From 6009e6b68ea4f8f3c162e1a7bcf4eda1531342a5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: CentOS Sources Date: Apr 23 2020 22:08:00 +0000 Subject: import edk2-20190829git37eef91017ad-9.el8 --- diff --git a/.edk2.metadata b/.edk2.metadata new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c3a24af --- /dev/null +++ b/.edk2.metadata @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +fdcb04021414cdd5a7e286058ca36aca359d323d SOURCES/RedHatSecureBootPkKek1.pem +c7ca6a13a5f9e7fe8071010c26a11ba41548308b SOURCES/edk2-37eef91017ad.tar.xz +cb385fc348395c187db3737e532de787ca2a17c9 SOURCES/openssl-rhel-d6c0e6e28ddc793474a3f9234eed50018f6c94ba.tar.xz diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ccf9027 --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitignore @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +SOURCES/RedHatSecureBootPkKek1.pem +SOURCES/edk2-37eef91017ad.tar.xz +SOURCES/openssl-rhel-d6c0e6e28ddc793474a3f9234eed50018f6c94ba.tar.xz diff --git a/SOURCES/0001-CryptoPkg-OpensslLib-Update-process_files.pl-to-gene.patch b/SOURCES/0001-CryptoPkg-OpensslLib-Update-process_files.pl-to-gene.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f7ece09 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0001-CryptoPkg-OpensslLib-Update-process_files.pl-to-gene.patch @@ -0,0 +1,668 @@ +From ac1a0b44df858e53be9e8af499e80a459f0cef16 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Shenglei Zhang +Date: Tue, 29 Oct 2019 15:43:11 +0000 +Subject: CryptoPkg/OpensslLib: Update process_files.pl to generate .h files + +Notes about the RHEL-8.1/20190308-89910a39dcfd [edk2-stable201903] -> +RHEL-8.2/20190904-37eef91017ad [edk2-stable201908] rebase: + +- New patch (cherry-picked from upstream, to be dropped at the next + downstream rebase). + +- Upstream moved to OpenSSL_1.1.1b (for TianoCore#1089) in release + edk2-stable201905. As part of that OpenSSL update, "OpensslLib.inf" and + "OpensslLibCrypto.inf" failed to list some new header files. + +- As a part of edk2-stable201908, commit 8906f076de35 + ("CryptoPkg/OpensslLib: Add missing header files in INF file", + 2019-08-16) fixed up "OpensslLib.inf" and "OpensslLibCrypto.inf" with + the missing header files, but did so manually. + +- The present patch (which is going to be released in edk2-stable201911) + updates "process_files.pl" to list the subject header files + automatically. + +- This patch is being backported primarily in order to keep further + backports for the modified files conflict-free. It might also come in + handy once we adopt RHEL8's own OpenSSL version (in case we have to + re-run "process_files.pl" ourselves). + +There are missing headers added into INF files at 8906f076de35b222a.. +They are now manually added but not auto-generated. So we update the +perl script to enable this feature. +Meanwhile, update the order of the .h files in INF files, which are +auto-generated now. +https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2085 + +Cc: Jian J Wang +Cc: Xiaoyu Lu +Signed-off-by: Shenglei Zhang +Reviewed-by: Jian J Wang +Reviewed-by: Xiaoyu Lu +(cherry picked from commit 9f4fbd56d43054cc73d722c1643659f9741c0fcf) +Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek +--- + CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/OpensslLib.inf | 103 +++++++++--------- + .../Library/OpensslLib/OpensslLibCrypto.inf | 96 ++++++++-------- + CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/process_files.pl | 28 +++++ + 3 files changed, 129 insertions(+), 98 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/OpensslLib.inf b/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/OpensslLib.inf +index 7432321fd4..dd873a0dcd 100644 +--- a/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/OpensslLib.inf ++++ b/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/OpensslLib.inf +@@ -34,9 +34,7 @@ + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/aes/aes_misc.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/aes/aes_ofb.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/aes/aes_wrap.c +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/aes/aes_locl.h + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/aria/aria.c +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/arm_arch.h + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/asn1/a_bitstr.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/asn1/a_d2i_fp.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/asn1/a_digest.c +@@ -101,21 +99,12 @@ + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/asn1/x_sig.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/asn1/x_spki.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/asn1/x_val.c +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/asn1/standard_methods.h +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/asn1/charmap.h +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/asn1/tbl_standard.h +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/asn1/asn1_item_list.h +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/asn1/asn1_locl.h + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/async/arch/async_null.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/async/arch/async_posix.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/async/arch/async_win.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/async/async.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/async/async_err.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/async/async_wait.c +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/async/arch/async_win.h +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/async/async_locl.h +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/async/arch/async_posix.h +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/async/arch/async_null.h + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/bio/b_addr.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/bio/b_dump.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/bio/b_sock.c +@@ -138,7 +127,6 @@ + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/bio/bss_mem.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/bio/bss_null.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/bio/bss_sock.c +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/bio/bio_lcl.h + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/bn/bn_add.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/bn/bn_asm.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c +@@ -170,9 +158,6 @@ + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/bn/bn_srp.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/bn/bn_word.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/bn/bn_x931p.c +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/bn/rsaz_exp.h +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/bn/bn_prime.h +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/buffer/buf_err.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/buffer/buffer.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/cmac/cm_ameth.c +@@ -181,7 +166,6 @@ + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/comp/c_zlib.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/comp/comp_err.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/comp/comp_lib.c +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/comp/comp_lcl.h + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/conf/conf_api.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/conf/conf_def.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/conf/conf_err.c +@@ -190,8 +174,6 @@ + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/conf/conf_mod.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/conf/conf_sap.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/conf/conf_ssl.c +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/conf/conf_lcl.h +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/conf/conf_def.h + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/cpt_err.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/cryptlib.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/ctype.c +@@ -215,8 +197,6 @@ + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/des/set_key.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/des/str2key.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/des/xcbc_enc.c +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/des/spr.h +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/des/des_locl.h + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/dh/dh_ameth.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/dh/dh_asn1.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/dh/dh_check.c +@@ -231,7 +211,6 @@ + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/dh/dh_prn.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/dh/dh_rfc5114.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/dh/dh_rfc7919.c +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/dh/dh_locl.h + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/dso/dso_dl.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/dso/dso_dlfcn.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/dso/dso_err.c +@@ -239,7 +218,6 @@ + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/dso/dso_openssl.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/dso/dso_vms.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/dso/dso_win32.c +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/dso/dso_locl.h + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/ebcdic.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/err/err.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/err/err_prn.c +@@ -304,13 +282,11 @@ + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/evp/pmeth_fn.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/evp/pmeth_gn.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/evp/evp_locl.h + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/ex_data.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/getenv.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/hmac/hm_ameth.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/hmac/hm_pmeth.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/hmac/hmac.c +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/hmac/hmac_lcl.h + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/init.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/kdf/hkdf.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/kdf/kdf_err.c +@@ -318,13 +294,10 @@ + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/kdf/tls1_prf.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/lhash/lh_stats.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/lhash/lhash.c +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/lhash/lhash_lcl.h + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/md4/md4_dgst.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/md4/md4_one.c +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/md4/md4_locl.h + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/md5/md5_dgst.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/md5/md5_one.c +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/md5/md5_locl.h + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/mem.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/mem_clr.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/mem_dbg.c +@@ -339,7 +312,6 @@ + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/modes/ofb128.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/modes/wrap128.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/modes/xts128.c +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/modes/modes_lcl.h + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/o_dir.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/o_fips.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/o_fopen.c +@@ -351,9 +323,6 @@ + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/objects/obj_err.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/objects/obj_lib.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/objects/obj_xref.c +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/objects/obj_dat.h +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/objects/obj_xref.h +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/objects/obj_lcl.h + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_asn.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_cl.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_err.c +@@ -364,7 +333,6 @@ + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_srv.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/ocsp/v3_ocsp.c +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_lcl.h + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/pem/pem_all.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/pem/pem_err.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/pem/pem_info.c +@@ -392,7 +360,6 @@ + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/pkcs12/p12_sbag.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/pkcs12/p12_utl.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/pkcs12/pk12err.c +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/pkcs12/p12_lcl.h + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/pkcs7/bio_pk7.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_asn1.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_attr.c +@@ -401,7 +368,6 @@ + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_mime.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_smime.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/pkcs7/pkcs7err.c +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/ppc_arch.h + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/rand/drbg_ctr.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/rand/rand_egd.c +@@ -410,10 +376,8 @@ + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/rand/rand_vms.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/rand/rand_win.c +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/rc4/rc4_enc.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/rc4/rc4_skey.c +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/rc4/rc4_locl.h + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/rsa/rsa_asn1.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/rsa/rsa_chk.c +@@ -436,24 +400,18 @@ + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/rsa/rsa_x931.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/rsa/rsa_x931g.c +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/rsa/rsa_locl.h +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/s390x_arch.h + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/sha/keccak1600.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/sha/sha1_one.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/sha/sha1dgst.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/sha/sha256.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/sha/sha512.c +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/sha/sha_locl.h + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/siphash/siphash.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/siphash/siphash_ameth.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/siphash/siphash_pmeth.c +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/siphash/siphash_local.h + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/sm3/m_sm3.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/sm3/sm3.c +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/sm3/sm3_locl.h + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/sm4/sm4.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/stack/stack.c +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/sparc_arch.h + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/threads_none.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/threads_pthread.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/threads_win.c +@@ -463,8 +421,6 @@ + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/ui/ui_null.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/ui/ui_util.c +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/ui/ui_locl.h +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/vms_rms.h + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/uid.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/x509/by_dir.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/x509/by_file.c +@@ -502,7 +458,6 @@ + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/x509/x_req.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/x509/x_x509.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/x509/x_x509a.c +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/x509/x509_lcl.h + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/x509v3/pcy_cache.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/x509v3/pcy_data.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/x509v3/pcy_lib.c +@@ -540,11 +495,57 @@ + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/x509v3/v3_tlsf.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/x509v3/v3_utl.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/x509v3/v3err.c ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/hmac/hmac_lcl.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/dh/dh_locl.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/bio/bio_lcl.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/conf/conf_def.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/conf/conf_lcl.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/lhash/lhash_lcl.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/sha/sha_locl.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/md5/md5_locl.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/store/store_locl.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/dso/dso_locl.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/pkcs12/p12_lcl.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/arm_arch.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/mips_arch.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/ppc_arch.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/s390x_arch.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/sparc_arch.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/vms_rms.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/bn/bn_prime.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/bn/rsaz_exp.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/ui/ui_locl.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/md4/md4_locl.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/rc4/rc4_locl.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/asn1/asn1_item_list.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/asn1/asn1_locl.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/asn1/charmap.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/asn1/standard_methods.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/asn1/tbl_standard.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/evp/evp_locl.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_lcl.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/modes/modes_lcl.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/comp/comp_lcl.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/rsa/rsa_locl.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/x509/x509_lcl.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/async/arch/async_null.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/async/arch/async_posix.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/async/arch/async_win.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/sm3/sm3_locl.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/des/des_locl.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/des/spr.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/siphash/siphash_local.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/aes/aes_locl.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/async/async_locl.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/x509v3/ext_dat.h + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/x509v3/pcy_int.h +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/x509v3/v3_admis.h + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/x509v3/standard_exts.h +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/x509v3/ext_dat.h +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/ms/uplink.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/x509v3/v3_admis.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/objects/obj_dat.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/objects/obj_lcl.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/objects/obj_xref.h + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/ssl/bio_ssl.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/ssl/d1_lib.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/ssl/d1_msg.c +@@ -589,13 +590,13 @@ + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/ssl/t1_trce.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/ssl/tls13_enc.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/ssl/tls_srp.c +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/ssl/record/record_locl.h + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/ssl/statem/statem.h + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/ssl/statem/statem_locl.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/ssl/packet_locl.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/ssl/ssl_cert_table.h + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/ssl/ssl_locl.h + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/ssl/record/record.h +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/ssl/ssl_cert_table.h +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/ssl/packet_locl.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/ssl/record/record_locl.h + # Autogenerated files list ends here + + ossl_store.c +diff --git a/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/OpensslLibCrypto.inf b/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/OpensslLibCrypto.inf +index 8134b45eda..a1bb560255 100644 +--- a/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/OpensslLibCrypto.inf ++++ b/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/OpensslLibCrypto.inf +@@ -33,9 +33,7 @@ + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/aes/aes_misc.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/aes/aes_ofb.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/aes/aes_wrap.c +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/aes/aes_locl.h + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/aria/aria.c +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/arm_arch.h + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/asn1/a_bitstr.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/asn1/a_d2i_fp.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/asn1/a_digest.c +@@ -100,21 +98,12 @@ + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/asn1/x_sig.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/asn1/x_spki.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/asn1/x_val.c +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/asn1/standard_methods.h +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/asn1/charmap.h +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/asn1/tbl_standard.h +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/asn1/asn1_item_list.h +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/asn1/asn1_locl.h + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/async/arch/async_null.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/async/arch/async_posix.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/async/arch/async_win.c +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/async/arch/async_posix.h +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/async/arch/async_null.h +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/async/arch/async_win.h + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/async/async.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/async/async_err.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/async/async_wait.c +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/async/async_locl.h + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/bio/b_addr.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/bio/b_dump.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/bio/b_sock.c +@@ -137,7 +126,6 @@ + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/bio/bss_mem.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/bio/bss_null.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/bio/bss_sock.c +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/bio/bio_lcl.h + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/bn/bn_add.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/bn/bn_asm.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c +@@ -169,9 +157,6 @@ + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/bn/bn_srp.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/bn/bn_word.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/bn/bn_x931p.c +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/bn/rsaz_exp.h +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/bn/bn_prime.h +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/buffer/buf_err.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/buffer/buffer.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/cmac/cm_ameth.c +@@ -180,7 +165,6 @@ + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/comp/c_zlib.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/comp/comp_err.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/comp/comp_lib.c +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/comp/comp_lcl.h + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/conf/conf_api.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/conf/conf_def.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/conf/conf_err.c +@@ -189,8 +173,6 @@ + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/conf/conf_mod.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/conf/conf_sap.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/conf/conf_ssl.c +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/conf/conf_lcl.h +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/conf/conf_def.h + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/cpt_err.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/cryptlib.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/ctype.c +@@ -214,8 +196,6 @@ + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/des/set_key.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/des/str2key.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/des/xcbc_enc.c +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/des/spr.h +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/des/des_locl.h + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/dh/dh_ameth.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/dh/dh_asn1.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/dh/dh_check.c +@@ -230,7 +210,6 @@ + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/dh/dh_prn.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/dh/dh_rfc5114.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/dh/dh_rfc7919.c +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/dh/dh_locl.h + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/dso/dso_dl.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/dso/dso_dlfcn.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/dso/dso_err.c +@@ -238,7 +217,6 @@ + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/dso/dso_openssl.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/dso/dso_vms.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/dso/dso_win32.c +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/dso/dso_locl.h + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/ebcdic.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/err/err.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/err/err_prn.c +@@ -280,7 +258,6 @@ + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/evp/evp_pkey.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/evp/m_md2.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/evp/m_md4.c +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/md4/md4_locl.h + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/evp/m_md5.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/evp/m_md5_sha1.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/evp/m_mdc2.c +@@ -304,13 +281,11 @@ + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/evp/pmeth_fn.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/evp/pmeth_gn.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/evp/evp_locl.h + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/ex_data.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/getenv.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/hmac/hm_ameth.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/hmac/hm_pmeth.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/hmac/hmac.c +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/hmac/hmac_lcl.h + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/init.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/kdf/hkdf.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/kdf/kdf_err.c +@@ -318,12 +293,10 @@ + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/kdf/tls1_prf.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/lhash/lh_stats.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/lhash/lhash.c +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/lhash/lhash_lcl.h + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/md4/md4_dgst.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/md4/md4_one.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/md5/md5_dgst.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/md5/md5_one.c +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/md5/md5_locl.h + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/mem.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/mem_clr.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/mem_dbg.c +@@ -338,7 +311,6 @@ + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/modes/ofb128.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/modes/wrap128.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/modes/xts128.c +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/modes/modes_lcl.h + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/o_dir.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/o_fips.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/o_fopen.c +@@ -350,9 +322,6 @@ + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/objects/obj_err.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/objects/obj_lib.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/objects/obj_xref.c +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/objects/obj_dat.h +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/objects/obj_xref.h +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/objects/obj_lcl.h + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_asn.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_cl.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_err.c +@@ -363,7 +332,6 @@ + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_srv.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/ocsp/v3_ocsp.c +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_lcl.h + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/pem/pem_all.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/pem/pem_err.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/pem/pem_info.c +@@ -399,8 +367,6 @@ + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_mime.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_smime.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/pkcs7/pkcs7err.c +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/pkcs12/p12_lcl.h +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/ppc_arch.h + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/rand/drbg_ctr.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/rand/rand_egd.c +@@ -409,10 +375,8 @@ + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/rand/rand_vms.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/rand/rand_win.c +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/rc4/rc4_enc.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/rc4/rc4_skey.c +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/rc4/rc4_locl.h + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/rsa/rsa_asn1.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/rsa/rsa_chk.c +@@ -435,24 +399,18 @@ + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/rsa/rsa_x931.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/rsa/rsa_x931g.c +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/rsa/rsa_locl.h + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/sha/keccak1600.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/sha/sha1_one.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/sha/sha1dgst.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/sha/sha256.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/sha/sha512.c +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/sha/sha_locl.h + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/siphash/siphash.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/siphash/siphash_ameth.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/siphash/siphash_pmeth.c +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/siphash/siphash_local.h + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/sm3/m_sm3.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/sm3/sm3.c +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/sm3/sm3_locl.h + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/sm4/sm4.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/stack/stack.c +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/s390x_arch.h +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/sparc_arch.h + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/threads_none.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/threads_pthread.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/threads_win.c +@@ -462,9 +420,7 @@ + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/ui/ui_null.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/ui/ui_util.c +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/ui/ui_locl.h + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/uid.c +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/vms_rms.h + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/x509/by_dir.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/x509/by_file.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/x509/t_crl.c +@@ -501,7 +457,6 @@ + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/x509/x_req.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/x509/x_x509.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/x509/x_x509a.c +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/x509/x509_lcl.h + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/x509v3/pcy_cache.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/x509v3/pcy_data.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/x509v3/pcy_lib.c +@@ -539,10 +494,57 @@ + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/x509v3/v3_tlsf.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/x509v3/v3_utl.c + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/x509v3/v3err.c ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/hmac/hmac_lcl.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/dh/dh_locl.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/bio/bio_lcl.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/conf/conf_def.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/conf/conf_lcl.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/lhash/lhash_lcl.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/sha/sha_locl.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/md5/md5_locl.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/store/store_locl.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/dso/dso_locl.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/pkcs12/p12_lcl.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/arm_arch.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/mips_arch.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/ppc_arch.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/s390x_arch.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/sparc_arch.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/vms_rms.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/bn/bn_prime.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/bn/rsaz_exp.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/ui/ui_locl.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/md4/md4_locl.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/rc4/rc4_locl.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/asn1/asn1_item_list.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/asn1/asn1_locl.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/asn1/charmap.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/asn1/standard_methods.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/asn1/tbl_standard.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/evp/evp_locl.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_lcl.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/modes/modes_lcl.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/comp/comp_lcl.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/rsa/rsa_locl.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/x509/x509_lcl.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/async/arch/async_null.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/async/arch/async_posix.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/async/arch/async_win.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/sm3/sm3_locl.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/des/des_locl.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/des/spr.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/siphash/siphash_local.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/aes/aes_locl.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/async/async_locl.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/x509v3/ext_dat.h + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/x509v3/pcy_int.h +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/x509v3/v3_admis.h + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/x509v3/standard_exts.h +- $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/x509v3/ext_dat.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/x509v3/v3_admis.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/objects/obj_dat.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/objects/obj_lcl.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/objects/obj_xref.h + # Autogenerated files list ends here + buildinf.h + rand_pool_noise.h +diff --git a/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/process_files.pl b/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/process_files.pl +index e13c0acb4d..4fe54cd808 100755 +--- a/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/process_files.pl ++++ b/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/process_files.pl +@@ -144,6 +144,34 @@ foreach my $product ((@{$unified_info{libraries}}, + } + } + ++ ++# ++# Update the perl script to generate the missing header files ++# ++my @dir_list = (); ++for (keys %{$unified_info{dirinfo}}){ ++ push @dir_list,$_; ++} ++ ++my $dir = getcwd(); ++my @files = (); ++my @headers = (); ++chdir ("openssl"); ++foreach(@dir_list){ ++ @files = glob($_."/*.h"); ++ push @headers, @files; ++} ++chdir ($dir); ++ ++foreach (@headers){ ++ if(/ssl/){ ++ push @sslfilelist, ' $(OPENSSL_PATH)/' . $_ . "\r\n"; ++ next; ++ } ++ push @cryptofilelist, ' $(OPENSSL_PATH)/' . $_ . "\r\n"; ++} ++ ++ + # + # Update OpensslLib.inf with autogenerated file list + # +-- +2.18.1 + diff --git a/SOURCES/0002-CryptoPkg-Upgrade-OpenSSL-to-1.1.1d.patch b/SOURCES/0002-CryptoPkg-Upgrade-OpenSSL-to-1.1.1d.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3838c15 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0002-CryptoPkg-Upgrade-OpenSSL-to-1.1.1d.patch @@ -0,0 +1,159 @@ +From bbda3f776bfcdbcb77b82f1f7fd5dafd798d9784 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Shenglei Zhang +Date: Mon, 21 Oct 2019 15:53:42 +0800 +Subject: CryptoPkg: Upgrade OpenSSL to 1.1.1d + +Notes about the RHEL-8.1/20190308-89910a39dcfd [edk2-stable201903] -> +RHEL-8.2/20190904-37eef91017ad [edk2-stable201908] rebase: + +- New patch (cherry-picked from upstream, to be dropped at the next + downstream rebase). + +- Upstream OpenSSL-1.1.1c contains commit 5fba3afad017 ("Rework DSO API + conditions and configuration option", 2019-04-10). This upstream OpenSSL + change requires edk2 to #define DSO_NONE explicitly. + +- The present patch (which is going to be released in edk2-stable201911) + updates "process_files.pl" to generate "dso_conf.h" with the above + macro, and captures the result (i.e. the actual definition of the macro) + in the git tree. + +- This patch is being backported primarily for the DSO_NONE macro (OpenSSL + in RHEL-8.2.0 is based on OpenSSL-1.1.1c). The patch could also come in + handy in case we have to re-run "process_files.pl" ourselves. + +Upgrade openssl from 1.1.1b to 1.1.1d. +Something needs to be noticed is that, there is a bug existing in the +released 1_1_1d version(894da2fb7ed5d314ee5c2fc9fd2d9b8b74111596), +which causes build failure. So we switch the code base to a usable +version, which is 2 commits later than the stable tag. +Now we use the version c3656cc594daac8167721dde7220f0e59ae146fc. +This log is to fix the build failure. +https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2226 + +Besides, the absense of "DSO_NONE" in dso_conf.h causes build failure +in OvmfPkg. So update process_files.pl to generate information from +"crypto/include/internal/dso_conf.h.in". + +shm.h and utsname.h are added to avoid GCC build failure. + +Cc: Jian J Wang +Cc: Xiaoyu Lu +Cc: Liming Gao +Signed-off-by: Shenglei Zhang +Reviewed-by: Jian J Wang +Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek +Tested-by: Laszlo Ersek +(cherry picked from commit 1bcc65b9a1408cf445b7b3f9499b27d9c235db71) +Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek +--- + CryptoPkg/Library/Include/internal/dso_conf.h | 16 ++++++++++++++++ + CryptoPkg/Library/Include/sys/shm.h | 9 +++++++++ + CryptoPkg/Library/Include/sys/utsname.h | 9 +++++++++ + CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl | 2 +- + CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/process_files.pl | 17 +++++++++++++++-- + 5 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + create mode 100644 CryptoPkg/Library/Include/sys/shm.h + create mode 100644 CryptoPkg/Library/Include/sys/utsname.h + +diff --git a/CryptoPkg/Library/Include/internal/dso_conf.h b/CryptoPkg/Library/Include/internal/dso_conf.h +index e69de29bb2..43c891588b 100644 +--- a/CryptoPkg/Library/Include/internal/dso_conf.h ++++ b/CryptoPkg/Library/Include/internal/dso_conf.h +@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ ++/* WARNING: do not edit! */ ++/* Generated from crypto/include/internal/dso_conf.h.in */ ++/* ++ * Copyright 2016-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. ++ * ++ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use ++ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy ++ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at ++ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html ++ */ ++ ++#ifndef HEADER_DSO_CONF_H ++# define HEADER_DSO_CONF_H ++# define DSO_NONE ++# define DSO_EXTENSION ".so" ++#endif +diff --git a/CryptoPkg/Library/Include/sys/shm.h b/CryptoPkg/Library/Include/sys/shm.h +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000..dc0b8e81c8 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/CryptoPkg/Library/Include/sys/shm.h +@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ ++/** @file ++ Include file to support building the third-party cryptographic library. ++ ++Copyright (c) 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
++SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent ++ ++**/ ++ ++#include +diff --git a/CryptoPkg/Library/Include/sys/utsname.h b/CryptoPkg/Library/Include/sys/utsname.h +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000..dc0b8e81c8 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/CryptoPkg/Library/Include/sys/utsname.h +@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ ++/** @file ++ Include file to support building the third-party cryptographic library. ++ ++Copyright (c) 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
++SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent ++ ++**/ ++ ++#include +diff --git a/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/process_files.pl b/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/process_files.pl +index 4fe54cd808..bbcfa0d0e7 100755 +--- a/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/process_files.pl ++++ b/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/process_files.pl +@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ + # + # This script runs the OpenSSL Configure script, then processes the + # resulting file list into our local OpensslLib[Crypto].inf and also +-# takes a copy of opensslconf.h. ++# takes copies of opensslconf.h and dso_conf.h. + # + # This only needs to be done once by a developer when updating to a + # new version of OpenSSL (or changing options, etc.). Normal users +@@ -106,6 +106,14 @@ BEGIN { + ) == 0 || + die "Failed to generate opensslconf.h!\n"; + ++ # Generate dso_conf.h per config data ++ system( ++ "perl -I. -Mconfigdata util/dofile.pl " . ++ "crypto/include/internal/dso_conf.h.in " . ++ "> include/internal/dso_conf.h" ++ ) == 0 || ++ die "Failed to generate dso_conf.h!\n"; ++ + chdir($basedir) || + die "Cannot change to base directory \"" . $basedir . "\""; + +@@ -249,12 +257,17 @@ rename( $new_inf_file, $inf_file ) || + print "Done!"; + + # +-# Copy opensslconf.h generated from OpenSSL Configuration ++# Copy opensslconf.h and dso_conf.h generated from OpenSSL Configuration + # + print "\n--> Duplicating opensslconf.h into Include/openssl ... "; + copy($OPENSSL_PATH . "/include/openssl/opensslconf.h", + $OPENSSL_PATH . "/../../Include/openssl/") || + die "Cannot copy opensslconf.h!"; ++print "Done!"; ++print "\n--> Duplicating dso_conf.h into Include/internal ... "; ++copy($OPENSSL_PATH . "/include/internal/dso_conf.h", ++ $OPENSSL_PATH . "/../../Include/internal/") || ++ die "Cannot copy dso_conf.h!"; + print "Done!\n"; + + print "\nProcessing Files Done!\n"; +-- +2.18.1 + diff --git a/SOURCES/0006-advertise-OpenSSL-on-TianoCore-splash-screen-boot-lo.patch b/SOURCES/0006-advertise-OpenSSL-on-TianoCore-splash-screen-boot-lo.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5d691f5 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0006-advertise-OpenSSL-on-TianoCore-splash-screen-boot-lo.patch @@ -0,0 +1,613 @@ +From 740d239222c2656ae8eeb2d1cc4802ce5b07f3d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Laszlo Ersek +Date: Wed, 11 Jun 2014 23:33:33 +0200 +Subject: advertise OpenSSL on TianoCore splash screen / boot logo (RHEL only) + +Notes about the RHEL-8.1/20190308-89910a39dcfd [edk2-stable201903] -> +RHEL-8.2/20190904-37eef91017ad [edk2-stable201908] rebase: + +- trivial context update (performed silently by git-cherry-pick) for + upstream commit 3207a872a405 ("OvmfPkg: Update DSC/FDF files to consume + CSM components in OvmfPkg", 2019-06-14) + +- A note for the future: the logo could change completely in a subsequent + rebase. See (in + CONFIRMED status at the time of writing). + +Notes about the RHEL-8.0/20180508-ee3198e672e2 -> +RHEL-8.1/20190308-89910a39dcfd rebase: + +- Upstream edk2 removed the obsoleted network drivers in MdeModulePkg. The + OvmfPkg platforms were adapted in commit d2f1f6423bd1 ("OvmfPkg: Replace + obsoleted network drivers from platform DSC/FDF.", 2018-11-06). The + ArmVirtPkg platforms were adapted in commit 9a67ba261fe9 ("ArmVirtPkg: + Replace obsoleted network drivers from platform DSC/FDF.", 2018-12-14). + + Consequently, because the NetworkPkg iSCSI driver requires OpenSSL + unconditionally, as explained in + , this patch now + builds LogoOpenSSLDxe unconditionally, squashing and updating previous + downstream commits + + - 8e8ea8811e26 advertise OpenSSL on TianoCore splash screen / boot logo + (RHEL only) + - 02ed2c501cdd advertise OpenSSL due to IPv6 enablement too (RHEL only) + +Notes about the RHEL-7.6/ovmf-20180508-2.gitee3198e672e2.el7 -> +RHEL-8.0/20180508-ee3198e672e2 rebase: + +- reorder the rebase changelog in the commit message so that it reads like + a blog: place more recent entries near the top +- no changes to the patch body + +Notes about the 20171011-92d07e48907f -> 20180508-ee3198e672e2 rebase: + +- Adapted to upstream 25184ec33c36 ("MdeModulePkg/Logo.idf: Remove + incorrect comments.", 2018-02-28) + +Notes about the 20170228-c325e41585e3 -> 20171011-92d07e48907f rebase: + +- After picking previous downstream-only commit 32192c62e289, carry new + upstream commit e01e9ae28250 ("MdeModulePkg/LogoDxe: Add missing + dependency gEfiHiiImageExProtocolGuid", 2017-03-16) over to + "LogoOpenSSLDxe.inf". + +Notes about the 20160608b-988715a -> 20170228-c325e41585e3 rebase: + +- For more fun, upstream completely changed the way logo bitmaps are + embedded in the firmware binary (see for example commit ab970515d2c6, + "OvmfPkg: Use the new LogoDxe driver", 2016-09-26). Therefore in this + rebase, we reimplement the previous downstream-only commit e775fb20c999, + as described below. + +- Beyond the new bitmap file (which we preserve intact from the last + downstream branch), we introduce: + + - a new IDF (image description file) referencing the new BMP, + + - a new driver INF file, referencing the new BMP and new IDF (same C + source code though), + + - a new UNI (~description) file for the new driver INF file. + +- In the OVMF DSC and FDF files, we select the new driver INF for + inclusion if either SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE or TLS_ENABLE is set, as they + both make use of OpenSSL (although different subsets of it). + +- In the AAVMF DSC and FDF files, we only look at SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE, + because the ArmVirtQemu platform does not support TLS_ENABLE yet. + +- This patch is best displayed with "git show --find-copies-harder". + +Notes about the d7c0dfa -> 90bb4c5 rebase: + +- squash in the following downstream-only commits (made originally for + ): + + - eef9eb0 restore TianoCore splash logo without OpenSSL advertisment + (RHEL only) + + - 25842f0 OvmfPkg, ArmVirtPkg: show OpenSSL-less logo without Secure + Boot (RH only) + + The reason is that ideas keep changing when and where to include the + Secure Boot feature, so the logo must be controllable directly on the + build command line, from the RPM spec file. See the following + references: + + - https://post-office.corp.redhat.com/mailman/private/virt-devel/2016-March/msg00253.html + - https://post-office.corp.redhat.com/mailman/private/virt-devel/2016-April/msg00118.html + - https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1323363 + +- This squashed variant should remain the final version of this patch. + +Notes about the c9e5618 -> b9ffeab rebase: +- AAVMF gained Secure Boot support, therefore the logo is again modified + in the common location, and no FDF changes are necessary. + +Notes about the 9ece15a -> c9e5618 rebase: +- Logo.bmp is no longer modified in-place; instead a modified copy is + created. That's because AAVMF includes the logo too, but it doesn't + include OpenSSL / Secure Boot, so we need the original copy too. + +Because we may include the OpenSSL library in our OVMF and AAVMF builds +now, we should advertise it as required by its license. This patch takes +the original TianoCore logo, shifts it up by 20 pixels, and adds the +horizontally centered message + + This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/) + +below. + +Logo-OpenSSL.bmp: PC bitmap, Windows 3.x format, 469 x 111 x 24 +Logo.bmp: PC bitmap, Windows 3.x format, 193 x 58 x 8 + +Downstream only because upstream edk2 does not intend to release a +secure-boot-enabled OVMF build. (However the advertising requirement in +the OpenSSL license, +"CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl-1.0.2*/LICENSE", has been discussed +nonetheless, which is why I'm changing the logo.) + +Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek +(cherry picked from commit 32192c62e289f261f5ce74acee48e5a94561f10b) +(cherry picked from commit 33a710cd613c2ca7d534b8401e2f9f2178af05be) +(cherry picked from commit 0b2d90347cb016cc71c2de62e941a2a4ab0f35a3) +(cherry picked from commit 8e8ea8811e269cdb31103c70fcd91d2dcfb1755d) +(cherry picked from commit 727c11ecd9f34990312e14f239e6238693619849) +--- + ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemu.dsc | 2 +- + ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuFvMain.fdf.inc | 2 +- + ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuKernel.dsc | 2 +- + MdeModulePkg/Logo/Logo-OpenSSL.bmp | Bin 0 -> 156342 bytes + MdeModulePkg/Logo/Logo-OpenSSL.idf | 15 +++++++ + MdeModulePkg/Logo/LogoOpenSSLDxe.inf | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + MdeModulePkg/Logo/LogoOpenSSLDxe.uni | 22 ++++++++++ + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc | 2 +- + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.fdf | 2 +- + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc | 2 +- + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.fdf | 2 +- + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc | 2 +- + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf | 2 +- + 13 files changed, 107 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) + create mode 100644 MdeModulePkg/Logo/Logo-OpenSSL.bmp + create mode 100644 MdeModulePkg/Logo/Logo-OpenSSL.idf + create mode 100644 MdeModulePkg/Logo/LogoOpenSSLDxe.inf + create mode 100644 MdeModulePkg/Logo/LogoOpenSSLDxe.uni + +diff --git a/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemu.dsc b/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemu.dsc +index 7ae6702ac1..a3cc3f26ec 100644 +--- a/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemu.dsc ++++ b/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemu.dsc +@@ -364,7 +364,7 @@ + MdeModulePkg/Universal/SetupBrowserDxe/SetupBrowserDxe.inf + MdeModulePkg/Universal/DriverHealthManagerDxe/DriverHealthManagerDxe.inf + MdeModulePkg/Universal/BdsDxe/BdsDxe.inf +- MdeModulePkg/Logo/LogoDxe.inf ++ MdeModulePkg/Logo/LogoOpenSSLDxe.inf + MdeModulePkg/Application/UiApp/UiApp.inf { + + NULL|MdeModulePkg/Library/DeviceManagerUiLib/DeviceManagerUiLib.inf +diff --git a/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuFvMain.fdf.inc b/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuFvMain.fdf.inc +index 31f615a9d0..57f2f625fe 100644 +--- a/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuFvMain.fdf.inc ++++ b/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuFvMain.fdf.inc +@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ READ_LOCK_STATUS = TRUE + # + # TianoCore logo (splash screen) + # +- INF MdeModulePkg/Logo/LogoDxe.inf ++ INF MdeModulePkg/Logo/LogoOpenSSLDxe.inf + + # + # Ramdisk support +diff --git a/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuKernel.dsc b/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuKernel.dsc +index 3b0f04967a..27e65b7638 100644 +--- a/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuKernel.dsc ++++ b/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuKernel.dsc +@@ -348,7 +348,7 @@ + MdeModulePkg/Universal/SetupBrowserDxe/SetupBrowserDxe.inf + MdeModulePkg/Universal/DriverHealthManagerDxe/DriverHealthManagerDxe.inf + MdeModulePkg/Universal/BdsDxe/BdsDxe.inf +- MdeModulePkg/Logo/LogoDxe.inf ++ MdeModulePkg/Logo/LogoOpenSSLDxe.inf + MdeModulePkg/Application/UiApp/UiApp.inf { + + NULL|MdeModulePkg/Library/DeviceManagerUiLib/DeviceManagerUiLib.inf +diff --git 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+zgdamB9JKZss5qfIuEVafQ{8IFHZ(DOQ1 +zL2xbpxXzOgb_Q=@TibUgI`Lgj(=e> +zMU)Nx~l!_3pH4%7MB!8D7Ym`!#`P^=;NZCbo +zYOx$bt!NLA<3PMHxQa+n1P7P-kAtlc1qjqsh;qTF)Ya?(MW}frTqQq}wQSO~Vq}Qh +z(-f*jPBe}T?|02&p|)mY^jJ&9L?98EM8M}fR1&GSE3cmU2gQ#K{RlEdP#0v4%e#ImMtXlgq`3qxe(=XJ#6JYIXtR@d=>u^LP`e(>mc9&@wKiE +zc&HqAVc`n|ry^h7)I+R9qY#{9VVIYkI8%WpISctWdaR{lB9I77BH$Byb;iFCsAmRr +zzpp*yt4)&zWELCVdj1!(?!C=-j~1rjIaU)fH~SDS;V>JF?Dc?VD+y4lwj$q2yfy#A(Q6|A(gmX6F3%RUOA>-!_~c7> +zMvt{rOau~vNd(NlgYhpEjPjh!KVV9MEl;c1khOQTTV%Qv2e=GKpUn9EA$Mer5cK^a +z0$zgOF7uMf$_Hj(*NETbfXY-NkO+)Mz-Ku8OK1r*D%6!w>``Ws028(CB@lz_AM`0q +zf7)`qfCKTHn1cVw*|W7Di!H#8j2>&Lm&Lm +z3nA`FS~-P8zz9qZs7xgSiNI(Cd=~L6i)U-?&B`ex0!Co;SWCr3AQ6~Ez-LjxzeQ5K +zY~>UZ0V6OupfZ&RBm$!m@L9z4LO1x0ER1aB6cPa=FnX+|Vj_?TOd{a3C{nG6SUEA@ +z$|)oQMqqM4WhxO!1V$s^v#1gOnu4vILLy)UMvt{rOau~vNd$ZrnPj`O5YDl33Wf`WzQnLf`< +zN(2&t(Fph~a{Oz~wUF}&Lm ++// ++// This program and the accompanying materials ++// are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License ++// which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at ++// http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php ++// THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS, ++// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED. ++// ++// **/ ++ ++#image IMG_LOGO Logo-OpenSSL.bmp +diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Logo/LogoOpenSSLDxe.inf b/MdeModulePkg/Logo/LogoOpenSSLDxe.inf +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000..2f79d873e2 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/MdeModulePkg/Logo/LogoOpenSSLDxe.inf +@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ ++## @file ++# The default logo bitmap picture shown on setup screen. ++# ++# Copyright (c) 2016 - 2017, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
++# ++# This program and the accompanying materials ++# are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License ++# which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at ++# http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php ++# THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS, ++# WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED. ++# ++# ++## ++ ++[Defines] ++ INF_VERSION = 0x00010005 ++ BASE_NAME = LogoOpenSSLDxe ++ MODULE_UNI_FILE = LogoOpenSSLDxe.uni ++ FILE_GUID = 9CAE7B89-D48D-4D68-BBC4-4C0F1D48CDFF ++ MODULE_TYPE = DXE_DRIVER ++ VERSION_STRING = 1.0 ++ ++ ENTRY_POINT = InitializeLogo ++# ++# This flag specifies whether HII resource section is generated into PE image. ++# ++ UEFI_HII_RESOURCE_SECTION = TRUE ++ ++# ++# The following information is for reference only and not required by the build tools. ++# ++# VALID_ARCHITECTURES = IA32 X64 ++# ++ ++[Sources] ++ Logo-OpenSSL.bmp ++ Logo.c ++ Logo-OpenSSL.idf ++ ++[Packages] ++ MdeModulePkg/MdeModulePkg.dec ++ MdePkg/MdePkg.dec ++ ++[LibraryClasses] ++ UefiBootServicesTableLib ++ UefiDriverEntryPoint ++ DebugLib ++ ++[Protocols] ++ gEfiHiiDatabaseProtocolGuid ## CONSUMES ++ gEfiHiiImageExProtocolGuid ## CONSUMES ++ gEfiHiiPackageListProtocolGuid ## PRODUCES CONSUMES ++ gEdkiiPlatformLogoProtocolGuid ## PRODUCES ++ ++[Depex] ++ gEfiHiiDatabaseProtocolGuid AND ++ gEfiHiiImageExProtocolGuid ++ ++[UserExtensions.TianoCore."ExtraFiles"] ++ LogoDxeExtra.uni +diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Logo/LogoOpenSSLDxe.uni b/MdeModulePkg/Logo/LogoOpenSSLDxe.uni +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000..7227ac3910 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/MdeModulePkg/Logo/LogoOpenSSLDxe.uni +@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ ++// /** @file ++// The logo bitmap picture (with OpenSSL advertisment) shown on setup screen. ++// ++// This module provides the logo bitmap picture (with OpenSSL advertisment) ++// shown on setup screen, through EDKII Platform Logo protocol. ++// ++// Copyright (c) 2016, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
++// ++// This program and the accompanying materials ++// are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License ++// which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at ++// http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php ++// THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS, ++// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED. ++// ++// **/ ++ ++ ++#string STR_MODULE_ABSTRACT #language en-US "Provides the logo bitmap picture (with OpenSSL advertisment) shown on setup screen." ++ ++#string STR_MODULE_DESCRIPTION #language en-US "This module provides the logo bitmap picture (with OpenSSL advertisment) shown on setup screen, through EDKII Platform Logo protocol." ++ +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc +index 66e944436a..044379e1ed 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc ++++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc +@@ -688,7 +688,7 @@ + NULL|OvmfPkg/Csm/LegacyBootManagerLib/LegacyBootManagerLib.inf + !endif + } +- MdeModulePkg/Logo/LogoDxe.inf ++ MdeModulePkg/Logo/LogoOpenSSLDxe.inf + MdeModulePkg/Application/UiApp/UiApp.inf { + + NULL|MdeModulePkg/Library/DeviceManagerUiLib/DeviceManagerUiLib.inf +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.fdf b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.fdf +index 785affeb90..326f82384e 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.fdf ++++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.fdf +@@ -283,7 +283,7 @@ INF ShellPkg/DynamicCommand/TftpDynamicCommand/TftpDynamicCommand.inf + !endif + INF ShellPkg/Application/Shell/Shell.inf + +-INF MdeModulePkg/Logo/LogoDxe.inf ++INF MdeModulePkg/Logo/LogoOpenSSLDxe.inf + + # + # Network modules +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc +index 51c2bfb44f..2ff68102d3 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc ++++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc +@@ -701,7 +701,7 @@ + NULL|OvmfPkg/Csm/LegacyBootManagerLib/LegacyBootManagerLib.inf + !endif + } +- MdeModulePkg/Logo/LogoDxe.inf ++ MdeModulePkg/Logo/LogoOpenSSLDxe.inf + MdeModulePkg/Application/UiApp/UiApp.inf { + + NULL|MdeModulePkg/Library/DeviceManagerUiLib/DeviceManagerUiLib.inf +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.fdf b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.fdf +index 7440707256..aefb6614ad 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.fdf ++++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.fdf +@@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ INF ShellPkg/DynamicCommand/TftpDynamicCommand/TftpDynamicCommand.inf + !endif + INF ShellPkg/Application/Shell/Shell.inf + +-INF MdeModulePkg/Logo/LogoDxe.inf ++INF MdeModulePkg/Logo/LogoOpenSSLDxe.inf + + # + # Network modules +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc +index ba7a758844..3a66d4d424 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc ++++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc +@@ -699,7 +699,7 @@ + NULL|OvmfPkg/Csm/LegacyBootManagerLib/LegacyBootManagerLib.inf + !endif + } +- MdeModulePkg/Logo/LogoDxe.inf ++ MdeModulePkg/Logo/LogoOpenSSLDxe.inf + MdeModulePkg/Application/UiApp/UiApp.inf { + + NULL|MdeModulePkg/Library/DeviceManagerUiLib/DeviceManagerUiLib.inf +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf +index 7440707256..aefb6614ad 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf ++++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf +@@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ INF ShellPkg/DynamicCommand/TftpDynamicCommand/TftpDynamicCommand.inf + !endif + INF ShellPkg/Application/Shell/Shell.inf + +-INF MdeModulePkg/Logo/LogoDxe.inf ++INF MdeModulePkg/Logo/LogoOpenSSLDxe.inf + + # + # Network modules +-- +2.18.1 + diff --git a/SOURCES/0007-OvmfPkg-increase-max-debug-message-length-to-512-RHE.patch b/SOURCES/0007-OvmfPkg-increase-max-debug-message-length-to-512-RHE.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d7ce5a8 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0007-OvmfPkg-increase-max-debug-message-length-to-512-RHE.patch @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ +From e949bab1268f83f0f5815a96cd1cb9dd3b21bfb5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Laszlo Ersek +Date: Thu, 20 Feb 2014 22:54:45 +0100 +Subject: OvmfPkg: increase max debug message length to 512 (RHEL only) + +Notes about the RHEL-8.1/20190308-89910a39dcfd [edk2-stable201903] -> +RHEL-8.2/20190904-37eef91017ad [edk2-stable201908] rebase: + +- trivial context difference due to upstream commit 2fe5f2f52918 + ("OvmfPkg/PlatformDebugLibIoPort: Add new APIs", 2019-04-02), resolved + by git-cherry-pick automatically + +Notes about the RHEL-8.0/20180508-ee3198e672e2 -> +RHEL-8.1/20190308-89910a39dcfd rebase: + +- no changes + +Notes about the RHEL-7.6/ovmf-20180508-2.gitee3198e672e2.el7 -> +RHEL-8.0/20180508-ee3198e672e2 rebase: + +- reorder the rebase changelog in the commit message so that it reads like + a blog: place more recent entries near the top +- no changes to the patch body + +Notes about the 20171011-92d07e48907f -> 20180508-ee3198e672e2 rebase: + +- no changes + +Notes about the 20170228-c325e41585e3 -> 20171011-92d07e48907f rebase: + +- no changes + +Notes about the 20160608b-988715a -> 20170228-c325e41585e3 rebase: + +- no changes + +Upstream prefers short debug messages (sometimes even limited to 80 +characters), but any line length under 512 characters is just unsuitable +for effective debugging. (For example, config strings in HII routing, +logged by the platform driver "OvmfPkg/PlatformDxe" on DEBUG_VERBOSE +level, can be several hundred characters long.) 512 is an empirically good +value. + +Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek +(cherry picked from commit bfe568d18dba15602604f155982e3b73add63dfb) +(cherry picked from commit 29435a32ec9428720c74c454ce9817662e601fb6) +(cherry picked from commit 58e1d1ebb78bfdaf05f4c6e8abf8d4908dfa038a) +(cherry picked from commit 1df2c822c996ad767f2f45570ab2686458f7604a) +(cherry picked from commit 22c9b4e971c70c69b4adf8eb93133824ccb6426a) +(cherry picked from commit a1260c9122c95bcbef1efc5eebe11902767813c2) +--- + OvmfPkg/Library/PlatformDebugLibIoPort/DebugLib.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Library/PlatformDebugLibIoPort/DebugLib.c b/OvmfPkg/Library/PlatformDebugLibIoPort/DebugLib.c +index 3dfa3126c3..9451c50c70 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/Library/PlatformDebugLibIoPort/DebugLib.c ++++ b/OvmfPkg/Library/PlatformDebugLibIoPort/DebugLib.c +@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ + // + // Define the maximum debug and assert message length that this library supports + // +-#define MAX_DEBUG_MESSAGE_LENGTH 0x100 ++#define MAX_DEBUG_MESSAGE_LENGTH 0x200 + + // + // VA_LIST can not initialize to NULL for all compiler, so we use this to +-- +2.18.1 + diff --git a/SOURCES/0008-OvmfPkg-QemuVideoDxe-enable-debug-messages-in-VbeShi.patch b/SOURCES/0008-OvmfPkg-QemuVideoDxe-enable-debug-messages-in-VbeShi.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3e3dc79 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0008-OvmfPkg-QemuVideoDxe-enable-debug-messages-in-VbeShi.patch @@ -0,0 +1,574 @@ +From 3aa0316ea1db5416cb528179a3ba5ce37c1279b7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Laszlo Ersek +Date: Thu, 12 Jun 2014 00:17:59 +0200 +Subject: OvmfPkg: QemuVideoDxe: enable debug messages in VbeShim (RHEL only) + +Notes about the RHEL-8.1/20190308-89910a39dcfd [edk2-stable201903] -> +RHEL-8.2/20190904-37eef91017ad [edk2-stable201908] rebase: + +- no changes + +Notes about the RHEL-8.0/20180508-ee3198e672e2 -> +RHEL-8.1/20190308-89910a39dcfd rebase: + +- no changes + +Notes about the RHEL-7.6/ovmf-20180508-2.gitee3198e672e2.el7 -> +RHEL-8.0/20180508-ee3198e672e2 rebase: + +- reorder the rebase changelog in the commit message so that it reads like + a blog: place more recent entries near the top +- no changes to the patch body + +Notes about the 20171011-92d07e48907f -> 20180508-ee3198e672e2 rebase: + +- update commit message as requested in + + +Notes about the 20170228-c325e41585e3 -> 20171011-92d07e48907f rebase: + +- no changes + +Notes about the 20160608b-988715a -> 20170228-c325e41585e3 rebase: + +- no changes + +The Int10h VBE Shim is capable of emitting short debug messages when the +win2k8r2 UEFI guest uses (emulates) the Video BIOS. In upstream the quiet +version is preferred; for us debug messages are important as a default. + +For this patch, the DEBUG macro is enabled in the assembly file, and then +the header file is regenerated from the assembly, by running +"OvmfPkg/QemuVideoDxe/VbeShim.sh". + +"VbeShim.h" is not auto-generated; it is manually generated. The patch +does not add "VbeShim.h", it just updates both "VbeShim.asm" and (the +manually re-generated) "VbeShim.h" atomically. Doing so helps with local +downstream builds, with bisection, and also keeps redhat/README a bit +simpler. + +Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek +(cherry picked from commit ccda46526bb2e573d9b54f0db75d27e442b4566f) +(cherry picked from commit ed45b26dbeadd63dd8f2edf627290957d8bbb3b2) +(cherry picked from commit 9a8a034ebc082f86fdbb54dc1303a5059508e14c) +(cherry picked from commit 7046d6040181bb0f76a5ebd680e0dc701c895dba) +(cherry picked from commit 4dd1cc745bc9a8c8b32b5810b40743fed1e36d7e) +(cherry picked from commit bd264265a99c60f45cadaa4109a9db59ae218471) +--- + OvmfPkg/QemuVideoDxe/VbeShim.asm | 2 +- + OvmfPkg/QemuVideoDxe/VbeShim.h | 481 ++++++++++++++++++++----------- + 2 files changed, 308 insertions(+), 175 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/QemuVideoDxe/VbeShim.asm b/OvmfPkg/QemuVideoDxe/VbeShim.asm +index cb2a60d827..26fe1bcc32 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/QemuVideoDxe/VbeShim.asm ++++ b/OvmfPkg/QemuVideoDxe/VbeShim.asm +@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ + ;------------------------------------------------------------------------------ + + ; enable this macro for debug messages +-;%define DEBUG ++%define DEBUG + + %macro DebugLog 1 + %ifdef DEBUG +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/QemuVideoDxe/VbeShim.h b/OvmfPkg/QemuVideoDxe/VbeShim.h +index cc9b6e14cd..325d6478a1 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/QemuVideoDxe/VbeShim.h ++++ b/OvmfPkg/QemuVideoDxe/VbeShim.h +@@ -517,185 +517,318 @@ STATIC CONST UINT8 mVbeShim[] = { + /* 000001FE nop */ 0x90, + /* 000001FF nop */ 0x90, + /* 00000200 cmp ax,0x4f00 */ 0x3D, 0x00, 0x4F, +- /* 00000203 jz 0x22d */ 0x74, 0x28, ++ /* 00000203 jz 0x235 */ 0x74, 0x30, + /* 00000205 cmp ax,0x4f01 */ 0x3D, 0x01, 0x4F, +- /* 00000208 jz 0x245 */ 0x74, 0x3B, ++ /* 00000208 jz 0x255 */ 0x74, 0x4B, + /* 0000020A cmp ax,0x4f02 */ 0x3D, 0x02, 0x4F, +- /* 0000020D jz 0x269 */ 0x74, 0x5A, ++ /* 0000020D jz 0x289 */ 0x74, 0x7A, + /* 0000020F cmp ax,0x4f03 */ 0x3D, 0x03, 0x4F, +- /* 00000212 jz word 0x331 */ 0x0F, 0x84, 0x1B, 0x01, ++ /* 00000212 jz word 0x361 */ 0x0F, 0x84, 0x4B, 0x01, + /* 00000216 cmp ax,0x4f10 */ 0x3D, 0x10, 0x4F, +- /* 00000219 jz word 0x336 */ 0x0F, 0x84, 0x19, 0x01, ++ /* 00000219 jz word 0x36e */ 0x0F, 0x84, 0x51, 0x01, + /* 0000021D cmp ax,0x4f15 */ 0x3D, 0x15, 0x4F, +- /* 00000220 jz word 0x338 */ 0x0F, 0x84, 0x14, 0x01, ++ /* 00000220 jz word 0x378 */ 0x0F, 0x84, 0x54, 0x01, + /* 00000224 cmp ah,0x0 */ 0x80, 0xFC, 0x00, +- /* 00000227 jz word 0x33a */ 0x0F, 0x84, 0x0F, 0x01, +- /* 0000022B jmp short 0x22b */ 0xEB, 0xFE, +- /* 0000022D push es */ 0x06, +- /* 0000022E push di */ 0x57, +- /* 0000022F push ds */ 0x1E, +- /* 00000230 push si */ 0x56, +- /* 00000231 push cx */ 0x51, +- /* 00000232 push cs */ 0x0E, +- /* 00000233 pop ds */ 0x1F, +- /* 00000234 mov si,0x0 */ 0xBE, 0x00, 0x00, +- /* 00000237 mov cx,0x100 */ 0xB9, 0x00, 0x01, +- /* 0000023A cld */ 0xFC, +- /* 0000023B rep movsb */ 0xF3, 0xA4, +- /* 0000023D pop cx */ 0x59, +- /* 0000023E pop si */ 0x5E, +- /* 0000023F pop ds */ 0x1F, +- /* 00000240 pop di */ 0x5F, +- /* 00000241 pop es */ 0x07, +- /* 00000242 jmp word 0x34c */ 0xE9, 0x07, 0x01, +- /* 00000245 push es */ 0x06, +- /* 00000246 push di */ 0x57, +- /* 00000247 push ds */ 0x1E, +- /* 00000248 push si */ 0x56, +- /* 00000249 push cx */ 0x51, +- /* 0000024A and cx,0xbfff */ 0x81, 0xE1, 0xFF, 0xBF, +- /* 0000024E cmp cx,0xf1 */ 0x81, 0xF9, 0xF1, 0x00, +- /* 00000252 jz 0x256 */ 0x74, 0x02, +- /* 00000254 jmp short 0x22b */ 0xEB, 0xD5, +- /* 00000256 push cs */ 0x0E, +- /* 00000257 pop ds */ 0x1F, +- /* 00000258 mov si,0x100 */ 0xBE, 0x00, 0x01, +- /* 0000025B mov cx,0x100 */ 0xB9, 0x00, 0x01, +- /* 0000025E cld */ 0xFC, +- /* 0000025F rep movsb */ 0xF3, 0xA4, +- /* 00000261 pop cx */ 0x59, +- /* 00000262 pop si */ 0x5E, +- /* 00000263 pop ds */ 0x1F, +- /* 00000264 pop di */ 0x5F, +- /* 00000265 pop es */ 0x07, +- /* 00000266 jmp word 0x34c */ 0xE9, 0xE3, 0x00, +- /* 00000269 push dx */ 0x52, +- /* 0000026A push ax */ 0x50, +- /* 0000026B cmp bx,0x40f1 */ 0x81, 0xFB, 0xF1, 0x40, +- /* 0000026F jz 0x273 */ 0x74, 0x02, +- /* 00000271 jmp short 0x22b */ 0xEB, 0xB8, +- /* 00000273 mov dx,0x3c0 */ 0xBA, 0xC0, 0x03, +- /* 00000276 mov al,0x20 */ 0xB0, 0x20, +- /* 00000278 out dx,al */ 0xEE, +- /* 00000279 push dx */ 0x52, +- /* 0000027A push ax */ 0x50, +- /* 0000027B mov dx,0x1ce */ 0xBA, 0xCE, 0x01, +- /* 0000027E mov ax,0x4 */ 0xB8, 0x04, 0x00, +- /* 00000281 out dx,ax */ 0xEF, +- /* 00000282 mov dx,0x1d0 */ 0xBA, 0xD0, 0x01, +- /* 00000285 mov ax,0x0 */ 0xB8, 0x00, 0x00, +- /* 00000288 out dx,ax */ 0xEF, +- /* 00000289 pop ax */ 0x58, +- /* 0000028A pop dx */ 0x5A, +- /* 0000028B push dx */ 0x52, +- /* 0000028C push ax */ 0x50, +- /* 0000028D mov dx,0x1ce */ 0xBA, 0xCE, 0x01, +- /* 00000290 mov ax,0x5 */ 0xB8, 0x05, 0x00, +- /* 00000293 out dx,ax */ 0xEF, +- /* 00000294 mov dx,0x1d0 */ 0xBA, 0xD0, 0x01, +- /* 00000297 mov ax,0x0 */ 0xB8, 0x00, 0x00, +- /* 0000029A out dx,ax */ 0xEF, +- /* 0000029B pop ax */ 0x58, +- /* 0000029C pop dx */ 0x5A, +- /* 0000029D push dx */ 0x52, +- /* 0000029E push ax */ 0x50, +- /* 0000029F mov dx,0x1ce */ 0xBA, 0xCE, 0x01, +- /* 000002A2 mov ax,0x8 */ 0xB8, 0x08, 0x00, +- /* 000002A5 out dx,ax */ 0xEF, +- /* 000002A6 mov dx,0x1d0 */ 0xBA, 0xD0, 0x01, +- /* 000002A9 mov ax,0x0 */ 0xB8, 0x00, 0x00, +- /* 000002AC out dx,ax */ 0xEF, +- /* 000002AD pop ax */ 0x58, +- /* 000002AE pop dx */ 0x5A, +- /* 000002AF push dx */ 0x52, +- /* 000002B0 push ax */ 0x50, +- /* 000002B1 mov dx,0x1ce */ 0xBA, 0xCE, 0x01, +- /* 000002B4 mov ax,0x9 */ 0xB8, 0x09, 0x00, +- /* 000002B7 out dx,ax */ 0xEF, +- /* 000002B8 mov dx,0x1d0 */ 0xBA, 0xD0, 0x01, +- /* 000002BB mov ax,0x0 */ 0xB8, 0x00, 0x00, +- /* 000002BE out dx,ax */ 0xEF, +- /* 000002BF pop ax */ 0x58, +- /* 000002C0 pop dx */ 0x5A, +- /* 000002C1 push dx */ 0x52, +- /* 000002C2 push ax */ 0x50, +- /* 000002C3 mov dx,0x1ce */ 0xBA, 0xCE, 0x01, +- /* 000002C6 mov ax,0x3 */ 0xB8, 0x03, 0x00, +- /* 000002C9 out dx,ax */ 0xEF, +- /* 000002CA mov dx,0x1d0 */ 0xBA, 0xD0, 0x01, +- /* 000002CD mov ax,0x20 */ 0xB8, 0x20, 0x00, +- /* 000002D0 out dx,ax */ 0xEF, +- /* 000002D1 pop ax */ 0x58, +- /* 000002D2 pop dx */ 0x5A, +- /* 000002D3 push dx */ 0x52, +- /* 000002D4 push ax */ 0x50, +- /* 000002D5 mov dx,0x1ce */ 0xBA, 0xCE, 0x01, +- /* 000002D8 mov ax,0x1 */ 0xB8, 0x01, 0x00, +- /* 000002DB out dx,ax */ 0xEF, +- /* 000002DC mov dx,0x1d0 */ 0xBA, 0xD0, 0x01, +- /* 000002DF mov ax,0x400 */ 0xB8, 0x00, 0x04, +- /* 000002E2 out dx,ax */ 0xEF, +- /* 000002E3 pop ax */ 0x58, +- /* 000002E4 pop dx */ 0x5A, +- /* 000002E5 push dx */ 0x52, +- /* 000002E6 push ax */ 0x50, +- /* 000002E7 mov dx,0x1ce */ 0xBA, 0xCE, 0x01, +- /* 000002EA mov ax,0x6 */ 0xB8, 0x06, 0x00, +- /* 000002ED out dx,ax */ 0xEF, +- /* 000002EE mov dx,0x1d0 */ 0xBA, 0xD0, 0x01, +- /* 000002F1 mov ax,0x400 */ 0xB8, 0x00, 0x04, +- /* 000002F4 out dx,ax */ 0xEF, +- /* 000002F5 pop ax */ 0x58, +- /* 000002F6 pop dx */ 0x5A, +- /* 000002F7 push dx */ 0x52, +- /* 000002F8 push ax */ 0x50, +- /* 000002F9 mov dx,0x1ce */ 0xBA, 0xCE, 0x01, +- /* 000002FC mov ax,0x2 */ 0xB8, 0x02, 0x00, +- /* 000002FF out dx,ax */ 0xEF, +- /* 00000300 mov dx,0x1d0 */ 0xBA, 0xD0, 0x01, +- /* 00000303 mov ax,0x300 */ 0xB8, 0x00, 0x03, +- /* 00000306 out dx,ax */ 0xEF, +- /* 00000307 pop ax */ 0x58, +- /* 00000308 pop dx */ 0x5A, +- /* 00000309 push dx */ 0x52, +- /* 0000030A push ax */ 0x50, +- /* 0000030B mov dx,0x1ce */ 0xBA, 0xCE, 0x01, +- /* 0000030E mov ax,0x7 */ 0xB8, 0x07, 0x00, +- /* 00000311 out dx,ax */ 0xEF, +- /* 00000312 mov dx,0x1d0 */ 0xBA, 0xD0, 0x01, +- /* 00000315 mov ax,0x300 */ 0xB8, 0x00, 0x03, +- /* 00000318 out dx,ax */ 0xEF, +- /* 00000319 pop ax */ 0x58, +- /* 0000031A pop dx */ 0x5A, +- /* 0000031B push dx */ 0x52, +- /* 0000031C push ax */ 0x50, +- /* 0000031D mov dx,0x1ce */ 0xBA, 0xCE, 0x01, +- /* 00000320 mov ax,0x4 */ 0xB8, 0x04, 0x00, +- /* 00000323 out dx,ax */ 0xEF, +- /* 00000324 mov dx,0x1d0 */ 0xBA, 0xD0, 0x01, +- /* 00000327 mov ax,0x41 */ 0xB8, 0x41, 0x00, +- /* 0000032A out dx,ax */ 0xEF, +- /* 0000032B pop ax */ 0x58, +- /* 0000032C pop dx */ 0x5A, +- /* 0000032D pop ax */ 0x58, +- /* 0000032E pop dx */ 0x5A, +- /* 0000032F jmp short 0x34c */ 0xEB, 0x1B, +- /* 00000331 mov bx,0x40f1 */ 0xBB, 0xF1, 0x40, +- /* 00000334 jmp short 0x34c */ 0xEB, 0x16, +- /* 00000336 jmp short 0x350 */ 0xEB, 0x18, +- /* 00000338 jmp short 0x350 */ 0xEB, 0x16, +- /* 0000033A cmp al,0x3 */ 0x3C, 0x03, +- /* 0000033C jz 0x345 */ 0x74, 0x07, +- /* 0000033E cmp al,0x12 */ 0x3C, 0x12, +- /* 00000340 jz 0x349 */ 0x74, 0x07, +- /* 00000342 jmp word 0x22b */ 0xE9, 0xE6, 0xFE, +- /* 00000345 mov al,0x30 */ 0xB0, 0x30, +- /* 00000347 jmp short 0x34b */ 0xEB, 0x02, +- /* 00000349 mov al,0x20 */ 0xB0, 0x20, +- /* 0000034B iretw */ 0xCF, +- /* 0000034C mov ax,0x4f */ 0xB8, 0x4F, 0x00, +- /* 0000034F iretw */ 0xCF, +- /* 00000350 mov ax,0x14f */ 0xB8, 0x4F, 0x01, +- /* 00000353 iretw */ 0xCF, ++ /* 00000227 jz word 0x382 */ 0x0F, 0x84, 0x57, 0x01, ++ /* 0000022B push si */ 0x56, ++ /* 0000022C mov si,0x3e9 */ 0xBE, 0xE9, 0x03, ++ /* 0000022F call word 0x3c4 */ 0xE8, 0x92, 0x01, ++ /* 00000232 pop si */ 0x5E, ++ /* 00000233 jmp short 0x233 */ 0xEB, 0xFE, ++ /* 00000235 push es */ 0x06, ++ /* 00000236 push di */ 0x57, ++ /* 00000237 push ds */ 0x1E, ++ /* 00000238 push si */ 0x56, ++ /* 00000239 push cx */ 0x51, ++ /* 0000023A push si */ 0x56, ++ /* 0000023B mov si,0x3fb */ 0xBE, 0xFB, 0x03, ++ /* 0000023E call word 0x3c4 */ 0xE8, 0x83, 0x01, ++ /* 00000241 pop si */ 0x5E, ++ /* 00000242 push cs */ 0x0E, ++ /* 00000243 pop ds */ 0x1F, ++ /* 00000244 mov si,0x0 */ 0xBE, 0x00, 0x00, ++ /* 00000247 mov cx,0x100 */ 0xB9, 0x00, 0x01, ++ /* 0000024A cld */ 0xFC, ++ /* 0000024B rep movsb */ 0xF3, 0xA4, ++ /* 0000024D pop cx */ 0x59, ++ /* 0000024E pop si */ 0x5E, ++ /* 0000024F pop ds */ 0x1F, ++ /* 00000250 pop di */ 0x5F, ++ /* 00000251 pop es */ 0x07, ++ /* 00000252 jmp word 0x3ac */ 0xE9, 0x57, 0x01, ++ /* 00000255 push es */ 0x06, ++ /* 00000256 push di */ 0x57, ++ /* 00000257 push ds */ 0x1E, ++ /* 00000258 push si */ 0x56, ++ /* 00000259 push cx */ 0x51, ++ /* 0000025A push si */ 0x56, ++ /* 0000025B mov si,0x404 */ 0xBE, 0x04, 0x04, ++ /* 0000025E call word 0x3c4 */ 0xE8, 0x63, 0x01, ++ /* 00000261 pop si */ 0x5E, ++ /* 00000262 and cx,0xbfff */ 0x81, 0xE1, 0xFF, 0xBF, ++ /* 00000266 cmp cx,0xf1 */ 0x81, 0xF9, 0xF1, 0x00, ++ /* 0000026A jz 0x276 */ 0x74, 0x0A, ++ /* 0000026C push si */ 0x56, ++ /* 0000026D mov si,0x432 */ 0xBE, 0x32, 0x04, ++ /* 00000270 call word 0x3c4 */ 0xE8, 0x51, 0x01, ++ /* 00000273 pop si */ 0x5E, ++ /* 00000274 jmp short 0x233 */ 0xEB, 0xBD, ++ /* 00000276 push cs */ 0x0E, ++ /* 00000277 pop ds */ 0x1F, ++ /* 00000278 mov si,0x100 */ 0xBE, 0x00, 0x01, ++ /* 0000027B mov cx,0x100 */ 0xB9, 0x00, 0x01, ++ /* 0000027E cld */ 0xFC, ++ /* 0000027F rep movsb */ 0xF3, 0xA4, ++ /* 00000281 pop cx */ 0x59, ++ /* 00000282 pop si */ 0x5E, ++ /* 00000283 pop ds */ 0x1F, ++ /* 00000284 pop di */ 0x5F, ++ /* 00000285 pop es */ 0x07, ++ /* 00000286 jmp word 0x3ac */ 0xE9, 0x23, 0x01, ++ /* 00000289 push dx */ 0x52, ++ /* 0000028A push ax */ 0x50, ++ /* 0000028B push si */ 0x56, ++ /* 0000028C mov si,0x41a */ 0xBE, 0x1A, 0x04, ++ /* 0000028F call word 0x3c4 */ 0xE8, 0x32, 0x01, ++ /* 00000292 pop si */ 0x5E, ++ /* 00000293 cmp bx,0x40f1 */ 0x81, 0xFB, 0xF1, 0x40, ++ /* 00000297 jz 0x2a3 */ 0x74, 0x0A, ++ /* 00000299 push si */ 0x56, ++ /* 0000029A mov si,0x432 */ 0xBE, 0x32, 0x04, ++ /* 0000029D call word 0x3c4 */ 0xE8, 0x24, 0x01, ++ /* 000002A0 pop si */ 0x5E, ++ /* 000002A1 jmp short 0x233 */ 0xEB, 0x90, ++ /* 000002A3 mov dx,0x3c0 */ 0xBA, 0xC0, 0x03, ++ /* 000002A6 mov al,0x20 */ 0xB0, 0x20, ++ /* 000002A8 out dx,al */ 0xEE, ++ /* 000002A9 push dx */ 0x52, ++ /* 000002AA push ax */ 0x50, ++ /* 000002AB mov dx,0x1ce */ 0xBA, 0xCE, 0x01, ++ /* 000002AE mov ax,0x4 */ 0xB8, 0x04, 0x00, ++ /* 000002B1 out dx,ax */ 0xEF, ++ /* 000002B2 mov dx,0x1d0 */ 0xBA, 0xD0, 0x01, ++ /* 000002B5 mov ax,0x0 */ 0xB8, 0x00, 0x00, ++ /* 000002B8 out dx,ax */ 0xEF, ++ /* 000002B9 pop ax */ 0x58, ++ /* 000002BA pop dx */ 0x5A, ++ /* 000002BB push dx */ 0x52, ++ /* 000002BC push ax */ 0x50, ++ /* 000002BD mov dx,0x1ce */ 0xBA, 0xCE, 0x01, ++ /* 000002C0 mov ax,0x5 */ 0xB8, 0x05, 0x00, ++ /* 000002C3 out dx,ax */ 0xEF, ++ /* 000002C4 mov dx,0x1d0 */ 0xBA, 0xD0, 0x01, ++ /* 000002C7 mov ax,0x0 */ 0xB8, 0x00, 0x00, ++ /* 000002CA out dx,ax */ 0xEF, ++ /* 000002CB pop ax */ 0x58, ++ /* 000002CC pop dx */ 0x5A, ++ /* 000002CD push dx */ 0x52, ++ /* 000002CE push ax */ 0x50, ++ /* 000002CF mov dx,0x1ce */ 0xBA, 0xCE, 0x01, ++ /* 000002D2 mov ax,0x8 */ 0xB8, 0x08, 0x00, ++ /* 000002D5 out dx,ax */ 0xEF, ++ /* 000002D6 mov dx,0x1d0 */ 0xBA, 0xD0, 0x01, ++ /* 000002D9 mov ax,0x0 */ 0xB8, 0x00, 0x00, ++ /* 000002DC out dx,ax */ 0xEF, ++ /* 000002DD pop ax */ 0x58, ++ /* 000002DE pop dx */ 0x5A, ++ /* 000002DF push dx */ 0x52, ++ /* 000002E0 push ax */ 0x50, ++ /* 000002E1 mov dx,0x1ce */ 0xBA, 0xCE, 0x01, ++ /* 000002E4 mov ax,0x9 */ 0xB8, 0x09, 0x00, ++ /* 000002E7 out dx,ax */ 0xEF, ++ /* 000002E8 mov dx,0x1d0 */ 0xBA, 0xD0, 0x01, ++ /* 000002EB mov ax,0x0 */ 0xB8, 0x00, 0x00, ++ /* 000002EE out dx,ax */ 0xEF, ++ /* 000002EF pop ax */ 0x58, ++ /* 000002F0 pop dx */ 0x5A, ++ /* 000002F1 push dx */ 0x52, ++ /* 000002F2 push ax */ 0x50, ++ /* 000002F3 mov dx,0x1ce */ 0xBA, 0xCE, 0x01, ++ /* 000002F6 mov ax,0x3 */ 0xB8, 0x03, 0x00, ++ /* 000002F9 out dx,ax */ 0xEF, ++ /* 000002FA mov dx,0x1d0 */ 0xBA, 0xD0, 0x01, ++ /* 000002FD mov ax,0x20 */ 0xB8, 0x20, 0x00, ++ /* 00000300 out dx,ax */ 0xEF, ++ /* 00000301 pop ax */ 0x58, ++ /* 00000302 pop dx */ 0x5A, ++ /* 00000303 push dx */ 0x52, ++ /* 00000304 push ax */ 0x50, ++ /* 00000305 mov dx,0x1ce */ 0xBA, 0xCE, 0x01, ++ /* 00000308 mov ax,0x1 */ 0xB8, 0x01, 0x00, ++ /* 0000030B out dx,ax */ 0xEF, ++ /* 0000030C mov dx,0x1d0 */ 0xBA, 0xD0, 0x01, ++ /* 0000030F mov ax,0x400 */ 0xB8, 0x00, 0x04, ++ /* 00000312 out dx,ax */ 0xEF, ++ /* 00000313 pop ax */ 0x58, ++ /* 00000314 pop dx */ 0x5A, ++ /* 00000315 push dx */ 0x52, ++ /* 00000316 push ax */ 0x50, ++ /* 00000317 mov dx,0x1ce */ 0xBA, 0xCE, 0x01, ++ /* 0000031A mov ax,0x6 */ 0xB8, 0x06, 0x00, ++ /* 0000031D out dx,ax */ 0xEF, ++ /* 0000031E mov dx,0x1d0 */ 0xBA, 0xD0, 0x01, ++ /* 00000321 mov ax,0x400 */ 0xB8, 0x00, 0x04, ++ /* 00000324 out dx,ax */ 0xEF, ++ /* 00000325 pop ax */ 0x58, ++ /* 00000326 pop dx */ 0x5A, ++ /* 00000327 push dx */ 0x52, ++ /* 00000328 push ax */ 0x50, ++ /* 00000329 mov dx,0x1ce */ 0xBA, 0xCE, 0x01, ++ /* 0000032C mov ax,0x2 */ 0xB8, 0x02, 0x00, ++ /* 0000032F out dx,ax */ 0xEF, ++ /* 00000330 mov dx,0x1d0 */ 0xBA, 0xD0, 0x01, ++ /* 00000333 mov ax,0x300 */ 0xB8, 0x00, 0x03, ++ /* 00000336 out dx,ax */ 0xEF, ++ /* 00000337 pop ax */ 0x58, ++ /* 00000338 pop dx */ 0x5A, ++ /* 00000339 push dx */ 0x52, ++ /* 0000033A push ax */ 0x50, ++ /* 0000033B mov dx,0x1ce */ 0xBA, 0xCE, 0x01, ++ /* 0000033E mov ax,0x7 */ 0xB8, 0x07, 0x00, ++ /* 00000341 out dx,ax */ 0xEF, ++ /* 00000342 mov dx,0x1d0 */ 0xBA, 0xD0, 0x01, ++ /* 00000345 mov ax,0x300 */ 0xB8, 0x00, 0x03, ++ /* 00000348 out dx,ax */ 0xEF, ++ /* 00000349 pop ax */ 0x58, ++ /* 0000034A pop dx */ 0x5A, ++ /* 0000034B push dx */ 0x52, ++ /* 0000034C push ax */ 0x50, ++ /* 0000034D mov dx,0x1ce */ 0xBA, 0xCE, 0x01, ++ /* 00000350 mov ax,0x4 */ 0xB8, 0x04, 0x00, ++ /* 00000353 out dx,ax */ 0xEF, ++ /* 00000354 mov dx,0x1d0 */ 0xBA, 0xD0, 0x01, ++ /* 00000357 mov ax,0x41 */ 0xB8, 0x41, 0x00, ++ /* 0000035A out dx,ax */ 0xEF, ++ /* 0000035B pop ax */ 0x58, ++ /* 0000035C pop dx */ 0x5A, ++ /* 0000035D pop ax */ 0x58, ++ /* 0000035E pop dx */ 0x5A, ++ /* 0000035F jmp short 0x3ac */ 0xEB, 0x4B, ++ /* 00000361 push si */ 0x56, ++ /* 00000362 mov si,0x411 */ 0xBE, 0x11, 0x04, ++ /* 00000365 call word 0x3c4 */ 0xE8, 0x5C, 0x00, ++ /* 00000368 pop si */ 0x5E, ++ /* 00000369 mov bx,0x40f1 */ 0xBB, 0xF1, 0x40, ++ /* 0000036C jmp short 0x3ac */ 0xEB, 0x3E, ++ /* 0000036E push si */ 0x56, ++ /* 0000036F mov si,0x43f */ 0xBE, 0x3F, 0x04, ++ /* 00000372 call word 0x3c4 */ 0xE8, 0x4F, 0x00, ++ /* 00000375 pop si */ 0x5E, ++ /* 00000376 jmp short 0x3b8 */ 0xEB, 0x40, ++ /* 00000378 push si */ 0x56, ++ /* 00000379 mov si,0x452 */ 0xBE, 0x52, 0x04, ++ /* 0000037C call word 0x3c4 */ 0xE8, 0x45, 0x00, ++ /* 0000037F pop si */ 0x5E, ++ /* 00000380 jmp short 0x3b8 */ 0xEB, 0x36, ++ /* 00000382 push si */ 0x56, ++ /* 00000383 mov si,0x423 */ 0xBE, 0x23, 0x04, ++ /* 00000386 call word 0x3c4 */ 0xE8, 0x3B, 0x00, ++ /* 00000389 pop si */ 0x5E, ++ /* 0000038A cmp al,0x3 */ 0x3C, 0x03, ++ /* 0000038C jz 0x39d */ 0x74, 0x0F, ++ /* 0000038E cmp al,0x12 */ 0x3C, 0x12, ++ /* 00000390 jz 0x3a1 */ 0x74, 0x0F, ++ /* 00000392 push si */ 0x56, ++ /* 00000393 mov si,0x432 */ 0xBE, 0x32, 0x04, ++ /* 00000396 call word 0x3c4 */ 0xE8, 0x2B, 0x00, ++ /* 00000399 pop si */ 0x5E, ++ /* 0000039A jmp word 0x233 */ 0xE9, 0x96, 0xFE, ++ /* 0000039D mov al,0x30 */ 0xB0, 0x30, ++ /* 0000039F jmp short 0x3a3 */ 0xEB, 0x02, ++ /* 000003A1 mov al,0x20 */ 0xB0, 0x20, ++ /* 000003A3 push si */ 0x56, ++ /* 000003A4 mov si,0x3d6 */ 0xBE, 0xD6, 0x03, ++ /* 000003A7 call word 0x3c4 */ 0xE8, 0x1A, 0x00, ++ /* 000003AA pop si */ 0x5E, ++ /* 000003AB iretw */ 0xCF, ++ /* 000003AC push si */ 0x56, ++ /* 000003AD mov si,0x3d6 */ 0xBE, 0xD6, 0x03, ++ /* 000003B0 call word 0x3c4 */ 0xE8, 0x11, 0x00, ++ /* 000003B3 pop si */ 0x5E, ++ /* 000003B4 mov ax,0x4f */ 0xB8, 0x4F, 0x00, ++ /* 000003B7 iretw */ 0xCF, ++ /* 000003B8 push si */ 0x56, ++ /* 000003B9 mov si,0x3dc */ 0xBE, 0xDC, 0x03, ++ /* 000003BC call word 0x3c4 */ 0xE8, 0x05, 0x00, ++ /* 000003BF pop si */ 0x5E, ++ /* 000003C0 mov ax,0x14f */ 0xB8, 0x4F, 0x01, ++ /* 000003C3 iretw */ 0xCF, ++ /* 000003C4 pushaw */ 0x60, ++ /* 000003C5 push ds */ 0x1E, ++ /* 000003C6 push cs */ 0x0E, ++ /* 000003C7 pop ds */ 0x1F, ++ /* 000003C8 mov dx,0x402 */ 0xBA, 0x02, 0x04, ++ /* 000003CB lodsb */ 0xAC, ++ /* 000003CC cmp al,0x0 */ 0x3C, 0x00, ++ /* 000003CE jz 0x3d3 */ 0x74, 0x03, ++ /* 000003D0 out dx,al */ 0xEE, ++ /* 000003D1 jmp short 0x3cb */ 0xEB, 0xF8, ++ /* 000003D3 pop ds */ 0x1F, ++ /* 000003D4 popaw */ 0x61, ++ /* 000003D5 ret */ 0xC3, ++ /* 000003D6 inc bp */ 0x45, ++ /* 000003D7 js 0x442 */ 0x78, 0x69, ++ /* 000003D9 jz 0x3e5 */ 0x74, 0x0A, ++ /* 000003DB add [di+0x6e],dl */ 0x00, 0x55, 0x6E, ++ /* 000003DE jnc 0x455 */ 0x73, 0x75, ++ /* 000003E0 jo 0x452 */ 0x70, 0x70, ++ /* 000003E2 outsw */ 0x6F, ++ /* 000003E3 jc 0x459 */ 0x72, 0x74, ++ /* 000003E5 or al,[fs:bx+si] */ 0x65, 0x64, 0x0A, 0x00, ++ /* 000003E9 push bp */ 0x55, ++ /* 000003EA outsb */ 0x6E, ++ /* 000003EB imul bp,[bp+0x6f],byte +0x77 */ 0x6B, 0x6E, 0x6F, 0x77, ++ /* 000003EF outsb */ 0x6E, ++ /* 000003F0 and [bp+0x75],al */ 0x20, 0x46, 0x75, ++ /* 000003F3 outsb */ 0x6E, ++ /* 000003F4 arpl [si+0x69],si */ 0x63, 0x74, 0x69, ++ /* 000003F7 outsw */ 0x6F, ++ /* 000003F8 outsb */ 0x6E, ++ /* 000003F9 or al,[bx+si] */ 0x0A, 0x00, ++ /* 000003FB inc di */ 0x47, ++ /* 000003FC gs jz 0x448 */ 0x65, 0x74, 0x49, ++ /* 000003FF outsb */ 0x6E, ++ /* 00000400 outsd */ 0x66, 0x6F, ++ /* 00000402 or al,[bx+si] */ 0x0A, 0x00, ++ /* 00000404 inc di */ 0x47, ++ /* 00000405 gs jz 0x455 */ 0x65, 0x74, 0x4D, ++ /* 00000408 outsw */ 0x6F, ++ /* 00000409 gs dec cx */ 0x64, 0x65, 0x49, ++ /* 0000040C outsb */ 0x6E, ++ /* 0000040D outsd */ 0x66, 0x6F, ++ /* 0000040F or al,[bx+si] */ 0x0A, 0x00, ++ /* 00000411 inc di */ 0x47, ++ /* 00000412 gs jz 0x462 */ 0x65, 0x74, 0x4D, ++ /* 00000415 outsw */ 0x6F, ++ /* 00000416 or al,[gs:bx+si] */ 0x64, 0x65, 0x0A, 0x00, ++ /* 0000041A push bx */ 0x53, ++ /* 0000041B gs jz 0x46b */ 0x65, 0x74, 0x4D, ++ /* 0000041E outsw */ 0x6F, ++ /* 0000041F or al,[gs:bx+si] */ 0x64, 0x65, 0x0A, 0x00, ++ /* 00000423 push bx */ 0x53, ++ /* 00000424 gs jz 0x474 */ 0x65, 0x74, 0x4D, ++ /* 00000427 outsw */ 0x6F, ++ /* 00000428 gs dec sp */ 0x64, 0x65, 0x4C, ++ /* 0000042B gs a32 popaw */ 0x65, 0x67, 0x61, ++ /* 0000042E arpl [bx+di+0xa],di */ 0x63, 0x79, 0x0A, ++ /* 00000431 add [di+0x6e],dl */ 0x00, 0x55, 0x6E, ++ /* 00000434 imul bp,[bx+0x77],byte +0x6e */ 0x6B, 0x6F, 0x77, 0x6E, ++ /* 00000438 and [di+0x6f],cl */ 0x20, 0x4D, 0x6F, ++ /* 0000043B or al,[gs:bx+si] */ 0x64, 0x65, 0x0A, 0x00, ++ /* 0000043F inc di */ 0x47, ++ /* 00000440 gs jz 0x493 */ 0x65, 0x74, 0x50, ++ /* 00000443 insw */ 0x6D, ++ /* 00000444 inc bx */ 0x43, ++ /* 00000445 popaw */ 0x61, ++ /* 00000446 jo 0x4a9 */ 0x70, 0x61, ++ /* 00000448 bound bp,[bx+di+0x6c] */ 0x62, 0x69, 0x6C, ++ /* 0000044B imul si,[si+0x69],word 0x7365 */ 0x69, 0x74, 0x69, 0x65, 0x73, ++ /* 00000450 or al,[bx+si] */ 0x0A, 0x00, ++ /* 00000452 push dx */ 0x52, ++ /* 00000453 gs popaw */ 0x65, 0x61, ++ /* 00000455 fs inc bp */ 0x64, 0x45, ++ /* 00000457 fs */ 0x64, ++ /* 00000458 db 0x69 */ 0x69, ++ /* 00000459 or al,[fs:bx+si] */ 0x64, 0x0A, 0x00, + }; + #endif +-- +2.18.1 + diff --git a/SOURCES/0009-MdeModulePkg-TerminalDxe-add-other-text-resolutions-.patch b/SOURCES/0009-MdeModulePkg-TerminalDxe-add-other-text-resolutions-.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5b008bb --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0009-MdeModulePkg-TerminalDxe-add-other-text-resolutions-.patch @@ -0,0 +1,156 @@ +From 12cb13a1da913912bd9148ce8f2353a75be77f18 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Laszlo Ersek +Date: Tue, 25 Feb 2014 18:40:35 +0100 +Subject: MdeModulePkg: TerminalDxe: add other text resolutions (RHEL only) + +Notes about the RHEL-8.1/20190308-89910a39dcfd [edk2-stable201903] -> +RHEL-8.2/20190904-37eef91017ad [edk2-stable201908] rebase: + +- no changes + +Notes about the RHEL-8.0/20180508-ee3198e672e2 -> +RHEL-8.1/20190308-89910a39dcfd rebase: + +- no change + +Notes about the RHEL-7.6/ovmf-20180508-2.gitee3198e672e2.el7 -> +RHEL-8.0/20180508-ee3198e672e2 rebase: + +- reorder the rebase changelog in the commit message so that it reads like + a blog: place more recent entries near the top +- no changes to the patch body + +Notes about the 20171011-92d07e48907f -> 20180508-ee3198e672e2 rebase: + +- update commit message as requested in + + +Notes about the 20170228-c325e41585e3 -> 20171011-92d07e48907f rebase: + +- no changes + +Notes about the 20160608b-988715a -> 20170228-c325e41585e3 rebase: + +- adapt commit 0bc77c63de03 (code and commit message) to upstream commit + 390b95a49c14 ("MdeModulePkg/TerminalDxe: Refine + InitializeTerminalConsoleTextMode", 2017-01-10). + +When the console output is multiplexed to several devices by +ConSplitterDxe, then ConSplitterDxe builds an intersection of text modes +supported by all console output devices. + +Two notable output devices are provided by: +(1) MdeModulePkg/Universal/Console/GraphicsConsoleDxe, +(2) MdeModulePkg/Universal/Console/TerminalDxe. + +GraphicsConsoleDxe supports four modes at most -- see +InitializeGraphicsConsoleTextMode() and "mGraphicsConsoleModeData": + +(1a) 80x25 (required by the UEFI spec as mode 0), +(1b) 80x50 (not necessarily supported, but if it is, then the UEFI spec + requires the driver to provide it as mode 1), +(1c) 100x31 (corresponding to graphics resolution 800x600, which the UEFI + spec requires from all plug-in graphics devices), +(1d) "full screen" resolution, derived form the underlying GOP's + horizontal and vertical resolutions with division by EFI_GLYPH_WIDTH + (8) and EFI_GLYPH_HEIGHT (19), respectively. + +The automatic "full screen resolution" makes GraphicsConsoleDxe's +character console very flexible. However, TerminalDxe (which runs on +serial ports) only provides the following fixed resolutions -- see +InitializeTerminalConsoleTextMode() and "mTerminalConsoleModeData": + +(2a) 80x25 (required by the UEFI spec as mode 0), +(2b) 80x50 (since the character resolution of a serial device cannot be + interrogated easily, this is added unconditionally as mode 1), +(2c) 100x31 (since the character resolution of a serial device cannot be + interrogated easily, this is added unconditionally as mode 2). + +When ConSplitterDxe combines (1) and (2), multiplexing console output to +both video output and serial terminal, the list of commonly supported text +modes (ie. the "intersection") comprises: + +(3a) 80x25, unconditionally, from (1a) and (2a), +(3b) 80x50, if the graphics console provides at least 640x950 pixel + resolution, from (1b) and (2b) +(3c) 100x31, if the graphics device is a plug-in one (because in that case + 800x600 is a mandated pixel resolution), from (1c) and (2c). + +Unfortunately, the "full screen resolution" (1d) of the GOP-based text +console is not available in general. + +Mitigate this problem by extending "mTerminalConsoleModeData" with a +handful of text resolutions that are derived from widespread maximal pixel +resolutions. This way TerminalDxe won't cause ConSplitterDxe to filter out +the most frequent (1d) values from the intersection, and eg. the MODE +command in the UEFI shell will offer the "best" (ie. full screen) +resolution too. + +Upstreaming efforts for this patch have been discontinued; it was clear +from the off-list thread that consensus was impossible to reach. + +Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek +(cherry picked from commit 99dc3720ac86059f60156197328cc433603c536e) +(cherry picked from commit d2066c1748f885043026c51dec1bc8d6d406ae8f) +(cherry picked from commit 1facdd58e946c584a3dc1e5be8f2f837b5a7c621) +(cherry picked from commit 28faeb5f94b4866b9da16cf2a1e4e0fc09a26e37) +(cherry picked from commit 4e4e15b80a5b2103eadd495ef4a830d46dd4ed51) +--- + .../Universal/Console/TerminalDxe/Terminal.