diff --git a/erlang.spec b/erlang.spec index 763da02..6f7bac6 100644 --- a/erlang.spec +++ b/erlang.spec @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ Name: erlang Version: 17.4 -Release: 3%{?dist} +Release: 4%{?dist} Summary: General-purpose programming language and runtime environment Group: Development/Languages @@ -70,6 +70,9 @@ Patch8: otp-0008-Introduce-os-getenv-2.patch Patch9: otp-0009-Patch-removes-support-for-SSLv3-protocol-because-it-.patch # end of autogenerated patch tag list +# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2015-2774 +Patch10: otp-0010-ssl-Reenable-padding-check-for-TLS-1.0-and-provide-b.patch + BuildRequires: lksctp-tools-devel BuildRequires: ncurses-devel BuildRequires: openssl-devel @@ -898,6 +901,8 @@ Erlang mode for XEmacs (source lisp files). %patch9 -p1 -b .Patch_removes_support_for_SSLv3_protocol_because_it_ # end of autogenerated prep patch list +%patch10 -p1 + # FIXME we should come up with a better solution # remove shipped zlib sources #rm -f erts/emulator/zlib/*.[ch] @@ -2216,6 +2221,9 @@ useradd -r -g epmd -d /tmp -s /sbin/nologin \ %changelog +* Wed Aug 5 2015 John Eckersberg - 17.4-4 +- Add patch for CVE-2015-2774 - TLS-1.0 POODLE vulnerability (rhbz#1206712) + * Wed Jun 17 2015 Fedora Release Engineering - 17.4-3 - Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_23_Mass_Rebuild diff --git a/otp-0010-ssl-Reenable-padding-check-for-TLS-1.0-and-provide-b.patch b/otp-0010-ssl-Reenable-padding-check-for-TLS-1.0-and-provide-b.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..04dd246 --- /dev/null +++ b/otp-0010-ssl-Reenable-padding-check-for-TLS-1.0-and-provide-b.patch @@ -0,0 +1,576 @@ +diff -Naur otp-OTP-17.4.orig/lib/ssl/doc/src/ssl.xml otp-OTP-17.4/lib/ssl/doc/src/ssl.xml +--- otp-OTP-17.4.orig/lib/ssl/doc/src/ssl.xml 2015-08-05 16:52:39.988500514 -0400 ++++ otp-OTP-17.4/lib/ssl/doc/src/ssl.xml 2015-08-05 16:52:50.478441422 -0400 +@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ + +
+ +- 19992014 ++ 19992015 + Ericsson AB. All Rights Reserved. + + +@@ -348,11 +348,23 @@ +

+ + ++ {padding_check, boolean()} ++ ++

This option only affects TLS-1.0 connections. ++ If set to false it disables the block cipher padding check ++ to be able to interoperate with legacy software. ++

++ ++

Using this option makes TLS vulnerable to ++ the Poodle attack

 ++ ++ ++ + +- ++ + +- +-
++ ++
+ SSL OPTION DESCRIPTIONS - CLIENT SIDE + +

Options described here are client specific or has a slightly different +diff -Naur otp-OTP-17.4.orig/lib/ssl/src/dtls_record.erl otp-OTP-17.4/lib/ssl/src/dtls_record.erl +--- otp-OTP-17.4.orig/lib/ssl/src/dtls_record.erl 2015-08-05 16:52:39.989500508 -0400 ++++ otp-OTP-17.4/lib/ssl/src/dtls_record.erl 2015-08-05 16:52:50.478441422 -0400 +@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ + %% + %% %CopyrightBegin% + %% +-%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2013-2014. All Rights Reserved. ++%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2013-2015. All Rights Reserved. + %% + %% The contents of this file are subject to the Erlang Public License, + %% Version 1.1, (the "License"); you may not use this file except in +@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ + = ConnnectionStates0) -> + CompressAlg = SecParams#security_parameters.compression_algorithm, + {PlainFragment, Mac, ReadState1} = ssl_record:decipher(dtls_v1:corresponding_tls_version(Version), +- CipherFragment, ReadState0), ++ CipherFragment, ReadState0, true), + MacHash = calc_mac_hash(ReadState1, Type, Version, Epoch, Seq, PlainFragment), + case