Szeredi + Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds + + Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi + +Signed-off-by: Joe Lawrence +--- + fs/file.c | 86 +++++++++++++++-------------------------- + include/linux/fdtable.h | 35 ++++++++++------- + 2 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 68 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/fs/file.c b/fs/file.c +index 44bd634b636a..564d60bf0fda 100644 +--- a/fs/file.c ++++ b/fs/file.c +@@ -718,42 +718,43 @@ void do_close_on_exec(struct files_struct *files) + spin_unlock(&files->file_lock); + } + +-struct file *fget(unsigned int fd) ++static struct file *__fget(unsigned int fd, fmode_t mask) + { +- struct file *file; + struct files_struct *files = current->files; ++ struct file *file; + + rcu_read_lock(); ++loop: + file = fcheck_files(files, fd); + if (file) { +- /* File object ref couldn't be taken */ +- if (file->f_mode & FMODE_PATH || !get_file_rcu(file)) ++ /* File object ref couldn't be taken. ++ * dup2() atomicity guarantee is the reason ++ * we loop to catch the new file (or NULL pointer) ++ */ ++ if (file->f_mode & mask) + file = NULL; ++ else if (!get_file_rcu(file)) ++ goto loop; ++ else if (fcheck_files(files, fd) != file) { ++ fput(file); ++ goto loop; ++ } + } + rcu_read_unlock(); + + return file; + } + ++__attribute__((optimize("-fno-optimize-sibling-calls"))) struct file *fget(unsigned int fd) ++{ ++ return __fget(fd, FMODE_PATH); ++} + EXPORT_SYMBOL(fget); + +-struct file *fget_raw(unsigned int fd) ++__attribute__((optimize("-fno-optimize-sibling-calls"))) struct file *fget_raw(unsigned int fd) + { +- struct file *file; +- struct files_struct *files = current->files; +- +- rcu_read_lock(); +- file = fcheck_files(files, fd); +- if (file) { +- /* File object ref couldn't be taken */ +- if (!atomic_long_inc_not_zero(&file->f_count)) +- file = NULL; +- } +- rcu_read_unlock(); +- +- return file; ++ return __fget(fd, 0); + } +- + EXPORT_SYMBOL(fget_raw); + + /* +@@ -772,56 +773,33 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(fget_raw); + * The fput_needed flag returned by fget_light should be passed to the + * corresponding fput_light. + */ +-struct file *fget_light(unsigned int fd, int *fput_needed) ++struct file *__fget_light(unsigned int fd, fmode_t mask, int *fput_needed) + { +- struct file *file; + struct files_struct *files = current->files; ++ struct file *file; + + *fput_needed = 0; + if (atomic_read(&files->count) == 1) { +- file = fcheck_files(files, fd); +- if (file && (file->f_mode & FMODE_PATH)) ++ file = __fcheck_files(files, fd); ++ if (file && (file->f_mode & mask)) + file = NULL; + } else { +- rcu_read_lock(); +- file = fcheck_files(files, fd); +- if (file) { +- if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_PATH) && +- atomic_long_inc_not_zero(&file->f_count)) +- *fput_needed = 1; +- else +- /* Didn't get the reference, someone's freed */ +- file = NULL; +- } +- rcu_read_unlock(); ++ file = __fget(fd, mask); ++ if (file) ++ *fput_needed = 1; + } + + return file; + } ++struct file *fget_light(unsigned int fd, int *fput_needed) ++{ ++ return __fget_light(fd, FMODE_PATH, fput_needed); ++} + EXPORT_SYMBOL(fget_light); + + struct file *fget_raw_light(unsigned int fd, int *fput_needed) + { +- struct file *file; +- struct files_struct *files = current->files; +- +- *fput_needed = 0; +- if (atomic_read(&files->count) == 1) { +- file = fcheck_files(files, fd); +- } else { +- rcu_read_lock(); +- file = fcheck_files(files, fd); +- if (file) { +- if (atomic_long_inc_not_zero(&file->f_count)) +- *fput_needed = 1; +- else +- /* Didn't get the reference, someone's freed */ +- file = NULL; +- } +- rcu_read_unlock(); +- } +- +- return file; ++ return __fget_light(fd, 0, fput_needed); + } + + void set_close_on_exec(unsigned int fd, int flag) +diff --git a/include/linux/fdtable.h b/include/linux/fdtable.h +index 88d74ca9418f..95bcca7c1a0f 100644 +--- a/include/linux/fdtable.h ++++ b/include/linux/fdtable.h +@@ -70,29 +70,36 @@ struct files_struct { + RH_KABI_EXTEND(wait_queue_head_t resize_wait) + }; + +-#define rcu_dereference_check_fdtable(files, fdtfd) \ +- (rcu_dereference_check((fdtfd), \ +- lockdep_is_held(&(files)->file_lock) || \ +- atomic_read(&(files)->count) == 1 || \ +- rcu_my_thread_group_empty())) +- +-#define files_fdtable(files) \ +- (rcu_dereference_check_fdtable((files), (files)->fdt)) +- + struct file_operations; + struct vfsmount; + struct dentry; + +-static inline struct file * fcheck_files(struct files_struct *files, unsigned int fd) ++#define rcu_dereference_check_fdtable(files, fdtfd) \ ++ rcu_dereference_check((fdtfd), lockdep_is_held(&(files)->file_lock)) ++ ++#define files_fdtable(files) \ ++ rcu_dereference_check_fdtable((files), (files)->fdt) ++ ++/* ++ * The caller must ensure that fd table isn't shared or hold rcu or file lock ++ */ ++static inline struct file *__fcheck_files(struct files_struct *files, unsigned int fd) + { +- struct file * file = NULL; +- struct fdtable *fdt = files_fdtable(files); ++ struct fdtable *fdt = rcu_dereference_raw(files->fdt); + + if (fd < fdt->max_fds) { + fd = array_index_nospec(fd, fdt->max_fds); +- file = rcu_dereference_check_fdtable(files, fdt->fd[fd]); ++ return rcu_dereference_raw(fdt->fd[fd]); + } +- return file; ++ return NULL; ++} ++ ++static inline struct file *fcheck_files(struct files_struct *files, unsigned int fd) ++{ ++ rcu_lockdep_assert(rcu_read_lock_held() || ++ lockdep_is_held(&files->file_lock), ++ "suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage"); ++ return __fcheck_files(files, fd); + } + + /* +-- +2.26.3 + + diff --git a/SPECS/kpatch-patch.spec b/SPECS/kpatch-patch.spec index f321808..6ccb73c 100644 --- a/SPECS/kpatch-patch.spec +++ b/SPECS/kpatch-patch.spec @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ %define kernel_ver 3.10.0-1160.41.1.el7 %define kpatch_ver 0.9.2 %define rpm_ver 1 -%define rpm_rel 4 +%define rpm_rel 5 %if !%{empty_package} # Patch sources below. DO NOT REMOVE THIS LINE. @@ -37,6 +37,12 @@ Source107: CVE-2022-0330.patch # # https://bugzilla.redhat.com/2047616 Source108: CVE-2022-22942.patch +# +# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/2033360 +Source109: CVE-2021-4028.patch +# +# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/2032491 +Source110: CVE-2021-4083.patch # End of patch sources. DO NOT REMOVE THIS LINE. %endif @@ -169,6 +175,10 @@ It is only a method to subscribe to the kpatch stream for kernel-%{kernel_ver}. %endif %changelog +* Thu Mar 24 2022 Joe Lawrence [1-5.el7] +- kernel: fget: check that the fd still exists after getting a ref to it [2032491] {CVE-2021-4083} +- kernel: use-after-free in RDMA listen() [2033360] {CVE-2021-4028} + * Fri Feb 11 2022 Joe Lawrence [1-4.el7] - kernel: failing usercopy allows for use-after-free exploitation [2047616] {CVE-2022-22942} - kernel: possible privileges escalation due to missing TLB flush [2044373] {CVE-2022-0330}