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++-- + 1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Console/TerminalDxe/Terminal.c b/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Console/TerminalDxe/Terminal.c +index c76b2c5100..eff9d9787f 100644 +--- a/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Console/TerminalDxe/Terminal.c ++++ b/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Console/TerminalDxe/Terminal.c +@@ -107,9 +107,44 @@ TERMINAL_DEV mTerminalDevTemplate = { + }; + + TERMINAL_CONSOLE_MODE_DATA mTerminalConsoleModeData[] = { +- {80, 25}, +- {80, 50}, +- {100, 31}, ++ { 80, 25 }, // from graphics resolution 640 x 480 ++ { 80, 50 }, // from graphics resolution 640 x 960 ++ { 100, 25 }, // from graphics resolution 800 x 480 ++ { 100, 31 }, // from graphics resolution 800 x 600 ++ { 104, 32 }, // from graphics resolution 832 x 624 ++ { 120, 33 }, // from graphics resolution 960 x 640 ++ { 128, 31 }, // from graphics resolution 1024 x 600 ++ { 128, 40 }, // from graphics resolution 1024 x 768 ++ { 144, 45 }, // from graphics resolution 1152 x 864 ++ { 144, 45 }, // from graphics resolution 1152 x 870 ++ { 160, 37 }, // from graphics resolution 1280 x 720 ++ { 160, 40 }, // from graphics resolution 1280 x 760 ++ { 160, 40 }, // from graphics resolution 1280 x 768 ++ { 160, 42 }, // from graphics resolution 1280 x 800 ++ { 160, 50 }, // from graphics resolution 1280 x 960 ++ { 160, 53 }, // from graphics resolution 1280 x 1024 ++ { 170, 40 }, // from graphics resolution 1360 x 768 ++ { 170, 40 }, // from graphics resolution 1366 x 768 ++ { 175, 55 }, // from graphics resolution 1400 x 1050 ++ { 180, 47 }, // from graphics resolution 1440 x 900 ++ { 200, 47 }, // from graphics resolution 1600 x 900 ++ { 200, 63 }, // from graphics resolution 1600 x 1200 ++ { 210, 55 }, // from graphics resolution 1680 x 1050 ++ { 240, 56 }, // from graphics resolution 1920 x 1080 ++ { 240, 63 }, // from graphics resolution 1920 x 1200 ++ { 240, 75 }, // from graphics resolution 1920 x 1440 ++ { 250, 105 }, // from graphics resolution 2000 x 2000 ++ { 256, 80 }, // from graphics resolution 2048 x 1536 ++ { 256, 107 }, // from graphics resolution 2048 x 2048 ++ { 320, 75 }, // from graphics resolution 2560 x 1440 ++ { 320, 84 }, // from graphics resolution 2560 x 1600 ++ { 320, 107 }, // from graphics resolution 2560 x 2048 ++ { 350, 110 }, // from graphics resolution 2800 x 2100 ++ { 400, 126 }, // from graphics resolution 3200 x 2400 ++ { 480, 113 }, // from graphics resolution 3840 x 2160 ++ { 512, 113 }, // from graphics resolution 4096 x 2160 ++ { 960, 227 }, // from graphics resolution 7680 x 4320 ++ { 1024, 227 }, // from graphics resolution 8192 x 4320 + // + // New modes can be added here. + // +-- +2.18.1 + diff --git a/SOURCES/0010-MdeModulePkg-TerminalDxe-set-xterm-resolution-on-mod.patch b/SOURCES/0010-MdeModulePkg-TerminalDxe-set-xterm-resolution-on-mod.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3edba86 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0010-MdeModulePkg-TerminalDxe-set-xterm-resolution-on-mod.patch @@ -0,0 +1,160 @@ +From a11602f5e2ef930be5b693ddfd0c789a1bd4c60c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Laszlo Ersek +Date: Tue, 25 Feb 2014 22:40:01 +0100 +Subject: MdeModulePkg: TerminalDxe: set xterm resolution on mode change (RH + only) + +Notes about the RHEL-8.1/20190308-89910a39dcfd [edk2-stable201903] -> +RHEL-8.2/20190904-37eef91017ad [edk2-stable201908] rebase: + +- Conflict in "MdeModulePkg/MdeModulePkg.dec" due to upstream commits + - 1103ba946aee ("MdeModulePkg: Add Capsule On Disk related definition.", + 2019-06-26), + - 1c7b3eb84631 ("MdeModulePkg/DxeIpl: Introduce PCD + PcdUse5LevelPageTable", 2019-08-09), + with easy manual resolution. + +Notes about the RHEL-8.0/20180508-ee3198e672e2 -> +RHEL-8.1/20190308-89910a39dcfd rebase: + +- no change + +Notes about the RHEL-7.6/ovmf-20180508-2.gitee3198e672e2.el7 -> +RHEL-8.0/20180508-ee3198e672e2 rebase: + +- reorder the rebase changelog in the commit message so that it reads like + a blog: place more recent entries near the top +- no changes to the patch body + +Notes about the 20171011-92d07e48907f -> 20180508-ee3198e672e2 rebase: + +- no change + +Notes about the 20170228-c325e41585e3 -> 20171011-92d07e48907f rebase: + +- Refresh downstream-only commit 2909e025db68 against "MdeModulePkg.dec" + context change from upstream commits e043f7895b83 ("MdeModulePkg: Add + PCD PcdPteMemoryEncryptionAddressOrMask", 2017-02-27) and 76081dfcc5b2 + ("MdeModulePkg: Add PROMPT&HELP string of pcd to UNI file", 2017-03-03). + +Notes about the 20160608b-988715a -> 20170228-c325e41585e3 rebase: + +- refresh commit 519b9751573e against various context changes + +The + + CSI Ps ; Ps ; Ps t + +escape sequence serves for window manipulation. We can use the + + CSI 8 ; ; t + +sequence to adapt eg. the xterm window size to the selected console mode. + +Reference: +Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 +Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek +(cherry picked from commit 2909e025db6878723b49644a8a0cf160d07e6444) +(cherry picked from commit b9c5c901f25e48d68eef6e78a4abca00e153f574) +(cherry picked from commit b7f6115b745de8cbc5214b6ede33c9a8558beb90) +(cherry picked from commit 67415982afdc77922aa37496c981adeb4351acdb) +(cherry picked from commit cfccb98d13e955beb0b93b4a75a973f30c273ffc) +--- + MdeModulePkg/MdeModulePkg.dec | 4 +++ + .../Console/TerminalDxe/TerminalConOut.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++ + .../Console/TerminalDxe/TerminalDxe.inf | 2 ++ + 3 files changed, 36 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/MdeModulePkg.dec b/MdeModulePkg/MdeModulePkg.dec +index 19935c88fa..5690bbd8b3 100644 +--- a/MdeModulePkg/MdeModulePkg.dec ++++ b/MdeModulePkg/MdeModulePkg.dec +@@ -2002,6 +2002,10 @@ + # @Prompt Capsule On Disk relocation device path. + gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCodRelocationDevPath|{0xFF}|VOID*|0x0000002f + ++ ## Controls whether TerminalDxe outputs an XTerm resize sequence on terminal ++ # mode change. ++ gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdResizeXterm|FALSE|BOOLEAN|0x00010080 ++ + [PcdsPatchableInModule] + ## Specify memory size with page number for PEI code when + # Loading Module at Fixed Address feature is enabled. +diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Console/TerminalDxe/TerminalConOut.c b/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Console/TerminalDxe/TerminalConOut.c +index 7ef655cca5..1113252df2 100644 +--- a/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Console/TerminalDxe/TerminalConOut.c ++++ b/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Console/TerminalDxe/TerminalConOut.c +@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent + + **/ + ++#include ++ + #include "Terminal.h" + + // +@@ -80,6 +82,16 @@ CHAR16 mSetCursorPositionString[] = { ESC, '[', '0', '0', ';', '0', '0', 'H', 0 + CHAR16 mCursorForwardString[] = { ESC, '[', '0', '0', 'C', 0 }; + CHAR16 mCursorBackwardString[] = { ESC, '[', '0', '0', 'D', 0 }; + ++// ++// Note that this is an ASCII format string, taking two INT32 arguments: ++// rows, columns. ++// ++// A %d (INT32) format specification can expand to at most 11 characters. ++// ++CHAR8 mResizeTextAreaFormatString[] = "\x1B[8;%d;%dt"; ++#define RESIZE_SEQ_SIZE (sizeof mResizeTextAreaFormatString + 2 * (11 - 2)) ++ ++ + // + // Body of the ConOut functions + // +@@ -502,6 +514,24 @@ TerminalConOutSetMode ( + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + } + ++ if (PcdGetBool (PcdResizeXterm)) { ++ CHAR16 ResizeSequence[RESIZE_SEQ_SIZE]; ++ ++ UnicodeSPrintAsciiFormat ( ++ ResizeSequence, ++ sizeof ResizeSequence, ++ mResizeTextAreaFormatString, ++ (INT32) TerminalDevice->TerminalConsoleModeData[ModeNumber].Rows, ++ (INT32) TerminalDevice->TerminalConsoleModeData[ModeNumber].Columns ++ ); ++ TerminalDevice->OutputEscChar = TRUE; ++ Status = This->OutputString (This, ResizeSequence); ++ TerminalDevice->OutputEscChar = FALSE; ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; ++ } ++ } ++ + This->Mode->Mode = (INT32) ModeNumber; + + Status = This->ClearScreen (This); +diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Console/TerminalDxe/TerminalDxe.inf b/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Console/TerminalDxe/TerminalDxe.inf +index 24e164ef4d..d1160ed1c7 100644 +--- a/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Console/TerminalDxe/TerminalDxe.inf ++++ b/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Console/TerminalDxe/TerminalDxe.inf +@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ + DebugLib + PcdLib + BaseLib ++ PrintLib + + [Guids] + ## SOMETIMES_PRODUCES ## Variable:L"ConInDev" +@@ -83,6 +84,7 @@ + [Pcd] + gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDefaultTerminalType ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES + gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdErrorCodeSetVariable ## CONSUMES ++ gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdResizeXterm ## CONSUMES + + # [Event] + # # Relative timer event set by UnicodeToEfiKey(), used to be one 2 seconds input timeout. +-- +2.18.1 + diff --git a/SOURCES/0011-OvmfPkg-take-PcdResizeXterm-from-the-QEMU-command-li.patch b/SOURCES/0011-OvmfPkg-take-PcdResizeXterm-from-the-QEMU-command-li.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b42de25 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0011-OvmfPkg-take-PcdResizeXterm-from-the-QEMU-command-li.patch @@ -0,0 +1,116 @@ +From 2cc462ee963d0be119bc97bfc9c70d292a40516f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Laszlo Ersek +Date: Wed, 14 Oct 2015 15:59:06 +0200 +Subject: OvmfPkg: take PcdResizeXterm from the QEMU command line (RH only) + +Notes about the RHEL-8.1/20190308-89910a39dcfd [edk2-stable201903] -> +RHEL-8.2/20190904-37eef91017ad [edk2-stable201908] rebase: + +- no change + +Notes about the RHEL-8.0/20180508-ee3198e672e2 -> +RHEL-8.1/20190308-89910a39dcfd rebase: + +- no change + +Notes about the RHEL-7.6/ovmf-20180508-2.gitee3198e672e2.el7 -> +RHEL-8.0/20180508-ee3198e672e2 rebase: + +- reorder the rebase changelog in the commit message so that it reads like + a blog: place more recent entries near the top +- no changes to the patch body + +Notes about the 20171011-92d07e48907f -> 20180508-ee3198e672e2 rebase: + +- no change + +Notes about the 20170228-c325e41585e3 -> 20171011-92d07e48907f rebase: + +- refresh downstream-only commit 8abc2a6ddad2 against context differences + in the DSC files from upstream commit 5e167d7e784c + ("OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: don't allocate reserved mem varstore if + SMM_REQUIRE", 2017-03-12). + +Notes about the 20160608b-988715a -> 20170228-c325e41585e3 rebase: + +- no changes + +Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 +Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek +(cherry picked from commit 6fa0c4d67c0bb8bde2ddd6db41c19eb0c40b2721) +(cherry picked from commit 8abc2a6ddad25af7e88dc0cf57d55dfb75fbf92d) +(cherry picked from commit b311932d3841c017a0f0fec553edcac365cc2038) +(cherry picked from commit 61914fb81cf624c9028d015533b400b2794e52d3) +(cherry picked from commit 2ebf3cc2ae99275d63bb6efd3c22dec76251a853) +(cherry picked from commit f9b73437b9b231773c1a20e0c516168817a930a2) +--- + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc | 1 + + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc | 1 + + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc | 1 + + OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/Platform.c | 1 + + OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/PlatformPei.inf | 1 + + 5 files changed, 5 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc +index 044379e1ed..accf5c0211 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc ++++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc +@@ -525,6 +525,7 @@ + # ($(SMM_REQUIRE) == FALSE) + gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdEmuVariableNvStoreReserved|0 + ++ gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdResizeXterm|FALSE + gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFlashNvStorageVariableBase64|0 + gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFlashNvStorageFtwWorkingBase|0 + gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFlashNvStorageFtwSpareBase|0 +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc +index 2ff68102d3..8812da9943 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc ++++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc +@@ -531,6 +531,7 @@ + # ($(SMM_REQUIRE) == FALSE) + gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdEmuVariableNvStoreReserved|0 + ++ gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdResizeXterm|FALSE + gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFlashNvStorageVariableBase64|0 + gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFlashNvStorageFtwWorkingBase|0 + gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFlashNvStorageFtwSpareBase|0 +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc +index 3a66d4d424..73e1b7824f 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc ++++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc +@@ -530,6 +530,7 @@ + # ($(SMM_REQUIRE) == FALSE) + gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdEmuVariableNvStoreReserved|0 + ++ gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdResizeXterm|FALSE + gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFlashNvStorageVariableBase64|0 + gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFlashNvStorageFtwWorkingBase|0 + gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFlashNvStorageFtwSpareBase|0 +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/Platform.c b/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/Platform.c +index 3ba2459872..bbbf1ac2a8 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/Platform.c ++++ b/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/Platform.c +@@ -667,6 +667,7 @@ InitializePlatform ( + PeiFvInitialization (); + MemMapInitialization (); + NoexecDxeInitialization (); ++ UPDATE_BOOLEAN_PCD_FROM_FW_CFG (PcdResizeXterm); + } + + InstallClearCacheCallback (); +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/PlatformPei.inf b/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/PlatformPei.inf +index d9fd9c8f05..666803916c 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/PlatformPei.inf ++++ b/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/PlatformPei.inf +@@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ + gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFlashNvStorageVariableSize + gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdEmuVariableNvStoreReserved + gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdPciDisableBusEnumeration ++ gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdResizeXterm + gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDxeIplSwitchToLongMode + gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdUse1GPageTable + gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSetNxForStack +-- +2.18.1 + diff --git a/SOURCES/0012-ArmVirtPkg-QemuFwCfgLib-allow-UEFI_DRIVER-client-mod.patch b/SOURCES/0012-ArmVirtPkg-QemuFwCfgLib-allow-UEFI_DRIVER-client-mod.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4972df3 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0012-ArmVirtPkg-QemuFwCfgLib-allow-UEFI_DRIVER-client-mod.patch @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ +From 0dd0ad0dcdfd1189ed8aa880765403d1f587cc59 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Laszlo Ersek +Date: Tue, 12 Apr 2016 20:50:25 +0200 +Subject: ArmVirtPkg: QemuFwCfgLib: allow UEFI_DRIVER client modules (RH only) + +Notes about the RHEL-8.1/20190308-89910a39dcfd [edk2-stable201903] -> +RHEL-8.2/20190904-37eef91017ad [edk2-stable201908] rebase: + +- no change + +Notes about the RHEL-8.0/20180508-ee3198e672e2 -> +RHEL-8.1/20190308-89910a39dcfd rebase: + +- no change + +Notes about the RHEL-7.6/ovmf-20180508-2.gitee3198e672e2.el7 -> +RHEL-8.0/20180508-ee3198e672e2 rebase: + +- reorder the rebase changelog in the commit message so that it reads like + a blog: place more recent entries near the top +- no changes to the patch body + +Notes about the 20171011-92d07e48907f -> 20180508-ee3198e672e2 rebase: + +- no change + +Notes about the 20170228-c325e41585e3 -> 20171011-92d07e48907f rebase: + +- no changes + +Notes about the 20160608b-988715a -> 20170228-c325e41585e3 rebase: + +- no changes + +Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 +Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek +(cherry picked from commit 8e2153358aa2bba2c91faa87a70beadcaae03fd8) +(cherry picked from commit 5af259a93f4bbee5515ae18638068125e170f2cd) +(cherry picked from commit 22b073005af491eef177ef5f80ffe71c1ebabb03) +(cherry picked from commit f77f1e7dd6013f918c70e089c95b8f4166085fb9) +(cherry picked from commit 762595334aa7ce88412cc77e136db9b41577a699) +(cherry picked from commit f372886be5f1c41677f168be77c484bae5841361) +--- + ArmVirtPkg/Library/QemuFwCfgLib/QemuFwCfgLib.inf | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/ArmVirtPkg/Library/QemuFwCfgLib/QemuFwCfgLib.inf b/ArmVirtPkg/Library/QemuFwCfgLib/QemuFwCfgLib.inf +index 4d27d7d30b..feceed5f93 100644 +--- a/ArmVirtPkg/Library/QemuFwCfgLib/QemuFwCfgLib.inf ++++ b/ArmVirtPkg/Library/QemuFwCfgLib/QemuFwCfgLib.inf +@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ + FILE_GUID = B271F41F-B841-48A9-BA8D-545B4BC2E2BF + MODULE_TYPE = BASE + VERSION_STRING = 1.0 +- LIBRARY_CLASS = QemuFwCfgLib|DXE_DRIVER ++ LIBRARY_CLASS = QemuFwCfgLib|DXE_DRIVER UEFI_DRIVER + + CONSTRUCTOR = QemuFwCfgInitialize + +-- +2.18.1 + diff --git a/SOURCES/0013-ArmVirtPkg-take-PcdResizeXterm-from-the-QEMU-command.patch b/SOURCES/0013-ArmVirtPkg-take-PcdResizeXterm-from-the-QEMU-command.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8600508 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0013-ArmVirtPkg-take-PcdResizeXterm-from-the-QEMU-command.patch @@ -0,0 +1,223 @@ +From 8338545260fbb423f796d5196faaaf8ff6e1ed99 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Laszlo Ersek +Date: Sun, 26 Jul 2015 08:02:50 +0000 +Subject: ArmVirtPkg: take PcdResizeXterm from the QEMU command line (RH only) + +Notes about the RHEL-8.1/20190308-89910a39dcfd [edk2-stable201903] -> +RHEL-8.2/20190904-37eef91017ad [edk2-stable201908] rebase: + +- no change + +Notes about the RHEL-8.0/20180508-ee3198e672e2 -> +RHEL-8.1/20190308-89910a39dcfd rebase: + +- no change + +Notes about the RHEL-7.6/ovmf-20180508-2.gitee3198e672e2.el7 -> +RHEL-8.0/20180508-ee3198e672e2 rebase: + +- reorder the rebase changelog in the commit message so that it reads like + a blog: place more recent entries near the top +- no changes to the patch body + +Notes about the 20171011-92d07e48907f -> 20180508-ee3198e672e2 rebase: + +- no change + +Notes about the 20170228-c325e41585e3 -> 20171011-92d07e48907f rebase: + +- Refresh downstream-only commit d4564d39dfdb against context changes in + "ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemu.dsc" from upstream commit 7e5f1b673870 + ("ArmVirtPkg/PlatformHasAcpiDtDxe: allow guest level ACPI disable + override", 2017-03-29). + +Notes about the 20160608b-988715a -> 20170228-c325e41585e3 rebase: + +- Adapt commit 6b97969096a3 to the fact that upstream has deprecated such + setter functions for dynamic PCDs that don't return a status code (such + as PcdSetBool()). Employ PcdSetBoolS(), and assert that it succeeds -- + there's really no circumstance in this case when it could fail. + +Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 +Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek +(cherry picked from commit d4564d39dfdbf74e762af43314005a2c026cb262) +(cherry picked from commit c9081ebe3bcd28e5cce4bf58bd8d4fca12f9af7c) +(cherry picked from commit 8e92730c8e1cdb642b3b3e680e643ff774a90c65) +(cherry picked from commit 9448b6b46267d8d807fac0c648e693171bb34806) +(cherry picked from commit 232fcf06f6b3048b7c2ebd6931f23186b3852f04) +--- + ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemu.dsc | 7 +- + .../TerminalPcdProducerLib.c | 87 +++++++++++++++++++ + .../TerminalPcdProducerLib.inf | 41 +++++++++ + 3 files changed, 134 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + create mode 100644 ArmVirtPkg/Library/TerminalPcdProducerLib/TerminalPcdProducerLib.c + create mode 100644 ArmVirtPkg/Library/TerminalPcdProducerLib/TerminalPcdProducerLib.inf + +diff --git a/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemu.dsc b/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemu.dsc +index a3cc3f26ec..696b0b5bcd 100644 +--- a/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemu.dsc ++++ b/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemu.dsc +@@ -237,6 +237,8 @@ + gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSmbiosDocRev|0x0 + gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdQemuSmbiosValidated|FALSE + ++ gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdResizeXterm|FALSE ++ + [PcdsDynamicHii] + gArmVirtTokenSpaceGuid.PcdForceNoAcpi|L"ForceNoAcpi"|gArmVirtVariableGuid|0x0|FALSE|NV,BS + +@@ -314,7 +316,10 @@ + MdeModulePkg/Universal/Console/ConPlatformDxe/ConPlatformDxe.inf + MdeModulePkg/Universal/Console/ConSplitterDxe/ConSplitterDxe.inf + MdeModulePkg/Universal/Console/GraphicsConsoleDxe/GraphicsConsoleDxe.inf +- MdeModulePkg/Universal/Console/TerminalDxe/TerminalDxe.inf ++ MdeModulePkg/Universal/Console/TerminalDxe/TerminalDxe.inf { ++ ++ NULL|ArmVirtPkg/Library/TerminalPcdProducerLib/TerminalPcdProducerLib.inf ++ } + MdeModulePkg/Universal/SerialDxe/SerialDxe.inf + + MdeModulePkg/Universal/HiiDatabaseDxe/HiiDatabaseDxe.inf +diff --git a/ArmVirtPkg/Library/TerminalPcdProducerLib/TerminalPcdProducerLib.c b/ArmVirtPkg/Library/TerminalPcdProducerLib/TerminalPcdProducerLib.c +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000..814ad48199 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/ArmVirtPkg/Library/TerminalPcdProducerLib/TerminalPcdProducerLib.c +@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@ ++/** @file ++* Plugin library for setting up dynamic PCDs for TerminalDxe, from fw_cfg ++* ++* Copyright (C) 2015-2016, Red Hat, Inc. ++* Copyright (c) 2014, Linaro Ltd. All rights reserved.
++* ++* This program and the accompanying materials are licensed and made available ++* under the terms and conditions of the BSD License which accompanies this ++* distribution. The full text of the license may be found at ++* http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php ++* ++* THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS, ++* WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR ++* IMPLIED. ++* ++**/ ++ ++#include ++#include ++#include ++ ++STATIC ++RETURN_STATUS ++GetNamedFwCfgBoolean ( ++ IN CONST CHAR8 *FwCfgFileName, ++ OUT BOOLEAN *Setting ++ ) ++{ ++ RETURN_STATUS Status; ++ FIRMWARE_CONFIG_ITEM FwCfgItem; ++ UINTN FwCfgSize; ++ UINT8 Value[3]; ++ ++ Status = QemuFwCfgFindFile (FwCfgFileName, &FwCfgItem, &FwCfgSize); ++ if (RETURN_ERROR (Status)) { ++ return Status; ++ } ++ if (FwCfgSize > sizeof Value) { ++ return RETURN_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE; ++ } ++ QemuFwCfgSelectItem (FwCfgItem); ++ QemuFwCfgReadBytes (FwCfgSize, Value); ++ ++ if ((FwCfgSize == 1) || ++ (FwCfgSize == 2 && Value[1] == '\n') || ++ (FwCfgSize == 3 && Value[1] == '\r' && Value[2] == '\n')) { ++ switch (Value[0]) { ++ case '0': ++ case 'n': ++ case 'N': ++ *Setting = FALSE; ++ return RETURN_SUCCESS; ++ ++ case '1': ++ case 'y': ++ case 'Y': ++ *Setting = TRUE; ++ return RETURN_SUCCESS; ++ ++ default: ++ break; ++ } ++ } ++ return RETURN_PROTOCOL_ERROR; ++} ++ ++#define UPDATE_BOOLEAN_PCD_FROM_FW_CFG(TokenName) \ ++ do { \ ++ BOOLEAN Setting; \ ++ RETURN_STATUS PcdStatus; \ ++ \ ++ if (!RETURN_ERROR (GetNamedFwCfgBoolean ( \ ++ "opt/org.tianocore.edk2.aavmf/" #TokenName, &Setting))) { \ ++ PcdStatus = PcdSetBoolS (TokenName, Setting); \ ++ ASSERT_RETURN_ERROR (PcdStatus); \ ++ } \ ++ } while (0) ++ ++RETURN_STATUS ++EFIAPI ++TerminalPcdProducerLibConstructor ( ++ VOID ++ ) ++{ ++ UPDATE_BOOLEAN_PCD_FROM_FW_CFG (PcdResizeXterm); ++ return RETURN_SUCCESS; ++} +diff --git a/ArmVirtPkg/Library/TerminalPcdProducerLib/TerminalPcdProducerLib.inf b/ArmVirtPkg/Library/TerminalPcdProducerLib/TerminalPcdProducerLib.inf +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000..fecb37bcdf +--- /dev/null ++++ b/ArmVirtPkg/Library/TerminalPcdProducerLib/TerminalPcdProducerLib.inf +@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ ++## @file ++# Plugin library for setting up dynamic PCDs for TerminalDxe, from fw_cfg ++# ++# Copyright (C) 2015-2016, Red Hat, Inc. ++# Copyright (c) 2014, Linaro Ltd. All rights reserved.
++# ++# This program and the accompanying materials are licensed and made available ++# under the terms and conditions of the BSD License which accompanies this ++# distribution. The full text of the license may be found at ++# http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php ++# ++# THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS, ++# WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR ++# IMPLIED. ++# ++## ++ ++[Defines] ++ INF_VERSION = 0x00010005 ++ BASE_NAME = TerminalPcdProducerLib ++ FILE_GUID = 4a0c5ed7-8c42-4c01-8f4c-7bf258316a96 ++ MODULE_TYPE = BASE ++ VERSION_STRING = 1.0 ++ LIBRARY_CLASS = TerminalPcdProducerLib|DXE_DRIVER ++ CONSTRUCTOR = TerminalPcdProducerLibConstructor ++ ++[Sources] ++ TerminalPcdProducerLib.c ++ ++[Packages] ++ MdePkg/MdePkg.dec ++ OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec ++ MdeModulePkg/MdeModulePkg.dec ++ ++[LibraryClasses] ++ DebugLib ++ PcdLib ++ QemuFwCfgLib ++ ++[Pcd] ++ gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdResizeXterm +-- +2.18.1 + diff --git a/SOURCES/0014-OvmfPkg-allow-exclusion-of-the-shell-from-the-firmwa.patch b/SOURCES/0014-OvmfPkg-allow-exclusion-of-the-shell-from-the-firmwa.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0023ba2 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0014-OvmfPkg-allow-exclusion-of-the-shell-from-the-firmwa.patch @@ -0,0 +1,147 @@ +From 229c88dc3ded9baeaca8b87767dc5c41c05afd6e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Laszlo Ersek +Date: Tue, 4 Nov 2014 23:02:53 +0100 +Subject: OvmfPkg: allow exclusion of the shell from the firmware image (RH + only) + +Notes about the RHEL-8.1/20190308-89910a39dcfd [edk2-stable201903] -> +RHEL-8.2/20190904-37eef91017ad [edk2-stable201908] rebase: + +- no change + +Notes about the RHEL-8.0/20180508-ee3198e672e2 -> +RHEL-8.1/20190308-89910a39dcfd rebase: + +- update the patch against the following upstream commits: + - 4b888334d234 ("OvmfPkg: Remove EdkShellBinPkg in FDF", 2018-11-19) + - 277a3958d93a ("OvmfPkg: Don't include TftpDynamicCommand in XCODE5 + tool chain", 2018-11-27) + +Notes about the RHEL-7.6/ovmf-20180508-2.gitee3198e672e2.el7 -> +RHEL-8.0/20180508-ee3198e672e2 rebase: + +- reorder the rebase changelog in the commit message so that it reads like + a blog: place more recent entries near the top +- no changes to the patch body + +Notes about the 20171011-92d07e48907f -> 20180508-ee3198e672e2 rebase: + +- no change + +Notes about the 20170228-c325e41585e3 -> 20171011-92d07e48907f rebase: + +- no changes + +Notes about the 20160608b-988715a -> 20170228-c325e41585e3 rebase: + +- no changes + +Message-id: <1415138578-27173-14-git-send-email-lersek@redhat.com> +Patchwork-id: 62119 +O-Subject: [RHEL-7.1 ovmf PATCH v2 13/18] OvmfPkg: allow exclusion of the shell + from the firmware image (RH only) +Bugzilla: 1147592 +Acked-by: Andrew Jones +Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann +Acked-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov + +When '-D EXCLUDE_SHELL_FROM_FD' is passed to 'build', exclude the shell +binary from the firmware image. + +Peter Jones advised us that firmware vendors for physical systems disable +the memory-mapped, firmware image-contained UEFI shell in +SecureBoot-enabled builds. The reason being that the memory-mapped shell +can always load, it may have direct access to various hardware in the +system, and it can run UEFI shell scripts (which cannot be signed at all). + +Intended use of the new build option: + +- In-tree builds: don't pass '-D EXCLUDE_SHELL_FROM_FD'. The resultant + firmware image will contain a shell binary, independently of SecureBoot + enablement, which is flexible for interactive development. (Ie. no + change for in-tree builds.) + +- RPM builds: pass both '-D SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE' and + '-D EXCLUDE_SHELL_FROM_FD'. The resultant RPM will provide: + + - OVMF_CODE.fd: SecureBoot-enabled firmware, without builtin UEFI shell, + + - OVMF_VARS.fd: variable store template matching OVMF_CODE.fd, + + - UefiShell.iso: a bootable ISO image with the shell on it as default + boot loader. The shell binary will load when SecureBoot is turned off, + and won't load when SecureBoot is turned on (because it is not + signed). + + UefiShell.iso is the reason we're not excluding the shell from the DSC + files as well, only the FDF files -- when '-D EXCLUDE_SHELL_FROM_FD' + is specified, the shell binary needs to be built the same, only it + will be included in UefiShell.iso. + +Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek +(cherry picked from commit 9c391def70366cabae08e6008814299c3372fafd) +(cherry picked from commit d9dd9ee42937b2611fe37183cc9ec7f62d946933) +(cherry picked from commit 23df46ebbe7b09451d3a05034acd4d3a25e7177b) +(cherry picked from commit f0303f71d576c51b01c4ff961b429d0e0e707245) +(cherry picked from commit bbd64eb8658e9a33eab4227d9f4e51ad78d9f687) +(cherry picked from commit 8628ef1b8d675ebec39d83834abbe3c8c8c42cf4) +--- + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.fdf | 2 ++ + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.fdf | 2 ++ + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf | 2 ++ + 3 files changed, 6 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.fdf b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.fdf +index 326f82384e..dff2fcd9f6 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.fdf ++++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.fdf +@@ -278,10 +278,12 @@ INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Acpi/BootGraphicsResourceTableDxe/BootGraphicsResour + INF FatPkg/EnhancedFatDxe/Fat.inf + INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Disk/UdfDxe/UdfDxe.inf + ++!ifndef $(EXCLUDE_SHELL_FROM_FD) + !if $(TOOL_CHAIN_TAG) != "XCODE5" + INF ShellPkg/DynamicCommand/TftpDynamicCommand/TftpDynamicCommand.inf + !endif + INF ShellPkg/Application/Shell/Shell.inf ++!endif + + INF MdeModulePkg/Logo/LogoOpenSSLDxe.inf + +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.fdf b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.fdf +index aefb6614ad..6684a2e799 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.fdf ++++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.fdf +@@ -279,10 +279,12 @@ INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Acpi/BootGraphicsResourceTableDxe/BootGraphicsResour + INF FatPkg/EnhancedFatDxe/Fat.inf + INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Disk/UdfDxe/UdfDxe.inf + ++!ifndef $(EXCLUDE_SHELL_FROM_FD) + !if $(TOOL_CHAIN_TAG) != "XCODE5" + INF ShellPkg/DynamicCommand/TftpDynamicCommand/TftpDynamicCommand.inf + !endif + INF ShellPkg/Application/Shell/Shell.inf ++!endif + + INF MdeModulePkg/Logo/LogoOpenSSLDxe.inf + +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf +index aefb6614ad..6684a2e799 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf ++++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf +@@ -279,10 +279,12 @@ INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Acpi/BootGraphicsResourceTableDxe/BootGraphicsResour + INF FatPkg/EnhancedFatDxe/Fat.inf + INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Disk/UdfDxe/UdfDxe.inf + ++!ifndef $(EXCLUDE_SHELL_FROM_FD) + !if $(TOOL_CHAIN_TAG) != "XCODE5" + INF ShellPkg/DynamicCommand/TftpDynamicCommand/TftpDynamicCommand.inf + !endif + INF ShellPkg/Application/Shell/Shell.inf ++!endif + + INF MdeModulePkg/Logo/LogoOpenSSLDxe.inf + +-- +2.18.1 + diff --git a/SOURCES/0015-ArmPlatformPkg-introduce-fixed-PCD-for-early-hello-m.patch b/SOURCES/0015-ArmPlatformPkg-introduce-fixed-PCD-for-early-hello-m.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7bdb27e --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0015-ArmPlatformPkg-introduce-fixed-PCD-for-early-hello-m.patch @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +From 9f756c1ad83cc81f7d892cd036d59a2b567b02dc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Laszlo Ersek +Date: Wed, 14 Oct 2015 13:49:43 +0200 +Subject: ArmPlatformPkg: introduce fixed PCD for early hello message (RH only) + +Notes about the RHEL-8.1/20190308-89910a39dcfd [edk2-stable201903] -> +RHEL-8.2/20190904-37eef91017ad [edk2-stable201908] rebase: + +- no change + +Notes about the RHEL-8.0/20180508-ee3198e672e2 -> +RHEL-8.1/20190308-89910a39dcfd rebase: + +- no change + +Notes about the RHEL-7.6/ovmf-20180508-2.gitee3198e672e2.el7 -> +RHEL-8.0/20180508-ee3198e672e2 rebase: + +- reorder the rebase changelog in the commit message so that it reads like + a blog: place more recent entries near the top +- no changes to the patch body + +Notes about the 20171011-92d07e48907f -> 20180508-ee3198e672e2 rebase: + +- no changes + +Notes about the 20170228-c325e41585e3 -> 20171011-92d07e48907f rebase: + +- no changes + +Notes about the 20160608b-988715a -> 20170228-c325e41585e3 rebase: + +- no changes + +Drew has proposed that ARM|AARCH64 platform firmware (especially virtual +machine firmware) print a reasonably early, simple hello message to the +serial port, regardless of debug mask settings. This should inform +interactive users, and provide some rough help in localizing boot +problems, even with restrictive debug masks. + +If a platform doesn't want this feature, it should stick with the default +empty string. + +RHBZ: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1270279 +Downstream only: +. + +Suggested-by: Drew Jones +Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 +Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek +(cherry picked from commit 7ce97b06421434c82095f01a1753a8c9c546cc30) +(cherry picked from commit 20b1f1cbd0590aa71c6d99d35e23cf08e0707750) +(cherry picked from commit 6734b88cf7abcaf42632e3d2fc469b2169dd2f16) +(cherry picked from commit ef77da632559e9baa1c69869e4cbea377068ef27) +(cherry picked from commit 58755c51d3252312d80cbcb97928d71199c2f5e1) +(cherry picked from commit c3f07e323e76856f1b42ea7b8c598ba3201c28a2) +--- + ArmPlatformPkg/ArmPlatformPkg.dec | 7 +++++++ + 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/ArmPlatformPkg/ArmPlatformPkg.dec b/ArmPlatformPkg/ArmPlatformPkg.dec +index c8ea183313..bab4804a17 100644 +--- a/ArmPlatformPkg/ArmPlatformPkg.dec ++++ b/ArmPlatformPkg/ArmPlatformPkg.dec +@@ -108,6 +108,13 @@ + ## If set, this will swap settings for HDLCD RED_SELECT and BLUE_SELECT registers + gArmPlatformTokenSpaceGuid.PcdArmHdLcdSwapBlueRedSelect|FALSE|BOOLEAN|0x00000045 + ++ # ++ # Early hello message (ASCII string), printed to the serial port. ++ # If set to the empty string, nothing is printed. ++ # Otherwise, a trailing CRLF should be specified explicitly. ++ # ++ gArmPlatformTokenSpaceGuid.PcdEarlyHelloMessage|""|VOID*|0x00000100 ++ + [PcdsFixedAtBuild.common,PcdsDynamic.common] + ## PL031 RealTimeClock + gArmPlatformTokenSpaceGuid.PcdPL031RtcBase|0x0|UINT32|0x00000024 +-- +2.18.1 + diff --git a/SOURCES/0016-ArmPlatformPkg-PrePeiCore-write-early-hello-message-.patch b/SOURCES/0016-ArmPlatformPkg-PrePeiCore-write-early-hello-message-.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ed0b97b --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0016-ArmPlatformPkg-PrePeiCore-write-early-hello-message-.patch @@ -0,0 +1,133 @@ +From 8d5a8827aabc67cb2a046697e1a750ca8d9cc453 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Laszlo Ersek +Date: Wed, 14 Oct 2015 13:59:20 +0200 +Subject: ArmPlatformPkg: PrePeiCore: write early hello message to the serial + port (RH) + +Notes about the RHEL-8.1/20190308-89910a39dcfd [edk2-stable201903] -> +RHEL-8.2/20190904-37eef91017ad [edk2-stable201908] rebase: + +- no change + +Notes about the RHEL-8.0/20180508-ee3198e672e2 -> +RHEL-8.1/20190308-89910a39dcfd rebase: + +- no change + +Notes about the RHEL-7.6/ovmf-20180508-2.gitee3198e672e2.el7 -> +RHEL-8.0/20180508-ee3198e672e2 rebase: + +- reorder the rebase changelog in the commit message so that it reads like + a blog: place more recent entries near the top +- no changes to the patch body + +Notes about the 20171011-92d07e48907f -> 20180508-ee3198e672e2 rebase: + +- adapt to upstream commit 7e2a8dfe8a9a ("ArmPlatformPkg/PrePeiCore: seed + temporary stack before entering PEI core", 2017-11-09) -- conflict + resolution in "ArmPlatformPkg/PrePeiCore/PrePeiCoreUniCore.inf" + +Notes about the 20170228-c325e41585e3 -> 20171011-92d07e48907f rebase: + +- no changes + +Notes about the 20160608b-988715a -> 20170228-c325e41585e3 rebase: + +- no changes + +The FixedPcdGetSize() macro expands to an integer constant, therefore an +optimizing compiler can eliminate the new code, if the platform DSC +doesn't override the empty string (size=1) default of +PcdEarlyHelloMessage. + +RHBZ: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1270279 +Downstream only: +. + +Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 +Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek +(cherry picked from commit b16c4c505ce0e27305235533eac9236aa66f132e) +(cherry picked from commit 742e5bf6d5ce5a1e73879d6e5c0dd00feda7a9ac) +(cherry picked from commit 93d69eb9393cf05af90676253875c59c1bec67fd) +(cherry picked from commit 638594083b191f84f5d9333eb6147a31570f5a5a) +(cherry picked from commit f4b7aae411d88b2b83f85d20ef06a4032a57e7de) +(cherry picked from commit bb71490fdda3b38fa9f071d281b863f9b64363bf) +--- + ArmPlatformPkg/PrePeiCore/MainMPCore.c | 5 +++++ + ArmPlatformPkg/PrePeiCore/MainUniCore.c | 5 +++++ + ArmPlatformPkg/PrePeiCore/PrePeiCore.h | 1 + + ArmPlatformPkg/PrePeiCore/PrePeiCoreMPCore.inf | 2 ++ + ArmPlatformPkg/PrePeiCore/PrePeiCoreUniCore.inf | 2 ++ + 5 files changed, 15 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/ArmPlatformPkg/PrePeiCore/MainMPCore.c b/ArmPlatformPkg/PrePeiCore/MainMPCore.c +index d379ad8b7a..ff1672f94d 100644 +--- a/ArmPlatformPkg/PrePeiCore/MainMPCore.c ++++ b/ArmPlatformPkg/PrePeiCore/MainMPCore.c +@@ -111,6 +111,11 @@ PrimaryMain ( + UINTN TemporaryRamBase; + UINTN TemporaryRamSize; + ++ if (FixedPcdGetSize (PcdEarlyHelloMessage) > 1) { ++ SerialPortWrite (FixedPcdGetPtr (PcdEarlyHelloMessage), ++ FixedPcdGetSize (PcdEarlyHelloMessage) - 1); ++ } ++ + CreatePpiList (&PpiListSize, &PpiList); + + // Enable the GIC Distributor +diff --git a/ArmPlatformPkg/PrePeiCore/MainUniCore.c b/ArmPlatformPkg/PrePeiCore/MainUniCore.c +index 1500d2bd51..5b0790beac 100644 +--- a/ArmPlatformPkg/PrePeiCore/MainUniCore.c ++++ b/ArmPlatformPkg/PrePeiCore/MainUniCore.c +@@ -29,6 +29,11 @@ PrimaryMain ( + UINTN TemporaryRamBase; + UINTN TemporaryRamSize; + ++ if (FixedPcdGetSize (PcdEarlyHelloMessage) > 1) { ++ SerialPortWrite (FixedPcdGetPtr (PcdEarlyHelloMessage), ++ FixedPcdGetSize (PcdEarlyHelloMessage) - 1); ++ } ++ + CreatePpiList (&PpiListSize, &PpiList); + + // Adjust the Temporary Ram as the new Ppi List (Common + Platform Ppi Lists) is created at +diff --git a/ArmPlatformPkg/PrePeiCore/PrePeiCore.h b/ArmPlatformPkg/PrePeiCore/PrePeiCore.h +index 7140c7f5b5..1d69a2b468 100644 +--- a/ArmPlatformPkg/PrePeiCore/PrePeiCore.h ++++ b/ArmPlatformPkg/PrePeiCore/PrePeiCore.h +@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + + #include + #include +diff --git a/ArmPlatformPkg/PrePeiCore/PrePeiCoreMPCore.inf b/ArmPlatformPkg/PrePeiCore/PrePeiCoreMPCore.inf +index f2ac45d171..fc93fda965 100644 +--- a/ArmPlatformPkg/PrePeiCore/PrePeiCoreMPCore.inf ++++ b/ArmPlatformPkg/PrePeiCore/PrePeiCoreMPCore.inf +@@ -67,6 +67,8 @@ + gArmPlatformTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCPUCorePrimaryStackSize + gArmPlatformTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCPUCoreSecondaryStackSize + ++ gArmPlatformTokenSpaceGuid.PcdEarlyHelloMessage ++ + gArmTokenSpaceGuid.PcdGicDistributorBase + gArmTokenSpaceGuid.PcdGicInterruptInterfaceBase + gArmTokenSpaceGuid.PcdGicSgiIntId +diff --git a/ArmPlatformPkg/PrePeiCore/PrePeiCoreUniCore.inf b/ArmPlatformPkg/PrePeiCore/PrePeiCoreUniCore.inf +index 84c319c367..46d1b30978 100644 +--- a/ArmPlatformPkg/PrePeiCore/PrePeiCoreUniCore.inf ++++ b/ArmPlatformPkg/PrePeiCore/PrePeiCoreUniCore.inf +@@ -65,4 +65,6 @@ + gArmPlatformTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCPUCorePrimaryStackSize + gArmPlatformTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCPUCoreSecondaryStackSize + ++ gArmPlatformTokenSpaceGuid.PcdEarlyHelloMessage ++ + gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdInitValueInTempStack +-- +2.18.1 + diff --git a/SOURCES/0017-ArmVirtPkg-set-early-hello-message-RH-only.patch b/SOURCES/0017-ArmVirtPkg-set-early-hello-message-RH-only.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9330386 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0017-ArmVirtPkg-set-early-hello-message-RH-only.patch @@ -0,0 +1,68 @@ +From ba73b99d5cb38f87c1a8f0936d515eaaefa3f04b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Laszlo Ersek +Date: Wed, 14 Oct 2015 14:07:17 +0200 +Subject: ArmVirtPkg: set early hello message (RH only) + +Notes about the RHEL-8.1/20190308-89910a39dcfd [edk2-stable201903] -> +RHEL-8.2/20190904-37eef91017ad [edk2-stable201908] rebase: + +- no change + +Notes about the RHEL-8.0/20180508-ee3198e672e2 -> +RHEL-8.1/20190308-89910a39dcfd rebase: + +- resolve context conflict with upstream commit eaa1e98ae31d ("ArmVirtPkg: + don't set PcdCoreCount", 2019-02-13) + +Notes about the RHEL-7.6/ovmf-20180508-2.gitee3198e672e2.el7 -> +RHEL-8.0/20180508-ee3198e672e2 rebase: + +- reorder the rebase changelog in the commit message so that it reads like + a blog: place more recent entries near the top +- no changes to the patch body + +Notes about the 20171011-92d07e48907f -> 20180508-ee3198e672e2 rebase: + +- no changes + +Notes about the 20170228-c325e41585e3 -> 20171011-92d07e48907f rebase: + +- no changes + +Notes about the 20160608b-988715a -> 20170228-c325e41585e3 rebase: + +- no changes + +Print a friendly banner on QEMU, regardless of debug mask settings. + +RHBZ: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1270279 +Downstream only: +. + +Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 +Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek +(cherry picked from commit 5d4a15b9019728b2d96322bc679099da49916925) +(cherry picked from commit 179df76dbb0d199bd905236e98775b4059c6502a) +(cherry picked from commit ce3f59d0710c24c162d5222bbf5cd7e36180c80c) +(cherry picked from commit c201a8e6ae28d75f7ba581828b533c3b26fa7f18) +(cherry picked from commit 2d4db6ec70e004cd9ac147615d17033bee5d3b18) +(cherry picked from commit fb2032bbea7e02c426855cf86a323556d493fd8a) +--- + ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemu.dsc | 1 + + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) + +diff --git a/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemu.dsc b/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemu.dsc +index 696b0b5bcd..08c7a36339 100644 +--- a/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemu.dsc ++++ b/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemu.dsc +@@ -101,6 +101,7 @@ + gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTurnOffUsbLegacySupport|TRUE + + [PcdsFixedAtBuild.common] ++ gArmPlatformTokenSpaceGuid.PcdEarlyHelloMessage|"UEFI firmware starting.\r\n" + !if $(ARCH) == AARCH64 + gArmTokenSpaceGuid.PcdVFPEnabled|1 + !endif +-- +2.18.1 + diff --git a/SOURCES/0018-OvmfPkg-enable-DEBUG_VERBOSE-RHEL-only.patch b/SOURCES/0018-OvmfPkg-enable-DEBUG_VERBOSE-RHEL-only.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ed65592 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0018-OvmfPkg-enable-DEBUG_VERBOSE-RHEL-only.patch @@ -0,0 +1,94 @@ +From 3cb92f9ba18ac79911bd5258ff4f949cc617ae89 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Paolo Bonzini +Date: Tue, 21 Nov 2017 00:57:45 +0100 +Subject: OvmfPkg: enable DEBUG_VERBOSE (RHEL only) + +Notes about the RHEL-8.1/20190308-89910a39dcfd [edk2-stable201903] -> +RHEL-8.2/20190904-37eef91017ad [edk2-stable201908] rebase: + +- no change + +Notes about the RHEL-8.0/20180508-ee3198e672e2 -> +RHEL-8.1/20190308-89910a39dcfd rebase: + +- no change + +Notes about the RHEL-7.6/ovmf-20180508-2.gitee3198e672e2.el7 -> +RHEL-8.0/20180508-ee3198e672e2 rebase: + +- reorder the rebase changelog in the commit message so that it reads like + a blog: place more recent entries near the top +- no changes to the patch body + +Notes about the 20171011-92d07e48907f -> 20180508-ee3198e672e2 rebase: + +- no changes + +Message-id: <20171120235748.29669-5-pbonzini@redhat.com> +Patchwork-id: 77760 +O-Subject: [PATCH 4/7] OvmfPkg: enable DEBUG_VERBOSE (RHEL only) +Bugzilla: 1488247 +Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek +Acked-by: Thomas Huth + +From: Laszlo Ersek + +Set the DEBUG_VERBOSE bit (0x00400000) in the log mask. We want detailed +debug messages, and code in OvmfPkg logs many messages on the +DEBUG_VERBOSE level. + +Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek +Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini +(this patch was previously applied as commit 78d3ed73172b5738e32d2b0bc03f7984b9584117) +(cherry picked from commit 7aeeaabc9871f657e65d2b99d81011b4964a1ce9) +(cherry picked from commit a0617a6be1a80966099ddceb010f89202a79ee76) +(cherry picked from commit 759bd3f591e2db699bdef4c7ea4e97c908e7f027) +(cherry picked from commit 7e6d5dc4078c64be6d55d8fc3317c59a91507a50) +--- + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc | 2 +- + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc | 2 +- + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc | 2 +- + 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc +index accf5c0211..759075a815 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc ++++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc +@@ -479,7 +479,7 @@ + # DEBUG_VERBOSE 0x00400000 // Detailed debug messages that may + # // significantly impact boot performance + # DEBUG_ERROR 0x80000000 // Error +- gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDebugPrintErrorLevel|0x8000004F ++ gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDebugPrintErrorLevel|0x8040004F + + !ifdef $(SOURCE_DEBUG_ENABLE) + gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDebugPropertyMask|0x17 +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc +index 8812da9943..634e20f09c 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc ++++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc +@@ -484,7 +484,7 @@ + # DEBUG_VERBOSE 0x00400000 // Detailed debug messages that may + # // significantly impact boot performance + # DEBUG_ERROR 0x80000000 // Error +- gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDebugPrintErrorLevel|0x8000004F ++ gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDebugPrintErrorLevel|0x8040004F + + !ifdef $(SOURCE_DEBUG_ENABLE) + gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDebugPropertyMask|0x17 +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc +index 73e1b7824f..bc5a345a37 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc ++++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc +@@ -484,7 +484,7 @@ + # DEBUG_VERBOSE 0x00400000 // Detailed debug messages that may + # // significantly impact boot performance + # DEBUG_ERROR 0x80000000 // Error +- gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDebugPrintErrorLevel|0x8000004F ++ gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDebugPrintErrorLevel|0x8040004F + + !ifdef $(SOURCE_DEBUG_ENABLE) + gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDebugPropertyMask|0x17 +-- +2.18.1 + diff --git a/SOURCES/0019-OvmfPkg-silence-DEBUG_VERBOSE-0x00400000-in-QemuVide.patch b/SOURCES/0019-OvmfPkg-silence-DEBUG_VERBOSE-0x00400000-in-QemuVide.