From 2f0218f91d35c83a2aaecb71849a54b2481390ab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001

From: Firstyear <william@blackhats.net.au>

Date: Fri, 9 Jul 2021 11:53:35 +1000

Subject: [PATCH] Issue 4817 - BUG - locked crypt accounts on import may allow

 all passwords (#4819)

Bug Description: Due to mishanding of short dbpwd hashes, the

crypt_r algorithm was misused and was only comparing salts

in some cases, rather than checking the actual content

of the password.

Fix Description: Stricter checks on dbpwd lengths to ensure

that content passed to crypt_r has at least 2 salt bytes and

1 hash byte, as well as stricter checks on ct_memcmp to ensure

that compared values are the same length, rather than potentially

allowing overruns/short comparisons.

fixes: https://github.com/389ds/389-ds-base/issues/4817

Author: William Brown <william@blackhats.net.au>

Review by: @mreynolds389

---

 .../password/pwd_crypt_asterisk_test.py       | 50 +++++++++++++++++++

 ldap/servers/plugins/pwdstorage/crypt_pwd.c   | 20 +++++---

 2 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

 create mode 100644 dirsrvtests/tests/suites/password/pwd_crypt_asterisk_test.py

diff --git a/dirsrvtests/tests/suites/password/pwd_crypt_asterisk_test.py b/dirsrvtests/tests/suites/password/pwd_crypt_asterisk_test.py

new file mode 100644

index 000000000..d76614db1

--- /dev/null

+++ b/dirsrvtests/tests/suites/password/pwd_crypt_asterisk_test.py

@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@

+# --- BEGIN COPYRIGHT BLOCK ---

+# Copyright (C) 2021 William Brown <william@blackhats.net.au>

+# All rights reserved.

+#

+# License: GPL (version 3 or any later version).

+# See LICENSE for details.

+# --- END COPYRIGHT BLOCK ---

+#

+import ldap

+import pytest

+from lib389.topologies import topology_st

+from lib389.idm.user import UserAccounts

+from lib389._constants import (DEFAULT_SUFFIX, PASSWORD)

+

+pytestmark = pytest.mark.tier1

+

+def test_password_crypt_asterisk_is_rejected(topology_st):

+    """It was reported that {CRYPT}* was allowing all passwords to be

+    valid in the bind process. This checks that we should be rejecting

+    these as they should represent locked accounts. Similar, {CRYPT}!

+

+    :id: 0b8f1a6a-f3eb-4443-985e-da14d0939dc3

+    :setup: Single instance

+    :steps: 1. Set a password hash in with CRYPT and the content *

+            2. Test a bind

+            3. Set a password hash in with CRYPT and the content !

+            4. Test a bind

+    :expectedresults:

+            1. Successfully set the values

+            2. The bind fails

+            3. Successfully set the values

+            4. The bind fails

+    """

+    topology_st.standalone.config.set('nsslapd-allow-hashed-passwords', 'on')

+    topology_st.standalone.config.set('nsslapd-enable-upgrade-hash', 'off')

+

+    users = UserAccounts(topology_st.standalone, DEFAULT_SUFFIX)

+    user = users.create_test_user()

+

+    user.set('userPassword', "{CRYPT}*")

+

+    # Attempt to bind with incorrect password.

+    with pytest.raises(ldap.INVALID_CREDENTIALS):

+        badconn = user.bind('badpassword')

+

+    user.set('userPassword', "{CRYPT}!")

+    # Attempt to bind with incorrect password.

+    with pytest.raises(ldap.INVALID_CREDENTIALS):

+        badconn = user.bind('badpassword')

+

diff --git a/ldap/servers/plugins/pwdstorage/crypt_pwd.c b/ldap/servers/plugins/pwdstorage/crypt_pwd.c

index 9031b2199..1b37d41ed 100644

--- a/ldap/servers/plugins/pwdstorage/crypt_pwd.c

+++ b/ldap/servers/plugins/pwdstorage/crypt_pwd.c

@@ -48,15 +48,23 @@ static unsigned char itoa64[] = /* 0 ... 63 => ascii - 64 */

 int

 crypt_pw_cmp(const char *userpwd, const char *dbpwd)

 {

-    int rc;

-    char *cp;

+    int rc = -1;

+    char *cp = NULL;

+    size_t dbpwd_len = strlen(dbpwd);

     struct crypt_data data;

     data.initialized = 0;

-    /* we use salt (first 2 chars) of encoded password in call to crypt_r() */

-    cp = crypt_r(userpwd, dbpwd, &data);

-    if (cp) {

-        rc = slapi_ct_memcmp(dbpwd, cp, strlen(dbpwd));

+    /*

+     * there MUST be at least 2 chars of salt and some pw bytes, else this is INVALID and will

+     * allow any password to bind as we then only compare SALTS.

+     */

+    if (dbpwd_len >= 3) {

+        /* we use salt (first 2 chars) of encoded password in call to crypt_r() */

+        cp = crypt_r(userpwd, dbpwd, &data);

+    }

+    /* If these are not the same length, we can not proceed safely with memcmp. */

+    if (cp && dbpwd_len == strlen(cp)) {

+        rc = slapi_ct_memcmp(dbpwd, cp, dbpwd_len);

     } else {

         rc = -1;

     }

-- 

2.31.1