ssl_record:is_correct_mac(Mac, MacHash) of + true -> +diff -Naur otp-OTP-17.4.orig/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl otp-OTP-17.4/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl +--- otp-OTP-17.4.orig/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl 2015-08-05 16:52:39.989500508 -0400 ++++ otp-OTP-17.4/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl 2015-08-05 16:52:50.479441417 -0400 +@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ + %% + %% %CopyrightBegin% + %% +-%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2014. All Rights Reserved. ++%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2015. All Rights Reserved. + %% + %% The contents of this file are subject to the Erlang Public License, + %% Version 1.1, (the "License"); you may not use this file except in +@@ -33,8 +33,7 @@ + -include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl"). + + -export([security_parameters/2, security_parameters/3, suite_definition/1, +- decipher/5, cipher/5, +- suite/1, suites/1, all_suites/1, ++ decipher/6, cipher/5, suite/1, suites/1, all_suites/1, + ec_keyed_suites/0, anonymous_suites/0, psk_suites/1, srp_suites/0, + openssl_suite/1, openssl_suite_name/1, filter/2, filter_suites/1, + hash_algorithm/1, sign_algorithm/1, is_acceptable_hash/2]). +@@ -143,17 +142,18 @@ + {T, CS0#cipher_state{iv=NextIV}}. + + %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +--spec decipher(cipher_enum(), integer(), #cipher_state{}, binary(), ssl_record:ssl_version()) -> ++-spec decipher(cipher_enum(), integer(), #cipher_state{}, binary(), ++ ssl_record:ssl_version(), boolean()) -> + {binary(), binary(), #cipher_state{}} | #alert{}. + %% + %% Description: Decrypts the data and the MAC using cipher described + %% by cipher_enum() and updating the cipher state. + %%------------------------------------------------------------------- +-decipher(?NULL, _HashSz, CipherState, Fragment, _) -> ++decipher(?NULL, _HashSz, CipherState, Fragment, _, _) -> + {Fragment, <<>>, CipherState}; +-decipher(?RC4, HashSz, CipherState, Fragment, _) -> ++decipher(?RC4, HashSz, CipherState, Fragment, _, _) -> + State0 = case CipherState#cipher_state.state of +- undefined -> crypto:stream_init(rc4, CipherState#cipher_state.key); ++ undefined -> crypto:stream_init(rc4, CipherState#cipher_state.key); + S -> S + end, + try crypto:stream_decrypt(State0, Fragment) of +@@ -171,23 +171,23 @@ + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_RECORD_MAC) + end; + +-decipher(?DES, HashSz, CipherState, Fragment, Version) -> ++decipher(?DES, HashSz, CipherState, Fragment, Version, PaddingCheck) -> + block_decipher(fun(Key, IV, T) -> + crypto:block_decrypt(des_cbc, Key, IV, T) +- end, CipherState, HashSz, Fragment, Version); +-decipher(?'3DES', HashSz, CipherState, Fragment, Version) -> ++ end, CipherState, HashSz, Fragment, Version, PaddingCheck); ++decipher(?'3DES', HashSz, CipherState, Fragment, Version, PaddingCheck) -> + block_decipher(fun(<>, IV, T) -> + crypto:block_decrypt(des3_cbc, [K1, K2, K3], IV, T) +- end, CipherState, HashSz, Fragment, Version); +-decipher(?AES, HashSz, CipherState, Fragment, Version) -> ++ end, CipherState, HashSz, Fragment, Version, PaddingCheck); ++decipher(?AES, HashSz, CipherState, Fragment, Version, PaddingCheck) -> + block_decipher(fun(Key, IV, T) when byte_size(Key) =:= 16 -> + crypto:block_decrypt(aes_cbc128, Key, IV, T); + (Key, IV, T) when byte_size(Key) =:= 32 -> + crypto:block_decrypt(aes_cbc256, Key, IV, T) +- end, CipherState, HashSz, Fragment, Version). ++ end, CipherState, HashSz, Fragment, Version, PaddingCheck). + + block_decipher(Fun, #cipher_state{key=Key, iv=IV} = CipherState0, +- HashSz, Fragment, Version) -> ++ HashSz, Fragment, Version, PaddingCheck) -> + try + Text = Fun(Key, IV, Fragment), + NextIV = next_iv(Fragment, IV), +@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ + Content = GBC#generic_block_cipher.content, + Mac = GBC#generic_block_cipher.mac, + CipherState1 = CipherState0#cipher_state{iv=GBC#generic_block_cipher.next_iv}, +- case is_correct_padding(GBC, Version) of ++ case is_correct_padding(GBC, Version, PaddingCheck) of + true -> + {Content, Mac, CipherState1}; + false -> +@@ -1288,16 +1288,18 @@ + #generic_stream_cipher{content=Content, + mac=Mac}. + +-%% For interoperability reasons we do not check the padding content in +-%% SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0 as it is not strictly required and breaks +-%% interopability with for instance Google. + is_correct_padding(#generic_block_cipher{padding_length = Len, +- padding = Padding}, {3, N}) +- when N == 0; N == 1 -> +- Len == byte_size(Padding); +-%% Padding must be check in TLS 1.1 and after ++ padding = Padding}, {3, 0}, _) -> ++ Len == byte_size(Padding); %% Only length check is done in SSL 3.0 spec ++%% For interoperability reasons it is possible to disable ++%% the padding check when using TLS 1.0, as it is not strictly required ++%% in the spec (only recommended), howerver this makes TLS 1.0 vunrable to the Poodle attack ++%% so by default this clause will not match ++is_correct_padding(GenBlockCipher, {3, 1}, false) -> ++ is_correct_padding(GenBlockCipher, {3, 0}, false); ++%% Padding must be checked in TLS 1.1 and after + is_correct_padding(#generic_block_cipher{padding_length = Len, +- padding = Padding}, _) -> ++ padding = Padding}, _, _) -> + Len == byte_size(Padding) andalso + list_to_binary(lists:duplicate(Len, Len)) == Padding. + +diff -Naur otp-OTP-17.4.orig/lib/ssl/src/ssl.erl otp-OTP-17.4/lib/ssl/src/ssl.erl +--- otp-OTP-17.4.orig/lib/ssl/src/ssl.erl 2015-08-05 16:52:39.989500508 -0400 ++++ otp-OTP-17.4/lib/ssl/src/ssl.erl 2015-08-05 16:52:50.479441417 -0400 +@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ + %% + %% %CopyrightBegin% + %% +-%% Copyright Ericsson AB 1999-2014. All Rights Reserved. ++%% Copyright Ericsson AB 1999-2015. All Rights Reserved. + %% + %% The contents of this file are subject to the Erlang Public License, + %% Version 1.1, (the "License"); you may not use this file except in +@@ -656,7 +656,8 @@ + log_alert = handle_option(log_alert, Opts, true), + server_name_indication = handle_option(server_name_indication, Opts, undefined), + honor_cipher_order = handle_option(honor_cipher_order, Opts, false), +- protocol = proplists:get_value(protocol, Opts, tls) ++ protocol = proplists:get_value(protocol, Opts, tls), ++ padding_check = proplists:get_value(padding_check, Opts, true) + }, + + CbInfo = proplists:get_value(cb_info, Opts, {gen_tcp, tcp, tcp_closed, tcp_error}), +@@ -669,7 +670,7 @@ + cb_info, renegotiate_at, secure_renegotiate, hibernate_after, + erl_dist, next_protocols_advertised, + client_preferred_next_protocols, log_alert, +- server_name_indication, honor_cipher_order], ++ server_name_indication, honor_cipher_order, padding_check], + + SockOpts = lists:foldl(fun(Key, PropList) -> + proplists:delete(Key, PropList) +@@ -847,6 +848,8 @@ + undefined; + validate_option(honor_cipher_order, Value) when is_boolean(Value) -> + Value; ++validate_option(padding_check, Value) when is_boolean(Value) -> ++ Value; + validate_option(Opt, Value) -> + throw({error, {options, {Opt, Value}}}). + +diff -Naur otp-OTP-17.4.orig/lib/ssl/src/ssl_internal.hrl otp-OTP-17.4/lib/ssl/src/ssl_internal.hrl +--- otp-OTP-17.4.orig/lib/ssl/src/ssl_internal.hrl 2015-08-05 16:52:39.990500503 -0400 ++++ otp-OTP-17.4/lib/ssl/src/ssl_internal.hrl 2015-08-05 16:52:50.479441417 -0400 +@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ + %% + %% %CopyrightBegin% + %% +-%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2014. All Rights Reserved. ++%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2015. All Rights Reserved. + %% + %% The contents of this file are subject to the Erlang Public License, + %% Version 1.1, (the "License"); you may not use this file except in +@@ -117,7 +117,8 @@ + server_name_indication = undefined, + %% Should the server prefer its own cipher order over the one provided by + %% the client? +- honor_cipher_order = false ++ honor_cipher_order = false, ++ padding_check = true + }). + + -record(socket_options, +diff -Naur otp-OTP-17.4.orig/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.erl otp-OTP-17.4/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.erl +--- otp-OTP-17.4.orig/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.erl 2015-08-05 16:52:39.989500508 -0400 ++++ otp-OTP-17.4/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.erl 2015-08-05 16:52:50.479441417 -0400 +@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ + %% + %% %CopyrightBegin% + %% +-%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2013-2014. All Rights Reserved. ++%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2013-2015. All Rights Reserved. + %% + %% The contents of this file are subject to the Erlang Public License, + %% Version 1.1, (the "License"); you may not use this file except in +@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ + -export([compress/3, uncompress/3, compressions/0]). + + %% Payload encryption/decryption +--export([cipher/4, decipher/3, is_correct_mac/2]). ++-export([cipher/4, decipher/4, is_correct_mac/2]). + + -export_type([ssl_version/0, ssl_atom_version/0]). + +@@ -376,8 +376,9 @@ + {CipherFragment, CipherS1} = + ssl_cipher:cipher(BulkCipherAlgo, CipherS0, MacHash, Fragment, Version), + {CipherFragment, WriteState0#connection_state{cipher_state = CipherS1}}. ++ + %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +--spec decipher(ssl_version(), binary(), #connection_state{}) -> {binary(), binary(), #connection_state{}} | #alert{}. ++-spec decipher(ssl_version(), binary(), #connection_state{}, boolean()) -> {binary(), binary(), #connection_state{}} | #alert{}. + %% + %% Description: Payload decryption + %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +@@ -387,8 +388,8 @@ + BulkCipherAlgo, + hash_size = HashSz}, + cipher_state = CipherS0 +- } = ReadState) -> +- case ssl_cipher:decipher(BulkCipherAlgo, HashSz, CipherS0, CipherFragment, Version) of ++ } = ReadState, PaddingCheck) -> ++ case ssl_cipher:decipher(BulkCipherAlgo, HashSz, CipherS0, CipherFragment, Version, PaddingCheck) of + {PlainFragment, Mac, CipherS1} -> + CS1 = ReadState#connection_state{cipher_state = CipherS1}, + {PlainFragment, Mac, CS1}; +diff -Naur otp-OTP-17.4.orig/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl otp-OTP-17.4/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl +--- otp-OTP-17.4.orig/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl 2015-08-05 16:52:39.990500503 -0400 ++++ otp-OTP-17.4/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl 2015-08-05 16:52:50.479441417 -0400 +@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ + %% + %% %CopyrightBegin% + %% +-%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2014. All Rights Reserved. ++%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2015. All Rights Reserved. + %% + %% The contents of this file are subject to the Erlang Public License, + %% Version 1.1, (the "License"); you may not use this file except in +@@ -482,8 +482,9 @@ + next_record(#state{protocol_buffers = + #protocol_buffers{tls_packets = [], tls_cipher_texts = [CT | Rest]} + = Buffers, +- connection_states = ConnStates0} = State) -> +- case tls_record:decode_cipher_text(CT, ConnStates0) of ++ connection_states = ConnStates0, ++ ssl_options = #ssl_options{padding_check = Check}} = State) -> ++ case tls_record:decode_cipher_text(CT, ConnStates0, Check) of + {Plain, ConnStates} -> + {Plain, State#state{protocol_buffers = + Buffers#protocol_buffers{tls_cipher_texts = Rest}, +diff -Naur otp-OTP-17.4.orig/lib/ssl/src/tls_record.erl otp-OTP-17.4/lib/ssl/src/tls_record.erl +--- otp-OTP-17.4.orig/lib/ssl/src/tls_record.erl 2015-08-05 16:52:39.990500503 -0400 ++++ otp-OTP-17.4/lib/ssl/src/tls_record.erl 2015-08-05 16:52:50.480441411 -0400 +@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ + %% + %% %CopyrightBegin% + %% +-%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2014. All Rights Reserved. ++%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2015. All Rights Reserved. + %% + %% The contents of this file are subject to the Erlang Public License, + %% Version 1.1, (the "License"); you may not use this file except in +@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ + -export([get_tls_records/2]). + + %% Decoding +--export([decode_cipher_text/2]). ++-export([decode_cipher_text/3]). + + %% Encoding + -export([encode_plain_text/4]). +@@ -142,19 +142,21 @@ + {CipherText, ConnectionStates#connection_states{current_write = WriteState#connection_state{sequence_number = Seq +1}}}. + + %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +--spec decode_cipher_text(#ssl_tls{}, #connection_states{}) -> ++-spec decode_cipher_text(#ssl_tls{}, #connection_states{}, boolean()) -> + {#ssl_tls{}, #connection_states{}}| #alert{}. + %% + %% Description: Decode cipher text + %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- + decode_cipher_text(#ssl_tls{type = Type, version = Version, +- fragment = CipherFragment} = CipherText, ConnnectionStates0) -> +- ReadState0 = ConnnectionStates0#connection_states.current_read, +- #connection_state{compression_state = CompressionS0, +- sequence_number = Seq, +- security_parameters = SecParams} = ReadState0, +- CompressAlg = SecParams#security_parameters.compression_algorithm, +- case ssl_record:decipher(Version, CipherFragment, ReadState0) of ++ fragment = CipherFragment} = CipherText, ++ #connection_states{current_read = ++ #connection_state{ ++ compression_state = CompressionS0, ++ sequence_number = Seq, ++ security_parameters= ++ #security_parameters{compression_algorithm = CompressAlg} ++ } = ReadState0} = ConnnectionStates0, PaddingCheck) -> ++ case ssl_record:decipher(Version, CipherFragment, ReadState0, PaddingCheck) of + {PlainFragment, Mac, ReadState1} -> + MacHash = calc_mac_hash(Type, Version, PlainFragment, ReadState1), + case ssl_record:is_correct_mac(Mac, MacHash) of +diff -Naur otp-OTP-17.4.orig/lib/ssl/test/ssl_cipher_SUITE.erl otp-OTP-17.4/lib/ssl/test/ssl_cipher_SUITE.erl +--- otp-OTP-17.4.orig/lib/ssl/test/ssl_cipher_SUITE.erl 2015-08-05 16:52:39.990500503 -0400 ++++ otp-OTP-17.4/lib/ssl/test/ssl_cipher_SUITE.erl 