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ca0d4d0 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0019-OvmfPkg-silence-DEBUG_VERBOSE-0x00400000-in-QemuVide.patch @@ -0,0 +1,141 @@ +From c8c3f893e7c3710afe45c46839e97954871536e4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Paolo Bonzini +Date: Tue, 21 Nov 2017 00:57:46 +0100 +Subject: OvmfPkg: silence DEBUG_VERBOSE (0x00400000) in + QemuVideoDxe/QemuRamfbDxe (RH) + +Notes about the RHEL-8.1/20190308-89910a39dcfd [edk2-stable201903] -> +RHEL-8.2/20190904-37eef91017ad [edk2-stable201908] rebase: + +- Due to upstream commit 4b04d9d73604 ("OvmfPkg: Don't build in + QemuVideoDxe when we have CSM", 2019-06-26), the contexts of + "QemuVideoDxe.inf" / "QemuRamfbDxe.inf" have changed in the DSC files. + Resolve the conflict manually. + +Notes about the RHEL-8.0/20180508-ee3198e672e2 -> +RHEL-8.1/20190308-89910a39dcfd rebase: + +- Upstream commit 1d25ff51af5c ("OvmfPkg: add QemuRamfbDxe", 2018-06-14) + introduced another GOP driver that consumes FrameBufferBltLib, and + thereby produces a large number of (mostly useless) debug messages at + the DEBUG_VERBOSE level. Extend the patch to suppress those messages in + both QemuVideoDxe and QemuRamfbDxe; update the subject accordingly. + QemuRamfbDxe itself doesn't log anything at the VERBOSE level (see also + the original commit message at the bottom of this downstream patch). + +Notes about the RHEL-7.6/ovmf-20180508-2.gitee3198e672e2.el7 -> +RHEL-8.0/20180508-ee3198e672e2 rebase: + +- reorder the rebase changelog in the commit message so that it reads like + a blog: place more recent entries near the top +- no changes to the patch body + +Notes about the 20171011-92d07e48907f -> 20180508-ee3198e672e2 rebase: + +- no changes + +Message-id: <20171120235748.29669-6-pbonzini@redhat.com> +Patchwork-id: 77761 +O-Subject: [PATCH 5/7] OvmfPkg: silence EFI_D_VERBOSE (0x00400000) in + QemuVideoDxe (RH only) +Bugzilla: 1488247 +Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek +Acked-by: Thomas Huth + +From: Laszlo Ersek + +In commit 5b2291f9567a ("OvmfPkg: QemuVideoDxe uses +MdeModulePkg/FrameBufferLib"), QemuVideoDxe was rebased to +FrameBufferBltLib. + +The FrameBufferBltLib instance added in commit b1ca386074bd +("MdeModulePkg: Add FrameBufferBltLib library instance") logs many +messages on the VERBOSE level; for example, a normal boot with OVMF can +produce 500+ "VideoFill" messages, dependent on the progress bar, when the +VERBOSE bit is set in PcdDebugPrintErrorLevel. + +QemuVideoDxe itself doesn't log anything at the VERBOSE level, so we lose +none of its messages this way. + +Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek +Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini +(this patch was previously applied as commit 9b0d031dee7e823f6717bab73e422fbc6f0a6c52) +(cherry picked from commit 9122d5f2e8d8d289064d1e1700cb61964d9931f3) +(cherry picked from commit 7eb3be1d4ccafc26c11fe5afb95cc12b250ce6f0) +(cherry picked from commit bd650684712fb840dbcda5d6eaee065bd9e91fa1) +(cherry picked from commit b06b87f8ffd4fed4ef7eacb13689a9b6d111f850) +--- + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc | 10 ++++++++-- + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc | 10 ++++++++-- + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc | 10 ++++++++-- + 3 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc +index 759075a815..6a07a6af81 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc ++++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc +@@ -742,9 +742,15 @@ + MdeModulePkg/Universal/MemoryTest/NullMemoryTestDxe/NullMemoryTestDxe.inf + + !ifndef $(CSM_ENABLE) +- OvmfPkg/QemuVideoDxe/QemuVideoDxe.inf ++ OvmfPkg/QemuVideoDxe/QemuVideoDxe.inf { ++ ++ gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDebugPrintErrorLevel|0x8000004F ++ } + !endif +- OvmfPkg/QemuRamfbDxe/QemuRamfbDxe.inf ++ OvmfPkg/QemuRamfbDxe/QemuRamfbDxe.inf { ++ ++ gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDebugPrintErrorLevel|0x8000004F ++ } + OvmfPkg/VirtioGpuDxe/VirtioGpu.inf + + # +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc +index 634e20f09c..c7f52992e9 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc ++++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc +@@ -755,9 +755,15 @@ + MdeModulePkg/Universal/MemoryTest/NullMemoryTestDxe/NullMemoryTestDxe.inf + + !ifndef $(CSM_ENABLE) +- OvmfPkg/QemuVideoDxe/QemuVideoDxe.inf ++ OvmfPkg/QemuVideoDxe/QemuVideoDxe.inf { ++ ++ gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDebugPrintErrorLevel|0x8000004F ++ } + !endif +- OvmfPkg/QemuRamfbDxe/QemuRamfbDxe.inf ++ OvmfPkg/QemuRamfbDxe/QemuRamfbDxe.inf { ++ ++ gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDebugPrintErrorLevel|0x8000004F ++ } + OvmfPkg/VirtioGpuDxe/VirtioGpu.inf + + # +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc +index bc5a345a37..594ecb5362 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc ++++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc +@@ -753,9 +753,15 @@ + MdeModulePkg/Universal/MemoryTest/NullMemoryTestDxe/NullMemoryTestDxe.inf + + !ifndef $(CSM_ENABLE) +- OvmfPkg/QemuVideoDxe/QemuVideoDxe.inf ++ OvmfPkg/QemuVideoDxe/QemuVideoDxe.inf { ++ ++ gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDebugPrintErrorLevel|0x8000004F ++ } + !endif +- OvmfPkg/QemuRamfbDxe/QemuRamfbDxe.inf ++ OvmfPkg/QemuRamfbDxe/QemuRamfbDxe.inf { ++ ++ gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDebugPrintErrorLevel|0x8000004F ++ } + OvmfPkg/VirtioGpuDxe/VirtioGpu.inf + + # +-- +2.18.1 + diff --git a/SOURCES/0020-ArmVirtPkg-silence-DEBUG_VERBOSE-0x00400000-in-QemuR.patch b/SOURCES/0020-ArmVirtPkg-silence-DEBUG_VERBOSE-0x00400000-in-QemuR.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..efee09b --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0020-ArmVirtPkg-silence-DEBUG_VERBOSE-0x00400000-in-QemuR.patch @@ -0,0 +1,85 @@ +From e5b8152bced2364a1ded0926dbba4d65e23e3f84 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Laszlo Ersek +Date: Wed, 27 Jan 2016 03:05:18 +0100 +Subject: ArmVirtPkg: silence DEBUG_VERBOSE (0x00400000) in QemuRamfbDxe (RH + only) + +Notes about the RHEL-8.1/20190308-89910a39dcfd [edk2-stable201903] -> +RHEL-8.2/20190904-37eef91017ad [edk2-stable201908] rebase: + +- The previous version of this patch (downstream commit 76b4ac28e975) + caused a regression (RHBZ#1714446), which was fixed up in downstream + commit 5a216abaa737 ("ArmVirtPkg: silence DEBUG_VERBOSE masking + ~0x00400000 in QemuRamfbDxe (RH only)", 2019-08-05). + + Squash the fixup into the original patch. Fuse the commit messages. + (Acked-by tags are not preserved, lest we confuse ourselves while + reviewing this rebase.) + +Notes about the RHEL-8.0/20180508-ee3198e672e2 -> +RHEL-8.1/20190308-89910a39dcfd rebase: + +- new patch, due to upstream commit c64688f36a8b ("ArmVirtPkg: add + QemuRamfbDxe", 2018-06-14) + +QemuRamfbDxe uses FrameBufferLib. The FrameBufferBltLib instance added in +commit b1ca386074bd ("MdeModulePkg: Add FrameBufferBltLib library +instance") logs many messages on the VERBOSE level; for example, a normal +boot with ArmVirtQemu[Kernel] can produce 500+ "VideoFill" messages, +dependent on the progress bar, when the VERBOSE bit is set in +PcdDebugPrintErrorLevel. + +Clear the VERBOSE bit without touching other bits -- those other bits +differ between the "silent" and "verbose" builds, so we can't set them as +constants. + +QemuRamfbDxe itself doesn't log anything at the VERBOSE level, so we lose +none of its messages, with the VERBOSE bit clear. + +Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek +(cherry picked from commit 76b4ac28e975bd63c25db903a1d42c47b38cc756) +Reported-by: Andrew Jones +Suggested-by: Laszlo Ersek +Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daude +(cherry picked from commit 5a216abaa737195327235e37563b18a6bf2a74dc) +Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek +--- + ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemu.dsc | 5 ++++- + ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuKernel.dsc | 5 ++++- + 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemu.dsc b/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemu.dsc +index 08c7a36339..b3dcdd747b 100644 +--- a/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemu.dsc ++++ b/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemu.dsc +@@ -422,7 +422,10 @@ + # + # Video support + # +- OvmfPkg/QemuRamfbDxe/QemuRamfbDxe.inf ++ OvmfPkg/QemuRamfbDxe/QemuRamfbDxe.inf { ++ ++ gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDebugPrintErrorLevel|($(DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR_LEVEL)) & 0xFFBFFFFF ++ } + OvmfPkg/VirtioGpuDxe/VirtioGpu.inf + OvmfPkg/PlatformDxe/Platform.inf + +diff --git a/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuKernel.dsc b/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuKernel.dsc +index 27e65b7638..008181055a 100644 +--- a/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuKernel.dsc ++++ b/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuKernel.dsc +@@ -400,7 +400,10 @@ + # + # Video support + # +- OvmfPkg/QemuRamfbDxe/QemuRamfbDxe.inf ++ OvmfPkg/QemuRamfbDxe/QemuRamfbDxe.inf { ++ ++ gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDebugPrintErrorLevel|($(DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR_LEVEL)) & 0xFFBFFFFF ++ } + OvmfPkg/VirtioGpuDxe/VirtioGpu.inf + OvmfPkg/PlatformDxe/Platform.inf + +-- +2.18.1 + diff --git a/SOURCES/0021-OvmfPkg-QemuRamfbDxe-Do-not-report-DXE-failure-on-Aa.patch b/SOURCES/0021-OvmfPkg-QemuRamfbDxe-Do-not-report-DXE-failure-on-Aa.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..da55568 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0021-OvmfPkg-QemuRamfbDxe-Do-not-report-DXE-failure-on-Aa.patch @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +From aa2b66b18a62d652bdbefae7b5732297294306ca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Philippe Mathieu-Daude +Date: Thu, 1 Aug 2019 20:43:48 +0200 +Subject: OvmfPkg: QemuRamfbDxe: Do not report DXE failure on Aarch64 silent + builds (RH only) + +Notes about the RHEL-8.1/20190308-89910a39dcfd [edk2-stable201903] -> +RHEL-8.2/20190904-37eef91017ad [edk2-stable201908] rebase: + +- We have to carry this downstream-only patch -- committed originally as + aaaedc1e2cfd -- indefinitely. + +- To avoid confusion, remove the tags from the commit message that had + been added by the downstream maintainer scripts, such as: Message-id, + Patchwork-id, O-Subject, Acked-by. These remain available on the + original downstream commit. The Bugzilla line is preserved, as it + doesn't relate to a specific posting, but to the problem. + +Bugzilla: 1714446 + +To suppress an error message on the silent build when ramfb is +not configured, change QemuRamfbDxe to return EFI_SUCCESS even +when it fails. +Some memory is wasted (driver stays resident without +any good use), but it is mostly harmless, as the memory +is released by the OS after ExitBootServices(). + +Suggested-by: Laszlo Ersek +Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daude +(cherry picked from commit aaaedc1e2cfd55ef003fb1b5a37c73a196b26dc7) +Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek +--- + OvmfPkg/QemuRamfbDxe/QemuRamfb.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ + OvmfPkg/QemuRamfbDxe/QemuRamfbDxe.inf | 1 + + 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/QemuRamfbDxe/QemuRamfb.c b/OvmfPkg/QemuRamfbDxe/QemuRamfb.c +index 0d49d8bbab..dbf9bcbe16 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/QemuRamfbDxe/QemuRamfb.c ++++ b/OvmfPkg/QemuRamfbDxe/QemuRamfb.c +@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + #include + #include + #include +@@ -242,6 +243,19 @@ InitializeQemuRamfb ( + + Status = QemuFwCfgFindFile ("etc/ramfb", &mRamfbFwCfgItem, &FwCfgSize); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++#if defined (MDE_CPU_AARCH64) ++ // ++ // RHBZ#1714446 ++ // If no ramfb device was configured, this platform DXE driver should ++ // returns EFI_NOT_FOUND, so the DXE Core can unload it. However, even ++ // using a silent build, an error message is issued to the guest console. ++ // Since this confuse users, return success and stay resident. The wasted ++ // guest RAM still gets freed later after ExitBootServices(). ++ // ++ if (GetDebugPrintErrorLevel () == DEBUG_ERROR) { ++ return EFI_SUCCESS; ++ } ++#endif + return EFI_NOT_FOUND; + } + if (FwCfgSize != sizeof (RAMFB_CONFIG)) { +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/QemuRamfbDxe/QemuRamfbDxe.inf b/OvmfPkg/QemuRamfbDxe/QemuRamfbDxe.inf +index e3890b8c20..6ffee5acb2 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/QemuRamfbDxe/QemuRamfbDxe.inf ++++ b/OvmfPkg/QemuRamfbDxe/QemuRamfbDxe.inf +@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ + BaseLib + BaseMemoryLib + DebugLib ++ DebugPrintErrorLevelLib + DevicePathLib + FrameBufferBltLib + MemoryAllocationLib +-- +2.18.1 + diff --git a/SOURCES/0022-OvmfPkg-silence-EFI_D_VERBOSE-0x00400000-in-NvmExpre.patch b/SOURCES/0022-OvmfPkg-silence-EFI_D_VERBOSE-0x00400000-in-NvmExpre.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fd79c90 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0022-OvmfPkg-silence-EFI_D_VERBOSE-0x00400000-in-NvmExpre.patch @@ -0,0 +1,104 @@ +From b8d0ebded8c2cf5b266c807519e2d8ccfd66fee6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Paolo Bonzini +Date: Tue, 21 Nov 2017 00:57:47 +0100 +Subject: OvmfPkg: silence EFI_D_VERBOSE (0x00400000) in NvmExpressDxe (RH + only) + +Notes about the RHEL-8.1/20190308-89910a39dcfd [edk2-stable201903] -> +RHEL-8.2/20190904-37eef91017ad [edk2-stable201908] rebase: + +- no change + +Notes about the RHEL-8.0/20180508-ee3198e672e2 -> +RHEL-8.1/20190308-89910a39dcfd rebase: + +- no change + +Notes about the RHEL-7.6/ovmf-20180508-2.gitee3198e672e2.el7 -> +RHEL-8.0/20180508-ee3198e672e2 rebase: + +- reorder the rebase changelog in the commit message so that it reads like + a blog: place more recent entries near the top +- no changes to the patch body + +Notes about the 20171011-92d07e48907f -> 20180508-ee3198e672e2 rebase: + +- no changes + +Message-id: <20171120235748.29669-7-pbonzini@redhat.com> +Patchwork-id: 77759 +O-Subject: [PATCH 6/7] OvmfPkg: silence EFI_D_VERBOSE (0x00400000) in + NvmExpressDxe (RH only) +Bugzilla: 1488247 +Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek +Acked-by: Thomas Huth + +From: Laszlo Ersek + +NvmExpressDxe logs all BlockIo read & write calls on the EFI_D_VERBOSE +level. + +Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek +Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini +(this patch was previously applied as commit 5f432837b9c60c2929b13dda1a1b488d5c3a6d2f) +(cherry picked from commit 33e00146eb878588ad1395d7b1ae38f401729da4) +(cherry picked from commit bd10cabcfcb1bc9a32b05062f4ee3792e27bc2d8) +(cherry picked from commit 5a27af700f49e00608f232f618dedd7bf5e9b3e6) +(cherry picked from commit 58bba429b9ec7b78109940ef945d0dc93f3cd958) +--- + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc | 5 ++++- + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc | 5 ++++- + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc | 5 ++++- + 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc +index 6a07a6af81..1c56e0948a 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc ++++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc +@@ -735,7 +735,10 @@ + OvmfPkg/SataControllerDxe/SataControllerDxe.inf + MdeModulePkg/Bus/Ata/AtaAtapiPassThru/AtaAtapiPassThru.inf + MdeModulePkg/Bus/Ata/AtaBusDxe/AtaBusDxe.inf +- MdeModulePkg/Bus/Pci/NvmExpressDxe/NvmExpressDxe.inf ++ MdeModulePkg/Bus/Pci/NvmExpressDxe/NvmExpressDxe.inf { ++ ++ gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDebugPrintErrorLevel|0x8000004F ++ } + MdeModulePkg/Universal/HiiDatabaseDxe/HiiDatabaseDxe.inf + MdeModulePkg/Universal/SetupBrowserDxe/SetupBrowserDxe.inf + MdeModulePkg/Universal/DisplayEngineDxe/DisplayEngineDxe.inf +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc +index c7f52992e9..29e12c9dff 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc ++++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc +@@ -748,7 +748,10 @@ + OvmfPkg/SataControllerDxe/SataControllerDxe.inf + MdeModulePkg/Bus/Ata/AtaAtapiPassThru/AtaAtapiPassThru.inf + MdeModulePkg/Bus/Ata/AtaBusDxe/AtaBusDxe.inf +- MdeModulePkg/Bus/Pci/NvmExpressDxe/NvmExpressDxe.inf ++ MdeModulePkg/Bus/Pci/NvmExpressDxe/NvmExpressDxe.inf { ++ ++ gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDebugPrintErrorLevel|0x8000004F ++ } + MdeModulePkg/Universal/HiiDatabaseDxe/HiiDatabaseDxe.inf + MdeModulePkg/Universal/SetupBrowserDxe/SetupBrowserDxe.inf + MdeModulePkg/Universal/DisplayEngineDxe/DisplayEngineDxe.inf +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc +index 594ecb5362..11fe9f6050 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc ++++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc +@@ -746,7 +746,10 @@ + OvmfPkg/SataControllerDxe/SataControllerDxe.inf + MdeModulePkg/Bus/Ata/AtaAtapiPassThru/AtaAtapiPassThru.inf + MdeModulePkg/Bus/Ata/AtaBusDxe/AtaBusDxe.inf +- MdeModulePkg/Bus/Pci/NvmExpressDxe/NvmExpressDxe.inf ++ MdeModulePkg/Bus/Pci/NvmExpressDxe/NvmExpressDxe.inf { ++ ++ gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDebugPrintErrorLevel|0x8000004F ++ } + MdeModulePkg/Universal/HiiDatabaseDxe/HiiDatabaseDxe.inf + MdeModulePkg/Universal/SetupBrowserDxe/SetupBrowserDxe.inf + MdeModulePkg/Universal/DisplayEngineDxe/DisplayEngineDxe.inf +-- +2.18.1 + diff --git a/SOURCES/0033-CryptoPkg-OpensslLib-list-RHEL8-specific-OpenSSL-fil.patch b/SOURCES/0033-CryptoPkg-OpensslLib-list-RHEL8-specific-OpenSSL-fil.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..da424bc --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0033-CryptoPkg-OpensslLib-list-RHEL8-specific-OpenSSL-fil.patch @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +From 57bd3f146590df8757865d8f2cdd1db3cf3f4d40 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Laszlo Ersek +Date: Sat, 16 Nov 2019 17:11:27 +0100 +Subject: CryptoPkg/OpensslLib: list RHEL8-specific OpenSSL files in the INFs + (RH) + +Notes about the RHEL-8.1/20190308-89910a39dcfd [edk2-stable201903] -> +RHEL-8.2/20190904-37eef91017ad [edk2-stable201908] rebase: + +- new patch + +The downstream changes in RHEL8's OpenSSL package, for example in +"openssl-1.1.1-evp-kdf.patch", introduce new files, and even move some +preexistent code into those new files. In order to avoid undefined +references in link editing, we have to list the new files. + +Note: "process_files.pl" is not re-run at this time manually, because + +(a) "process_files.pl" would pollute the file list (and some of the + auto-generated header files) with RHEL8-specific FIPS artifacts, which + are explicitly unwanted in edk2, + +(b) The RHEL OpenSSL maintainer, Tomas Mraz, identified this specific set + of files in , + and will help with future changes too. + +Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek +--- + CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/OpensslLib.inf | 11 +++++++++++ + CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/OpensslLibCrypto.inf | 11 +++++++++++ + 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/OpensslLib.inf b/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/OpensslLib.inf +index dd873a0dcd..d1c7602b87 100644 +--- a/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/OpensslLib.inf ++++ b/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/OpensslLib.inf +@@ -598,6 +598,17 @@ + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/ssl/record/record.h + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/ssl/record/record_locl.h + # Autogenerated files list ends here ++# RHEL8-specific OpenSSL file list starts here ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/evp/kdf_lib.c ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/evp/pkey_kdf.c ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/kdf/kbkdf.c ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/kdf/kdf_local.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/kdf/kdf_util.c ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/kdf/krb5kdf.c ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/kdf/pbkdf2.c ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/kdf/sshkdf.c ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/kdf/sskdf.c ++# RHEL8-specific OpenSSL file list ends here + + ossl_store.c + rand_pool.c +diff --git a/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/OpensslLibCrypto.inf b/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/OpensslLibCrypto.inf +index a1bb560255..0785a421dd 100644 +--- a/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/OpensslLibCrypto.inf ++++ b/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/OpensslLibCrypto.inf +@@ -546,6 +546,17 @@ + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/objects/obj_lcl.h + $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/objects/obj_xref.h + # Autogenerated files list ends here ++# RHEL8-specific OpenSSL file list starts here ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/evp/kdf_lib.c ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/evp/pkey_kdf.c ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/kdf/kbkdf.c ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/kdf/kdf_local.h ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/kdf/kdf_util.c ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/kdf/krb5kdf.c ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/kdf/pbkdf2.c ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/kdf/sshkdf.c ++ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/kdf/sskdf.c ++# RHEL8-specific OpenSSL file list ends here + buildinf.h + rand_pool_noise.h + ossl_store.c +-- +2.18.1 + diff --git a/SOURCES/LICENSE.qosb b/SOURCES/LICENSE.qosb new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9849381 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/LICENSE.qosb @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +MIT License + +Copyright (c) 2017 Patrick Uiterwijk + +Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy +of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal +in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights +to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell +copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is +furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions: + +The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all +copies or substantial portions of the Software. + +THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR +IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, +FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE +AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER +LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, +OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE +SOFTWARE. diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-CryptoPkg-Crt-import-inet_pton.c-CVE-2019-14553.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-CryptoPkg-Crt-import-inet_pton.c-CVE-2019-14553.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fba10c3 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-CryptoPkg-Crt-import-inet_pton.c-CVE-2019-14553.patch @@ -0,0 +1,338 @@ +From 3c9574af677c24b969c3baa6a527dabaf97f11a2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Laszlo Ersek +Date: Mon, 2 Dec 2019 12:31:53 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 5/9] CryptoPkg/Crt: import "inet_pton.c" (CVE-2019-14553) +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +RH-Author: Laszlo Ersek +Message-id: <20191117220052.15700-6-lersek@redhat.com> +Patchwork-id: 92461 +O-Subject: [RHEL-8.2.0 edk2 PATCH 5/9] CryptoPkg/Crt: import "inet_pton.c" (CVE-2019-14553) +Bugzilla: 1536624 +RH-Acked-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé +RH-Acked-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov + +For TianoCore BZ#1734, StdLib has been moved from the edk2 project to the +edk2-libc project, in commit 964f432b9b0a ("edk2: Remove AppPkg, StdLib, +StdLibPrivateInternalFiles", 2019-04-29). + +We'd like to use the inet_pton() function in CryptoPkg. Resurrect the +"inet_pton.c" file from just before the StdLib removal, as follows: + + $ git show \ + 964f432b9b0a^:StdLib/BsdSocketLib/inet_pton.c \ + > CryptoPkg/Library/BaseCryptLib/SysCall/inet_pton.c + +The inet_pton() function is only intended for the DXE phase at this time, +therefore only the "BaseCryptLib" instance INF file receives the new file. + +Cc: David Woodhouse +Cc: Jian J Wang +Cc: Jiaxin Wu +Cc: Sivaraman Nainar +Cc: Xiaoyu Lu +Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=960 +CVE: CVE-2019-14553 +Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek +Reviewed-by: Jian J Wang +Reviewed-by: Jiaxin Wu +(cherry picked from commit 8d16ef8269b2ff373d8da674e59992adfdc032d3) +--- + CryptoPkg/Library/BaseCryptLib/BaseCryptLib.inf | 1 + + CryptoPkg/Library/BaseCryptLib/SysCall/inet_pton.c | 257 +++++++++++++++++++++ + CryptoPkg/Library/Include/CrtLibSupport.h | 1 + + 3 files changed, 259 insertions(+) + create mode 100644 CryptoPkg/Library/BaseCryptLib/SysCall/inet_pton.c + +diff --git a/CryptoPkg/Library/BaseCryptLib/BaseCryptLib.inf b/CryptoPkg/Library/BaseCryptLib/BaseCryptLib.inf +index 8d4988e..b5cfd8b 100644 +--- a/CryptoPkg/Library/BaseCryptLib/BaseCryptLib.inf ++++ b/CryptoPkg/Library/BaseCryptLib/BaseCryptLib.inf +@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ + SysCall/CrtWrapper.c + SysCall/TimerWrapper.c + SysCall/BaseMemAllocation.c ++ SysCall/inet_pton.c + + [Sources.Ia32] + Rand/CryptRandTsc.c +diff --git a/CryptoPkg/Library/BaseCryptLib/SysCall/inet_pton.c b/CryptoPkg/Library/BaseCryptLib/SysCall/inet_pton.c +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..32e1ab8 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/CryptoPkg/Library/BaseCryptLib/SysCall/inet_pton.c +@@ -0,0 +1,257 @@ ++/* Copyright (c) 1996 by Internet Software Consortium. ++ * ++ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any ++ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above ++ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. ++ * ++ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND INTERNET SOFTWARE CONSORTIUM DISCLAIMS ++ * ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES ++ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL INTERNET SOFTWARE ++ * CONSORTIUM BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL ++ * DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR ++ * PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ++ * ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS ++ * SOFTWARE. ++ */ ++ ++/* ++ * Portions copyright (c) 1999, 2000 ++ * Intel Corporation. ++ * All rights reserved. ++ * ++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without ++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions ++ * are met: ++ * ++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. ++ * ++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the ++ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. ++ * ++ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software ++ * must display the following acknowledgement: ++ * ++ * This product includes software developed by Intel Corporation and ++ * its contributors. ++ * ++ * 4. Neither the name of Intel Corporation or its contributors may be ++ * used to endorse or promote products derived from this software ++ * without specific prior written permission. ++ * ++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY INTEL CORPORATION AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' ++ * AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE ++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ++ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL INTEL CORPORATION OR CONTRIBUTORS BE ++ * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR ++ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF ++ * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS ++ * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN ++ * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ++ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF ++ * THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. ++ * ++ */ ++ ++#if defined(LIBC_SCCS) && !defined(lint) ++static char rcsid[] = "$Id: inet_pton.c,v 1.1.1.1 2003/11/19 01:51:30 kyu3 Exp $"; ++#endif /* LIBC_SCCS and not lint */ ++ ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++ ++/* ++ * WARNING: Don't even consider trying to compile this on a system where ++ * sizeof(int) < 4. sizeof(int) > 4 is fine; all the world's not a VAX. ++ */ ++ ++static int inet_pton4 (const char *src, u_char *dst); ++static int inet_pton6 (const char *src, u_char *dst); ++ ++/* int ++ * inet_pton(af, src, dst) ++ * convert from presentation format (which usually means ASCII printable) ++ * to network format (which is usually some kind of binary format). ++ * return: ++ * 1 if the address was valid for the specified address family ++ * 0 if the address wasn't valid (`dst' is untouched in this case) ++ * -1 if some other error occurred (`dst' is untouched in this case, too) ++ * author: ++ * Paul Vixie, 1996. ++ */ ++int ++inet_pton( ++ int af, ++ const char *src, ++ void *dst ++ ) ++{ ++ switch (af) { ++ case AF_INET: ++ return (inet_pton4(src, dst)); ++ case AF_INET6: ++ return (inet_pton6(src, dst)); ++ default: ++ errno = EAFNOSUPPORT; ++ return (-1); ++ } ++ /* NOTREACHED */ ++} ++ ++/* int ++ * inet_pton4(src, dst) ++ * like inet_aton() but without all the hexadecimal and shorthand. ++ * return: ++ * 1 if `src' is a valid dotted quad, else 0. ++ * notice: ++ * does not touch `dst' unless it's returning 1. ++ * author: ++ * Paul Vixie, 1996. ++ */ ++static int ++inet_pton4( ++ const char *src, ++ u_char *dst ++ ) ++{ ++ static const char digits[] = "0123456789"; ++ int saw_digit, octets, ch; ++ u_char tmp[NS_INADDRSZ], *tp; ++ ++ saw_digit = 0; ++ octets = 0; ++ *(tp = tmp) = 0; ++ while ((ch = *src++) != '\0') { ++ const char *pch; ++ ++ if ((pch = strchr(digits, ch)) != NULL) { ++ u_int new = *tp * 10 + (u_int)(pch - digits); ++ ++ if (new > 255) ++ return (0); ++ *tp = (u_char)new; ++ if (! saw_digit) { ++ if (++octets > 4) ++ return (0); ++ saw_digit = 1; ++ } ++ } else if (ch == '.' && saw_digit) { ++ if (octets == 4) ++ return (0); ++ *++tp = 0; ++ saw_digit = 0; ++ } else ++ return (0); ++ } ++ if (octets < 4) ++ return (0); ++ ++ memcpy(dst, tmp, NS_INADDRSZ); ++ return (1); ++} ++ ++/* int ++ * inet_pton6(src, dst) ++ * convert presentation level address to network order binary form. ++ * return: ++ * 1 if `src' is a valid [RFC1884 2.2] address, else 0. ++ * notice: ++ * (1) does not touch `dst' unless it's returning 1. ++ * (2) :: in a full address is silently ignored. ++ * credit: ++ * inspired by Mark Andrews. ++ * author: ++ * Paul Vixie, 1996. ++ */ ++static int ++inet_pton6( ++ const char *src, ++ u_char *dst ++ ) ++{ ++ static const char xdigits_l[] = "0123456789abcdef", ++ xdigits_u[] = "0123456789ABCDEF"; ++ u_char tmp[NS_IN6ADDRSZ], *tp, *endp, *colonp; ++ const char *xdigits, *curtok; ++ int ch, saw_xdigit; ++ u_int val; ++ ++ memset((tp = tmp), '\0', NS_IN6ADDRSZ); ++ endp = tp + NS_IN6ADDRSZ; ++ colonp = NULL; ++ /* Leading :: requires some special handling. */ ++ if (*src == ':') ++ if (*++src != ':') ++ return (0); ++ curtok = src; ++ saw_xdigit = 0; ++ val = 0; ++ while ((ch = *src++) != '\0') { ++ const char *pch; ++ ++ if ((pch = strchr((xdigits = xdigits_l), ch)) == NULL) ++ pch = strchr((xdigits = xdigits_u), ch); ++ if (pch != NULL) { ++ val <<= 4; ++ val |= (pch - xdigits); ++ if (val > 0xffff) ++ return (0); ++ saw_xdigit = 1; ++ continue; ++ } ++ if (ch == ':') { ++ curtok = src; ++ if (!saw_xdigit) { ++ if (colonp) ++ return (0); ++ colonp = tp; ++ continue; ++ } ++ if (tp + NS_INT16SZ > endp) ++ return (0); ++ *tp++ = (u_char) (val >> 8) & 0xff; ++ *tp++ = (u_char) val & 0xff; ++ saw_xdigit = 0; ++ val = 0; ++ continue; ++ } ++ if (ch == '.' && ((tp + NS_INADDRSZ) <= endp) && ++ inet_pton4(curtok, tp) > 0) { ++ tp += NS_INADDRSZ; ++ saw_xdigit = 0; ++ break; /* '\0' was seen by inet_pton4(). */ ++ } ++ return (0); ++ } ++ if (saw_xdigit) { ++ if (tp + NS_INT16SZ > endp) ++ return (0); ++ *tp++ = (u_char) (val >> 8) & 0xff; ++ *tp++ = (u_char) val & 0xff; ++ } ++ if (colonp != NULL) { ++ /* ++ * Since some memmove()'s erroneously fail to handle ++ * overlapping regions, we'll do the shift by hand. ++ */ ++ const int n = (int)(tp - colonp); ++ int i; ++ ++ for (i = 1; i <= n; i++) { ++ endp[- i] = colonp[n - i]; ++ colonp[n - i] = 0; ++ } ++ tp = endp; ++ } ++ if (tp != endp) ++ return (0); ++ memcpy(dst, tmp, NS_IN6ADDRSZ); ++ return (1); ++} +diff --git a/CryptoPkg/Library/Include/CrtLibSupport.h b/CryptoPkg/Library/Include/CrtLibSupport.h +index e603fad..5a20ba6 100644 +--- a/CryptoPkg/Library/Include/CrtLibSupport.h ++++ b/CryptoPkg/Library/Include/CrtLibSupport.h +@@ -192,6 +192,7 @@ void abort (void) __attribute__((__noreturn__)); + #else + void abort (void); + #endif ++int inet_pton (int, const char *, void *); + + // + // Macros that directly map functions to BaseLib, BaseMemoryLib, and DebugLib functions +-- +1.8.3.1 + diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-CryptoPkg-Crt-satisfy-inet_pton.c-dependencies-CVE-2.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-CryptoPkg-Crt-satisfy-inet_pton.c-dependencies-CVE-2.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e38a454 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-CryptoPkg-Crt-satisfy-inet_pton.c-dependencies-CVE-2.patch @@ -0,0 +1,188 @@ +From 1ab1024f94401300fe9a1d5cdce6c15a2b091e02 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Laszlo Ersek +Date: Mon, 2 Dec 2019 12:31:50 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 4/9] CryptoPkg/Crt: satisfy "inet_pton.c" dependencies + (CVE-2019-14553) +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +RH-Author: Laszlo Ersek +Message-id: <20191117220052.15700-5-lersek@redhat.com> +Patchwork-id: 92453 +O-Subject: [RHEL-8.2.0 edk2 PATCH 4/9] CryptoPkg/Crt: satisfy "inet_pton.c" dependencies (CVE-2019-14553) +Bugzilla: 1536624 +RH-Acked-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé +RH-Acked-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov + +In a later patch in this series, we're going to resurrect "inet_pton.c" +(originally from the StdLib package). That source file has a number of +standard C and BSD socket dependencies. Provide those dependencies here: + +- The header files below will simply #include : + + - arpa/inet.h + - arpa/nameser.h + - netinet/in.h + - sys/param.h + - sys/socket.h + +- EAFNOSUPPORT comes from "StdLib/Include/errno.h", at commit + e2d3a25f1a31; which is the commit immediately preceding the removal of + StdLib from edk2 (964f432b9b0a). + + Note that the other error macro, which we alread #define, namely EINVAL, + has a value (22) that also matches "StdLib/Include/errno.h". + +- The AF_INET and AF_INET6 address family macros come from + "StdLib/Include/sys/socket.h". + +- The NS_INT16SZ, NS_INADDRSZ and NS_IN6ADDRSZ macros come from + "StdLib/Include/arpa/nameser.h". + +- The "u_int" and "u_char" types come from "StdLib/Include/sys/types.h". + +Cc: David Woodhouse +Cc: Jian J Wang +Cc: Jiaxin Wu +Cc: Sivaraman Nainar +Cc: Xiaoyu Lu +Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=960 +CVE: CVE-2019-14553 +Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek +Reviewed-by: Jian J Wang +Reviewed-by: Jiaxin Wu +(cherry picked from commit 2ac41c12c0d4b3d3ee8f905ab80da019e784de00) +--- + CryptoPkg/Library/Include/CrtLibSupport.h | 16 ++++++++++++++++ + CryptoPkg/Library/Include/arpa/inet.h | 9 +++++++++ + CryptoPkg/Library/Include/arpa/nameser.h | 9 +++++++++ + CryptoPkg/Library/Include/netinet/in.h | 9 +++++++++ + CryptoPkg/Library/Include/sys/param.h | 9 +++++++++ + CryptoPkg/Library/Include/sys/socket.h | 9 +++++++++ + 6 files changed, 61 insertions(+) + create mode 100644 CryptoPkg/Library/Include/arpa/inet.h + create mode 100644 CryptoPkg/Library/Include/arpa/nameser.h + create mode 100644 CryptoPkg/Library/Include/netinet/in.h + create mode 100644 CryptoPkg/Library/Include/sys/param.h + create mode 100644 CryptoPkg/Library/Include/sys/socket.h + +diff --git a/CryptoPkg/Library/Include/CrtLibSupport.h b/CryptoPkg/Library/Include/CrtLibSupport.h +index b90da20..e603fad 100644 +--- a/CryptoPkg/Library/Include/CrtLibSupport.h ++++ b/CryptoPkg/Library/Include/CrtLibSupport.h +@@ -74,6 +74,7 @@ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent + // Definitions for global constants used by CRT library routines + // + #define EINVAL 22 /* Invalid argument */ ++#define EAFNOSUPPORT 47 /* Address family not supported by protocol family */ + #define INT_MAX 0x7FFFFFFF /* Maximum (signed) int value */ + #define LONG_MAX 0X7FFFFFFFL /* max value for a long */ + #define LONG_MIN (-LONG_MAX-1) /* min value for a long */ +@@ -81,13 +82,28 @@ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent + #define CHAR_BIT 8 /* Number of bits in a char */ + + // ++// Address families. ++// ++#define AF_INET 2 /* internetwork: UDP, TCP, etc. */ ++#define AF_INET6 24 /* IP version 6 */ ++ ++// ++// Define constants based on RFC0883, RFC1034, RFC 1035 ++// ++#define NS_INT16SZ 2 /*%< #/bytes of data in a u_int16_t */ ++#define NS_INADDRSZ 4 /*%< IPv4 T_A */ ++#define NS_IN6ADDRSZ 16 /*%< IPv6 T_AAAA */ ++ ++// + // Basic types mapping + // + typedef UINTN size_t; ++typedef UINTN u_int; + typedef INTN ssize_t; + typedef INT32 time_t; + typedef UINT8 __uint8_t; + typedef UINT8 sa_family_t; ++typedef UINT8 u_char; + typedef UINT32 uid_t; + typedef UINT32 gid_t; + +diff --git a/CryptoPkg/Library/Include/arpa/inet.h b/CryptoPkg/Library/Include/arpa/inet.h +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..988e4e0 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/CryptoPkg/Library/Include/arpa/inet.h +@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ ++/** @file ++ Include file to support building third-party standard C / BSD sockets code. ++ ++ Copyright (C) 2019, Red Hat, Inc. ++ ++ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent ++**/ ++ ++#include +diff --git a/CryptoPkg/Library/Include/arpa/nameser.h b/CryptoPkg/Library/Include/arpa/nameser.h +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..988e4e0 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/CryptoPkg/Library/Include/arpa/nameser.h +@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ ++/** @file ++ Include file to support building third-party standard C / BSD sockets code. ++ ++ Copyright (C) 2019, Red Hat, Inc. ++ ++ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent ++**/ ++ ++#include +diff --git a/CryptoPkg/Library/Include/netinet/in.h b/CryptoPkg/Library/Include/netinet/in.h +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..988e4e0 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/CryptoPkg/Library/Include/netinet/in.h +@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ ++/** @file ++ Include file to support building third-party standard C / BSD sockets code. ++ ++ Copyright (C) 2019, Red Hat, Inc. ++ ++ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent ++**/ ++ ++#include +diff --git a/CryptoPkg/Library/Include/sys/param.h b/CryptoPkg/Library/Include/sys/param.h +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..988e4e0 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/CryptoPkg/Library/Include/sys/param.h +@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ ++/** @file ++ Include file to support building third-party standard C / BSD sockets code. ++ ++ Copyright (C) 2019, Red Hat, Inc. ++ ++ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent ++**/ ++ ++#include +diff --git a/CryptoPkg/Library/Include/sys/socket.h b/CryptoPkg/Library/Include/sys/socket.h +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..988e4e0 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/CryptoPkg/Library/Include/sys/socket.h +@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ ++/** @file ++ Include file to support building third-party standard C / BSD sockets code. ++ ++ Copyright (C) 2019, Red Hat, Inc. ++ ++ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent ++**/ ++ ++#include +-- +1.8.3.1 + diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-CryptoPkg-Crt-turn-strchr-into-a-function-CVE-2019-1.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-CryptoPkg-Crt-turn-strchr-into-a-function-CVE-2019-1.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3f4fd02 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-CryptoPkg-Crt-turn-strchr-into-a-function-CVE-2019-1.patch @@ -0,0 +1,86 @@ +From 697cb1880b624f83bc9e926c3614d070eb365f06 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Laszlo Ersek +Date: Mon, 2 Dec 2019 12:31:47 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 3/9] CryptoPkg/Crt: turn strchr() into a function + (CVE-2019-14553) +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +RH-Author: Laszlo Ersek +Message-id: <20191117220052.15700-4-lersek@redhat.com> +Patchwork-id: 92458 +O-Subject: [RHEL-8.2.0 edk2 PATCH 3/9] CryptoPkg/Crt: turn strchr() into a function (CVE-2019-14553) +Bugzilla: 1536624 +RH-Acked-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé +RH-Acked-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov + +According to the ISO C standard, strchr() is a function. We #define it as +a macro. Unfortunately, our macro evaluates the first argument ("str") +twice. If the expression passed for "str" has side effects, the behavior +may be undefined. + +In a later patch in this series, we're going to resurrect "inet_pton.c" +(originally from the StdLib package), which calls strchr() just like that: + + strchr((xdigits = xdigits_l), ch) + strchr((xdigits = xdigits_u), ch) + +To enable this kind of function call, turn strchr() into a function. + +Cc: David Woodhouse +Cc: Jian J Wang +Cc: Jiaxin Wu +Cc: Sivaraman Nainar +Cc: Xiaoyu Lu +Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=960 +CVE: CVE-2019-14553 +Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek +Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daude +Reviewed-by: Jian J Wang +Reviewed-by: Jiaxin Wu +(cherry picked from commit eb520d94dba7369d1886cd5522d5a2c36fb02209) +--- + CryptoPkg/Library/BaseCryptLib/SysCall/CrtWrapper.c | 5 +++++ + CryptoPkg/Library/Include/CrtLibSupport.h | 2 +- + 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/CryptoPkg/Library/BaseCryptLib/SysCall/CrtWrapper.c b/CryptoPkg/Library/BaseCryptLib/SysCall/CrtWrapper.c +index 71a2ef3..42235ab 100644 +--- a/CryptoPkg/Library/BaseCryptLib/SysCall/CrtWrapper.c ++++ b/CryptoPkg/Library/BaseCryptLib/SysCall/CrtWrapper.c +@@ -115,6 +115,11 @@ QuickSortWorker ( + // -- String Manipulation Routines -- + // + ++char *strchr(const char *str, int ch) ++{ ++ return ScanMem8 (str, AsciiStrSize (str), (UINT8)ch); ++} ++ + /* Scan a string for the last occurrence of a character */ + char *strrchr (const char *str, int c) + { +diff --git a/CryptoPkg/Library/Include/CrtLibSupport.h b/CryptoPkg/Library/Include/CrtLibSupport.h +index 5806f50..b90da20 100644 +--- a/CryptoPkg/Library/Include/CrtLibSupport.h ++++ b/CryptoPkg/Library/Include/CrtLibSupport.h +@@ -147,6 +147,7 @@ int isupper (int); + int tolower (int); + int strcmp (const char *, const char *); + int strncasecmp (const char *, const char *, size_t); ++char *strchr (const char *, int); + char *strrchr (const char *, int); + unsigned long strtoul (const char *, char **, int); + long strtol (const char *, char **, int); +@@ -188,7 +189,6 @@ void abort (void); + #define strcpy(strDest,strSource) AsciiStrCpyS(strDest,MAX_STRING_SIZE,strSource) + #define strncpy(strDest,strSource,count) AsciiStrnCpyS(strDest,MAX_STRING_SIZE,strSource,(UINTN)count) + #define strcat(strDest,strSource) AsciiStrCatS(strDest,MAX_STRING_SIZE,strSource) +-#define strchr(str,ch) ScanMem8((VOID *)(str),AsciiStrSize(str),(UINT8)ch) + #define strncmp(string1,string2,count) (int)(AsciiStrnCmp(string1,string2,(UINTN)(count))) + #define strcasecmp(str1,str2) (int)AsciiStriCmp(str1,str2) + #define sprintf(buf,...) AsciiSPrint(buf,MAX_STRING_SIZE,__VA_ARGS__) +-- +1.8.3.1 + diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-CryptoPkg-TlsLib-Add-the-new-API-TlsSetVerifyHost-CV.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-CryptoPkg-TlsLib-Add-the-new-API-TlsSetVerifyHost-CV.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bdaff30 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-CryptoPkg-TlsLib-Add-the-new-API-TlsSetVerifyHost-CV.patch @@ -0,0 +1,134 @@ +From 3885ce313d1d06359aa76b085668c1391d8a5f50 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Laszlo Ersek +Date: Mon, 2 Dec 2019 12:31:43 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 2/9] CryptoPkg/TlsLib: Add the new API "TlsSetVerifyHost" + (CVE-2019-14553) +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +RH-Author: Laszlo Ersek +Message-id: <20191117220052.15700-3-lersek@redhat.com> +Patchwork-id: 92460 +O-Subject: [RHEL-8.2.0 edk2 PATCH 2/9] CryptoPkg/TlsLib: Add the new API "TlsSetVerifyHost" (CVE-2019-14553) +Bugzilla: 1536624 +RH-Acked-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé +RH-Acked-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov + +From: "Wu, Jiaxin" + +REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=960 +CVE: CVE-2019-14553 +In the patch, we add the new API "TlsSetVerifyHost" for the TLS +protocol to set the specified host name that need to be verified. + +Signed-off-by: Wu Jiaxin +Reviewed-by: Ye Ting +Reviewed-by: Long Qin +Reviewed-by: Fu Siyuan +Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek +Message-Id: <20190927034441.3096-3-Jiaxin.wu@intel.com> +Cc: David Woodhouse +Cc: Jian J Wang +Cc: Jiaxin Wu +Cc: Sivaraman Nainar +Cc: Xiaoyu Lu +Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek +Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daude +Reviewed-by: Jian J Wang +(cherry picked from commit 2ca74e1a175232cc201798e27437700adc7fb07e) +--- + CryptoPkg/Include/Library/TlsLib.h | 20 +++++++++++++++++++ + CryptoPkg/Library/TlsLib/TlsConfig.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- + 2 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/CryptoPkg/Include/Library/TlsLib.h b/CryptoPkg/Include/Library/TlsLib.h +index 9875cb6..3af7d4b 100644 +--- a/CryptoPkg/Include/Library/TlsLib.h ++++ b/CryptoPkg/Include/Library/TlsLib.h +@@ -397,6 +397,26 @@ TlsSetVerify ( + ); + + /** ++ Set the specified host name to be verified. ++ ++ @param[in] Tls Pointer to the TLS object. ++ @param[in] Flags The setting flags during the validation. ++ @param[in] HostName The specified host name to be verified. ++ ++ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The HostName setting was set successfully. ++ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The parameter is invalid. ++ @retval EFI_ABORTED Invalid HostName setting. ++ ++**/ ++EFI_STATUS ++EFIAPI ++TlsSetVerifyHost ( ++ IN VOID *Tls, ++ IN UINT32 Flags, ++ IN CHAR8 *HostName ++ ); ++ ++/** + Sets a TLS/SSL session ID to be used during TLS/SSL connect. + + This function sets a session ID to be used when the TLS/SSL connection is +diff --git a/CryptoPkg/Library/TlsLib/TlsConfig.c b/CryptoPkg/Library/TlsLib/TlsConfig.c +index 74b577d..2bf5aee 100644 +--- a/CryptoPkg/Library/TlsLib/TlsConfig.c ++++ b/CryptoPkg/Library/TlsLib/TlsConfig.c +@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ + /** @file + SSL/TLS Configuration Library Wrapper Implementation over OpenSSL. + +-Copyright (c) 2016 - 2017, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
