From d066c82a5a5c63c50617be27409ae0bb4bd3a356 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001

From: =?UTF-8?q?Zbigniew=20J=C4=99drzejewski-Szmek?= <zbyszek@in.waw.pl>

Date: Sat, 14 Mar 2015 22:35:30 -0400

Subject: [PATCH] cryptsetup-generator: remove warning about crypttab access

 mode

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This file contains no privileged data — just names of devices to decrypt

and files containing keys. On a running system most of this can be inferred from

the device tree anyway.

(cherry picked from commit 71e4e1258436e7e81d772aed52a02bb5d9c87cb8)

---

 src/cryptsetup/cryptsetup-generator.c | 7 -------

 1 file changed, 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/src/cryptsetup/cryptsetup-generator.c b/src/cryptsetup/cryptsetup-generator.c

index dfbca87..d191def 100644

--- a/src/cryptsetup/cryptsetup-generator.c

+++ b/src/cryptsetup/cryptsetup-generator.c

@@ -377,13 +377,6 @@ static int add_crypttab_devices(void) {

                 return 0;

         }

-        /* If we readd support for specifying passphrases

-         * directly in crypttab we should upgrade the warning

-         * below, though possibly only if a passphrase is

-         * specified directly. */

-        if (st.st_mode & 0005)

-                log_debug("/etc/crypttab is world-readable. This is usually not a good idea.");

-

         for (;;) {

                 int r, k;

                 char line[LINE_MAX], *l, *uuid;