2015-08-05 16:52:50.480441411 -0400 +@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ + %% + %% %CopyrightBegin% + %% +-%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2008-2013. All Rights Reserved. ++%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2008-2015. All Rights Reserved. + %% + %% The contents of this file are subject to the Erlang Public License, + %% Version 1.1, (the "License"); you may not use this file except in +@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ + suite() -> [{ct_hooks,[ts_install_cth]}]. + + all() -> +- [aes_decipher_good, aes_decipher_good_tls11, aes_decipher_fail, aes_decipher_fail_tls11]. ++ [aes_decipher_good, aes_decipher_fail, padding_test]. + + groups() -> + []. +@@ -73,93 +73,123 @@ + %% Test Cases -------------------------------------------------------- + %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- + aes_decipher_good() -> +- [{doc,"Decipher a known cryptotext."}]. ++ [{doc,"Decipher a known cryptotext using a correct key"}]. + + aes_decipher_good(Config) when is_list(Config) -> + HashSz = 32, +- CipherState = #cipher_state{iv = <<59,201,85,117,188,206,224,136,5,109,46,70,104,79,4,9>>, +- key = <<72,196,247,97,62,213,222,109,210,204,217,186,172,184,197,148>>}, +- Fragment = <<220,193,179,139,171,33,143,245,202,47,123,251,13,232,114,8, +- 190,162,74,31,186,227,119,155,94,74,119,79,169,193,240,160, +- 198,181,81,19,98,162,213,228,74,224,253,168,156,59,195,122, +- 108,101,107,242,20,15,169,150,163,107,101,94,93,104,241,165>>, +- Content = <<183,139,16,132,10,209,67,86,168,100,61,217,145,57,36,56, "HELLO\n">>, +- Mac = <<71,136,212,107,223,200,70,232,127,116,148,205,232,35,158,113,237,174,15,217,192,168,35,8,6,107,107,233,25,174,90,111>>, +- Version = {3,0}, +- {Content, Mac, _} = ssl_cipher:decipher(?AES, HashSz, CipherState, Fragment, Version), +- Version1 = {3,1}, +- {Content, Mac, _} = ssl_cipher:decipher(?AES, HashSz, CipherState, Fragment, Version1), +- ok. +- +-%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +- +-aes_decipher_good_tls11() -> +- [{doc,"Decipher a known TLS 1.1 cryptotext."}]. +- +-%% the fragment is actuall a TLS 1.1 record, with +-%% Version = TLS 1.1, we get the correct NextIV in #cipher_state +-aes_decipher_good_tls11(Config) when is_list(Config) -> +- HashSz = 32, +- CipherState = #cipher_state{iv = <<59,201,85,117,188,206,224,136,5,109,46,70,104,79,4,9>>, +- key = <<72,196,247,97,62,213,222,109,210,204,217,186,172,184,197,148>>}, +- Fragment = <<220,193,179,139,171,33,143,245,202,47,123,251,13,232,114,8, +- 190,162,74,31,186,227,119,155,94,74,119,79,169,193,240,160, +- 198,181,81,19,98,162,213,228,74,224,253,168,156,59,195,122, +- 108,101,107,242,20,15,169,150,163,107,101,94,93,104,241,165>>, +- Content = <<"HELLO\n">>, +- NextIV = <<183,139,16,132,10,209,67,86,168,100,61,217,145,57,36,56>>, +- Mac = <<71,136,212,107,223,200,70,232,127,116,148,205,232,35,158,113,237,174,15,217,192,168,35,8,6,107,107,233,25,174,90,111>>, +- Version = {3,2}, +- {Content, Mac, #cipher_state{iv = NextIV}} = ssl_cipher:decipher(?AES, HashSz, CipherState, Fragment, Version), +- Version1 = {3,2}, +- {Content, Mac, #cipher_state{iv = NextIV}} = ssl_cipher:decipher(?AES, HashSz, CipherState, Fragment, Version1), +- ok. ++ CipherState = correct_cipher_state(), ++ decipher_check_good(HashSz, CipherState, {3,0}), ++ decipher_check_good(HashSz, CipherState, {3,1}), ++ decipher_check_good(HashSz, CipherState, {3,2}), ++ decipher_check_good(HashSz, CipherState, {3,3}). + + %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- + + aes_decipher_fail() -> +- [{doc,"Decipher a known cryptotext."