++Copyright (c) 2016 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
+ (C) Copyright 2016 Hewlett Packard Enterprise Development LP
+ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent + +@@ -498,6 +498,42 @@ TlsSetVerify ( + } + + /** ++ Set the specified host name to be verified. ++ ++ @param[in] Tls Pointer to the TLS object. ++ @param[in] Flags The setting flags during the validation. ++ @param[in] HostName The specified host name to be verified. ++ ++ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The HostName setting was set successfully. ++ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The parameter is invalid. ++ @retval EFI_ABORTED Invalid HostName setting. ++ ++**/ ++EFI_STATUS ++EFIAPI ++TlsSetVerifyHost ( ++ IN VOID *Tls, ++ IN UINT32 Flags, ++ IN CHAR8 *HostName ++ ) ++{ ++ TLS_CONNECTION *TlsConn; ++ ++ TlsConn = (TLS_CONNECTION *) Tls; ++ if (TlsConn == NULL || TlsConn->Ssl == NULL || HostName == NULL) { ++ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; ++ } ++ ++ SSL_set_hostflags(TlsConn->Ssl, Flags); ++ ++ if (SSL_set1_host(TlsConn->Ssl, HostName) == 0) { ++ return EFI_ABORTED; ++ } ++ ++ return EFI_SUCCESS; ++} ++ ++/** + Sets a TLS/SSL session ID to be used during TLS/SSL connect. + + This function sets a session ID to be used when the TLS/SSL connection is +-- +1.8.3.1 + diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-CryptoPkg-TlsLib-TlsSetVerifyHost-parse-IP-address-l.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-CryptoPkg-TlsLib-TlsSetVerifyHost-parse-IP-address-l.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e9fae52 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-CryptoPkg-TlsLib-TlsSetVerifyHost-parse-IP-address-l.patch @@ -0,0 +1,100 @@ +From 970b5f67512e00fb26765a14b4a1cb8a8a04276d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Laszlo Ersek +Date: Mon, 2 Dec 2019 12:31:57 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 6/9] CryptoPkg/TlsLib: TlsSetVerifyHost: parse IP address + literals as such (CVE-2019-14553) +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +RH-Author: Laszlo Ersek +Message-id: <20191117220052.15700-7-lersek@redhat.com> +Patchwork-id: 92452 +O-Subject: [RHEL-8.2.0 edk2 PATCH 6/9] CryptoPkg/TlsLib: TlsSetVerifyHost: parse IP address literals as such (CVE-2019-14553) +Bugzilla: 1536624 +RH-Acked-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé +RH-Acked-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov + +Using the inet_pton() function that we imported in the previous patches, +recognize if "HostName" is an IP address literal, and then parse it into +binary representation. Passing the latter to OpenSSL for server +certificate validation is important, per RFC-2818 +: + +> In some cases, the URI is specified as an IP address rather than a +> hostname. In this case, the iPAddress subjectAltName must be present in +> the certificate and must exactly match the IP in the URI. + +Note: we cannot use X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip_asc() because in the OpenSSL +version that is currently consumed by edk2, said function depends on +sscanf() for parsing IPv4 literals. In +"CryptoPkg/Library/BaseCryptLib/SysCall/CrtWrapper.c", we only provide an +empty -- always failing -- stub for sscanf(), however. + +Cc: David Woodhouse +Cc: Jian J Wang +Cc: Jiaxin Wu +Cc: Sivaraman Nainar +Cc: Xiaoyu Lu +Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=960 +CVE: CVE-2019-14553 +Suggested-by: David Woodhouse +Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek +Acked-by: Jian J Wang +Reviewed-by: Jiaxin Wu +(cherry picked from commit 1e72b1fb2ec597caedb5170079bb213f6d67f32a) +--- + CryptoPkg/Library/TlsLib/TlsConfig.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---- + 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/CryptoPkg/Library/TlsLib/TlsConfig.c b/CryptoPkg/Library/TlsLib/TlsConfig.c +index 2bf5aee..307eb57 100644 +--- a/CryptoPkg/Library/TlsLib/TlsConfig.c ++++ b/CryptoPkg/Library/TlsLib/TlsConfig.c +@@ -517,7 +517,11 @@ TlsSetVerifyHost ( + IN CHAR8 *HostName + ) + { +- TLS_CONNECTION *TlsConn; ++ TLS_CONNECTION *TlsConn; ++ X509_VERIFY_PARAM *VerifyParam; ++ UINTN BinaryAddressSize; ++ UINT8 BinaryAddress[MAX (NS_INADDRSZ, NS_IN6ADDRSZ)]; ++ INTN ParamStatus; + + TlsConn = (TLS_CONNECTION *) Tls; + if (TlsConn == NULL || TlsConn->Ssl == NULL || HostName == NULL) { +@@ -526,11 +530,27 @@ TlsSetVerifyHost ( + + SSL_set_hostflags(TlsConn->Ssl, Flags); + +- if (SSL_set1_host(TlsConn->Ssl, HostName) == 0) { +- return EFI_ABORTED; ++ VerifyParam = SSL_get0_param (TlsConn->Ssl); ++ ASSERT (VerifyParam != NULL); ++ ++ BinaryAddressSize = 0; ++ if (inet_pton (AF_INET6, HostName, BinaryAddress) == 1) { ++ BinaryAddressSize = NS_IN6ADDRSZ; ++ } else if (inet_pton (AF_INET, HostName, BinaryAddress) == 1) { ++ BinaryAddressSize = NS_INADDRSZ; + } + +- return EFI_SUCCESS; ++ if (BinaryAddressSize > 0) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_VERBOSE, "%a:%a: parsed \"%a\" as an IPv%c address " ++ "literal\n", gEfiCallerBaseName, __FUNCTION__, HostName, ++ (UINTN)((BinaryAddressSize == NS_IN6ADDRSZ) ? '6' : '4'))); ++ ParamStatus = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip (VerifyParam, BinaryAddress, ++ BinaryAddressSize); ++ } else { ++ ParamStatus = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host (VerifyParam, HostName, 0); ++ } ++ ++ return (ParamStatus == 1) ? EFI_SUCCESS : EFI_ABORTED; + } + + /** +-- +1.8.3.1 + diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-MdeModulePkg-Enable-Disable-S3BootScript-dynamically.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-MdeModulePkg-Enable-Disable-S3BootScript-dynamically.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a635f82 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-MdeModulePkg-Enable-Disable-S3BootScript-dynamically.patch @@ -0,0 +1,148 @@ +From 4ef57a1e6b9411e785e00e8874bd5c67235e9134 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Laszlo Ersek +Date: Tue, 11 Feb 2020 17:01:59 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 1/2] MdeModulePkg: Enable/Disable S3BootScript dynamically. +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +RH-Author: Laszlo Ersek +Message-id: <20200211170200.12389-2-lersek@redhat.com> +Patchwork-id: 93776 +O-Subject: [RHEL-8.2.0 edk2 PATCH 1/2] MdeModulePkg: Enable/Disable S3BootScript dynamically. +Bugzilla: 1801274 +RH-Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini +RH-Acked-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé + +From: Chasel Chiu + +--v-- RHEL8 note start --v-- + +This patch is cherry-picked from upstream as a contextual (not semantic / +functional) pre-requisite for the next patch. + +Functionally, this patch makes no difference in OVMF, for two reasons: + +- Downstream, we don't enable S3 anyway (per QEMU default). + +- The S3-related modules that are built into OVMF (S3SaveStateDxe, + BootScriptExecutorDxe) already consider PcdAcpiS3Enable, and exit their + entry point functions with EFI_UNSUPPORTED when the PCD is FALSE. As a + consequence, the DESTRUCTOR function of the PiDxeS3BootScriptLib library + instance (which is linked into those binaries) will undo whatever the + CONSTRUCTOR function did; no resources will be leaked. + + https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/message/47996 + http://mid.mail-archive.com/e43e3f56-d2db-7989-b6f1-03e1c810d908@redhat.com + +--^-- RHEL8 note end --^-- + +REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2212 + +In binary model the same binary may have to support both +S3 enabled and disabled scenarios, however not all DXE +drivers linking PiDxeS3BootScriptLib can return error to +invoke library DESTRUCTOR for releasing resource. + +To support this usage model below PCD is used to skip +S3BootScript functions when PCD set to FALSE: + gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdAcpiS3Enable + +Test: Verified on internal platform and S3BootScript + functions can be skipped by PCD during boot time. + +Cc: Hao A Wu +Cc: Eric Dong +Cc: Nate DeSimone +Cc: Liming Gao +Cc: Laszlo Ersek +Signed-off-by: Chasel Chiu +Reviewed-by: Nate DeSimone +Reviewed-by: Eric Dong +Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek +(cherry picked from commit ed9db1b91ceba7d3a24743d4d9314c6fbe11c4b3) +Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek +Signed-off-by: Miroslav Rezanina +--- + .../Library/PiDxeS3BootScriptLib/BootScriptSave.c | 17 ++++++++++++++++- + .../Library/PiDxeS3BootScriptLib/DxeS3BootScriptLib.inf | 4 ++-- + 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Library/PiDxeS3BootScriptLib/BootScriptSave.c b/MdeModulePkg/Library/PiDxeS3BootScriptLib/BootScriptSave.c +index c116727..9106e7d 100644 +--- a/MdeModulePkg/Library/PiDxeS3BootScriptLib/BootScriptSave.c ++++ b/MdeModulePkg/Library/PiDxeS3BootScriptLib/BootScriptSave.c +@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ + /** @file + Save the S3 data to S3 boot script. + +- Copyright (c) 2006 - 2017, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
++ Copyright (c) 2006 - 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
+ + SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent + +@@ -124,6 +124,7 @@ VOID *mRegistrationSmmReadyToLock = NULL; + BOOLEAN mS3BootScriptTableAllocated = FALSE; + BOOLEAN mS3BootScriptTableSmmAllocated = FALSE; + EFI_SMM_SYSTEM_TABLE2 *mBootScriptSmst = NULL; ++BOOLEAN mAcpiS3Enable = TRUE; + + /** + This is an internal function to add a terminate node the entry, recalculate the table +@@ -436,6 +437,12 @@ S3BootScriptLibInitialize ( + BOOLEAN InSmm; + EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS Buffer; + ++ if (!PcdGetBool (PcdAcpiS3Enable)) { ++ mAcpiS3Enable = FALSE; ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: Skip S3BootScript because ACPI S3 disabled.\n", gEfiCallerBaseName)); ++ return RETURN_SUCCESS; ++ } ++ + S3TablePtr = (SCRIPT_TABLE_PRIVATE_DATA*)(UINTN)PcdGet64(PcdS3BootScriptTablePrivateDataPtr); + // + // The Boot script private data is not be initialized. create it +@@ -562,6 +569,10 @@ S3BootScriptLibDeinitialize ( + { + EFI_STATUS Status; + ++ if (!mAcpiS3Enable) { ++ return RETURN_SUCCESS; ++ } ++ + DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "%a() in %a module\n", __FUNCTION__, gEfiCallerBaseName)); + + if (mEventDxeSmmReadyToLock != NULL) { +@@ -810,6 +821,10 @@ S3BootScriptGetEntryAddAddress ( + { + UINT8* NewEntryPtr; + ++ if (!mAcpiS3Enable) { ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ + if (mS3BootScriptTablePtr->SmmLocked) { + // + // We need check InSmm, because after SmmReadyToLock, only SMM driver is allowed to write boot script. +diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Library/PiDxeS3BootScriptLib/DxeS3BootScriptLib.inf b/MdeModulePkg/Library/PiDxeS3BootScriptLib/DxeS3BootScriptLib.inf +index 517ea69..2b894c9 100644 +--- a/MdeModulePkg/Library/PiDxeS3BootScriptLib/DxeS3BootScriptLib.inf ++++ b/MdeModulePkg/Library/PiDxeS3BootScriptLib/DxeS3BootScriptLib.inf +@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ + ## @file + # DXE S3 boot script Library. + # +-# Copyright (c) 2006 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
++# Copyright (c) 2006 - 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
+ # + # SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent + # +@@ -65,4 +65,4 @@ + ## SOMETIMES_PRODUCES + gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdS3BootScriptTablePrivateSmmDataPtr + gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdS3BootScriptRuntimeTableReservePageNumber ## CONSUMES +- ++ gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdAcpiS3Enable ## CONSUMES +-- +1.8.3.1 + diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-MdeModulePkg-PiDxeS3BootScriptLib-Fix-potential-nume.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-MdeModulePkg-PiDxeS3BootScriptLib-Fix-potential-nume.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4899f97 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-MdeModulePkg-PiDxeS3BootScriptLib-Fix-potential-nume.patch @@ -0,0 +1,182 @@ +From 51d2956d480fef83f765013c8aec7f7ddc14b84d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Laszlo Ersek +Date: Tue, 11 Feb 2020 17:02:00 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 2/2] MdeModulePkg/PiDxeS3BootScriptLib: Fix potential numeric + truncation (CVE-2019-14563) +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +RH-Author: Laszlo Ersek +Message-id: <20200211170200.12389-3-lersek@redhat.com> +Patchwork-id: 93777 +O-Subject: [RHEL-8.2.0 edk2 PATCH 2/2] MdeModulePkg/PiDxeS3BootScriptLib: Fix potential numeric truncation (CVE-2019-14563) +Bugzilla: 1801274 +RH-Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini +RH-Acked-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé + +From: Hao A Wu + +REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2001 + +For S3BootScriptLib APIs: + +S3BootScriptSaveIoWrite +S3BootScriptSaveMemWrite +S3BootScriptSavePciCfgWrite +S3BootScriptSavePciCfg2Write +S3BootScriptSaveSmbusExecute +S3BootScriptSaveInformation +S3BootScriptSaveInformationAsciiString +S3BootScriptLabel (happen in S3BootScriptLabelInternal()) + +possible numeric truncations will happen that may lead to S3 boot script +entry with improper size being returned to store the boot script data. +This commit will add checks to prevent this kind of issue. + +Please note that the remaining S3BootScriptLib APIs: + +S3BootScriptSaveIoReadWrite +S3BootScriptSaveMemReadWrite +S3BootScriptSavePciCfgReadWrite +S3BootScriptSavePciCfg2ReadWrite +S3BootScriptSaveStall +S3BootScriptSaveDispatch2 +S3BootScriptSaveDispatch +S3BootScriptSaveMemPoll +S3BootScriptSaveIoPoll +S3BootScriptSavePciPoll +S3BootScriptSavePci2Poll +S3BootScriptCloseTable +S3BootScriptExecute +S3BootScriptMoveLastOpcode +S3BootScriptCompare + +are not affected by such numeric truncation. + +Signed-off-by: Hao A Wu +Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek +Reviewed-by: Eric Dong +Acked-by: Jian J Wang +(cherry picked from commit 322ac05f8bbc1bce066af1dabd1b70ccdbe28891) +Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek +Signed-off-by: Miroslav Rezanina +--- + .../Library/PiDxeS3BootScriptLib/BootScriptSave.c | 52 +++++++++++++++++++++- + 1 file changed, 51 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Library/PiDxeS3BootScriptLib/BootScriptSave.c b/MdeModulePkg/Library/PiDxeS3BootScriptLib/BootScriptSave.c +index 9106e7d..9315fc9 100644 +--- a/MdeModulePkg/Library/PiDxeS3BootScriptLib/BootScriptSave.c ++++ b/MdeModulePkg/Library/PiDxeS3BootScriptLib/BootScriptSave.c +@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ + /** @file + Save the S3 data to S3 boot script. + +- Copyright (c) 2006 - 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
++ Copyright (c) 2006 - 2020, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
+ + SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent + +@@ -1006,6 +1006,14 @@ S3BootScriptSaveIoWrite ( + EFI_BOOT_SCRIPT_IO_WRITE ScriptIoWrite; + + WidthInByte = (UINT8) (0x01 << (Width & 0x03)); ++ ++ // ++ // Truncation check ++ // ++ if ((Count > MAX_UINT8) || ++ (WidthInByte * Count > MAX_UINT8 - sizeof (EFI_BOOT_SCRIPT_IO_WRITE))) { ++ return RETURN_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; ++ } + Length = (UINT8)(sizeof (EFI_BOOT_SCRIPT_IO_WRITE) + (WidthInByte * Count)); + + Script = S3BootScriptGetEntryAddAddress (Length); +@@ -1102,6 +1110,14 @@ S3BootScriptSaveMemWrite ( + EFI_BOOT_SCRIPT_MEM_WRITE ScriptMemWrite; + + WidthInByte = (UINT8) (0x01 << (Width & 0x03)); ++ ++ // ++ // Truncation check ++ // ++ if ((Count > MAX_UINT8) || ++ (WidthInByte * Count > MAX_UINT8 - sizeof (EFI_BOOT_SCRIPT_MEM_WRITE))) { ++ return RETURN_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; ++ } + Length = (UINT8)(sizeof (EFI_BOOT_SCRIPT_MEM_WRITE) + (WidthInByte * Count)); + + Script = S3BootScriptGetEntryAddAddress (Length); +@@ -1206,6 +1222,14 @@ S3BootScriptSavePciCfgWrite ( + } + + WidthInByte = (UINT8) (0x01 << (Width & 0x03)); ++ ++ // ++ // Truncation check ++ // ++ if ((Count > MAX_UINT8) || ++ (WidthInByte * Count > MAX_UINT8 - sizeof (EFI_BOOT_SCRIPT_PCI_CONFIG_WRITE))) { ++ return RETURN_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; ++ } + Length = (UINT8)(sizeof (EFI_BOOT_SCRIPT_PCI_CONFIG_WRITE) + (WidthInByte * Count)); + + Script = S3BootScriptGetEntryAddAddress (Length); +@@ -1324,6 +1348,14 @@ S3BootScriptSavePciCfg2Write ( + } + + WidthInByte = (UINT8) (0x01 << (Width & 0x03)); ++ ++ // ++ // Truncation check ++ // ++ if ((Count > MAX_UINT8) || ++ (WidthInByte * Count > MAX_UINT8 - sizeof (EFI_BOOT_SCRIPT_PCI_CONFIG2_WRITE))) { ++ return RETURN_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; ++ } + Length = (UINT8)(sizeof (EFI_BOOT_SCRIPT_PCI_CONFIG2_WRITE) + (WidthInByte * Count)); + + Script = S3BootScriptGetEntryAddAddress (Length); +@@ -1549,6 +1581,12 @@ S3BootScriptSaveSmbusExecute ( + return Status; + } + ++ // ++ // Truncation check ++ // ++ if (BufferLength > MAX_UINT8 - sizeof (EFI_BOOT_SCRIPT_SMBUS_EXECUTE)) { ++ return RETURN_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; ++ } + DataSize = (UINT8)(sizeof (EFI_BOOT_SCRIPT_SMBUS_EXECUTE) + BufferLength); + + Script = S3BootScriptGetEntryAddAddress (DataSize); +@@ -1736,6 +1774,12 @@ S3BootScriptSaveInformation ( + UINT8 *Script; + EFI_BOOT_SCRIPT_INFORMATION ScriptInformation; + ++ // ++ // Truncation check ++ // ++ if (InformationLength > MAX_UINT8 - sizeof (EFI_BOOT_SCRIPT_INFORMATION)) { ++ return RETURN_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; ++ } + Length = (UINT8)(sizeof (EFI_BOOT_SCRIPT_INFORMATION) + InformationLength); + + Script = S3BootScriptGetEntryAddAddress (Length); +@@ -2195,6 +2239,12 @@ S3BootScriptLabelInternal ( + UINT8 *Script; + EFI_BOOT_SCRIPT_INFORMATION ScriptInformation; + ++ // ++ // Truncation check ++ // ++ if (InformationLength > MAX_UINT8 - sizeof (EFI_BOOT_SCRIPT_INFORMATION)) { ++ return RETURN_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; ++ } + Length = (UINT8)(sizeof (EFI_BOOT_SCRIPT_INFORMATION) + InformationLength); + + Script = S3BootScriptGetEntryAddAddress (Length); +-- +1.8.3.1 + diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-MdeModulePkg-UefiBootManagerLib-log-reserved-mem-all.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-MdeModulePkg-UefiBootManagerLib-log-reserved-mem-all.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..92bb1d4 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-MdeModulePkg-UefiBootManagerLib-log-reserved-mem-all.patch @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ +From e57f49101a66663a4f5425995e9ea97ae0858e1b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Laszlo Ersek +Date: Tue, 14 Jan 2020 12:39:05 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 1/2] MdeModulePkg/UefiBootManagerLib: log reserved mem + allocation failure +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +RH-Author: Laszlo Ersek +Message-id: <20200114123906.8547-2-lersek@redhat.com> +Patchwork-id: 93339 +O-Subject: [RHEL-8.2.0 edk2 PATCH 1/2] MdeModulePkg/UefiBootManagerLib: log reserved mem allocation failure +Bugzilla: 1789797 +RH-Acked-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov +RH-Acked-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé + +The LoadFile protocol can report such a large buffer size that we cannot +allocate enough reserved pages for. This particularly affects HTTP(S) +Boot, if the remote file is very large (for example, an ISO image). + +While the TianoCore wiki mentions this at +: + +> The maximum RAM disk image size depends on how much continuous reserved +> memory block the platform could provide. + +it's hard to remember; so log a DEBUG_ERROR message when the allocation +fails. + +This patch produces error messages such as: + +> UiApp:BmExpandLoadFile: failed to allocate reserved pages: +> BufferSize=4501536768 +> LoadFile="PciRoot(0x0)/Pci(0x3,0x0)/MAC(5254001B103E,0x1)/ +> IPv4(0.0.0.0,TCP,DHCP,192.168.124.106,192.168.124.1,255.255.255.0)/ +> Dns(192.168.124.1)/ +> Uri(https://ipv4-server/RHEL-7.7-20190723.1-Server-x86_64-dvd1.iso)" +> FilePath="" + +(Manually rewrapped here for keeping PatchCheck.py happy.) + +Cc: Hao A Wu +Cc: Jian J Wang +Cc: Ray Ni +Cc: Zhichao Gao +Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek +Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daude +Reviewed-by: Siyuan Fu +Acked-by: Hao A Wu +(cherry picked from commit a56af23f066e2816c67b7c6e64de7ddefcd70780) +Signed-off-by: Miroslav Rezanina +--- + MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmBoot.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmBoot.c b/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmBoot.c +index 952033f..ded9ae9 100644 +--- a/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmBoot.c ++++ b/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmBoot.c +@@ -1386,6 +1386,37 @@ BmExpandLoadFile ( + // + FileBuffer = AllocateReservedPages (EFI_SIZE_TO_PAGES (BufferSize)); + if (FileBuffer == NULL) { ++ DEBUG_CODE ( ++ EFI_DEVICE_PATH *LoadFilePath; ++ CHAR16 *LoadFileText; ++ CHAR16 *FileText; ++ ++ LoadFilePath = DevicePathFromHandle (LoadFileHandle); ++ if (LoadFilePath == NULL) { ++ LoadFileText = NULL; ++ } else { ++ LoadFileText = ConvertDevicePathToText (LoadFilePath, FALSE, FALSE); ++ } ++ FileText = ConvertDevicePathToText (FilePath, FALSE, FALSE); ++ ++ DEBUG (( ++ DEBUG_ERROR, ++ "%a:%a: failed to allocate reserved pages: " ++ "BufferSize=%Lu LoadFile=\"%s\" FilePath=\"%s\"\n", ++ gEfiCallerBaseName, ++ __FUNCTION__, ++ (UINT64)BufferSize, ++ LoadFileText, ++ FileText ++ )); ++ ++ if (FileText != NULL) { ++ FreePool (FileText); ++ } ++ if (LoadFileText != NULL) { ++ FreePool (LoadFileText); ++ } ++ ); + return NULL; + } + +-- +1.8.3.1 + diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-MdePkg-Include-Protocol-Tls.h-Add-the-data-type-of-E.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-MdePkg-Include-Protocol-Tls.h-Add-the-data-type-of-E.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f1b88d3 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-MdePkg-Include-Protocol-Tls.h-Add-the-data-type-of-E.patch @@ -0,0 +1,156 @@ +From 22ebe3ff84003e9256759e230ac68da35c6d77a2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Laszlo Ersek +Date: Mon, 2 Dec 2019 12:31:37 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 1/9] MdePkg/Include/Protocol/Tls.h: Add the data type of + EfiTlsVerifyHost (CVE-2019-14553) +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +RH-Author: Laszlo Ersek +Message-id: <20191117220052.15700-2-lersek@redhat.com> +Patchwork-id: 92457 +O-Subject: [RHEL-8.2.0 edk2 PATCH 1/9] MdePkg/Include/Protocol/Tls.h: Add the data type of EfiTlsVerifyHost (CVE-2019-14553) +Bugzilla: 1536624 +RH-Acked-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé +RH-Acked-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov + +From: "Wu, Jiaxin" + +REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=960 +CVE: CVE-2019-14553 +In the patch, we add the new data type named "EfiTlsVerifyHost" and +the EFI_TLS_VERIFY_HOST_FLAG for the TLS protocol consumer (HTTP) +to enable the host name check so as to avoid the potential +Man-In-The-Middle attack. + +Signed-off-by: Wu Jiaxin +Reviewed-by: Ye Ting +Reviewed-by: Long Qin +Reviewed-by: Fu Siyuan +Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek +Message-Id: <20190927034441.3096-2-Jiaxin.wu@intel.com> +Cc: David Woodhouse +Cc: Jian J Wang +Cc: Jiaxin Wu +Cc: Sivaraman Nainar +Cc: Xiaoyu Lu +Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek +Reviewed-by: Liming Gao +(cherry picked from commit 31efec82796cb950e99d1622aa9c0eb8380613a0) +--- + MdePkg/Include/Protocol/Tls.h | 68 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- + 1 file changed, 57 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/MdePkg/Include/Protocol/Tls.h b/MdePkg/Include/Protocol/Tls.h +index bf1b672..af524ae 100644 +--- a/MdePkg/Include/Protocol/Tls.h ++++ b/MdePkg/Include/Protocol/Tls.h +@@ -42,10 +42,6 @@ typedef struct _EFI_TLS_PROTOCOL EFI_TLS_PROTOCOL; + /// + typedef enum { + /// +- /// Session Configuration +- /// +- +- /// + /// TLS session Version. The corresponding Data is of type EFI_TLS_VERSION. + /// + EfiTlsVersion, +@@ -86,11 +82,6 @@ typedef enum { + /// The corresponding Data is of type EFI_TLS_SESSION_STATE. + /// + EfiTlsSessionState, +- +- /// +- /// Session information +- /// +- + /// + /// TLS session data client random. + /// The corresponding Data is of type EFI_TLS_RANDOM. +@@ -106,9 +97,15 @@ typedef enum { + /// The corresponding Data is of type EFI_TLS_MASTER_SECRET. + /// + EfiTlsKeyMaterial, ++ /// ++ /// TLS session hostname for validation which is used to verify whether the name ++ /// within the peer certificate matches a given host name. ++ /// This parameter is invalid when EfiTlsVerifyMethod is EFI_TLS_VERIFY_NONE. ++ /// The corresponding Data is of type EFI_TLS_VERIFY_HOST. ++ /// ++ EfiTlsVerifyHost, + + EfiTlsSessionDataTypeMaximum +- + } EFI_TLS_SESSION_DATA_TYPE; + + /// +@@ -178,7 +175,8 @@ typedef UINT32 EFI_TLS_VERIFY; + /// + #define EFI_TLS_VERIFY_PEER 0x1 + /// +-/// TLS session will fail peer certificate is absent. ++/// EFI_TLS_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT is only meaningful in the server mode. ++/// TLS session will fail if client certificate is absent. + /// + #define EFI_TLS_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT 0x2 + /// +@@ -188,6 +186,54 @@ typedef UINT32 EFI_TLS_VERIFY; + #define EFI_TLS_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE 0x4 + + /// ++/// EFI_TLS_VERIFY_HOST_FLAG ++/// ++typedef UINT32 EFI_TLS_VERIFY_HOST_FLAG; ++/// ++/// There is no additional flags set for hostname validation. ++/// Wildcards are supported and they match only in the left-most label. ++/// ++#define EFI_TLS_VERIFY_FLAG_NONE 0x00 ++/// ++/// Always check the Subject Distinguished Name (DN) in the peer certificate even if the ++/// certificate contains Subject Alternative Name (SAN). ++/// ++#define EFI_TLS_VERIFY_FLAG_ALWAYS_CHECK_SUBJECT 0x01 ++/// ++/// Disable the match of all wildcards. ++/// ++#define EFI_TLS_VERIFY_FLAG_NO_WILDCARDS 0x02 ++/// ++/// Disable the "*" as wildcard in labels that have a prefix or suffix (e.g. "www*" or "*www"). ++/// ++#define EFI_TLS_VERIFY_FLAG_NO_PARTIAL_WILDCARDS 0x04 ++/// ++/// Allow the "*" to match more than one labels. Otherwise, only matches a single label. ++/// ++#define EFI_TLS_VERIFY_FLAG_MULTI_LABEL_WILDCARDS 0x08 ++/// ++/// Restrict to only match direct child sub-domains which start with ".". ++/// For example, a name of ".example.com" would match "www.example.com" with this flag, ++/// but would not match "www.sub.example.com". ++/// ++#define EFI_TLS_VERIFY_FLAG_SINGLE_LABEL_SUBDOMAINS 0x10 ++/// ++/// Never check the Subject Distinguished Name (DN) even there is no ++/// Subject Alternative Name (SAN) in the certificate. ++/// ++#define EFI_TLS_VERIFY_FLAG_NEVER_CHECK_SUBJECT 0x20 ++ ++/// ++/// EFI_TLS_VERIFY_HOST ++/// ++#pragma pack (1) ++typedef struct { ++ EFI_TLS_VERIFY_HOST_FLAG Flags; ++ CHAR8 *HostName; ++} EFI_TLS_VERIFY_HOST; ++#pragma pack () ++ ++/// + /// EFI_TLS_RANDOM + /// Note: The definition of EFI_TLS_RANDOM is from "RFC 5246 A.4.1. + /// Hello Messages". +-- +1.8.3.1 + diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-HttpDxe-Set-the-HostName-for-the-verifica.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-HttpDxe-Set-the-HostName-for-the-verifica.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..06caad5 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-HttpDxe-Set-the-HostName-for-the-verifica.patch @@ -0,0 +1,99 @@ +From d28c0053e94b8e721307ac1698d86e5dfb328e6d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Laszlo Ersek +Date: Mon, 2 Dec 2019 12:32:04 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 8/9] NetworkPkg/HttpDxe: Set the HostName for the verification + (CVE-2019-14553) +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +RH-Author: Laszlo Ersek +Message-id: <20191117220052.15700-9-lersek@redhat.com> +Patchwork-id: 92459 +O-Subject: [RHEL-8.2.0 edk2 PATCH 8/9] NetworkPkg/HttpDxe: Set the HostName for the verification (CVE-2019-14553) +Bugzilla: 1536624 +RH-Acked-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov +RH-Acked-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé + +From: "Wu, Jiaxin" + +REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=960 +CVE: CVE-2019-14553 +Set the HostName by consuming TLS protocol to enable the host name +check so as to avoid the potential Man-In-The-Middle attack. + +Signed-off-by: Wu Jiaxin +Reviewed-by: Ye Ting +Reviewed-by: Long Qin +Reviewed-by: Fu Siyuan +Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek +Message-Id: <20190927034441.3096-5-Jiaxin.wu@intel.com> +Cc: David Woodhouse +Cc: Jian J Wang +Cc: Jiaxin Wu +Cc: Sivaraman Nainar +Cc: Xiaoyu Lu +Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek +(cherry picked from commit e2fc50812895b17e8b23f5a9c43cde29531b200f) +--- + NetworkPkg/HttpDxe/HttpProto.h | 1 + + NetworkPkg/HttpDxe/HttpsSupport.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++---- + 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/NetworkPkg/HttpDxe/HttpProto.h b/NetworkPkg/HttpDxe/HttpProto.h +index 6e1f517..34308e0 100644 +--- a/NetworkPkg/HttpDxe/HttpProto.h ++++ b/NetworkPkg/HttpDxe/HttpProto.h +@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ typedef struct { + EFI_TLS_VERSION Version; + EFI_TLS_CONNECTION_END ConnectionEnd; + EFI_TLS_VERIFY VerifyMethod; ++ EFI_TLS_VERIFY_HOST VerifyHost; + EFI_TLS_SESSION_STATE SessionState; + } TLS_CONFIG_DATA; + +diff --git a/NetworkPkg/HttpDxe/HttpsSupport.c b/NetworkPkg/HttpDxe/HttpsSupport.c +index 988bbcb..5dfb13b 100644 +--- a/NetworkPkg/HttpDxe/HttpsSupport.c ++++ b/NetworkPkg/HttpDxe/HttpsSupport.c +@@ -623,13 +623,16 @@ TlsConfigureSession ( + // + // TlsConfigData initialization + // +- HttpInstance->TlsConfigData.ConnectionEnd = EfiTlsClient; +- HttpInstance->TlsConfigData.VerifyMethod = EFI_TLS_VERIFY_PEER; +- HttpInstance->TlsConfigData.SessionState = EfiTlsSessionNotStarted; ++ HttpInstance->TlsConfigData.ConnectionEnd = EfiTlsClient; ++ HttpInstance->TlsConfigData.VerifyMethod = EFI_TLS_VERIFY_PEER; ++ HttpInstance->TlsConfigData.VerifyHost.Flags = EFI_TLS_VERIFY_FLAG_NO_WILDCARDS; ++ HttpInstance->TlsConfigData.VerifyHost.HostName = HttpInstance->RemoteHost; ++ HttpInstance->TlsConfigData.SessionState = EfiTlsSessionNotStarted; + + // + // EfiTlsConnectionEnd, +- // EfiTlsVerifyMethod ++ // EfiTlsVerifyMethod, ++ // EfiTlsVerifyHost, + // EfiTlsSessionState + // + Status = HttpInstance->Tls->SetSessionData ( +@@ -654,6 +657,16 @@ TlsConfigureSession ( + + Status = HttpInstance->Tls->SetSessionData ( + HttpInstance->Tls, ++ EfiTlsVerifyHost, ++ &HttpInstance->TlsConfigData.VerifyHost, ++ sizeof (EFI_TLS_VERIFY_HOST) ++ ); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ return Status; ++ } ++ ++ Status = HttpInstance->Tls->SetSessionData ( ++ HttpInstance->Tls, + EfiTlsSessionState, + &(HttpInstance->TlsConfigData.SessionState), + sizeof (EFI_TLS_SESSION_STATE) +-- +1.8.3.1 + diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-HttpDxe-fix-32-bit-truncation-in-HTTPS-do.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-HttpDxe-fix-32-bit-truncation-in-HTTPS-do.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ec51be6 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-HttpDxe-fix-32-bit-truncation-in-HTTPS-do.patch @@ -0,0 +1,120 @@ +From 555d93f2daa551dc2311b15210a918aa79ed18ff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Laszlo Ersek +Date: Tue, 14 Jan 2020 12:39:06 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 2/2] NetworkPkg/HttpDxe: fix 32-bit truncation in HTTPS + download +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +RH-Author: Laszlo Ersek +Message-id: <20200114123906.8547-3-lersek@redhat.com> +Patchwork-id: 93340 +O-Subject: [RHEL-8.2.0 edk2 PATCH 2/2] NetworkPkg/HttpDxe: fix 32-bit truncation in HTTPS download +Bugzilla: 1789797 +RH-Acked-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov +RH-Acked-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé + +When downloading over TLS, each TLS message ("APP packet") is returned as +a (decrypted) fragment table by EFI_TLS_PROTOCOL.ProcessPacket(). + +The TlsProcessMessage() function in "NetworkPkg/HttpDxe/HttpsSupport.c" +linearizes the fragment table into a single contiguous data block. The +resultant flat data block contains both TLS headers and data. + +The HttpsReceive() function parses the actual application data -- in this +case: decrypted HTTP data -- out of the flattened TLS data block, peeling +off the TLS headers. + +The HttpResponseWorker() function in "NetworkPkg/HttpDxe/HttpImpl.c" +propagates this HTTP data outwards, implementing the +EFI_HTTP_PROTOCOL.Response() function. + +Now consider the following documentation for EFI_HTTP_PROTOCOL.Response(), +quoted from "MdePkg/Include/Protocol/Http.h": + +> It is the responsibility of the caller to allocate a buffer for Body and +> specify the size in BodyLength. If the remote host provides a response +> that contains a content body, up to BodyLength bytes will be copied from +> the receive buffer into Body and BodyLength will be updated with the +> amount of bytes received and copied to Body. This allows the client to +> download a large file in chunks instead of into one contiguous block of +> memory. + +Note that, if the caller-allocated buffer is larger than the +server-provided chunk, then the transfer length is limited by the latter. +This is in fact the dominant case when downloading a huge file (for which +UefiBootManagerLib allocated a huge contiguous RAM Disk buffer) in small +TLS messages. + +For adjusting BodyLength as described above -- i.e., to the application +data chunk that has been extracted from the TLS message --, the +HttpResponseWorker() function employs the following assignment: + + HttpMsg->BodyLength = MIN (Fragment.Len, (UINT32) HttpMsg->BodyLength); + +The (UINT32) cast is motivated by the MIN() requirement -- in +"MdePkg/Include/Base.h" -- that both arguments be of the same type. + +"Fragment.Len" (NET_FRAGMENT.Len) has type UINT32, and +"HttpMsg->BodyLength" (EFI_HTTP_MESSAGE.BodyLength) has type UINTN. +Therefore a cast is indeed necessary. + +Unfortunately, the cast is done in the wrong direction. Consider the +following circumstances: + +- "Fragment.Len" happens to be consistently 16KiB, dictated by the HTTPS + Server's TLS stack, + +- the size of the file to download is 4GiB + N*16KiB, where N is a + positive integer. + +As the download progresses, each received 16KiB application data chunk +brings the *next* input value of BodyLength closer down to 4GiB. The cast +in MIN() always masks off the high-order bits from the input value of +BodyLength, but this is no problem because the low-order bits are nonzero, +therefore the MIN() always permits progress. + +However, once BodyLength reaches 4GiB exactly on input, the MIN() +invocation produces a zero value. HttpResponseWorker() adjusts the output +value of BodyLength to zero, and then passes it to HttpParseMessageBody(). + +HttpParseMessageBody() (in "NetworkPkg/Library/DxeHttpLib/DxeHttpLib.c") +rejects the zero BodyLength with EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER, which is fully +propagated outwards, and aborts the HTTPS download. HttpBootDxe writes the +message "Error: Unexpected network error" to the UEFI console. + +For example, a file with size (4GiB + 197MiB) terminates after downloading +just 197MiB. + +Invert the direction of the cast: widen "Fragment.Len" to UINTN. + +Cc: Jiaxin Wu +Cc: Maciej Rabeda +Cc: Siyuan Fu +Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek +Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daude +Reviewed-by: Siyuan Fu +Reviewed-by: Maciej Rabeda +(cherry picked from commit 4cca7923992a13f6b753782f469ee944da2db796) +Signed-off-by: Miroslav Rezanina +--- + NetworkPkg/HttpDxe/HttpImpl.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/NetworkPkg/HttpDxe/HttpImpl.c b/NetworkPkg/HttpDxe/HttpImpl.c +index 6b87731..1acbb60 100644 +--- a/NetworkPkg/HttpDxe/HttpImpl.c ++++ b/NetworkPkg/HttpDxe/HttpImpl.c +@@ -1348,7 +1348,7 @@ HttpResponseWorker ( + // + // Process the received the body packet. + // +- HttpMsg->BodyLength = MIN (Fragment.Len, (UINT32) HttpMsg->BodyLength); ++ HttpMsg->BodyLength = MIN ((UINTN) Fragment.Len, HttpMsg->BodyLength); + + CopyMem (HttpMsg->Body, Fragment.Bulk, HttpMsg->BodyLength); + +-- +1.8.3.1 + diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-TlsDxe-Add-the-support-of-host-validation.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-TlsDxe-Add-the-support-of-host-validation.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3aa8efd --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-TlsDxe-Add-the-support-of-host-validation.patch @@ -0,0 +1,117 @@ +From 24a4a1d62ae749c197f36d72f645c7142f368e6a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Laszlo Ersek +Date: Mon, 2 Dec 2019 12:32:00 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 7/9] NetworkPkg/TlsDxe: Add the support of host validation to + TlsDxe driver (CVE-2019-14553) +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +RH-Author: Laszlo Ersek +Message-id: <20191117220052.15700-8-lersek@redhat.com> +Patchwork-id: 92456 +O-Subject: [RHEL-8.2.0 edk2 PATCH 7/9] NetworkPkg/TlsDxe: Add the support of host validation to TlsDxe driver (CVE-2019-14553) +Bugzilla: 1536624 +RH-Acked-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé +RH-Acked-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov + +From: "Wu, Jiaxin" + +REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=960 +CVE: CVE-2019-14553 +The new data type named "EfiTlsVerifyHost" and the +EFI_TLS_VERIFY_HOST_FLAG are supported in TLS protocol. + +Signed-off-by: Wu Jiaxin +Reviewed-by: Ye Ting +Reviewed-by: Long Qin +Reviewed-by: Fu Siyuan +Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek +Message-Id: <20190927034441.3096-4-Jiaxin.wu@intel.com> +Cc: David Woodhouse +Cc: Jian J Wang +Cc: Jiaxin Wu +Cc: Sivaraman Nainar +Cc: Xiaoyu Lu +Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek +(cherry picked from commit 703e7ab21ff8fda9ababf7751d59bd28ad5da947) +--- + NetworkPkg/TlsDxe/TlsProtocol.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- + 1 file changed, 41 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/NetworkPkg/TlsDxe/TlsProtocol.c b/NetworkPkg/TlsDxe/TlsProtocol.c +index a7a993f..001e540 100644 +--- a/NetworkPkg/TlsDxe/TlsProtocol.c ++++ b/NetworkPkg/TlsDxe/TlsProtocol.c +@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ + /** @file + Implementation of EFI TLS Protocol Interfaces. + +- Copyright (c) 2016 - 2017, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
++ Copyright (c) 2016 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
+ + SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent + +@@ -56,12 +56,16 @@ TlsSetSessionData ( + UINT16 *CipherId; + CONST EFI_TLS_CIPHER *TlsCipherList; + UINTN CipherCount; ++ CONST EFI_TLS_VERIFY_HOST *TlsVerifyHost; ++ EFI_TLS_VERIFY VerifyMethod; ++ UINTN VerifyMethodSize; + UINTN Index; + + EFI_TPL OldTpl; + +- Status = EFI_SUCCESS; +- CipherId = NULL; ++ Status = EFI_SUCCESS; ++ CipherId = NULL; ++ VerifyMethodSize = sizeof (EFI_TLS_VERIFY); + + if (This == NULL || Data == NULL || DataSize == 0) { + return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; +@@ -149,6 +153,40 @@ TlsSetSessionData ( + + TlsSetVerify (Instance->TlsConn, *((UINT32 *) Data)); + break; ++ case EfiTlsVerifyHost: ++ if (DataSize != sizeof (EFI_TLS_VERIFY_HOST)) { ++ Status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; ++ goto ON_EXIT; ++ } ++ ++ TlsVerifyHost = (CONST EFI_TLS_VERIFY_HOST *) Data; ++ ++ if ((TlsVerifyHost->Flags & EFI_TLS_VERIFY_FLAG_ALWAYS_CHECK_SUBJECT) != 0 && ++ (TlsVerifyHost->Flags & EFI_TLS_VERIFY_FLAG_NEVER_CHECK_SUBJECT) != 0) { ++ Status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; ++ goto ON_EXIT; ++ } ++ ++ if ((TlsVerifyHost->Flags & EFI_TLS_VERIFY_FLAG_NO_WILDCARDS) != 0 && ++ ((TlsVerifyHost->Flags & EFI_TLS_VERIFY_FLAG_NO_PARTIAL_WILDCARDS) != 0 || ++ (TlsVerifyHost->Flags & EFI_TLS_VERIFY_FLAG_MULTI_LABEL_WILDCARDS) != 0)) { ++ Status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; ++ goto ON_EXIT; ++ } ++ ++ Status = This->GetSessionData (This, EfiTlsVerifyMethod, &VerifyMethod, &VerifyMethodSize); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ goto ON_EXIT; ++ } ++ ++ if ((VerifyMethod & EFI_TLS_VERIFY_PEER) == 0) { ++ Status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; ++ goto ON_EXIT; ++ } ++ ++ Status = TlsSetVerifyHost (Instance->TlsConn, TlsVerifyHost->Flags, TlsVerifyHost->HostName); ++ ++ break; + case EfiTlsSessionID: + if (DataSize != sizeof (EFI_TLS_SESSION_ID)) { + Status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; +-- +1.8.3.1 + diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-OvmfPkg-QemuVideoDxe-unbreak-secondary-vga-and-bochs.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-OvmfPkg-QemuVideoDxe-unbreak-secondary-vga-and-bochs.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e8167d6 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-OvmfPkg-QemuVideoDxe-unbreak-secondary-vga-and-bochs.patch @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +From 78cfb461bedb0e0491b267528b2ebd30adc1d87c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Laszlo Ersek +Date: Fri, 27 Mar 2020 07:01:18 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] OvmfPkg/QemuVideoDxe: unbreak "secondary-vga" and + "bochs-display" support +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +Message-id: <20200226173820.16398-2-lersek@redhat.com> +Patchwork-id: 94054 +O-Subject: [RHEL-8.2.0 edk2 PATCH 1/1] OvmfPkg/QemuVideoDxe: unbreak "secondary-vga" and "bochs-display" support +Bugzilla: 1806359 +RH-Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann +RH-Acked-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé + +In edk2 commit 333f32ec23dd, QemuVideoDxe gained support for QEMU's +"secondary-vga" device model (originally introduced in QEMU commit +63e3e24db2e9). + +In QEMU commit 765c94290863, the "bochs-display" device was introduced, +which would work with QemuVideoDxe out of the box, reusing the +"secondary-vga" logic. + +Support for both models has been broken since edk2 commit 662bd0da7fd7. +Said patch ended up requiring VGA IO Ports -- i.e., at least one of +EFI_PCI_IO_ATTRIBUTE_VGA_IO and EFI_PCI_IO_ATTRIBUTE_VGA_IO_16 -- even if +the device wasn't actually VGA compatible. + +Restrict the IO Ports requirement to VGA compatible devices. + +Cc: Ard Biesheuvel +Cc: Gerd Hoffmann +Cc: Jordan Justen +Cc: Marc W Chen +Cc: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé +Fixes: 662bd0da7fd77e4d2cf9ef4a78015af5cad7d9db +Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2555 +Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek +Message-Id: <20200224171741.7494-1-lersek@redhat.com> +Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel +Reviewed-by: Gerd Hoffmann +Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé +(cherry picked from commit edfe16a6d9f8c6830d7ad93ee7616225fe4e9c13) +--- + OvmfPkg/QemuVideoDxe/Driver.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/QemuVideoDxe/Driver.c b/OvmfPkg/QemuVideoDxe/Driver.c +index 522110e..902dd1b 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/QemuVideoDxe/Driver.c ++++ b/OvmfPkg/QemuVideoDxe/Driver.c +@@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ QemuVideoControllerDriverStart ( + } + + SupportedVgaIo &= (UINT64)(EFI_PCI_IO_ATTRIBUTE_VGA_IO | EFI_PCI_IO_ATTRIBUTE_VGA_IO_16); +- if (SupportedVgaIo == 0) { ++ if (SupportedVgaIo == 0 && IS_PCI_VGA (&Pci)) { + Status = EFI_UNSUPPORTED; + goto ClosePciIo; + } +-- +1.8.3.1 + diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeImageVerificationHandler-eliminate-St.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeImageVerificationHandler-eliminate-St.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c57efd8 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeImageVerificationHandler-eliminate-St.patch @@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ +From b68d6a626977f48ac4d05396edcb70a73b12c66c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Laszlo Ersek +Date: Fri, 31 Jan 2020 12:42:45 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 09/12] SecurityPkg/DxeImageVerificationHandler: eliminate + "Status" variable +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +RH-Author: Laszlo Ersek +Message-id: <20200131124248.22369-10-lersek@redhat.com> +Patchwork-id: 93619 +O-Subject: [RHEL-8.2.0 edk2 PATCH 09/12] SecurityPkg/DxeImageVerificationHandler: eliminate "Status" variable +Bugzilla: 1751993 +RH-Acked-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé +RH-Acked-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov + +The "Status" variable is set to EFI_ACCESS_DENIED at the top of the +function. Then it is overwritten with EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION under the +"Failed" (earlier: "Done") label. We finally return "Status". + +The above covers the complete usage of "Status" in +DxeImageVerificationHandler(). Remove the variable, and simply return +EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION in the end. + +This patch is a no-op, regarding behavior. + +Cc: Chao Zhang +Cc: Jian J Wang +Cc: Jiewen Yao +Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2129 +Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek +Message-Id: <20200116190705.18816-9-lersek@redhat.com> +Reviewed-by: Michael D Kinney +[lersek@redhat.com: push with Mike's R-b due to Chinese New Year + Holiday: ; msgid + ] +(cherry picked from commit fb02f5b2cd0b2a2d413a4f4fc41e085be2ede089) + +Signed-off-by: Miroslav Rezanina +--- + .../Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c | 5 +---- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c +index 51968bd..b49fe87 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c +@@ -1560,7 +1560,6 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler ( + IN BOOLEAN BootPolicy + ) + { +- EFI_STATUS Status; + EFI_IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *DosHdr; + BOOLEAN IsVerified; + EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *SignatureList; +@@ -1588,7 +1587,6 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler ( + SecDataDir = NULL; + PkcsCertData = NULL; + Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_UNTESTED; +- Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED; + IsVerified = FALSE; + + +@@ -1880,13 +1878,12 @@ Failed: + DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "The image doesn't pass verification: %s\n", NameStr)); + FreePool(NameStr); + } +- Status = EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION; + + if (SignatureList != NULL) { + FreePool (SignatureList); + } + +- return Status; ++ return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION; + } + + /** +-- +1.8.3.1 + diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeImageVerificationHandler-fix-defer-vs.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeImageVerificationHandler-fix-defer-vs.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9c7a572 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeImageVerificationHandler-fix-defer-vs.patch @@ -0,0 +1,103 @@ +From ff8b6134756fca6b0c55fedc76aeb5000f783875 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Laszlo Ersek +Date: Fri, 31 Jan 2020 12:42:48 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 12/12] SecurityPkg/DxeImageVerificationHandler: fix "defer" + vs. "deny" policies +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +RH-Author: Laszlo Ersek +Message-id: <20200131124248.22369-13-lersek@redhat.com> +Patchwork-id: 93620 +O-Subject: [RHEL-8.2.0 edk2 PATCH 12/12] SecurityPkg/DxeImageVerificationHandler: fix "defer" vs. "deny" policies +Bugzilla: 1751993 +RH-Acked-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé +RH-Acked-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov + +In DxeImageVerificationHandler(), we should return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION +for a rejected image only if the platform sets +DEFER_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION as the policy for the image's source. +Otherwise, EFI_ACCESS_DENIED must be returned. + +Right now, EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION is returned for all rejected images, +which is wrong -- it causes LoadImage() to hold on to rejected images (in +untrusted state), for further platform actions. However, if a platform +already set DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION, the platform will not +expect the rejected image to stick around in memory (regardless of its +untrusted state). + +Therefore, adhere to the platform policy in the return value of the +DxeImageVerificationHandler() function. + +Furthermore, according to "32.4.2 Image Execution Information Table" in +the UEFI v2.8 spec, and considering that edk2 only supports (AuditMode==0) +at the moment: + +> When AuditMode==0, if the image's signature is not found in the +> authorized database, or is found in the forbidden database, the image +> will not be started and instead, information about it will be placed in +> this table. + +we have to store an EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO record in both the "defer" +case and the "deny" case. Thus, the AddImageExeInfo() call is not being +made conditional on (Policy == DEFER_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION); the +documentation is updated instead. + +Cc: Chao Zhang +Cc: Jian J Wang +Cc: Jiewen Yao +Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2129 +Fixes: 5db28a6753d307cdfb1cfdeb2f63739a9f959837 +Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek +Message-Id: <20200116190705.18816-12-lersek@redhat.com> +Reviewed-by: Michael D Kinney +[lersek@redhat.com: push with Mike's R-b due to Chinese New Year + Holiday: ; msgid + ] +(cherry picked from commit 8b0932c19f31cbf9da26d3b8d4e8d954bdbb5269) + +Signed-off-by: Miroslav Rezanina +--- + .../Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c | 11 ++++++++--- + 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c +index 015a5b6..dbfbfcb 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c +@@ -1548,7 +1548,8 @@ Done: + execution table. + @retval EFI_ACCESS_DENIED The file specified by File and FileBuffer did not + authenticate, and the platform policy dictates that the DXE +- Foundation many not use File. ++ Foundation may not use File. The image has ++ been added to the file execution table. + + **/ + EFI_STATUS +@@ -1872,7 +1873,8 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler ( + + Failed: + // +- // Policy decides to defer or reject the image; add its information in image executable information table. ++ // Policy decides to defer or reject the image; add its information in image ++ // executable information table in either case. + // + NameStr = ConvertDevicePathToText (File, FALSE, TRUE); + AddImageExeInfo (Action, NameStr, File, SignatureList, SignatureListSize); +@@ -1885,7 +1887,10 @@ Failed: + FreePool (SignatureList); + } + +- return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION; ++ if (Policy == DEFER_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION) { ++ return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION; ++ } ++ return EFI_ACCESS_DENIED; + } + + /** +-- +1.8.3.1 + diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeImageVerificationHandler-fix-imgexec-.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeImageVerificationHandler-fix-imgexec-.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..396f1c0 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeImageVerificationHandler-fix-imgexec-.patch @@ -0,0 +1,87 @@ +From d9f12d175da2d203be078d03c9127293ea6fe86b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Laszlo Ersek +Date: Fri, 31 Jan 2020 12:42:47 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 11/12] SecurityPkg/DxeImageVerificationHandler: fix imgexec + info on memalloc fail +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +RH-Author: Laszlo Ersek +Message-id: <20200131124248.22369-12-lersek@redhat.com> +Patchwork-id: 93618 +O-Subject: [RHEL-8.2.0 edk2 PATCH 11/12] SecurityPkg/DxeImageVerificationHandler: fix imgexec info on memalloc fail +Bugzilla: 1751993 +RH-Acked-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé +RH-Acked-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov + +It makes no sense to call AddImageExeInfo() with (Signature == NULL) and +(SignatureSize > 0). AddImageExeInfo() does not crash in such a case -- it +avoids the CopyMem() call --, but it creates an invalid +EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO record. Namely, the +"EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO.InfoSize" field includes "SignatureSize", but +the actual signature bytes are not filled in. + +Document and ASSERT() this condition in AddImageExeInfo(). + +In DxeImageVerificationHandler(), zero out "SignatureListSize" if we set +"SignatureList" to NULL due to AllocateZeroPool() failure. + +(Another approach could be to avoid calling AddImageExeInfo() completely, +in case AllocateZeroPool() fails. Unfortunately, the UEFI v2.8 spec does +not seem to state clearly whether a signature is mandatory in +EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO, if the "Action" field is +EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FAILED or EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FOUND. + +For now, the EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO addition logic is not changed; we +only make sure that the record we add is not malformed.) + +Cc: Chao Zhang +Cc: Jian J Wang +Cc: Jiewen Yao +Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2129 +Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek +Message-Id: <20200116190705.18816-11-lersek@redhat.com> +Reviewed-by: Michael D Kinney +[lersek@redhat.com: push with Mike's R-b due to Chinese New Year + Holiday: ; msgid + ] +(cherry picked from commit 6aa31db5ebebe18b55aa5359142223a03592416f) + +Signed-off-by: Miroslav Rezanina +--- + SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c | 4 +++- + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c +index c98b9e4..015a5b6 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c +@@ -704,7 +704,7 @@ GetImageExeInfoTableSize ( + @param[in] Name Input a null-terminated, user-friendly name. + @param[in] DevicePath Input device path pointer. + @param[in] Signature Input signature info in EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST data structure. +- @param[in] SignatureSize Size of signature. ++ @param[in] SignatureSize Size of signature. Must be zero if Signature is NULL. + + **/ + VOID +@@ -761,6 +761,7 @@ AddImageExeInfo ( + // + // Signature size can be odd. Pad after signature to ensure next EXECUTION_INFO entry align + // ++ ASSERT (Signature != NULL || SignatureSize == 0); + NewImageExeInfoEntrySize = sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO) + NameStringLen + DevicePathSize + SignatureSize; + + NewImageExeInfoTable = (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE *) AllocateRuntimePool (ImageExeInfoTableSize + NewImageExeInfoEntrySize); +@@ -1858,6 +1859,7 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler ( + SignatureListSize = sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + mImageDigestSize; + SignatureList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) AllocateZeroPool (SignatureListSize); + if (SignatureList == NULL) { ++ SignatureListSize = 0; + goto Failed; + } + SignatureList->SignatureHeaderSize = 0; +-- +1.8.3.1 + diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeImageVerificationHandler-fix-retval-f.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeImageVerificationHandler-fix-retval-f.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..926cc90 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeImageVerificationHandler-fix-retval-f.patch @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +From e2efec69c63703c324099b987204a38fdb0d9d6f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Laszlo Ersek +Date: Fri, 31 Jan 2020 12:42:46 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 10/12] SecurityPkg/DxeImageVerificationHandler: fix retval for + (FileBuffer==NULL) +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +RH-Author: Laszlo Ersek +Message-id: <20200131124248.22369-11-lersek@redhat.com> +Patchwork-id: 93613 +O-Subject: [RHEL-8.2.0 edk2 PATCH 10/12] SecurityPkg/DxeImageVerificationHandler: fix retval for (FileBuffer==NULL) +Bugzilla: 1751993 +RH-Acked-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé +RH-Acked-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov + +"FileBuffer" is a non-optional input (pointer) parameter to +DxeImageVerificationHandler(). Normally, when an edk2 function receives a +NULL argument for such a parameter, we return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER or +RETURN_INVALID_PARAMETER. However, those don't conform to the +SECURITY2_FILE_AUTHENTICATION_HANDLER prototype. + +Return EFI_ACCESS_DENIED when "FileBuffer" is NULL; it means that no image +has been loaded. + +This patch does not change the control flow in the function, it only +changes the "Status" outcome from API-incompatible error codes to +EFI_ACCESS_DENIED, under some circumstances. + +Cc: Chao Zhang +Cc: Jian J Wang +Cc: Jiewen Yao +Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2129 +Fixes: 570b3d1a7278df29878da87990e8366bd42d0ec5 +Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek +Message-Id: <20200116190705.18816-10-lersek@redhat.com> +Reviewed-by: Michael D Kinney +[lersek@redhat.com: push with Mike's R-b due to Chinese New Year + Holiday: ; msgid + ] +(cherry picked from commit 6d57592740cdd0b6868baeef7929d6e6fef7a8e3) + +Signed-off-by: Miroslav Rezanina +--- + SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c +index b49fe87..c98b9e4 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c +@@ -1655,7 +1655,7 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler ( + // Read the Dos header. + // + if (FileBuffer == NULL) { +- return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; ++ return EFI_ACCESS_DENIED; + } + + mImageBase = (UINT8 *) FileBuffer; +-- +1.8.3.1 + diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeImageVerificationHandler-fix-retval-o.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeImageVerificationHandler-fix-retval-o.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..04bcd90 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeImageVerificationHandler-fix-retval-o.patch @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +From 58902877128851f628fe644a5c71600866317fac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Laszlo Ersek +Date: Fri, 31 Jan 2020 12:42:42 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 06/12] SecurityPkg/DxeImageVerificationHandler: fix retval on + memalloc failure +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +RH-Author: Laszlo Ersek +Message-id: <20200131124248.22369-7-lersek@redhat.com> +Patchwork-id: 93616 +O-Subject: [RHEL-8.2.0 edk2 PATCH 06/12] SecurityPkg/DxeImageVerificationHandler: fix retval on memalloc failure +Bugzilla: 1751993 +RH-Acked-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé +RH-Acked-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov + +A SECURITY2_FILE_AUTHENTICATION_HANDLER function is not expected to return +EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES. We should only return EFI_SUCCESS, +EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION, or EFI_ACCESS_DENIED. + +In case we run out of memory while preparing "SignatureList" for +AddImageExeInfo(), we should simply stick with the EFI_ACCESS_DENIED value +that is already in "Status" -- from just before the "Action" condition --, +and not suppress it with EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES. + +This patch does not change the control flow in the function, it only +changes the "Status" outcome from API-incompatible error codes to +EFI_ACCESS_DENIED, under some circumstances. + +Cc: Chao Zhang +Cc: Jian J Wang +Cc: Jiewen Yao +Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2129 +Fixes: 570b3d1a7278df29878da87990e8366bd42d0ec5 +Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek +Message-Id: <20200116190705.18816-6-lersek@redhat.com> +Reviewed-by: Michael D Kinney +[lersek@redhat.com: push with Mike's R-b due to Chinese New Year + Holiday: ; msgid + ] +(cherry picked from commit f891b052c5ec13c1032fb9d340d5262ac1a7e7e1) + +Signed-off-by: Miroslav Rezanina +--- + SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c | 2 -- + 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c +index 5cc82c1..5f09a66 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c +@@ -1541,7 +1541,6 @@ Done: + and non-NULL FileBuffer did authenticate, and the platform + policy dictates that the DXE Foundation may execute the image in + FileBuffer. +- @retval EFI_OUT_RESOURCE Fail to allocate memory. + @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The file specified by File did not authenticate, and + the platform policy dictates that File should be placed + in the untrusted state. The image has been added to the file +@@ -1862,7 +1861,6 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler ( + SignatureListSize = sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + mImageDigestSize; + SignatureList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) AllocateZeroPool (SignatureListSize); + if (SignatureList == NULL) { +- Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; + goto Done; + } + SignatureList->SignatureHeaderSize = 0; +-- +1.8.3.1 + diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeImageVerificationHandler-keep-PE-COFF.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeImageVerificationHandler-keep-PE-COFF.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3719f4e --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeImageVerificationHandler-keep-PE-COFF.patch @@ -0,0 +1,97 @@ +From 37b5981bf7eb94314b62810da495d724873d904a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Laszlo Ersek +Date: Fri, 31 Jan 2020 12:42:40 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 04/12] SecurityPkg/DxeImageVerificationHandler: keep PE/COFF + info status internal +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +RH-Author: Laszlo Ersek +Message-id: <20200131124248.22369-5-lersek@redhat.com> +Patchwork-id: 93609 +O-Subject: [RHEL-8.2.0 edk2 PATCH 04/12] SecurityPkg/DxeImageVerificationHandler: keep PE/COFF info status internal +Bugzilla: 1751993 +RH-Acked-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé +RH-Acked-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov + +The PeCoffLoaderGetImageInfo() function may return various error codes, +such as RETURN_INVALID_PARAMETER and RETURN_UNSUPPORTED. + +Such error values should not be assigned to our "Status" variable in the +DxeImageVerificationHandler() function, because "Status" generally stands +for the main exit value of the function. And +SECURITY2_FILE_AUTHENTICATION_HANDLER functions are expected to return one +of EFI_SUCCESS, EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION, and EFI_ACCESS_DENIED only. + +Introduce the "PeCoffStatus" helper variable for keeping the return value +of PeCoffLoaderGetImageInfo() internal to the function. If +PeCoffLoaderGetImageInfo() fails, we'll jump to the "Done" label with +"Status" being EFI_ACCESS_DENIED, inherited from the top of the function. + +Note that this is consistent with the subsequent PE/COFF Signature check, +where we jump to the "Done" label with "Status" having been re-set to +EFI_ACCESS_DENIED. + +As a consequence, we can at once remove the + + Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED; + +assignment right after the "PeCoffStatus" check. + +This patch does not change the control flow in the function, it only +changes the "Status" outcome from API-incompatible error codes to +EFI_ACCESS_DENIED, under some circumstances. + +Cc: Chao Zhang +Cc: Jian J Wang +Cc: Jiewen Yao +Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2129 +Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek +Message-Id: <20200116190705.18816-4-lersek@redhat.com> +Reviewed-by: Michael D Kinney +[lersek@redhat.com: push with Mike's R-b due to Chinese New Year + Holiday: ; msgid + ] +(cherry picked from commit 61a9fa589a15e9005bec293f9766c78b60fbc9fc) + +Signed-off-by: Miroslav Rezanina +--- + .../Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c | 7 +++---- + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c +index 8204c9c..e6c8a54 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c +@@ -1580,6 +1580,7 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler ( + EFI_IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY *SecDataDir; + UINT32 OffSet; + CHAR16 *NameStr; ++ RETURN_STATUS PeCoffStatus; + + SignatureList = NULL; + SignatureListSize = 0; +@@ -1669,8 +1670,8 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler ( + // + // Get information about the image being loaded + // +- Status = PeCoffLoaderGetImageInfo (&ImageContext); +- if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ PeCoffStatus = PeCoffLoaderGetImageInfo (&ImageContext); ++ if (RETURN_ERROR (PeCoffStatus)) { + // + // The information can't be got from the invalid PeImage + // +@@ -1678,8 +1679,6 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler ( + goto Done; + } + +- Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED; +- + DosHdr = (EFI_IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *) mImageBase; + if (DosHdr->e_magic == EFI_IMAGE_DOS_SIGNATURE) { + // +-- +1.8.3.1 + diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeImageVerificationHandler-narrow-down-.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeImageVerificationHandler-narrow-down-.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2365eb8 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeImageVerificationHandler-narrow-down-.patch @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +From 73de814a5f30c2c6d82736082c1114a028d12115 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Laszlo Ersek +Date: Fri, 31 Jan 2020 12:42:41 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 05/12] SecurityPkg/DxeImageVerificationHandler: narrow down + PE/COFF hash status +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +RH-Author: Laszlo Ersek +Message-id: <20200131124248.22369-6-lersek@redhat.com> +Patchwork-id: 93615 +O-Subject: [RHEL-8.2.0 edk2 PATCH 05/12] SecurityPkg/DxeImageVerificationHandler: narrow down PE/COFF hash status +Bugzilla: 1751993 +RH-Acked-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé +RH-Acked-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov + +Inside the "for" loop that scans the signatures of the image, we call +HashPeImageByType(), and assign its return value to "Status". + +Beyond the immediate retval check, this assignment is useless (never +consumed). That's because a subsequent access to "Status" may only be one +of the following: + +- the "Status" assignment when we call HashPeImageByType() in the next + iteration of the loop, + +- the "Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED" assignment right after the final + "IsVerified" check. + +To make it clear that the assignment is only useful for the immediate +HashPeImageByType() retval check, introduce a specific helper variable, +called "HashStatus". + +This patch is a no-op, functionally. + +Cc: Chao Zhang +Cc: Jian J Wang +Cc: Jiewen Yao +Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2129 +Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek +Message-Id: <20200116190705.18816-5-lersek@redhat.com> +Reviewed-by: Michael D Kinney +[lersek@redhat.com: push with Mike's R-b due to Chinese New Year + Holiday: ; msgid + ] +(cherry picked from commit 47650a5cab608e07c31d66bdb9b4cc6e58bdf22f) + +Signed-off-by: Miroslav Rezanina +--- + .../Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c | 5 +++-- + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c +index e6c8a54..5cc82c1 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c +@@ -1581,6 +1581,7 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler ( + UINT32 OffSet; + CHAR16 *NameStr; + RETURN_STATUS PeCoffStatus; ++ EFI_STATUS HashStatus; + + SignatureList = NULL; + SignatureListSize = 0; +@@ -1802,8 +1803,8 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler ( + continue; + } + +- Status = HashPeImageByType (AuthData, AuthDataSize); +- if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ HashStatus = HashPeImageByType (AuthData, AuthDataSize); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (HashStatus)) { + continue; + } + +-- +1.8.3.1 + diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeImageVerificationHandler-remove-else-.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeImageVerificationHandler-remove-else-.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e48ebd5 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeImageVerificationHandler-remove-else-.patch @@ -0,0 +1,142 @@ +From 5aa2d52451b7890480d31a3437a0024bfd9e1a57 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Laszlo Ersek +Date: Fri, 31 Jan 2020 12:42:39 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 03/12] SecurityPkg/DxeImageVerificationHandler: remove "else" + after return/break +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +RH-Author: Laszlo Ersek +Message-id: <20200131124248.22369-4-lersek@redhat.com> +Patchwork-id: 93614 +O-Subject: [RHEL-8.2.0 edk2 PATCH 03/12] SecurityPkg/DxeImageVerificationHandler: remove "else" after return/break +Bugzilla: 1751993 +RH-Acked-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé +RH-Acked-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov + +In the code structure + + if (condition) { + // + // block1 + // + return; + } else { + // + // block2 + // + } + +nesting "block2" in an "else" branch is superfluous, and harms +readability. It can be transformed to: + + if (condition) { + // + // block1 + // + return; + } + // + // block2 + // + +with identical behavior, and improved readability (less nesting). + +The same applies to "break" (instead of "return") in a loop body. + +Perform these transformations on DxeImageVerificationHandler(). + +This patch is a no-op for behavior. Use + + git show -b -W + +for reviewing it more easily. + +Cc: Chao Zhang +Cc: Jian J Wang +Cc: Jiewen Yao +Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2129 +Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek +Message-Id: <20200116190705.18816-3-lersek@redhat.com> +Reviewed-by: Michael D Kinney +[lersek@redhat.com: push with Mike's R-b due to Chinese New Year + Holiday: ; msgid + ] +(cherry picked from commit eccb856f013aec700234211e7371f03454ef9d52) + +Signed-off-by: Miroslav Rezanina +--- + .../DxeImageVerificationLib.c | 41 +++++++++++----------- + 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c +index 5afd723..8204c9c 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c +@@ -1621,7 +1621,8 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler ( + // + if (Policy == ALWAYS_EXECUTE) { + return EFI_SUCCESS; +- } else if (Policy == NEVER_EXECUTE) { ++ } ++ if (Policy == NEVER_EXECUTE) { + return EFI_ACCESS_DENIED; + } + +@@ -1833,7 +1834,8 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler ( + DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "DxeImageVerificationLib: Image is signed but %s hash of image is found in DBX.\n", mHashTypeStr)); + IsVerified = FALSE; + break; +- } else if (!IsVerified) { ++ } ++ if (!IsVerified) { + if (IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, mImageDigest, &mCertType, mImageDigestSize)) { + IsVerified = TRUE; + } else { +@@ -1851,25 +1853,24 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler ( + + if (IsVerified) { + return EFI_SUCCESS; +- } else { +- Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED; +- if (Action == EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FAILED || Action == EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FOUND) { +- // +- // Get image hash value as signature of executable. +- // +- SignatureListSize = sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + mImageDigestSize; +- SignatureList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) AllocateZeroPool (SignatureListSize); +- if (SignatureList == NULL) { +- Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; +- goto Done; +- } +- SignatureList->SignatureHeaderSize = 0; +- SignatureList->SignatureListSize = (UINT32) SignatureListSize; +- SignatureList->SignatureSize = (UINT32) (sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + mImageDigestSize); +- CopyMem (&SignatureList->SignatureType, &mCertType, sizeof (EFI_GUID)); +- Signature = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) SignatureList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST)); +- CopyMem (Signature->SignatureData, mImageDigest, mImageDigestSize); ++ } ++ Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED; ++ if (Action == EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FAILED || Action == EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FOUND) { ++ // ++ // Get image hash value as signature of executable. ++ // ++ SignatureListSize = sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + mImageDigestSize; ++ SignatureList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) AllocateZeroPool (SignatureListSize); ++ if (SignatureList == NULL) { ++ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; ++ goto Done; + } ++ SignatureList->SignatureHeaderSize = 0; ++ SignatureList->SignatureListSize = (UINT32) SignatureListSize; ++ SignatureList->SignatureSize = (UINT32) (sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + mImageDigestSize); ++ CopyMem (&SignatureList->SignatureType, &mCertType, sizeof (EFI_GUID)); ++ Signature = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) SignatureList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST)); ++ CopyMem (Signature->SignatureData, mImageDigest, mImageDigestSize); + } + + Done: +-- +1.8.3.1 + diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeImageVerificationHandler-remove-super.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeImageVerificationHandler-remove-super.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..def2524 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeImageVerificationHandler-remove-super.patch @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +From d25dc10aa262b33794f16b75a0ada3aad507abe7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Laszlo Ersek +Date: Fri, 31 Jan 2020 12:42:43 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 07/12] SecurityPkg/DxeImageVerificationHandler: remove + superfluous Status setting +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +RH-Author: Laszlo Ersek +Message-id: <20200131124248.22369-8-lersek@redhat.com> +Patchwork-id: 93617 +O-Subject: [RHEL-8.2.0 edk2 PATCH 07/12] SecurityPkg/DxeImageVerificationHandler: remove superfluous Status setting +Bugzilla: 1751993 +RH-Acked-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé +RH-Acked-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov + +After the final "IsVerified" check, we set "Status" to EFI_ACCESS_DENIED. +This is superfluous, as "Status" already carries EFI_ACCESS_DENIED value +there, from the top of the function. Remove the assignment. + +Functionally, this change is a no-op. + +Cc: Chao Zhang +Cc: Jian J Wang +Cc: Jiewen Yao +Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2129 +Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek +Message-Id: <20200116190705.18816-7-lersek@redhat.com> +Reviewed-by: Michael D Kinney +[lersek@redhat.com: push with Mike's R-b due to Chinese New Year + Holiday: ; msgid + ] +(cherry picked from commit 12a4ef58a8b1f8610f6f7cd3ffb973f924f175fb) + +Signed-off-by: Miroslav Rezanina +--- + SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c | 1 - + 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c +index 5f09a66..6ccce1f 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c +@@ -1853,7 +1853,6 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler ( + if (IsVerified) { + return EFI_SUCCESS; + } +- Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED; + if (Action == EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FAILED || Action == EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FOUND) { + // + // Get image hash value as signature of executable. +-- +1.8.3.1 + diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeImageVerificationHandler-simplify-Ver.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeImageVerificationHandler-simplify-Ver.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e045894 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeImageVerificationHandler-simplify-Ver.patch @@ -0,0 +1,119 @@ +From cd4f4b384857f4295d336d66fc8693348ef08a33 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Laszlo Ersek +Date: Fri, 31 Jan 2020 12:42:38 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 02/12] SecurityPkg/DxeImageVerificationHandler: simplify + "VerifyStatus" +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +RH-Author: Laszlo Ersek +Message-id: <20200131124248.22369-3-lersek@redhat.com> +Patchwork-id: 93611 +O-Subject: [RHEL-8.2.0 edk2 PATCH 02/12] SecurityPkg/DxeImageVerificationHandler: simplify "VerifyStatus" +Bugzilla: 1751993 +RH-Acked-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé +RH-Acked-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov + +In the DxeImageVerificationHandler() function, the "VerifyStatus" variable +can only contain one of two values: EFI_SUCCESS and EFI_ACCESS_DENIED. +Furthermore, the variable is only consumed with EFI_ERROR(). + +Therefore, using the EFI_STATUS type for the variable is unnecessary. +Worse, given the complex meanings of the function's return values, using +EFI_STATUS for "VerifyStatus" is actively confusing. + +Rename the variable to "IsVerified", and make it a simple BOOLEAN. + +This patch is a no-op, regarding behavior. + +Cc: Chao Zhang +Cc: Jian J Wang +Cc: Jiewen Yao +Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2129 +Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek +Message-Id: <20200116190705.18816-2-lersek@redhat.com> +Reviewed-by: Michael D Kinney +[lersek@redhat.com: push with Mike's R-b due to Chinese New Year + Holiday: ; msgid + ] +(cherry picked from commit 1e0f973b65c34841288c25fd441a37eec8a30ac7) + +Signed-off-by: Miroslav Rezanina +--- + .../DxeImageVerificationLib.c | 20 ++++++++++---------- + 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c +index a0a12b5..5afd723 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c +@@ -1563,7 +1563,7 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler ( + { + EFI_STATUS Status; + EFI_IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *DosHdr; +- EFI_STATUS VerifyStatus; ++ BOOLEAN IsVerified; + EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *SignatureList; + UINTN SignatureListSize; + EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Signature; +@@ -1588,7 +1588,7 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler ( + PkcsCertData = NULL; + Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_UNTESTED; + Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED; +- VerifyStatus = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED; ++ IsVerified = FALSE; + + + // +@@ -1812,16 +1812,16 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler ( + // + if (IsForbiddenByDbx (AuthData, AuthDataSize)) { + Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FAILED; +- VerifyStatus = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED; ++ IsVerified = FALSE; + break; + } + + // + // Check the digital signature against the valid certificate in allowed database (db). + // +- if (EFI_ERROR (VerifyStatus)) { ++ if (!IsVerified) { + if (IsAllowedByDb (AuthData, AuthDataSize)) { +- VerifyStatus = EFI_SUCCESS; ++ IsVerified = TRUE; + } + } + +@@ -1831,11 +1831,11 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler ( + if (IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, mImageDigest, &mCertType, mImageDigestSize)) { + Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FOUND; + DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "DxeImageVerificationLib: Image is signed but %s hash of image is found in DBX.\n", mHashTypeStr)); +- VerifyStatus = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED; ++ IsVerified = FALSE; + break; +- } else if (EFI_ERROR (VerifyStatus)) { ++ } else if (!IsVerified) { + if (IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, mImageDigest, &mCertType, mImageDigestSize)) { +- VerifyStatus = EFI_SUCCESS; ++ IsVerified = TRUE; + } else { + DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "DxeImageVerificationLib: Image is signed but signature is not allowed by DB and %s hash of image is not found in DB/DBX.\n", mHashTypeStr)); + } +@@ -1846,10 +1846,10 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler ( + // + // The Size in Certificate Table or the attribute certificate table is corrupted. + // +- VerifyStatus = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED; ++ IsVerified = FALSE; + } + +- if (!EFI_ERROR (VerifyStatus)) { ++ if (IsVerified) { + return EFI_SUCCESS; + } else { + Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED; +-- +1.8.3.1 + diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeImageVerificationHandler-unnest-AddIm.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeImageVerificationHandler-unnest-AddIm.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ef9d48e --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeImageVerificationHandler-unnest-AddIm.patch @@ -0,0 +1,139 @@ +From 3e06fe42d63856e48c6457dbb7e816b82416c9ca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Laszlo Ersek +Date: Fri, 31 Jan 2020 12:42:44 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 08/12] SecurityPkg/DxeImageVerificationHandler: unnest + AddImageExeInfo() call +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +RH-Author: Laszlo Ersek +Message-id: <20200131124248.22369-9-lersek@redhat.com> +Patchwork-id: 93610 +O-Subject: [RHEL-8.2.0 edk2 PATCH 08/12] SecurityPkg/DxeImageVerificationHandler: unnest AddImageExeInfo() call +Bugzilla: 1751993 +RH-Acked-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé +RH-Acked-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov + +Before the "Done" label at the end of DxeImageVerificationHandler(), we +now have a single access to "Status": we set "Status" to EFI_ACCESS_DENIED +at the top of the function. Therefore, the (Status != EFI_SUCCESS) +condition is always true under the "Done" label. + +Accordingly, unnest the AddImageExeInfo() call dependent on that +condition, remove the condition, and also rename the "Done" label to +"Failed". + +Functionally, this patch is a no-op. It's easier to review with: + + git show -b -W + +Cc: Chao Zhang +Cc: Jian J Wang +Cc: Jiewen Yao +Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2129 +Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek +Message-Id: <20200116190705.18816-8-lersek@redhat.com> +Reviewed-by: Michael D Kinney +[lersek@redhat.com: replace EFI_D_INFO w/ DEBUG_INFO for PatchCheck.py] +[lersek@redhat.com: push with Mike's R-b due to Chinese New Year + Holiday: ; msgid + ] +(cherry picked from commit c602e97446a8e818bf09182f5dc9f3fa409ece95) + +Signed-off-by: Miroslav Rezanina +--- + .../DxeImageVerificationLib.c | 34 ++++++++++------------ + 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c +index 6ccce1f..51968bd 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c +@@ -1676,7 +1676,7 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler ( + // The information can't be got from the invalid PeImage + // + DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "DxeImageVerificationLib: PeImage invalid. Cannot retrieve image information.\n")); +- goto Done; ++ goto Failed; + } + + DosHdr = (EFI_IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *) mImageBase; +@@ -1698,7 +1698,7 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler ( + // It is not a valid Pe/Coff file. + // + DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "DxeImageVerificationLib: Not a valid PE/COFF image.\n")); +- goto Done; ++ goto Failed; + } + + if (mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) { +@@ -1729,7 +1729,7 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler ( + // + if (!HashPeImage (HASHALG_SHA256)) { + DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "DxeImageVerificationLib: Failed to hash this image using %s.\n", mHashTypeStr)); +- goto Done; ++ goto Failed; + } + + if (IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, mImageDigest, &mCertType, mImageDigestSize)) { +@@ -1737,7 +1737,7 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler ( + // Image Hash is in forbidden database (DBX). + // + DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "DxeImageVerificationLib: Image is not signed and %s hash of image is forbidden by DBX.\n", mHashTypeStr)); +- goto Done; ++ goto Failed; + } + + if (IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, mImageDigest, &mCertType, mImageDigestSize)) { +@@ -1751,7 +1751,7 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler ( + // Image Hash is not found in both forbidden and allowed database. + // + DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "DxeImageVerificationLib: Image is not signed and %s hash of image is not found in DB/DBX.\n", mHashTypeStr)); +- goto Done; ++ goto Failed; + } + + // +@@ -1860,7 +1860,7 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler ( + SignatureListSize = sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + mImageDigestSize; + SignatureList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) AllocateZeroPool (SignatureListSize); + if (SignatureList == NULL) { +- goto Done; ++ goto Failed; + } + SignatureList->SignatureHeaderSize = 0; + SignatureList->SignatureListSize = (UINT32) SignatureListSize; +@@ -1870,19 +1870,17 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler ( + CopyMem (Signature->SignatureData, mImageDigest, mImageDigestSize); + } + +-Done: +- if (Status != EFI_SUCCESS) { +- // +- // Policy decides to defer or reject the image; add its information in image executable information table. +- // +- NameStr = ConvertDevicePathToText (File, FALSE, TRUE); +- AddImageExeInfo (Action, NameStr, File, SignatureList, SignatureListSize); +- if (NameStr != NULL) { +- DEBUG((EFI_D_INFO, "The image doesn't pass verification: %s\n", NameStr)); +- FreePool(NameStr); +- } +- Status = EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION; ++Failed: ++ // ++ // Policy decides to defer or reject the image; add its information in image executable information table. ++ // ++ NameStr = ConvertDevicePathToText (File, FALSE, TRUE); ++ AddImageExeInfo (Action, NameStr, File, SignatureList, SignatureListSize); ++ if (NameStr != NULL) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "The image doesn't pass verification: %s\n", NameStr)); ++ FreePool(NameStr); + } ++ Status = EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION; + + if (SignatureList != NULL) { + FreePool (SignatureList); +-- +1.8.3.1 + diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-Fix-spelling-errors-PARTIAL-PICK.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-Fix-spelling-errors-PARTIAL-PICK.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..578487c --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-Fix-spelling-errors-PARTIAL-PICK.patch @@ -0,0 +1,103 @@ +From 7f364d9a95905efee0a8b46e4108042aaebe7849 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Laszlo Ersek +Date: Fri, 31 Jan 2020 12:42:37 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 01/12] SecurityPkg: Fix spelling errors [PARTIAL PICK] +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +RH-Author: Laszlo Ersek +Message-id: <20200131124248.22369-2-lersek@redhat.com> +Patchwork-id: 93612 +O-Subject: [RHEL-8.2.0 edk2 PATCH 01/12] SecurityPkg: Fix spelling errors [PARTIAL PICK] +Bugzilla: 1751993 +RH-Acked-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé +RH-Acked-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov + +From: Sean Brogan + +--v-- RHEL-8 note start --v-- + +This is a partial cherry-pick, restricted to +"SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c". + +The upstream patch has a super-ugly diffstat (81 files changed, 205 +insertions(+), 205 deletions(-)), fixing spelling errors all over +SecurityPkg in one go. It doesn't apply cleanly down-stream, and I don't +want to pick more (unrelated) SecurityPkg dependencies for this backport +series. + +Thus, the only alternative to this partial cherry-pick would be resolving +conflicts over the rest of this series. That's obviously worse than a +partial typo fix backport. At the next rebase, we're going to drop this +patch and the rest of the backport series alike, anyway. + +--^-- RHEL-8 note end --^-- + +https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2265 + +Cc: Jiewen Yao +Cc: Jian J Wang +Cc: Chao Zhang +Signed-off-by: Michael D Kinney +Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao +Reviewed-by: Jian J Wang +(cherry picked from commit d6b926e76e3d639ac37610e97d33ff9e3a6281eb) +Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek +Signed-off-by: Miroslav Rezanina +--- + .../Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c | 10 +++++----- + 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c +index fe4cdcc..a0a12b5 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c +@@ -745,7 +745,7 @@ AddImageExeInfo ( + if (ImageExeInfoTable != NULL) { + // + // The table has been found! +- // We must enlarge the table to accomodate the new exe info entry. ++ // We must enlarge the table to accommodate the new exe info entry. + // + ImageExeInfoTableSize = GetImageExeInfoTableSize (ImageExeInfoTable); + } else { +@@ -947,7 +947,7 @@ Done: + + @param[in] VariableName Name of database variable that is searched in. + @param[in] Signature Pointer to signature that is searched for. +- @param[in] CertType Pointer to hash algrithom. ++ @param[in] CertType Pointer to hash algorithm. + @param[in] SignatureSize Size of Signature. + + @return TRUE Found the signature in the variable database. +@@ -992,7 +992,7 @@ IsSignatureFoundInDatabase ( + goto Done; + } + // +- // Enumerate all signature data in SigDB to check if executable's signature exists. ++ // Enumerate all signature data in SigDB to check if signature exists for executable. + // + CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data; + while ((DataSize > 0) && (DataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) { +@@ -1844,7 +1844,7 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler ( + + if (OffSet != (SecDataDir->VirtualAddress + SecDataDir->Size)) { + // +- // The Size in Certificate Table or the attribute certicate table is corrupted. ++ // The Size in Certificate Table or the attribute certificate table is corrupted. + // + VerifyStatus = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED; + } +@@ -1855,7 +1855,7 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler ( + Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED; + if (Action == EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FAILED || Action == EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FOUND) { + // +- // Get image hash value as executable's signature. ++ // Get image hash value as signature of executable. + // + SignatureListSize = sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + mImageDigestSize; + SignatureList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) AllocateZeroPool (SignatureListSize); +-- +1.8.3.1 + diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-UefiCpuPkg-PiSmmCpuDxeSmm-fix-2M-4K-page-splitting-r.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-UefiCpuPkg-PiSmmCpuDxeSmm-fix-2M-4K-page-splitting-r.