}]. ++ [{doc,"Decipher a known cryptotext using a incorrect key"}]. + +-%% same as above, last byte of key replaced + aes_decipher_fail(Config) when is_list(Config) -> + HashSz = 32, +- CipherState = #cipher_state{iv = <<59,201,85,117,188,206,224,136,5,109,46,70,104,79,4,9>>, +- key = <<72,196,247,97,62,213,222,109,210,204,217,186,172,184,197,254>>}, +- Fragment = <<220,193,179,139,171,33,143,245,202,47,123,251,13,232,114,8, +- 190,162,74,31,186,227,119,155,94,74,119,79,169,193,240,160, +- 198,181,81,19,98,162,213,228,74,224,253,168,156,59,195,122, +- 108,101,107,242,20,15,169,150,163,107,101,94,93,104,241,165>>, +- Version = {3,0}, +- {Content, Mac, _} = ssl_cipher:decipher(?AES, HashSz, CipherState, Fragment, Version), +- 32 = byte_size(Content), +- 32 = byte_size(Mac), +- Version1 = {3,1}, +- {Content1, Mac1, _} = ssl_cipher:decipher(?AES, HashSz, CipherState, Fragment, Version1), +- 32 = byte_size(Content1), +- 32 = byte_size(Mac1), +- ok. + +-%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +- +-aes_decipher_fail_tls11() -> +- [{doc,"Decipher a known TLS 1.1 cryptotext."}]. +- +-%% same as above, last byte of key replaced +-%% stricter padding checks in TLS 1.1 mean we get an alert instead +-aes_decipher_fail_tls11(Config) when is_list(Config) -> +- HashSz = 32, +- CipherState = #cipher_state{iv = <<59,201,85,117,188,206,224,136,5,109,46,70,104,79,4,9>>, +- key = <<72,196,247,97,62,213,222,109,210,204,217,186,172,184,197,254>>}, +- Fragment = <<220,193,179,139,171,33,143,245,202,47,123,251,13,232,114,8, +- 190,162,74,31,186,227,119,155,94,74,119,79,169,193,240,160, +- 198,181,81,19,98,162,213,228,74,224,253,168,156,59,195,122, +- 108,101,107,242,20,15,169,150,163,107,101,94,93,104,241,165>>, +- Version = {3,2}, +- #alert{level = ?FATAL, description = ?BAD_RECORD_MAC} = +- ssl_cipher:decipher(?AES, HashSz, CipherState, Fragment, Version), +- Version1 = {3,3}, +- #alert{level = ?FATAL, description = ?BAD_RECORD_MAC} = +- ssl_cipher:decipher(?AES, HashSz, CipherState, Fragment, Version1), +- ok. +- +-%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- ++ CipherState = incorrect_cipher_state(), ++ decipher_check_fail(HashSz, CipherState, {3,0}), ++ decipher_check_fail(HashSz, CipherState, {3,1}), ++ decipher_check_fail(HashSz, CipherState, {3,2}), ++ decipher_check_fail(HashSz, CipherState, {3,3}). ++ ++%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- ++padding_test(Config) when is_list(Config) -> ++ HashSz = 16, ++ CipherState = correct_cipher_state(), ++ pad_test(HashSz, CipherState, {3,0}), ++ pad_test(HashSz, CipherState, {3,1}), ++ pad_test(HashSz, CipherState, {3,2}), ++ pad_test(HashSz, CipherState, {3,3}). ++ ++%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- ++% Internal functions -------------------------------------------------------- ++%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- ++decipher_check_good(HashSz, CipherState, Version) -> ++ {Content, NextIV, Mac} = content_nextiv_mac(Version), ++ {Content, Mac, #cipher_state{iv = NextIV}} = ++ ssl_cipher:decipher(?AES, HashSz, CipherState, aes_fragment(Version), Version, true). ++ ++decipher_check_fail(HashSz, CipherState, Version) -> ++ {Content, NextIV, Mac} = content_nextiv_mac(Version), ++ true = {Content, Mac, #cipher_state{iv = NextIV}} =/= ++ ssl_cipher:decipher(?AES, HashSz, CipherState, aes_fragment(Version), Version, true). ++ ++pad_test(HashSz, CipherState, {3,0} = Version) -> ++ %% 3.0 does not have padding test ++ {Content, NextIV, Mac} = badpad_content_nextiv_mac(Version), ++ {Content, Mac, #cipher_state{iv = NextIV}} = ++ ssl_cipher:decipher(?AES, HashSz, CipherState, badpad_aes_fragment({3,0}), {3,0}, true), ++ {Content, Mac, #cipher_state{iv = NextIV}} = ++ ssl_cipher:decipher(?AES, HashSz, CipherState, badpad_aes_fragment({3,0}), {3,0}, false); ++pad_test(HashSz, CipherState, {3,1} = Version) -> ++ %% 3.1 should have padding test, but may be disabled ++ {Content, NextIV, Mac} = badpad_content_nextiv_mac(Version), ++ BadCont = badpad_content(Content), ++ {Content, Mac, #cipher_state{iv = NextIV}} = ++ ssl_cipher:decipher(?AES, HashSz, CipherState, badpad_aes_fragment({3,1}) , {3,1}, false), ++ {BadCont, Mac, #cipher_state{iv = NextIV}} = ++ ssl_cipher:decipher(?AES, HashSz, CipherState, badpad_aes_fragment({3,1}), {3,1}, true); ++pad_test(HashSz, CipherState, Version) -> ++ %% 3.2 and 3.3 must have padding test ++ {Content, NextIV, Mac} = badpad_content_nextiv_mac(Version), ++ BadCont = badpad_content(Content), ++ {BadCont, Mac, #cipher_state{iv = NextIV}} = ssl_cipher:decipher(?AES, HashSz, CipherState, ++ badpad_aes_fragment(Version), Version, false), ++ {BadCont, Mac, #cipher_state{iv = NextIV}} = ssl_cipher:decipher(?AES, HashSz, CipherState, ++ badpad_aes_fragment(Version), Version, true). ++ ++aes_fragment({3,N}) when N == 0; N == 1-> ++ <<197,9,6,109,242,87,80,154,85,250,110,81,119,95,65,185,53,206,216,153,246,169, ++ 119,177,178,238,248,174,253,220,242,81,33,0,177,251,91,44,247,53,183,198,165, ++ 63,20,194,159,107>>; ++ ++aes_fragment(_) -> ++ <<220,193,179,139,171,33,143,245,202,47,123,251,13,232,114,8, ++ 190,162,74,31,186,227,119,155,94,74,119,79,169,193,240,160, ++ 198,181,81,19,98,162,213,228,74,224,253,168,156,59,195,122, ++ 108,101,107,242,20,15,169,150,163,107,101,94,93,104,241,165>>. ++ ++badpad_aes_fragment({3,N}) when N == 0; N == 1 -> ++ <<186,139,125,10,118,21,26,248,120,108,193,104,87,118,145,79,225,55,228,10,105, ++ 30,190,37,1,88,139,243,210,99,65,41>>; ++badpad_aes_fragment(_) -> ++ <<137,31,14,77,228,80,76,103,183,125,55,250,68,190,123,131,117,23,229,180,207, ++ 94,121,137,117,157,109,99,113,61,190,138,131,229,201,120,142,179,172,48,77, ++ 234,19,240,33,38,91,93>>. ++ ++content_nextiv_mac({3,N}) when N == 0; N == 1 -> ++ {<<"HELLO\n">>, ++ <<33,0, 177,251, 91,44, 247,53, 183,198, 165,63, 20,194, 159,107>>, ++ <<71,136,212,107,223,200,70,232,127,116,148,205,232,35,158,113,237,174,15,217,192,168,35,8,6,107,107,233,25,174,90,111>>}; ++content_nextiv_mac(_) -> ++ {<<"HELLO\n">>, ++ <<183,139,16,132,10,209,67,86,168,100,61,217,145,57,36,56>>, ++ <<71,136,212,107,223,200,70,232,127,116,148,205,232,35,158,113,237,174,15,217,192,168,35,8,6,107,107,233,25,174,90,111>>}. ++ ++badpad_content_nextiv_mac({3,N}) when N == 0; N == 1 -> ++ {<<"HELLO\n">>, ++ <<225,55,228,10,105,30,190,37,1,88,139,243,210,99,65,41>>, ++ <<183,139,16,132,10,209,67,86,168,100,61,217,145,57,36,56>> ++ }; ++badpad_content_nextiv_mac(_) -> ++ {<<"HELLO\n">>, ++ <<133,211,45,189,179,229,56,86,11,178,239,159,14,160,253,140>>, ++ <<183,139,16,132,10,209,67,86,168,100,61,217,145,57,36,56>> ++ }. ++ ++badpad_content(Content) -> ++ %% BadContent will fail mac test ++ <<16#F0, Content/binary>>. ++ ++correct_cipher_state() -> ++ #cipher_state{iv = <<59,201,85,117,188,206,224,136,5,109,46,70,104,79,4,9>>, ++ key = <<72,196,247,97,62,213,222,109,210,204,217,186,172,184,197,148>>}. ++ ++incorrect_cipher_state() -> ++ #cipher_state{iv = <<59,201,85,117,188,206,224,136,5,109,46,70,104,79,4,9>>, ++ key = <<72,196,247,97,62,213,222,109,210,204,217,186,172,184,197,254>>}.