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..627d458 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-UefiCpuPkg-PiSmmCpuDxeSmm-fix-2M-4K-page-splitting-r.patch @@ -0,0 +1,152 @@ +From 2613601640be75f79e9dd8d2db21ad45d227d907 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Laszlo Ersek +Date: Fri, 17 Jan 2020 11:33:43 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpuDxeSmm: fix 2M->4K page splitting + regression for PDEs +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +RH-Author: Laszlo Ersek +Message-id: <20200117113343.30392-2-lersek@redhat.com> +Patchwork-id: 93389 +O-Subject: [RHEL-8.2.0 edk2 PATCH 1/1] UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpuDxeSmm: fix 2M->4K page splitting regression for PDEs +Bugzilla: 1789335 +RH-Acked-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé +RH-Acked-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov + +In commit 4eee0cc7cc0d ("UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpu: Enable 5 level paging when +CPU supports", 2019-07-12), the Page Directory Entry setting was regressed +(corrupted) when splitting a 2MB page to 512 4KB pages, in the +InitPaging() function. + +Consider the following hunk, displayed with + +$ git show --function-context --ignore-space-change 4eee0cc7cc0db + +> // +> // If it is 2M page, check IsAddressSplit() +> // +> if (((*Pd & IA32_PG_PS) != 0) && IsAddressSplit (Address)) { +> // +> // Based on current page table, create 4KB page table for split area. +> // +> ASSERT (Address == (*Pd & PHYSICAL_ADDRESS_MASK)); +> +> Pt = AllocatePageTableMemory (1); +> ASSERT (Pt != NULL); +> +> + *Pd = (UINTN) Pt | IA32_PG_RW | IA32_PG_P; +> + +> // Split it +> - for (PtIndex = 0; PtIndex < SIZE_4KB / sizeof(*Pt); PtIndex++) { +> - Pt[PtIndex] = Address + ((PtIndex << 12) | mAddressEncMask | PAGE_ATTRIBUTE_BITS); +> + for (PtIndex = 0; PtIndex < SIZE_4KB / sizeof(*Pt); PtIndex++, Pt++) { +> + *Pt = Address + ((PtIndex << 12) | mAddressEncMask | PAGE_ATTRIBUTE_BITS); +> } // end for PT +> *Pd = (UINT64)(UINTN)Pt | mAddressEncMask | PAGE_ATTRIBUTE_BITS; +> } // end if IsAddressSplit +> } // end for PD + +First, the new assignment to the Page Directory Entry (*Pd) is +superfluous. That's because (a) we set (*Pd) after the Page Table Entry +loop anyway, and (b) here we do not attempt to access the memory starting +at "Address" (which is mapped by the original value of the Page Directory +Entry). + +Second, appending "Pt++" to the incrementing expression of the PTE loop is +a bug. It causes "Pt" to point *right past* the just-allocated Page Table, +once we finish the loop. But the PDE assignment that immediately follows +the loop assumes that "Pt" still points to the *start* of the new Page +Table. + +The result is that the originally mapped 2MB page disappears from the +processor's view. The PDE now points to a "Page Table" that is filled with +garbage. The random entries in that "Page Table" will cause some virtual +addresses in the original 2MB area to fault. Other virtual addresses in +the same range will no longer have a 1:1 physical mapping, but be +scattered over random physical page frames. + +The second phase of the InitPaging() function ("Go through page table and +set several page table entries to absent or execute-disable") already +manipulates entries in wrong Page Tables, for such PDEs that got split in +the first phase. + +This issue has been caught as follows: + +- OVMF is started with 2001 MB of guest RAM. + +- This places the main SMRAM window at 0x7C10_1000. + +- The SMRAM management in the SMM Core links this SMRAM window into + "mSmmMemoryMap", with a FREE_PAGE_LIST record placed at the start of the + area. + +- At "SMM Ready To Lock" time, PiSmmCpuDxeSmm calls InitPaging(). The + first phase (quoted above) decides to split the 2MB page at 0x7C00_0000 + into 512 4KB pages, and corrupts the PDE. The new Page Table is + allocated at 0x7CE0_D000, but the PDE is set to 0x7CE0_E000 (plus + attributes 0x67). + +- Due to the corrupted PDE, the second phase of InitPaging() already looks + up the PTE for Address=0x7C10_1000 in the wrong place. The second phase + goes on to mark bogus PTEs as "NX". + +- PiSmmCpuDxeSmm calls SetMemMapAttributes(). Address 0x7C10_1000 is at + the base of the SMRAM window, therefore it happens to be listed in the + SMRAM map as an EfiConventionalMemory region. SetMemMapAttributes() + calls SmmSetMemoryAttributes() to mark the region as XP. However, + GetPageTableEntry() in ConvertMemoryPageAttributes() fails -- address + 0x7C10_1000 is no longer mapped by anything! -- and so the attribute + setting fails with RETURN_UNSUPPORTED. This error goes unnoticed, as + SetMemMapAttributes() ignores the return value of + SmmSetMemoryAttributes(). + +- When SetMemMapAttributes() reaches another entry in the SMRAM map, + ConvertMemoryPageAttributes() decides it needs to split a 2MB page, and + calls SplitPage(). + +- SplitPage() calls AllocatePageTableMemory() for the new Page Table, + which takes us to InternalAllocMaxAddress() in the SMM Core. + +- The SMM core attempts to read the FREE_PAGE_LIST record at 0x7C10_1000. + Because this virtual address is no longer mapped, the firmware crashes + in InternalAllocMaxAddress(), when accessing (Pages->NumberOfPages). + +Remove the useless assignment to (*Pd) from before the loop. Revert the +loop incrementing and the PTE assignment to the known good version. + +Cc: Eric Dong +Cc: Ray Ni +Ref: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1789335 +Fixes: 4eee0cc7cc0db74489b99c19eba056b53eda6358 +Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek +Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daude +Reviewed-by: Ray Ni +(cherry picked from commit a5235562444021e9c5aff08f45daa6b5b7952c7a) +Signed-off-by: Miroslav Rezanina +--- + UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpuDxeSmm/SmmProfile.c | 6 ++---- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpuDxeSmm/SmmProfile.c b/UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpuDxeSmm/SmmProfile.c +index c513152..c47b557 100644 +--- a/UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpuDxeSmm/SmmProfile.c ++++ b/UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpuDxeSmm/SmmProfile.c +@@ -657,11 +657,9 @@ InitPaging ( + Pt = AllocatePageTableMemory (1); + ASSERT (Pt != NULL); + +- *Pd = (UINTN) Pt | IA32_PG_RW | IA32_PG_P; +- + // Split it +- for (PtIndex = 0; PtIndex < SIZE_4KB / sizeof(*Pt); PtIndex++, Pt++) { +- *Pt = Address + ((PtIndex << 12) | mAddressEncMask | PAGE_ATTRIBUTE_BITS); ++ for (PtIndex = 0; PtIndex < SIZE_4KB / sizeof(*Pt); PtIndex++) { ++ Pt[PtIndex] = Address + ((PtIndex << 12) | mAddressEncMask | PAGE_ATTRIBUTE_BITS); + } // end for PT + *Pd = (UINT64)(UINTN)Pt | mAddressEncMask | PAGE_ATTRIBUTE_BITS; + } // end if IsAddressSplit +-- +1.8.3.1 + diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-aarch64-verbose.json b/SOURCES/edk2-aarch64-verbose.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ceec878 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-aarch64-verbose.json @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +{ + "description": "UEFI firmware for ARM64 virtual machines, verbose logs", + "interface-types": [ + "uefi" + ], + "mapping": { + "device": "flash", + "executable": { + "filename": "/usr/share/edk2/aarch64/QEMU_EFI-pflash.raw", + "format": "raw" + }, + "nvram-template": { + "filename": "/usr/share/edk2/aarch64/vars-template-pflash.raw", + "format": "raw" + } + }, + "targets": [ + { + "architecture": "aarch64", + "machines": [ + "virt-*" + ] + } + ], + "features": [ + "verbose-static" + ], + "tags": [ + + ] +} diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-aarch64.json b/SOURCES/edk2-aarch64.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c5a73cb --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-aarch64.json @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +{ + "description": "UEFI firmware for ARM64 virtual machines", + "interface-types": [ + "uefi" + ], + "mapping": { + "device": "flash", + "executable": { + "filename": "/usr/share/edk2/aarch64/QEMU_EFI-silent-pflash.raw", + "format": "raw" + }, + "nvram-template": { + "filename": "/usr/share/edk2/aarch64/vars-template-pflash.raw", + "format": "raw" + } + }, + "targets": [ + { + "architecture": "aarch64", + "machines": [ + "virt-*" + ] + } + ], + "features": [ + + ], + "tags": [ + + ] +} diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-ovmf-sb.json b/SOURCES/edk2-ovmf-sb.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a0203e8 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-ovmf-sb.json @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +{ + "description": "OVMF with SB+SMM, SB enabled, MS certs enrolled", + "interface-types": [ + "uefi" + ], + "mapping": { + "device": "flash", + "executable": { + "filename": "/usr/share/edk2/ovmf/OVMF_CODE.secboot.fd", + "format": "raw" + }, + "nvram-template": { + "filename": "/usr/share/edk2/ovmf/OVMF_VARS.secboot.fd", + "format": "raw" + } + }, + "targets": [ + { + "architecture": "x86_64", + "machines": [ + "pc-q35-*" + ] + } + ], + "features": [ + "acpi-s3", + "amd-sev", + "enrolled-keys", + "requires-smm", + "secure-boot", + "verbose-dynamic" + ], + "tags": [ + + ] +} diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-ovmf.json b/SOURCES/edk2-ovmf.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000..74d00e3 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-ovmf.json @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +{ + "description": "OVMF with SB+SMM, empty varstore", + "interface-types": [ + "uefi" + ], + "mapping": { + "device": "flash", + "executable": { + "filename": "/usr/share/edk2/ovmf/OVMF_CODE.secboot.fd", + "format": "raw" + }, + "nvram-template": { + "filename": "/usr/share/edk2/ovmf/OVMF_VARS.fd", + "format": "raw" + } + }, + "targets": [ + { + "architecture": "x86_64", + "machines": [ + "pc-q35-*" + ] + } + ], + "features": [ + "acpi-s3", + "amd-sev", + "requires-smm", + "secure-boot", + "verbose-dynamic" + ], + "tags": [ + + ] +} diff --git a/SOURCES/ovmf-vars-generator b/SOURCES/ovmf-vars-generator new file mode 100755 index 0000000..111e438 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/ovmf-vars-generator @@ -0,0 +1,295 @@ +#!/bin/python3 +# Copyright (C) 2017 Red Hat +# Authors: +# - Patrick Uiterwijk +# - Kashyap Chamarthy +# +# Licensed under MIT License, for full text see LICENSE +# +# Purpose: Launch a QEMU guest and enroll ithe UEFI keys into an OVMF +# variables ("VARS") file. Then boot a Linux kernel with QEMU. +# Finally, perform a check to verify if Secure Boot +# is enabled. + +from __future__ import print_function + +import argparse +import os +import logging +import tempfile +import shutil +import string +import subprocess + + +def strip_special(line): + return ''.join([c for c in str(line) if c in string.printable]) + + +def generate_qemu_cmd(args, readonly, *extra_args): + if args.disable_smm: + machinetype = 'pc' + else: + machinetype = 'q35,smm=on' + machinetype += ',accel=%s' % ('kvm' if args.enable_kvm else 'tcg') + + if args.oem_string is None: + oemstrings = [] + else: + oemstring_values = [ + ",value=" + s.replace(",", ",,") for s in args.oem_string ] + oemstrings = [ + '-smbios', + "type=11" + ''.join(oemstring_values) ] + + return [ + args.qemu_binary, + '-machine', machinetype, + '-display', 'none', + '-no-user-config', + '-nodefaults', + '-m', '768', + '-smp', '2,sockets=2,cores=1,threads=1', + '-chardev', 'pty,id=charserial1', + '-device', 'isa-serial,chardev=charserial1,id=serial1', + '-global', 'driver=cfi.pflash01,property=secure,value=%s' % ( + 'off' if args.disable_smm else 'on'), + '-drive', + 'file=%s,if=pflash,format=raw,unit=0,readonly=on' % ( + args.ovmf_binary), + '-drive', + 'file=%s,if=pflash,format=raw,unit=1,readonly=%s' % ( + args.out_temp, 'on' if readonly else 'off'), + '-serial', 'stdio'] + oemstrings + list(extra_args) + + +def download(url, target, suffix, no_download): + istemp = False + if target and os.path.exists(target): + return target, istemp + if not target: + temped = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix='qosb.', suffix='.%s' % suffix) + os.close(temped[0]) + target = temped[1] + istemp = True + if no_download: + raise Exception('%s did not exist, but downloading was disabled' % + target) + import requests + logging.debug('Downloading %s to %s', url, target) + r = requests.get(url, stream=True) + with open(target, 'wb') as f: + for chunk in r.iter_content(chunk_size=1024): + if chunk: + f.write(chunk) + return target, istemp + + +def enroll_keys(args): + shutil.copy(args.ovmf_template_vars, args.out_temp) + + logging.info('Starting enrollment') + + cmd = generate_qemu_cmd( + args, + False, + '-drive', + 'file=%s,format=raw,if=none,media=cdrom,id=drive-cd1,' + 'readonly=on' % args.uefi_shell_iso, + '-device', + 'ide-cd,drive=drive-cd1,id=cd1,' + 'bootindex=1') + p = subprocess.Popen(cmd, + stdin=subprocess.PIPE, + stdout=subprocess.PIPE, + stderr=subprocess.STDOUT) + logging.info('Performing enrollment') + # Wait until the UEFI shell starts (first line is printed) + read = p.stdout.readline() + if b'char device redirected' in read: + read = p.stdout.readline() + # Skip passed QEMU warnings, like the following one we see in Ubuntu: + # qemu-system-x86_64: warning: TCG doesn't support requested feature: CPUID.01H:ECX.vmx [bit 5] + while b'qemu-system-x86_64: warning:' in read: + read = p.stdout.readline() + if args.print_output: + print(strip_special(read), end='') + print() + # Send the escape char to enter the UEFI shell early + p.stdin.write(b'\x1b') + p.stdin.flush() + # And then run the following three commands from the UEFI shell: + # change into the first file system device; install the default + # keys and certificates, and reboot + p.stdin.write(b'fs0:\r\n') + p.stdin.write(b'EnrollDefaultKeys.efi\r\n') + p.stdin.write(b'reset -s\r\n') + p.stdin.flush() + while True: + read = p.stdout.readline() + if args.print_output: + print('OUT: %s' % strip_special(read), end='') + print() + if b'info: success' in read: + break + p.wait() + if args.print_output: + print(strip_special(p.stdout.read()), end='') + logging.info('Finished enrollment') + + +def test_keys(args): + logging.info('Grabbing test kernel') + kernel, kerneltemp = download(args.kernel_url, args.kernel_path, + 'kernel', args.no_download) + + logging.info('Starting verification') + try: + cmd = generate_qemu_cmd( + args, + True, + '-append', 'console=tty0 console=ttyS0,115200n8', + '-kernel', kernel) + p = subprocess.Popen(cmd, + stdin=subprocess.PIPE, + stdout=subprocess.PIPE, + stderr=subprocess.STDOUT) + logging.info('Performing verification') + while True: + read = p.stdout.readline() + if args.print_output: + print('OUT: %s' % strip_special(read), end='') + print() + if b'Secure boot disabled' in read: + raise Exception('Secure Boot was disabled') + elif b'Secure boot enabled' in read: + logging.info('Confirmed: Secure Boot is enabled') + break + elif b'Kernel is locked down from EFI secure boot' in read: + logging.info('Confirmed: Secure Boot is enabled') + break + p.kill() + if args.print_output: + print(strip_special(p.stdout.read()), end='') + logging.info('Finished verification') + finally: + if kerneltemp: + os.remove(kernel) + + +def parse_args(): + parser = argparse.ArgumentParser() + parser.add_argument('output', help='Filename for output vars file') + parser.add_argument('--out-temp', help=argparse.SUPPRESS) + parser.add_argument('--force', help='Overwrite existing output file', + action='store_true') + parser.add_argument('--print-output', help='Print the QEMU guest output', + action='store_true') + parser.add_argument('--verbose', '-v', help='Increase verbosity', + action='count') + parser.add_argument('--quiet', '-q', help='Decrease verbosity', + action='count') + parser.add_argument('--qemu-binary', help='QEMU binary path', + default='/usr/bin/qemu-system-x86_64') + parser.add_argument('--enable-kvm', help='Enable KVM acceleration', + action='store_true') + parser.add_argument('--ovmf-binary', help='OVMF secureboot code file', + default='/usr/share/edk2/ovmf/OVMF_CODE.secboot.fd') + parser.add_argument('--ovmf-template-vars', help='OVMF empty vars file', + default='/usr/share/edk2/ovmf/OVMF_VARS.fd') + parser.add_argument('--uefi-shell-iso', help='Path to uefi shell iso', + default='/usr/share/edk2/ovmf/UefiShell.iso') + parser.add_argument('--skip-enrollment', + help='Skip enrollment, only test', action='store_true') + parser.add_argument('--skip-testing', + help='Skip testing generated "VARS" file', + action='store_true') + parser.add_argument('--kernel-path', + help='Specify a consistent path for kernel') + parser.add_argument('--no-download', action='store_true', + help='Never download a kernel') + parser.add_argument('--fedora-version', + help='Fedora version to get kernel for checking', + default='27') + parser.add_argument('--kernel-url', help='Kernel URL', + default='https://download.fedoraproject.org/pub/fedora' + '/linux/releases/%(version)s/Everything/x86_64' + '/os/images/pxeboot/vmlinuz') + parser.add_argument('--disable-smm', + help=('Don\'t restrict varstore pflash writes to ' + 'guest code that executes in SMM. Use this ' + 'option only if your OVMF binary doesn\'t have ' + 'the edk2 SMM driver stack built into it ' + '(possibly because your QEMU binary lacks SMM ' + 'emulation). Note that without restricting ' + 'varstore pflash writes to guest code that ' + 'executes in SMM, a malicious guest kernel, ' + 'used for testing, could undermine Secure ' + 'Boot.'), + action='store_true') + parser.add_argument('--oem-string', + help=('Pass the argument to the guest as a string in ' + 'the SMBIOS Type 11 (OEM Strings) table. ' + 'Multiple occurrences of this option are ' + 'collected into a single SMBIOS Type 11 table. ' + 'A pure ASCII string argument is strongly ' + 'suggested.'), + action='append') + args = parser.parse_args() + args.kernel_url = args.kernel_url % {'version': args.fedora_version} + + validate_args(args) + return args + + +def validate_args(args): + if (os.path.exists(args.output) + and not args.force + and not args.skip_enrollment): + raise Exception('%s already exists' % args.output) + + if args.skip_enrollment and not os.path.exists(args.output): + raise Exception('%s does not yet exist' % args.output) + + verbosity = (args.verbose or 1) - (args.quiet or 0) + if verbosity >= 2: + logging.basicConfig(level=logging.DEBUG) + elif verbosity == 1: + logging.basicConfig(level=logging.INFO) + elif verbosity < 0: + logging.basicConfig(level=logging.ERROR) + else: + logging.basicConfig(level=logging.WARN) + + if args.skip_enrollment: + args.out_temp = args.output + else: + temped = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix='qosb.', suffix='.vars') + os.close(temped[0]) + args.out_temp = temped[1] + logging.debug('Temp output: %s', args.out_temp) + + +def move_to_dest(args): + shutil.copy(args.out_temp, args.output) + os.remove(args.out_temp) + + +def main(): + args = parse_args() + if not args.skip_enrollment: + enroll_keys(args) + if not args.skip_testing: + test_keys(args) + if not args.skip_enrollment: + move_to_dest(args) + if args.skip_testing: + logging.info('Created %s' % args.output) + else: + logging.info('Created and verified %s' % args.output) + else: + logging.info('Verified %s', args.output) + + +if __name__ == '__main__': + main() diff --git a/SOURCES/ovmf-whitepaper-c770f8c.txt b/SOURCES/ovmf-whitepaper-c770f8c.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ba727b4 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/ovmf-whitepaper-c770f8c.txt @@ -0,0 +1,2422 @@ +Open Virtual Machine Firmware (OVMF) Status Report +July 2014 (with updates in August 2014 - January 2015) + +Author: Laszlo Ersek +Copyright (C) 2014-2015, Red Hat, Inc. +CC BY-SA 4.0 + +Abstract +-------- + +The Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) is a specification that +defines a software interface between an operating system and platform firmware. +UEFI is designed to replace the Basic Input/Output System (BIOS) firmware +interface. + +Hardware platform vendors have been increasingly adopting the UEFI +Specification to govern their boot firmware developments. OVMF (Open Virtual +Machine Firmware), a sub-project of Intel's EFI Development Kit II (edk2), +enables UEFI support for Ia32 and X64 Virtual Machines. + +This paper reports on the status of the OVMF project, treats features and +limitations, gives end-user hints, and examines some areas in-depth. + +Keywords: ACPI, boot options, CSM, edk2, firmware, flash, fw_cfg, KVM, memory +map, non-volatile variables, OVMF, PCD, QEMU, reset vector, S3, Secure Boot, +Smbios, SMM, TianoCore, UEFI, VBE shim, Virtio + +Table of Contents +----------------- + +- Motivation +- Scope +- Example qemu invocation +- Installation of OVMF guests with virt-manager and virt-install +- Supported guest operating systems +- Compatibility Support Module (CSM) +- Phases of the boot process +- Project structure +- Platform Configuration Database (PCD) +- Firmware image structure +- S3 (suspend to RAM and resume) +- A comprehensive memory map of OVMF +- Known Secure Boot limitations +- Variable store and LockBox in SMRAM +- Select features + - X64-specific reset vector for OVMF + - Client library for QEMU's firmware configuration interface + - Guest ACPI tables + - Guest SMBIOS tables + - Platform-specific boot policy + - Virtio drivers + - Platform Driver + - Video driver +- Afterword + +Motivation +---------- + +OVMF extends the usual benefits of virtualization to UEFI. Reasons to use OVMF +include: + +- Legacy-free guests. A UEFI-based environment eliminates dependencies on + legacy address spaces and devices. This is especially beneficial when used + with physically assigned devices where the legacy operating mode is + troublesome to support, ex. assigned graphics cards operating in legacy-free, + non-VGA mode in the guest. + +- Future proof guests. The x86 market is steadily moving towards a legacy-free + platform and guest operating systems may eventually require a UEFI + environment. OVMF provides that next generation firmware support for such + applications. + +- GUID partition tables (GPTs). MBR partition tables represent partition + offsets and sizes with 32-bit integers, in units of 512 byte sectors. This + limits the addressable portion of the disk to 2 TB. GPT represents logical + block addresses with 64 bits. + +- Liberating boot loader binaries from residing in contested and poorly defined + space between the partition table and the partitions. + +- Support for booting off disks (eg. pass-through physical SCSI devices) with a + 4kB physical and logical sector size, i.e. which don't have 512-byte block + emulation. + +- Development and testing of Secure Boot-related features in guest operating + systems. Although OVMF's Secure Boot implementation is currently not secure + against malicious UEFI drivers, UEFI applications, and guest kernels, + trusted guest code that only uses standard UEFI interfaces will find a valid + Secure Boot environment under OVMF, with working key enrollment and signature + validation. This enables development and testing of portable, Secure + Boot-related guest code. + +- Presence of non-volatile UEFI variables. This furthers development and + testing of OS installers, UEFI boot loaders, and unique, dependent guest OS + features. For example, an efivars-backed pstore (persistent storage) + file system works under Linux. + +- Altogether, a near production-level UEFI environment for virtual machines + when Secure Boot is not required. + +Scope +----- + +UEFI and especially Secure Boot have been topics fraught with controversy and +political activism. This paper sidesteps these aspects and strives to focus on +use cases, hands-on information for end users, and technical details. + +Unless stated otherwise, the expression "X supports Y" means "X is technically +compatible with interfaces provided or required by Y". It does not imply +support as an activity performed by natural persons or companies. + +We discuss the status of OVMF at a state no earlier than edk2 SVN revision +16158. The paper concentrates on upstream projects and communities, but +occasionally it pans out about OVMF as it is planned to be shipped (as +Technical Preview) in Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7.1. Such digressions are marked +with the [RHEL] margin notation. + +Although other VMMs and accelerators are known to support (or plan to support) +OVMF to various degrees -- for example, VirtualBox, Xen, BHyVe --, we'll +emphasize OVMF on qemu/KVM, because QEMU and KVM have always been Red Hat's +focus wrt. OVMF. + +The recommended upstream QEMU version is 2.1+. The recommended host Linux +kernel (KVM) version is 3.10+. The recommended QEMU machine type is +"qemu-system-x86_64 -M pc-i440fx-2.1" or later. + +The term "TianoCore" is used interchangeably with "edk2" in this paper. + +Example qemu invocation +----------------------- + +The following commands give a quick foretaste of installing a UEFI operating +system on OVMF, relying only on upstream edk2 and qemu. + +- Clone and build OVMF: + + git clone https://github.com/tianocore/edk2.git + cd edk2 + nice OvmfPkg/build.sh -a X64 -n $(getconf _NPROCESSORS_ONLN) + + (Note that this ad-hoc build will not include the Secure Boot feature.) + +- The build output file, "OVMF.fd", includes not only the executable firmware + code, but the non-volatile variable store as well. For this reason, make a + VM-specific copy of the build output (the variable store should be private to + the virtual machine): + + cp Build/OvmfX64/DEBUG_GCC4?/FV/OVMF.fd fedora.flash + + (The variable store and the firmware executable are also available in the + build output as separate files: "OVMF_VARS.fd" and "OVMF_CODE.fd". This + enables central management and updates of the firmware executable, while each + virtual machine can retain its own variable store.) + +- Download a Fedora LiveCD: + + wget https://dl.fedoraproject.org/pub/fedora/linux/releases/20/Live/x86_64/Fedora-Live-Xfce-x86_64-20-1.iso + +- Create a virtual disk (qcow2 format, 20 GB in size): + + qemu-img create -f qcow2 fedora.img 20G + +- Create the following qemu wrapper script under the name "fedora.sh": + + # Basic virtual machine properties: a recent i440fx machine type, KVM + # acceleration, 2048 MB RAM, two VCPUs. + OPTS="-M pc-i440fx-2.1 -enable-kvm -m 2048 -smp 2" + + # The OVMF binary, including the non-volatile variable store, appears as a + # "normal" qemu drive on the host side, and it is exposed to the guest as a + # persistent flash device. + OPTS="$OPTS -drive if=pflash,format=raw,file=fedora.flash" + + # The hard disk is exposed to the guest as a virtio-block device. OVMF has a + # driver stack that supports such a disk. We specify this disk as first boot + # option. OVMF recognizes the boot order specification. + OPTS="$OPTS -drive id=disk0,if=none,format=qcow2,file=fedora.img" + OPTS="$OPTS -device virtio-blk-pci,drive=disk0,bootindex=0" + + # The Fedora installer disk appears as an IDE CD-ROM in the guest. This is + # the 2nd boot option. + OPTS="$OPTS -drive id=cd0,if=none,format=raw,readonly" + OPTS="$OPTS,file=Fedora-Live-Xfce-x86_64-20-1.iso" + OPTS="$OPTS -device ide-cd,bus=ide.1,drive=cd0,bootindex=1" + + # The following setting enables S3 (suspend to RAM). OVMF supports S3 + # suspend/resume. + OPTS="$OPTS -global PIIX4_PM.disable_s3=0" + + # OVMF emits a number of info / debug messages to the QEMU debug console, at + # ioport 0x402. We configure qemu so that the debug console is indeed + # available at that ioport. We redirect the host side of the debug console to + # a file. + OPTS="$OPTS -global isa-debugcon.iobase=0x402 -debugcon file:fedora.ovmf.log" + + # QEMU accepts various commands and queries from the user on the monitor + # interface. Connect the monitor with the qemu process's standard input and + # output. + OPTS="$OPTS -monitor stdio" + + # A USB tablet device in the guest allows for accurate pointer tracking + # between the host and the guest. + OPTS="$OPTS -device piix3-usb-uhci -device usb-tablet" + + # Provide the guest with a virtual network card (virtio-net). + # + # Normally, qemu provides the guest with a UEFI-conformant network driver + # from the iPXE project, in the form of a PCI expansion ROM. For this test, + # we disable the expansion ROM and allow OVMF's built-in virtio-net driver to + # take effect. + # + # On the host side, we use the SLIRP ("user") network backend, which has + # relatively low performance, but it doesn't require extra privileges from + # the user executing qemu. + OPTS="$OPTS -netdev id=net0,type=user" + OPTS="$OPTS -device virtio-net-pci,netdev=net0,romfile=" + + # A Spice QXL GPU is recommended as the primary VGA-compatible display + # device. It is a full-featured virtual video card, with great operating + # system driver support. OVMF supports it too. + OPTS="$OPTS -device qxl-vga" + + qemu-system-x86_64 $OPTS + +- Start the Fedora guest: + + sh fedora.sh + +- The above command can be used for both installation and later boots of the + Fedora guest. + +- In order to verify basic OVMF network connectivity: + + - Assuming that the non-privileged user running qemu belongs to group G + (where G is a numeric identifier), ensure as root on the host that the + group range in file "/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ping_group_range" includes G. + + - As the non-privileged user, boot the guest as usual. + + - On the TianoCore splash screen, press ESC. + + - Navigate to Boot Manager | EFI Internal Shell + + - In the UEFI Shell, issue the following commands: + + ifconfig -s eth0 dhcp + ping A.B.C.D + + where A.B.C.D is a public IPv4 address in dotted decimal notation that your + host can reach. + + - Type "quit" at the (qemu) monitor prompt. + +Installation of OVMF guests with virt-manager and virt-install +-------------------------------------------------------------- + +(1) Assuming OVMF has been installed on the host with the following files: + - /usr/share/OVMF/OVMF_CODE.fd + - /usr/share/OVMF/OVMF_VARS.fd + + locate the "nvram" stanza in "/etc/libvirt/qemu.conf", and edit it as + follows: + + nvram = [ "/usr/share/OVMF/OVMF_CODE.fd:/usr/share/OVMF/OVMF_VARS.fd" ] + +(2) Restart libvirtd with your Linux distribution's service management tool; + for example, + + systemctl restart libvirtd + +(3) In virt-manager, proceed with the guest installation as usual: + - select File | New Virtual Machine, + - advance to Step 5 of 5, + - in Step 5, check "Customize configuration before install", + - click Finish; + - in the customization dialog, select Overview | Firmware, and choose UEFI, + - click Apply and Begin Installation. + +(4) With virt-install: + + LDR="loader=/usr/share/OVMF/OVMF_CODE.fd,loader_ro=yes,loader_type=pflash" + virt-install \ + --name fedora20 \ + --memory 2048 \ + --vcpus 2 \ + --os-variant fedora20 \ + --boot hd,cdrom,$LDR \ + --disk size=20 \ + --disk path=Fedora-Live-Xfce-x86_64-20-1.iso,device=cdrom,bus=scsi + +(5) A popular, distribution-independent, bleeding-edge OVMF package is + available under , courtesy of Gerd Hoffmann. + + The "edk2.git-ovmf-x64" package provides the following files, among others: + - /usr/share/edk2.git/ovmf-x64/OVMF_CODE-pure-efi.fd + - /usr/share/edk2.git/ovmf-x64/OVMF_VARS-pure-efi.fd + + When using this package, adapt steps (1) and (4) accordingly. + +(6) Additionally, the "edk2.git-ovmf-x64" package seeks to simplify the + enablement of Secure Boot in a virtual machine (strictly for development + and testing purposes). + + - Boot the virtual machine off the CD-ROM image called + "/usr/share/edk2.git/ovmf-x64/UefiShell.iso"; before or after installing + the main guest operating system. + + - When the UEFI shell appears, issue the following commands: + + EnrollDefaultKeys.efi + reset -s + + - The EnrollDefaultKeys.efi utility enrolls the following keys: + + - A static example X.509 certificate (CN=TestCommonName) as Platform Key + and first Key Exchange Key. + + The private key matching this certificate has been destroyed (but you + shouldn't trust this statement). + + - "Microsoft Corporation KEK CA 2011" as second Key Exchange Key + (SHA1: 31:59:0b:fd:89:c9:d7:4e:d0:87:df:ac:66:33:4b:39:31:25:4b:30). + + - "Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011" as first DB entry + (SHA1: 58:0a:6f:4c:c4:e4:b6:69:b9:eb:dc:1b:2b:3e:08:7b:80:d0:67:8d). + + - "Microsoft Corporation UEFI CA 2011" as second DB entry + (SHA1: 46:de:f6:3b:5c:e6:1c:f8:ba:0d:e2:e6:63:9c:10:19:d0:ed:14:f3). + + These keys suffice to boot released versions of popular Linux + distributions (through the shim.efi utility), and Windows 8 and Windows + Server 2012 R2, in Secure Boot mode. + +Supported guest operating systems +--------------------------------- + +Upstream OVMF does not favor some guest operating systems over others for +political or ideological reasons. However, some operating systems are harder to +obtain and/or technically more difficult to support. The general expectation is +that recent UEFI OSes should just work. Please consult the "OvmfPkg/README" +file. + +The following guest OSes were tested with OVMF: +- Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6 +- Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 +- Fedora 18 +- Fedora 19 +- Fedora 20 +- Windows Server 2008 R2 SP1 +- Windows Server 2012 +- Windows 8 + +Notes about Windows Server 2008 R2 (paraphrasing the "OvmfPkg/README" file): + +- QEMU should be started with one of the "-device qxl-vga" and "-device VGA" + options. + +- Only one video mode, 1024x768x32, is supported at OS runtime. + + Please refer to the section about QemuVideoDxe (OVMF's built-in video driver) + for more details on this limitation. + +- The qxl-vga video card is recommended ("-device qxl-vga"). After booting the + installed guest OS, select the video card in Device Manager, and upgrade the + video driver to the QXL XDDM one. + + The QXL XDDM driver can be downloaded from + , under Guest | Windows binaries. + + This driver enables additional graphics resolutions at OS runtime, and + provides S3 (suspend/resume) capability. + +Notes about Windows Server 2012 and Windows 8: + +- QEMU should be started with the "-device qxl-vga,revision=4" option (or a + later revision, if available). + +- The guest OS's builtin video driver inherits the video mode / frame buffer + from OVMF. There's no way to change the resolution at OS runtime. + + For this reason, a platform driver has been developed for OVMF, which allows + users to change the preferred video mode in the firmware. Please refer to the + section about PlatformDxe for details. + +- It is recommended to upgrade the guest OS's video driver to the QXL WDDM one, + via Device Manager. + + Binaries for the QXL WDDM driver can be found at + (pick a version greater than or + equal to 0.6), while the source code resides at + . + + This driver enables additional graphics resolutions at OS runtime, and + provides S3 (suspend/resume) capability. + +Compatibility Support Module (CSM) +---------------------------------- + +Collaboration between SeaBIOS and OVMF developers has enabled SeaBIOS to be +built as a Compatibility Support Module, and OVMF to embed and use it. + +Benefits of a SeaBIOS CSM include: + +- The ability to boot legacy (non-UEFI) operating systems, such as legacy Linux + systems, Windows 7, OpenBSD 5.2, FreeBSD 8/9, NetBSD, DragonflyBSD, Solaris + 10/11. + +- Legacy (non-UEFI-compliant) PCI expansion ROMs, such as a VGA BIOS, mapped by + QEMU in emulated devices' ROM BARs, are loaded and executed by OVMF. + + For example, this grants the Windows Server 2008 R2 SP1 guest's native, + legacy video driver access to all modes of all QEMU video cards. + +Building the CSM target of the SeaBIOS source tree is out of scope for this +report. Additionally, upstream OVMF does not enable the CSM by default. + +Interested users and developers should look for OVMF's "-D CSM_ENABLE" +build-time option, and check out the continuous +integration repository, which provides CSM-enabled OVMF builds. + +[RHEL] The "OVMF_CODE.fd" firmware image made available on the Red Hat + Enterprise Linux 7.1 host does not include a Compatibility Support + Module, for the following reasons: + + - Virtual machines running officially supported, legacy guest operating + systems should just use the standalone SeaBIOS firmware. Firmware + selection is flexible in virtualization, see eg. "Installation of OVMF + guests with virt-manager and virt-install" above. + + - The 16-bit thunking interface between OVMF and SeaBIOS is very complex + and presents a large debugging and support burden, based on past + experience. + + - Secure Boot is incompatible with CSM. + + - Inter-project dependencies should be minimized whenever possible. + + - Using the default QXL video card, the Windows 2008 R2 SP1 guest can be + installed with its built-in, legacy video driver. Said driver will + select the only available video mode, 1024x768x32. After installation, + the video driver can be upgraded to the full-featured QXL XDDM driver. + +Phases of the boot process +-------------------------- + +The PI and UEFI specifications, and Intel's UEFI and EDK II Learning and +Development materials provide ample information on PI and UEFI concepts. The +following is an absolutely minimal, rough glossary that is included only to +help readers new to PI and UEFI understand references in later, OVMF-specific +sections. We defer heavily to the official specifications and the training +materials, and frequently quote them below. + +A central concept to mention early is the GUID -- globally unique identifier. A +GUID is a 128-bit number, written as XXXXXXXX-XXXX-XXXX-XXXX-XXXXXXXXXXXX, +where each X stands for a hexadecimal nibble. GUIDs are used to name everything +in PI and in UEFI. Programmers introduce new GUIDs with the "uuidgen" utility, +and standards bodies standardize well-known services by positing their GUIDs. + +The boot process is roughly divided in the following phases: + +- Reset vector code. + +- SEC: Security phase. This phase is the root of firmware integrity. + +- PEI: Pre-EFI Initialization. This phase performs "minimal processor, chipset + and platform configuration for the purpose of discovering memory". Modules in + PEI collectively save their findings about the platform in a list of HOBs + (hand-off blocks). + + When developing PEI code, the Platform Initialization (PI) specification + should be consulted. + +- DXE: Driver eXecution Environment, pronounced as "Dixie". This "is the phase + where the bulk of the booting occurs: devices are enumerated and initialized, + UEFI services are supported, and protocols and drivers are implemented. Also, + the tables that create the UEFI interface are produced". + + On the PEI/DXE boundary, the HOBs produced by PEI are consumed. For example, + this is how the memory space map is configured initially. + +- BDS: Boot Device Selection. It is "responsible for determining how and where + you want to boot the operating system". + + When developing DXE and BDS code, it is mainly the UEFI specification that + should be consulted. When speaking about DXE, BDS is frequently considered to + be a part of it. + +The following concepts are tied to specific boot process phases: + +- PEIM: a PEI Module (pronounced "PIM"). A binary module running in the PEI + phase, consuming some PPIs and producing other PPIs, and producing HOBs. + +- PPI: PEIM-to-PEIM interface. A structure of function pointers and related + data members that establishes a PEI service, or an instance of a PEI service. + PPIs are identified by GUID. + + An example is EFI_PEI_S3_RESUME2_PPI (6D582DBC-DB85-4514-8FCC-5ADF6227B147). + +- DXE driver: a binary module running in the DXE and BDS phases, consuming some + protocols and producing other protocols. + +- Protocol: A structure of function pointers and related data members that + establishes a DXE service, or an instance of a DXE service. Protocols are + identified by GUID. + + An example is EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL (964E5B21-6459-11D2-8E39-00A0C969723B). + +- Architectural protocols: a set of standard protocols that are foundational to + the working of a UEFI system. Each architectural protocol has at most one + instance. Architectural protocols are implemented by a subset of DXE drivers. + DXE drivers explicitly list the set of protocols (including architectural + protocols) that they need to work. UEFI drivers can only be loaded once all + architectural protocols have become available during the DXE phase. + + An example is EFI_VARIABLE_WRITE_ARCH_PROTOCOL + (6441F818-6362-4E44-B570-7DBA31DD2453). + +Project structure +----------------- + +The term "OVMF" usually denotes the project (community and development effort) +that provide and maintain the subject matter UEFI firmware for virtual +machines. However the term is also frequently applied to the firmware binary +proper that a virtual machine executes. + +OVMF emerges as a compilation of several modules from the edk2 source +repository. "edk2" stands for EFI Development Kit II; it is a "modern, +feature-rich, cross-platform firmware development environment for the UEFI and +PI specifications". + +The composition of OVMF is dictated by the following build control files: + + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.fdf + + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.fdf + + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf + +The format of these files is described in the edk2 DSC and FDF specifications. +Roughly, the DSC file determines: +- library instance resolutions for library class requirements presented by the + modules to be compiled, +- the set of modules to compile. + +The FDF file roughly determines: +- what binary modules (compilation output files, precompiled binaries, graphics + image files, verbatim binary sections) to include in the firmware image, +- how to lay out the firmware image. + +The Ia32 flavor of these files builds a firmware where both PEI and DXE phases +are 32-bit. The Ia32X64 flavor builds a firmware where the PEI phase consists +of 32-bit modules, and the DXE phase is 64-bit. The X64 flavor builds a purely +64-bit firmware. + +The word size of the DXE phase must match the word size of the runtime OS -- a +32-bit DXE can't cooperate with a 64-bit OS, and a 64-bit DXE can't work a +32-bit OS. + +OVMF pulls together modules from across the edk2 tree. For example: + +- common drivers and libraries that are platform independent are usually + located under MdeModulePkg and MdePkg, + +- common but hardware-specific drivers and libraries that match QEMU's + pc-i440fx-* machine type are pulled in from IntelFrameworkModulePkg, + PcAtChipsetPkg and UefiCpuPkg, + +- the platform independent UEFI Shell is built from ShellPkg, + +- OvmfPkg includes drivers and libraries that are useful for virtual machines + and may or may not be specific to QEMU's pc-i440fx-* machine type. + +Platform Configuration Database (PCD) +------------------------------------- + +Like the "Phases of the boot process" section, this one introduces a concept in +very raw form. We defer to the PCD related edk2 specifications, and we won't +discuss implementation details here. Our purpose is only to offer the reader a +usable (albeit possibly inaccurate) definition, so that we can refer to PCDs +later on. + +Colloquially, when we say "PCD", we actually mean "PCD entry"; that is, an +entry stored in the Platform Configuration Database. + +The Platform Configuration Database is +- a firmware-wide +- name-value store +- of scalars and buffers +- where each entry may be + - build-time constant, or + - run-time dynamic, or + - theoretically, a middle option: patchable in the firmware file itself, + using a dedicated tool. (OVMF does not utilize externally patchable + entries.) + +A PCD entry is declared in the DEC file of the edk2 top-level Package directory +whose modules (drivers and libraries) are the primary consumers of the PCD +entry. (See for example OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec). Basically, a PCD in a DEC file +exposes a simple customization point. + +Interest in a PCD entry is communicated to the build system by naming the PCD +entry in the INF file of the interested module (application, driver or +library). The module may read and -- dependent on the PCD entry's category -- +write the PCD entry. + +Let's investigate the characteristics of the Database and the PCD entries. + +- Firmware-wide: technically, all modules may access all entries they are + interested in, assuming they advertise their interest in their INF files. + With careful design, PCDs enable inter-driver propagation of (simple) system + configuration. PCDs are available in both PEI and DXE. + + (UEFI drivers meant to be portable (ie. from third party vendors) are not + supposed to use PCDs, since PCDs qualify internal to the specific edk2 + firmware in question.) + +- Name-value store of scalars and buffers: each PCD has a symbolic name, and a + fixed scalar type (UINT16, UINT32 etc), or VOID* for buffers. Each PCD entry + belongs to a namespace, where a namespace is (obviously) a GUID, defined in + the DEC file. + +- A DEC file can permit several categories for a PCD: + - build-time constant ("FixedAtBuild"), + - patchable in the firmware image ("PatchableInModule", unused in OVMF), + - runtime modifiable ("Dynamic"). + +The platform description file (DSC) of a top-level Package directory may choose +the exact category for a given PCD entry that its modules wish to use, and +assign a default (or constant) initial value to it. + +In addition, the edk2 build system too can initialize PCD entries to values +that it calculates while laying out the flash device image. Such PCD +assignments are described in the FDF control file. + +Firmware image structure +------------------------ + +(We assume the common X64 choice for both PEI and DXE, and the default DEBUG +build target.) + +The OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf file defines the following layout for the flash +device image "OVMF.fd": + + Description Compression type Size + ------------------------------ ---------------------- ------- + Non-volatile data storage open-coded binary data 128 KB + Variable store 56 KB + Event log 4 KB + Working block 4 KB + Spare area 64 KB + + FVMAIN_COMPACT uncompressed 1712 KB + FV Firmware File System file LZMA compressed + PEIFV uncompressed 896 KB + individual PEI modules uncompressed + DXEFV uncompressed 8192 KB + individual DXE modules uncompressed + + SECFV uncompressed 208 KB + SEC driver + reset vector code + +The top-level image consists of three regions (three firmware volumes): +- non-volatile data store (128 KB), +- main firmware volume (FVMAIN_COMPACT, 1712 KB), +- firmware volume containing the reset vector code and the SEC phase code (208 + KB). + +In total, the OVMF.fd file has size 128 KB + 1712 KB + 208 KB == 2 MB. + +(1) The firmware volume with non-volatile data store (128 KB) has the following + internal structure, in blocks of 4 KB: + + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ L: event log + LIVE | varstore |L|W| W: working block + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + SPARE | | + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + + The first half of this firmware volume is "live", while the second half is + "spare". The spare half is important when the variable driver reclaims + unused storage and reorganizes the variable store. + + The live half dedicates 14 blocks (56 KB) to the variable store itself. On + top of those, one block is set aside for an event log, and one block is + used as the working block of the fault tolerant write protocol. Fault + tolerant writes are used to recover from an occasional (virtual) power loss + during variable updates. + + The blocks in this firmware volume are accessed, in stacking order from + least abstract to most abstract, by: + + - EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_BLOCK_PROTOCOL (provided by + OvmfPkg/QemuFlashFvbServicesRuntimeDxe), + + - EFI_FAULT_TOLERANT_WRITE_PROTOCOL (provided by + MdeModulePkg/Universal/FaultTolerantWriteDxe), + + - architectural protocols instrumental to the runtime UEFI variable + services: + - EFI_VARIABLE_ARCH_PROTOCOL, + - EFI_VARIABLE_WRITE_ARCH_PROTOCOL. + + In a non-secure boot build, the DXE driver providing these architectural + protocols is MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe. In a secure boot + build, where authenticated variables are available, the DXE driver + offering these protocols is SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/RuntimeDxe. + +(2) The main firmware volume (FVMAIN_COMPACT, 1712 KB) embeds further firmware + volumes. The outermost layer is a Firmware File System (FFS), carrying a + single file. This file holds an LZMA-compressed section, which embeds two + firmware volumes: PEIFV (896 KB) with PEIMs, and DXEFV (8192 KB) with DXE + and UEFI drivers. + + This scheme enables us to build 896 KB worth of PEI drivers and 8192 KB + worth of DXE and UEFI drivers, compress them all with LZMA in one go, and + store the compressed result in 1712 KB, saving room in the flash device. + +(3) The SECFV firmware volume (208 KB) is not compressed. It carries the + "volume top file" with the reset vector code, to end at 4 GB in + guest-physical address space, and the SEC phase driver (OvmfPkg/Sec). + + The last 16 bytes of the volume top file (mapped directly under 4 GB) + contain a NOP slide and a jump instruction. This is where QEMU starts + executing the firmware, at address 0xFFFF_FFF0. The reset vector and the + SEC driver run from flash directly. + + The SEC driver locates FVMAIN_COMPACT in the flash, and decompresses the + main firmware image to RAM. The rest of OVMF (PEI, DXE, BDS phases) run + from RAM. + +As already mentioned, the OVMF.fd file is mapped by qemu's +"hw/block/pflash_cfi01.c" device just under 4 GB in guest-physical address +space, according to the command line option + + -drive if=pflash,format=raw,file=fedora.flash + +(refer to the Example qemu invocation). This is a "ROMD device", which can +switch out of "ROMD mode" and back into it. + +Namely, in the default ROMD mode, the guest-physical address range backed by +the flash device reads and executes as ROM (it does not trap from KVM to QEMU). +The first write access in this mode traps to QEMU, and flips the device out of +ROMD mode. + +In non-ROMD mode, the flash chip is programmed by storing CFI (Common Flash +Interface) command values at the flash-covered addresses; both reads and writes +trap to QEMU, and the flash contents are modified and synchronized to the +host-side file. A special CFI command flips the flash device back to ROMD mode. + +Qemu implements the above based on the KVM_CAP_READONLY_MEM / KVM_MEM_READONLY +KVM features, and OVMF puts it to use in its EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_BLOCK_PROTOCOL +implementation, under "OvmfPkg/QemuFlashFvbServicesRuntimeDxe". + +IMPORTANT: Never pass OVMF.fd to qemu with the -bios option. That option maps +the firmware image as ROM into the guest's address space, and forces OVMF to +emulate non-volatile variables with a fallback driver that is bound to have +insufficient and confusing semantics. + +The 128 KB firmware volume with the variable store, discussed under (1), is +also built as a separate host-side file, named "OVMF_VARS.fd". The "rest" is +built into a third file, "OVMF_CODE.fd", which is only 1920 KB in size. The +variable store is mapped into its usual location, at 4 GB - 2 MB = 0xFFE0_0000, +through the following qemu options: + + -drive if=pflash,format=raw,readonly,file=OVMF_CODE.fd \ + -drive if=pflash,format=raw,file=fedora.varstore.fd + +This way qemu configures two flash chips consecutively, with start addresses +growing downwards, which is transparent to OVMF. + +[RHEL] Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7.1 ships a Secure Boot-enabled, X64, DEBUG + firmware only. Furthermore, only the split files ("OVMF_VARS.fd" and + "OVMF_CODE.fd") are available. + +S3 (suspend to RAM and resume) +------------------------------ + +As noted in Example qemu invocation, the + + -global PIIX4_PM.disable_s3=0 + +command line option tells qemu and OVMF if the user would like to enable S3 +support. (This is corresponds to the /domain/pm/suspend-to-mem/@enabled libvirt +domain XML attribute.) + +Implementing / orchestrating S3 was a considerable community effort in OVMF. A +detailed description exceeds the scope of this report; we only make a few +statements. + +(1) S3-related PPIs and protocols are well documented in the PI specification. + +(2) Edk2 contains most modules that are needed to implement S3 on a given + platform. One abstraction that is central to the porting / extending of the + S3-related modules to a new platform is the LockBox library interface, + which a specific platform can fill in by implementing its own LockBox + library instance. + + The LockBox library provides a privileged name-value store (to be addressed + by GUIDs). The privilege separation stretches between the firmware and the + operating system. That is, the S3-related machinery of the firmware saves + some items in the LockBox securely, under well-known GUIDs, before booting + the operating system. During resume (which is a form of warm reset), the + firmware is activated again, and retrieves items from the LockBox. Before + jumping to the OS's resume vector, the LockBox is secured again. + + We'll return to this later when we separately discuss SMRAM and SMM. + +(3) During resume, the DXE and later phases are never reached; only the reset + vector, and the SEC and PEI phases of the firmware run. The platform is + supposed to detect a resume in progress during PEI, and to store that fact + in the BootMode field of the Phase Handoff Information Table (PHIT) HOB. + OVMF keys this off the CMOS, see OvmfPkg/PlatformPei. + + At the end of PEI, the DXE IPL PEIM (Initial Program Load PEI Module, see + MdeModulePkg/Core/DxeIplPeim) examines the Boot Mode, and if it says "S3 + resume in progress", then the IPL branches to the PEIM that exports + EFI_PEI_S3_RESUME2_PPI (provided by UefiCpuPkg/Universal/Acpi/S3Resume2Pei) + rather than loading the DXE core. + + S3Resume2Pei executes the technical steps of the resumption, relying on the + contents of the LockBox. + +(4) During first boot (or after a normal platform reset), when DXE does run, + hardware drivers in the DXE phase are encouraged to "stash" their hardware + configuration steps (eg. accesses to PCI config space, I/O ports, memory + mapped addresses, and so on) in a centrally maintained, so called "S3 boot + script". Hardware accesses are represented with opcodes of a special binary + script language. + + This boot script is to be replayed during resume, by S3Resume2Pei. The + general goal is to bring back hardware devices -- which have been powered + off during suspend -- to their original after-first-boot state, and in + particular, to do so quickly. + + At the moment, OVMF saves only one opcode in the S3 resume boot script: an + INFORMATION opcode, with contents 0xDEADBEEF (in network byte order). The + consensus between Linux developers seems to be that boot firmware is only + responsible for restoring basic chipset state, which OVMF does during PEI + anyway, independently of S3 vs. normal reset. (One example is the power + management registers of the i440fx chipset.) Device and peripheral state is + the responsibility of the runtime operating system. + + Although an experimental OVMF S3 boot script was at one point captured for + the virtual Cirrus VGA card, such a boot script cannot follow eg. video + mode changes effected by the OS. Hence the operating system can never avoid + restoring device state, and most Linux display drivers (eg. stdvga, QXL) + already cover S3 resume fully. + + The XDDM and WDDM driver models used under Windows OSes seem to recognize + this notion of runtime OS responsibility as well. (See the list of OSes + supported by OVMF in a separate section.) + +(5) The S3 suspend/resume data flow in OVMF is included here tersely, for + interested developers. + + (a) BdsLibBootViaBootOption() + EFI_ACPI_S3_SAVE_PROTOCOL [AcpiS3SaveDxe] + - saves ACPI S3 Context to LockBox ---------------------+ + (including FACS address -- FACS ACPI table | + contains OS waking vector) | + | + - prepares boot script: | + EFI_S3_SAVE_STATE_PROTOCOL.Write() [S3SaveStateDxe] | + S3BootScriptLib [PiDxeS3BootScriptLib] | + - opcodes & arguments are saved in NVS. --+ | + | | + - issues a notification by installing | | + EFI_DXE_SMM_READY_TO_LOCK_PROTOCOL | | + | | + (b) EFI_S3_SAVE_STATE_PROTOCOL [S3SaveStateDxe] | | + S3BootScriptLib [PiDxeS3BootScriptLib] | | + - closes script with special opcode <---------+ | + - script is available in non-volatile memory | + via PcdS3BootScriptTablePrivateDataPtr --+ | + | | + BootScriptExecutorDxe | | + S3BootScriptLib [PiDxeS3BootScriptLib] | | + - Knows about boot script location by <----+ | + synchronizing with the other library | + instance via | + PcdS3BootScriptTablePrivateDataPtr. | + - Copies relocated image of itself to | + reserved memory. --------------------------------+ | + - Saved image contains pointer to boot script. ---|--+ | + | | | + Runtime: | | | + | | | + (c) OS is booted, writes OS waking vector to FACS, | | | + suspends machine | | | + | | | + S3 Resume (PEI): | | | + | | | + (d) PlatformPei sets S3 Boot Mode based on CMOS | | | + | | | + (e) DXE core is skipped and EFI_PEI_S3_RESUME2 is | | | + called as last step of PEI | | | + | | | + (f) S3Resume2Pei retrieves from LockBox: | | | + - ACPI S3 Context (path to FACS) <------------------|--|--+ + | | | + +------------------|--|--+ + - Boot Script Executor Image <----------------------+ | | + | | + (g) BootScriptExecutorDxe | | + S3BootScriptLib [PiDxeS3BootScriptLib] | | + - executes boot script <-----------------------------+ | + | + (h) OS waking vector available from ACPI S3 Context / FACS <--+ + is called + +A comprehensive memory map of OVMF +---------------------------------- + +The following section gives a detailed analysis of memory ranges below 4 GB +that OVMF statically uses. + +In the rightmost column, the PCD entry is identified by which the source refers +to the address or size in question. + +The flash-covered range has been discussed previously in "Firmware image +structure", therefore we include it only for completeness. Due to the fact that +this range is always backed by a memory mapped device (and never RAM), it is +unaffected by S3 (suspend to RAM and resume). + ++--------------------------+ 4194304 KB +| | +| SECFV | size: 208 KB +| | ++--------------------------+ 4194096 KB +| | +| FVMAIN_COMPACT | size: 1712 KB +| | ++--------------------------+ 4192384 KB +| | +| variable store | size: 64 KB PcdFlashNvStorageFtwSpareSize +| spare area | +| | ++--------------------------+ 4192320 KB PcdOvmfFlashNvStorageFtwSpareBase +| | +| FTW working block | size: 4 KB PcdFlashNvStorageFtwWorkingSize +| | ++--------------------------+ 4192316 KB PcdOvmfFlashNvStorageFtwWorkingBase +| | +| Event log of | size: 4 KB PcdOvmfFlashNvStorageEventLogSize +| non-volatile storage | +| | ++--------------------------+ 4192312 KB PcdOvmfFlashNvStorageEventLogBase +| | +| variable store | size: 56 KB PcdFlashNvStorageVariableSize +| | ++--------------------------+ 4192256 KB PcdOvmfFlashNvStorageVariableBase + +The flash-mapped image of OVMF.fd covers the entire structure above (2048 KB). + +When using the split files, the address 4192384 KB +(PcdOvmfFlashNvStorageFtwSpareBase + PcdFlashNvStorageFtwSpareSize) is the +boundary between the mapped images of OVMF_VARS.fd (56 KB + 4 KB + 4 KB + 64 KB += 128 KB) and OVMF_CODE.fd (1712 KB + 208 KB = 1920 KB). + +With regard to RAM that is statically used by OVMF, S3 (suspend to RAM and +resume) complicates matters. Many ranges have been introduced only to support +S3, hence for all ranges below, the following questions will be audited: + +(a) when and how a given range is initialized after first boot of the VM, +(b) how it is protected from memory allocations during DXE, +(c) how it is protected from the OS, +(d) how it is accessed on the S3 resume path, +(e) how it is accessed on the warm reset path. + +Importantly, the term "protected" is meant as protection against inadvertent +reallocations and overwrites by co-operating DXE and OS modules. It does not +imply security against malicious code. + ++--------------------------+ 17408 KB +| | +|DXEFV from FVMAIN_COMPACT | size: 8192 KB PcdOvmfDxeMemFvSize +| decompressed firmware | +| volume with DXE modules | +| | ++--------------------------+ 9216 KB PcdOvmfDxeMemFvBase +| | +|PEIFV from FVMAIN_COMPACT | size: 896 KB PcdOvmfPeiMemFvSize +| decompressed firmware | +| volume with PEI modules | +| | ++--------------------------+ 8320 KB PcdOvmfPeiMemFvBase +| | +| permanent PEI memory for | size: 32 KB PcdS3AcpiReservedMemorySize +| the S3 resume path | +| | ++--------------------------+ 8288 KB PcdS3AcpiReservedMemoryBase +| | +| temporary SEC/PEI heap | size: 32 KB PcdOvmfSecPeiTempRamSize +| and stack | +| | ++--------------------------+ 8256 KB PcdOvmfSecPeiTempRamBase +| | +| unused | size: 32 KB +| | ++--------------------------+ 8224 KB +| | +| SEC's table of | size: 4 KB PcdGuidedExtractHandlerTableSize +| GUIDed section handlers | +| | ++--------------------------+ 8220 KB PcdGuidedExtractHandlerTableAddress +| | +| LockBox storage | size: 4 KB PcdOvmfLockBoxStorageSize +| | ++--------------------------+ 8216 KB PcdOvmfLockBoxStorageBase +| | +| early page tables on X64 | size: 24 KB PcdOvmfSecPageTablesSize +| | ++--------------------------+ 8192 KB PcdOvmfSecPageTablesBase + +(1) Early page tables on X64: + + (a) when and how it is initialized after first boot of the VM + + The range is filled in during the SEC phase + [OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia32/PageTables64.asm]. The CR3 register is verified + against the base address in SecCoreStartupWithStack() + [OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.c]. + + (b) how it is protected from memory allocations during DXE + + If S3 was enabled on the QEMU command line (see "-global + PIIX4_PM.disable_s3=0" earlier), then InitializeRamRegions() + [OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/MemDetect.c] protects the range with an AcpiNVS memory + allocation HOB, in PEI. + + If S3 was disabled, then this range is not protected. DXE's own page tables + are first built while still in PEI (see HandOffToDxeCore() + [MdeModulePkg/Core/DxeIplPeim/X64/DxeLoadFunc.c]). Those tables are located + in permanent PEI memory. After CR3 is switched over to them (which occurs + before jumping to the DXE core entry point), we don't have to preserve the + initial tables. + + (c) how it is protected from the OS + + If S3 is enabled, then (1b) reserves it from the OS too. + + If S3 is disabled, then the range needs no protection. + + (d) how it is accessed on the S3 resume path + + It is rewritten same as in (1a), which is fine because (1c) reserved it. + + (e) how it is accessed on the warm reset path + + It is rewritten same as in (1a). + +(2) LockBox storage: + + (a) when and how it is initialized after first boot of the VM + + InitializeRamRegions() [OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/MemDetect.c] zeroes out the + area during PEI. This is correct but not strictly necessary, since on first + boot the area is zero-filled anyway. + + The LockBox signature of the area is filled in by the PEI module or DXE + driver that has been linked against OVMF's LockBoxLib and is run first. The + signature is written in LockBoxLibInitialize() + [OvmfPkg/Library/LockBoxLib/LockBoxLib.c]. + + Any module calling SaveLockBox() [OvmfPkg/Library/LockBoxLib/LockBoxLib.c] + will co-populate this area. + + (b) how it is protected from memory allocations during DXE + + If S3 is enabled, then InitializeRamRegions() + [OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/MemDetect.c] protects the range as AcpiNVS. + + Otherwise, the range is covered with a BootServicesData memory allocation + HOB. + + (c) how it is protected from the OS + + If S3 is enabled, then (2b) protects it sufficiently. + + Otherwise the range requires no runtime protection, and the + BootServicesData allocation type from (2b) ensures that the range will be + released to the OS. + + (d) how it is accessed on the S3 resume path + + The S3 Resume PEIM restores data from the LockBox, which has been correctly + protected in (2c). + + (e) how it is accessed on the warm reset path + + InitializeRamRegions() [OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/MemDetect.c] zeroes out the + range during PEI, effectively emptying the LockBox. Modules will + re-populate the LockBox as described in (2a). + +(3) SEC's table of GUIDed section handlers + + (a) when and how it is initialized after first boot of the VM + + The following two library instances are linked into SecMain: + - IntelFrameworkModulePkg/Library/LzmaCustomDecompressLib, + - MdePkg/Library/BaseExtractGuidedSectionLib. + + The first library registers its LZMA decompressor plugin (which is a called + a "section handler") by calling the second library: + + LzmaDecompressLibConstructor() [GuidedSectionExtraction.c] + ExtractGuidedSectionRegisterHandlers() [BaseExtractGuidedSectionLib.c] + + The second library maintains its table of registered "section handlers", to + be indexed by GUID, in this fixed memory area, independently of S3 + enablement. + + (The decompression of FVMAIN_COMPACT's FFS file section that contains the + PEIFV and DXEFV firmware volumes occurs with the LZMA decompressor + registered above. See (6) and (7) below.) + + (b) how it is protected from memory allocations during DXE + + There is no need to protect this area from DXE: because nothing else in + OVMF links against BaseExtractGuidedSectionLib, the area loses its + significance as soon as OVMF progresses from SEC to PEI, therefore DXE is + allowed to overwrite the region. + + (c) how it is protected from the OS + + When S3 is enabled, we cover the range with an AcpiNVS memory allocation + HOB in InitializeRamRegions(). + + When S3 is disabled, the range is not protected. + + (d) how it is accessed on the S3 resume path + + The table of registered section handlers is again managed by + BaseExtractGuidedSectionLib linked into SecMain exclusively. Section + handler registrations update the table in-place (based on GUID matches). + + (e) how it is accessed on the warm reset path + + If S3 is enabled, then the OS won't damage the table (due to (3c)), thus + see (3d). + + If S3 is disabled, then the OS has most probably overwritten the range with + its own data, hence (3a) -- complete reinitialization -- will come into + effect, based on the table signature check in BaseExtractGuidedSectionLib. + +(4) temporary SEC/PEI heap and stack + + (a) when and how it is initialized after first boot of the VM + + The range is configured in [OvmfPkg/Sec/X64/SecEntry.S] and + SecCoreStartupWithStack() [OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.c]. The stack half is read & + written by the CPU transparently. The heap half is used for memory + allocations during PEI. + + Data is migrated out (to permanent PEI stack & memory) in (or soon after) + PublishPeiMemory() [OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/MemDetect.c]. + + (b) how it is protected from memory allocations during DXE + + It is not necessary to protect this range during DXE because its use ends + still in PEI. + + (c) how it is protected from the OS + + If S3 is enabled, then InitializeRamRegions() + [OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/MemDetect.c] reserves it as AcpiNVS. + + If S3 is disabled, then the range doesn't require protection. + + (d) how it is accessed on the S3 resume path + + Same as in (4a), except the target area of the migration triggered by + PublishPeiMemory() [OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/MemDetect.c] is different -- see + (5). + + (e) how it is accessed on the warm reset path + + Same as in (4a). The stack and heap halves both may contain garbage, but it + doesn't matter. + +(5) permanent PEI memory for the S3 resume path + + (a) when and how it is initialized after first boot of the VM + + No particular initialization or use. + + (b) how it is protected from memory allocations during DXE + + We don't need to protect this area during DXE. + + (c) how it is protected from the OS + + When S3 is enabled, InitializeRamRegions() + [OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/MemDetect.c] makes sure the OS stays away by covering + the range with an AcpiNVS memory allocation HOB. + + When S3 is disabled, the range needs no protection. + + (d) how it is accessed on the S3 resume path + + PublishPeiMemory() installs the range as permanent RAM for PEI. The range + will serve as stack and will satisfy allocation requests during the rest of + PEI. OS data won't overlap due to (5c). + + (e) how it is accessed on the warm reset path + + Same as (5a). + +(6) PEIFV -- decompressed firmware volume with PEI modules + + (a) when and how it is initialized after first boot of the VM + + DecompressMemFvs() [OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.c] populates the area, by + decompressing the flash-mapped FVMAIN_COMPACT volume's contents. (Refer to + "Firmware image structure".) + + (b) how it is protected from memory allocations during DXE + + When S3 is disabled, PeiFvInitialization() [OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/Fv.c] + covers the range with a BootServicesData memory allocation HOB. + + When S3 is enabled, the same is coverage is ensured, just with the stronger + AcpiNVS memory allocation type. + + (c) how it is protected from the OS + + When S3 is disabled, it is not necessary to keep the range from the OS. + + Otherwise the AcpiNVS type allocation from (6b) provides coverage. + + (d) how it is accessed on the S3 resume path + + Rather than decompressing it again from FVMAIN_COMPACT, GetS3ResumePeiFv() + [OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.c] reuses the protected area for parsing / execution + from (6c). + + (e) how it is accessed on the warm reset path + + Same as (6a). + +(7) DXEFV -- decompressed firmware volume with DXE modules + + (a) when and how it is initialized after first boot of the VM + + Same as (6a). + + (b) how it is protected from memory allocations during DXE + + PeiFvInitialization() [OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/Fv.c] covers the range with a + BootServicesData memory allocation HOB. + + (c) how it is protected from the OS + + The OS is allowed to release and reuse this range. + + (d) how it is accessed on the S3 resume path + + It's not; DXE never runs during S3 resume. + + (e) how it is accessed on the warm reset path + + Same as in (7a). + +Known Secure Boot limitations +----------------------------- + +Under "Motivation" we've mentioned that OVMF's Secure Boot implementation is +not suitable for production use yet -- it's only good for development and +testing of standards-conformant, non-malicious guest code (UEFI and operating +system alike). + +Now that we've examined the persistent flash device, the workings of S3, and +the memory map, we can discuss two currently known shortcomings of OVMF's +Secure Boot that in fact make it insecure. (Clearly problems other than these +two might exist; the set of issues considered here is not meant to be +exhaustive.) + +One trait of Secure Boot is tamper-evidence. Secure Boot may not prevent +malicious modification of software components (for example, operating system +drivers), but by being the root of integrity on a platform, it can catch (or +indirectly contribute to catching) unauthorized changes, by way of signature +and certificate checks at the earliest phases of boot. + +If an attacker can tamper with key material stored in authenticated and/or +boot-time only persistent variables (for example, PK, KEK, db, dbt, dbx), then +the intended security of this scheme is compromised. The UEFI 2.4A +specification says + +- in section 28.3.4: + + Platform Keys: + + The public key must be stored in non-volatile storage which is tamper and + delete resistant. + + Key Exchange Keys: + + The public key must be stored in non-volatile storage which is tamper + resistant. + +- in section 28.6.1: + + The signature database variables db, dbt, and dbx must be stored in + tamper-resistant non-volatile storage. + +(1) The combination of QEMU, KVM, and OVMF does not provide this kind of + resistance. The variable store in the emulated flash chip is directly + accessible to, and reprogrammable by, UEFI drivers, applications, and + operating systems. + +(2) Under "S3 (suspend to RAM and resume)" we pointed out that the LockBox + storage must be similarly secure and tamper-resistant. + + On the S3 resume path, the PEIM providing EFI_PEI_S3_RESUME2_PPI + (UefiCpuPkg/Universal/Acpi/S3Resume2Pei) restores and interprets data from + the LockBox that has been saved there during boot. This PEIM, being part of + the firmware, has full access to the platform. If an operating system can + tamper with the contents of the LockBox, then at the next resume the + platform's integrity might be subverted. + + OVMF stores the LockBox in normal guest RAM (refer to the memory map + section above). Operating systems and third party UEFI drivers and UEFI + applications that respect the UEFI memory map will not inadvertently + overwrite the LockBox storage, but there's nothing to prevent eg. a + malicious kernel from modifying the LockBox. + +One means to address these issues is SMM and SMRAM (System Management Mode and +System Management RAM). + +During boot and resume, the firmware can enter and leave SMM and access SMRAM. +Before the DXE phase is left, and control is transferred to the BDS phase (when +third party UEFI drivers and applications can be loaded, and an operating +system can be loaded), SMRAM is locked in hardware, and subsequent modules +cannot access it directly. (See EFI_DXE_SMM_READY_TO_LOCK_PROTOCOL.) + +Once SMRAM has been locked, UEFI drivers and the operating system can enter SMM +by raising a System Management Interrupt (SMI), at which point trusted code +(part of the platform firmware) takes control. SMRAM is also unlocked by +platform reset, at which point the boot firmware takes control again. + +Variable store and LockBox in SMRAM +----------------------------------- + +Edk2 provides almost all components to implement the variable store and the +LockBox in SMRAM. In this section we summarize ideas for utilizing those +facilities. + +The SMRAM and SMM infrastructure in edk2 is built up as follows: + +(1) The platform hardware provides SMM / SMI / SMRAM. + + Qemu/KVM doesn't support these features currently and should implement them + in the longer term. + +(2) The platform vendor (in this case, OVMF developers) implement device + drivers for the platform's System Management Mode: + + - EFI_SMM_CONTROL2_PROTOCOL: for raising a synchronous (and/or) periodic + SMI(s); that is, for entering SMM. + + - EFI_SMM_ACCESS2_PROTOCOL: for describing and accessing SMRAM. + + These protocols are documented in the PI Specification, Volume 4. + +(3) The platform DSC file is to include the following platform-independent + modules: + + - MdeModulePkg/Core/PiSmmCore/PiSmmIpl.inf: SMM Initial Program Load + - MdeModulePkg/Core/PiSmmCore/PiSmmCore.inf: SMM Core + +(4) At this point, modules of type DXE_SMM_DRIVER can be loaded. + + Such drivers are privileged. They run in SMM, have access to SMRAM, and are + separated and switched from other drivers through SMIs. Secure + communication between unprivileged (non-SMM) and privileged (SMM) drivers + happens through EFI_SMM_COMMUNICATION_PROTOCOL (implemented by the SMM + Core, see (3)). + + DXE_SMM_DRIVER modules must sanitize their input (coming from unprivileged + drivers) carefully. + +(5) The authenticated runtime variable services driver (for Secure Boot builds) + is located under "SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/RuntimeDxe". OVMF + currently builds the driver (a DXE_RUNTIME_DRIVER module) with the + "VariableRuntimeDxe.inf" control file (refer to "OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc"), + which does not use SMM. + + The directory includes two more INF files: + + - VariableSmm.inf -- module type: DXE_SMM_DRIVER. A privileged driver that + runs in SMM and has access to SMRAM. + + - VariableSmmRuntimeDxe.inf -- module type: DXE_RUNTIME_DRIVER. A + non-privileged driver that implements the variable runtime services + (replacing the current "VariableRuntimeDxe.inf" file) by communicating + with the above privileged SMM half via EFI_SMM_COMMUNICATION_PROTOCOL. + +(6) An SMRAM-based LockBox implementation needs to be discussed in two parts, + because the LockBox is accessed in both PEI and DXE. + + (a) During DXE, drivers save data in the LockBox. A save operation is + layered as follows: + + - The unprivileged driver wishing to store data in the LockBox links + against the "MdeModulePkg/Library/SmmLockBoxLib/SmmLockBoxDxeLib.inf" + library instance. + + The library allows the unprivileged driver to format requests for the + privileged SMM LockBox driver (see below), and to parse responses. + + - The privileged SMM LockBox driver is built from + "MdeModulePkg/Universal/LockBox/SmmLockBox/SmmLockBox.inf". This + driver has module type DXE_SMM_DRIVER and can access SMRAM. + + The driver delegates command parsing and response formatting to + "MdeModulePkg/Library/SmmLockBoxLib/SmmLockBoxSmmLib.inf". + + - The above two halves (unprivileged and privileged) mirror what we've + seen in case of the variable service drivers, under (5). + + (b) In PEI, the S3 Resume PEIM (UefiCpuPkg/Universal/Acpi/S3Resume2Pei) + retrieves data from the LockBox. + + Presumably, S3Resume2Pei should be considered an "unprivileged PEIM", + and the SMRAM access should be layered as seen in DXE. Unfortunately, + edk2 does not implement all of the layers in PEI -- the code either + doesn't exist, or it is not open source: + + role | DXE: protocol/module | PEI: PPI/module + -------------+--------------------------------+------------------------------ + unprivileged | any | S3Resume2Pei.inf + driver | | + -------------+--------------------------------+------------------------------ + command | LIBRARY_CLASS = LockBoxLib | LIBRARY_CLASS = LockBoxLib + formatting | | + and response | SmmLockBoxDxeLib.inf | SmmLockBoxPeiLib.inf + parsing | | + -------------+--------------------------------+------------------------------ + privilege | EFI_SMM_COMMUNICATION_PROTOCOL | EFI_PEI_SMM_COMMUNICATION_PPI + separation | | + | PiSmmCore.inf | missing! + -------------+--------------------------------+------------------------------ + platform SMM | EFI_SMM_CONTROL2_PROTOCOL | PEI_SMM_CONTROL_PPI + and SMRAM | EFI_SMM_ACCESS2_PROTOCOL | PEI_SMM_ACCESS_PPI + access | | + | to be done in OVMF | to be done in OVMF + -------------+--------------------------------+------------------------------ + command | LIBRARY_CLASS = LockBoxLib | LIBRARY_CLASS = LockBoxLib + parsing and | | + response | SmmLockBoxSmmLib.inf | missing! + formatting | | + -------------+--------------------------------+------------------------------ + privileged | SmmLockBox.inf | missing! + LockBox | | + driver | | + + Alternatively, in the future OVMF might be able to provide a LockBoxLib + instance (an SmmLockBoxPeiLib substitute) for S3Resume2Pei that + accesses SMRAM directly, eliminating the need for deeper layers in the + stack (that is, EFI_PEI_SMM_COMMUNICATION_PPI and deeper). + + In fact, a "thin" EFI_PEI_SMM_COMMUNICATION_PPI implementation whose + sole Communicate() member invariably returns EFI_NOT_STARTED would + cause the current SmmLockBoxPeiLib library instance to directly perform + full-depth SMRAM access and LockBox search, obviating the "missing" + cells. (With reference to A Tour Beyond BIOS: Implementing S3 Resume + with EDK2, by Jiewen Yao and Vincent Zimmer, October 2014.) + +Select features +--------------- + +In this section we'll browse the top-level "OvmfPkg" package directory, and +discuss the more interesting drivers and libraries that have not been mentioned +thus far. + +X64-specific reset vector for OVMF +.................................. + +The "OvmfPkg/ResetVector" directory customizes the reset vector (found in +"UefiCpuPkg/ResetVector/Vtf0") for "OvmfPkgX64.fdf", that is, when the SEC/PEI +phases run in 64-bit (ie. long) mode. + +The reset vector's control flow looks roughly like: + + resetVector [Ia16/ResetVectorVtf0.asm] + EarlyBspInitReal16 [Ia16/Init16.asm] + Main16 [Main.asm] + EarlyInit16 [Ia16/Init16.asm] + + ; Transition the processor from + ; 16-bit real mode to 32-bit flat mode + TransitionFromReal16To32BitFlat [Ia16/Real16ToFlat32.asm] + + ; Search for the + ; Boot Firmware Volume (BFV) + Flat32SearchForBfvBase [Ia32/SearchForBfvBase.asm] + + ; Search for the SEC entry point + Flat32SearchForSecEntryPoint [Ia32/SearchForSecEntry.asm] + + %ifdef ARCH_IA32 + ; Jump to the 32-bit SEC entry point + %else + ; Transition the processor + ; from 32-bit flat mode + ; to 64-bit flat mode + Transition32FlatTo64Flat [Ia32/Flat32ToFlat64.asm] + + SetCr3ForPageTables64 [Ia32/PageTables64.asm] + ; set CR3 to page tables + ; built into the ROM image + + ; enable PAE + ; set LME + ; enable paging + + ; Jump to the 64-bit SEC entry point + %endif + +On physical platforms, the initial page tables referenced by +SetCr3ForPageTables64 are built statically into the flash device image, and are +present in ROM at runtime. This is fine on physical platforms because the +pre-built page table entries have the Accessed and Dirty bits set from the +start. + +Accordingly, for OVMF running in long mode on qemu/KVM, the initial page tables +were mapped as a KVM_MEM_READONLY slot, as part of QEMU's pflash device (refer +to "Firmware image structure" above). + +In spite of the Accessed and Dirty bits being pre-set in the read-only, +in-flash PTEs, in a virtual machine attempts are made to update said PTE bits, +differently from physical hardware. The component attempting to update the +read-only PTEs can be one of the following: + +- The processor itself, if it supports nested paging, and the user enables that + processor feature, + +- KVM code implementing shadow paging, otherwise. + +The first case presents no user-visible symptoms, but the second case (KVM, +shadow paging) used to cause a triple fault, prior to Linux commit ba6a354 +("KVM: mmu: allow page tables to be in read-only slots"). + +For compatibility with earlier KVM versions, the OvmfPkg/ResetVector directory +adapts the generic reset vector code as follows: + + Transition32FlatTo64Flat [UefiCpuPkg/.../Ia32/Flat32ToFlat64.asm] + + SetCr3ForPageTables64 [OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia32/PageTables64.asm] + + ; dynamically build the initial page tables in RAM, at address + ; PcdOvmfSecPageTablesBase (refer to the memory map above), + ; identity-mapping the first 4 GB of address space + + ; set CR3 to PcdOvmfSecPageTablesBase + + ; enable PAE + ; set LME + ; enable paging + +This way the PTEs that earlier KVM versions try to update (during shadow +paging) are located in a read-write memory slot, and the write attempts +succeed. + +Client library for QEMU's firmware configuration interface +.......................................................... + +QEMU provides a write-only, 16-bit wide control port, and a read-write, 8-bit +wide data port for exchanging configuration elements with the firmware. + +The firmware writes a selector (a key) to the control port (0x510), and then +reads the corresponding configuration data (produced by QEMU) from the data +port (0x511). + +If the selected entry is writable, the firmware may overwrite it. If QEMU has +associated a callback with the entry, then when the entry is completely +rewritten, QEMU runs the callback. (OVMF does not rewrite any entries at the +moment.) + +A number of selector values (keys) are predefined. In particular, key 0x19 +selects (returns) a directory of { name, selector, size } triplets, roughly +speaking. + +The firmware can request configuration elements by well-known name as well, by +looking up the selector value first in the directory, by name, and then writing +the selector to the control port. The number of bytes to read subsequently from +the data port is known from the directory entry's "size" field. + +By convention, directory entries (well-known symbolic names of configuration +elements) are formatted as POSIX pathnames. For example, the array selected by +the "etc/system-states" name indicates (among other things) whether the user +enabled S3 support in QEMU. + +The above interface is called "fw_cfg". + +The binary data associated with a symbolic name is called an "fw_cfg file". + +OVMF's fw_cfg client library is found in "OvmfPkg/Library/QemuFwCfgLib". OVMF +discovers many aspects of the virtual system with it; we refer to a few +examples below. + +Guest ACPI tables +................. + +An operating system discovers a good amount of its hardware by parsing ACPI +tables, and by interpreting ACPI objects and methods. On physical hardware, the +platform vendor's firmware installs ACPI tables in memory that match both the +hardware present in the system and the user's firmware configuration ("BIOS +setup"). + +Under qemu/KVM, the owner of the (virtual) hardware configuration is QEMU. +Hardware can easily be reconfigured on the command line. Furthermore, features +like CPU hotplug, PCI hotplug, memory hotplug are continuously developed for +QEMU, and operating systems need direct ACPI support to exploit these features. + +For this reason, QEMU builds its own ACPI tables dynamically, in a +self-descriptive manner, and exports them to the firmware through a complex, +multi-file fw_cfg interface. It is rooted in the "etc/table-loader" fw_cfg +file. (Further details of this interface are out of scope for this report.) + +OVMF's AcpiPlatformDxe driver fetches the ACPI tables, and installs them for +the guest OS with the EFI_ACPI_TABLE_PROTOCOL (which is in turn provided by the +generic "MdeModulePkg/Universal/Acpi/AcpiTableDxe" driver). + +For earlier QEMU versions and machine types (which we generally don't recommend +for OVMF; see "Scope"), the "OvmfPkg/AcpiTables" directory contains a few +static ACPI table templates. When the "etc/table-loader" fw_cfg file is +unavailable, AcpiPlatformDxe installs these default tables (with a little bit +of dynamic patching). + +When OVMF runs in a Xen domU, AcpiTableDxe also installs ACPI tables that +originate from the hypervisor's environment. + +Guest SMBIOS tables +................... + +Quoting the SMBIOS Reference Specification, + + [...] the System Management BIOS Reference Specification addresses how + motherboard and system vendors present management information about their + products in a standard format [...] + +In practice SMBIOS tables are just another set of tables that the platform +vendor's firmware installs in RAM for the operating system, and, importantly, +for management applications running on the OS. Without rehashing the "Guest +ACPI tables" section in full, let's map the OVMF roles seen there from ACPI to +SMBIOS: + + role | ACPI | SMBIOS + -------------------------+-------------------------+------------------------- + fw_cfg file | etc/table-loader | etc/smbios/smbios-tables + -------------------------+-------------------------+------------------------- + OVMF driver | AcpiPlatformDxe | SmbiosPlatformDxe + under "OvmfPkg" | | + -------------------------+-------------------------+------------------------- + Underlying protocol, | EFI_ACPI_TABLE_PROTOCOL | EFI_SMBIOS_PROTOCOL + implemented by generic | | + driver under | Acpi/AcpiTableDxe | SmbiosDxe + "MdeModulePkg/Universal" | | + -------------------------+-------------------------+------------------------- + default tables available | yes | [RHEL] yes, Type0 and + for earlier QEMU machine | | Type1 tables + types, with hot-patching | | + -------------------------+-------------------------+------------------------- + tables fetched in Xen | yes | yes + domUs | | + +Platform-specific boot policy +............................. + +OVMF's BDS (Boot Device Selection) phase is implemented by +IntelFrameworkModulePkg/Universal/BdsDxe. Roughly speaking, this large driver: + +- provides the EFI BDS architectural protocol (which DXE transfers control to + after dispatching all DXE drivers), + +- connects drivers to devices, + +- enumerates boot devices, + +- auto-generates boot options, + +- provides "BIOS setup" screens, such as: + + - Boot Manager, for booting an option, + + - Boot Maintenance Manager, for adding, deleting, and reordering boot + options, changing console properties etc, + + - Device Manager, where devices can register configuration forms, including + + - Secure Boot configuration forms, + + - OVMF's Platform Driver form (see under PlatformDxe). + +Firmware that includes the "IntelFrameworkModulePkg/Universal/BdsDxe" driver +can customize its behavior by providing an instance of the PlatformBdsLib +library class. The driver links against this platform library, and the +platform library can call Intel's BDS utility functions from +"IntelFrameworkModulePkg/Library/GenericBdsLib". + +OVMF's PlatformBdsLib instance can be found in +"OvmfPkg/Library/PlatformBdsLib". The main function where the BdsDxe driver +enters the library is PlatformBdsPolicyBehavior(). We mention two OVMF +particulars here. + +(1) OVMF is capable of loading kernel images directly from fw_cfg, matching + QEMU's -kernel, -initrd, and -append command line options. This feature is + useful for rapid, repeated Linux kernel testing, and is implemented in the + following call tree: + + PlatformBdsPolicyBehavior() [OvmfPkg/Library/PlatformBdsLib/BdsPlatform.c] + TryRunningQemuKernel() [OvmfPkg/Library/PlatformBdsLib/QemuKernel.c] + LoadLinux*() [OvmfPkg/Library/LoadLinuxLib/Linux.c] + + OvmfPkg/Library/LoadLinuxLib ports the efilinux bootloader project into + OvmfPkg. + +(2) OVMF seeks to comply with the boot order specification passed down by QEMU + over fw_cfg. + + (a) About Boot Modes + + During the PEI phase, OVMF determines and stores the Boot Mode in the + PHIT HOB (already mentioned in "S3 (suspend to RAM and resume)"). The + boot mode is supposed to influence the rest of the system, for example it + distinguishes S3 resume (BOOT_ON_S3_RESUME) from a "normal" boot. + + In general, "normal" boots can be further differentiated from each other; + for example for speed reasons. When the firmware can tell during PEI that + the chassis has not been opened since last power-up, then it might want + to save time by not connecting all devices and not enumerating all boot + options from scratch; it could just rely on the stored results of the + last enumeration. The matching BootMode value, to be set during PEI, + would be BOOT_ASSUMING_NO_CONFIGURATION_CHANGES. + + OVMF only sets one of the following two boot modes, based on CMOS + contents: + - BOOT_ON_S3_RESUME, + - BOOT_WITH_FULL_CONFIGURATION. + + For BOOT_ON_S3_RESUME, please refer to "S3 (suspend to RAM and resume)". + The other boot mode supported by OVMF, BOOT_WITH_FULL_CONFIGURATION, is + an appropriate "catch-all" for a virtual machine, where hardware can + easily change from boot to boot. + + (b) Auto-generation of boot options + + Accordingly, when not resuming from S3 sleep (*), OVMF always connects + all devices, and enumerates all bootable devices as new boot options + (non-volatile variables called Boot####). + + (*) During S3 resume, DXE is not reached, hence BDS isn't either. + + The auto-enumerated boot options are stored in the BootOrder non-volatile + variable after any preexistent options. (Boot options may exist before + auto-enumeration eg. because the user added them manually with the Boot + Maintenance Manager or the efibootmgr utility. They could also originate + from an earlier auto-enumeration.) + + PlatformBdsPolicyBehavior() [OvmfPkg/.../BdsPlatform.c] + TryRunningQemuKernel() [OvmfPkg/.../QemuKernel.c] + BdsLibConnectAll() [IntelFrameworkModulePkg/.../BdsConnect.c] + BdsLibEnumerateAllBootOption() [IntelFrameworkModulePkg/.../BdsBoot.c] + BdsLibBuildOptionFromHandle() [IntelFrameworkModulePkg/.../BdsBoot.c] + BdsLibRegisterNewOption() [IntelFrameworkModulePkg/.../BdsMisc.c] + // + // Append the new option number to the original option order + // + + (c) Relative UEFI device paths in boot options + + The handling of relative ("short-form") UEFI device paths is best + demonstrated through an example, and by quoting the UEFI 2.4A + specification. + + A short-form hard drive UEFI device path could be (displaying each device + path node on a separate line for readability): + + HD(1,GPT,14DD1CC5-D576-4BBF-8858-BAF877C8DF61,0x800,0x64000)/ + \EFI\fedora\shim.efi + + This device path lacks prefix nodes (eg. hardware or messaging type + nodes) that would lead to the hard drive. During load option processing, + the above short-form or relative device path could be matched against the + following absolute device path: + + PciRoot(0x0)/ + Pci(0x4,0x0)/ + HD(1,GPT,14DD1CC5-D576-4BBF-8858-BAF877C8DF61,0x800,0x64000)/ + \EFI\fedora\shim.efi + + The motivation for this type of device path matching / completion is to + allow the user to move around the hard drive (for example, to plug a + controller in a different PCI slot, or to expose the block device on a + different iSCSI path) and still enable the firmware to find the hard + drive. + + The UEFI specification says, + + 9.3.6 Media Device Path + 9.3.6.1 Hard Drive + + [...] Section 3.1.2 defines special rules for processing the Hard + Drive Media Device Path. These special rules enable a disk's location + to change and still have the system boot from the disk. [...] + + 3.1.2 Load Option Processing + + [...] The boot manager must [...] support booting from a short-form + device path that starts with the first element being a hard drive + media device path [...]. The boot manager must use the GUID or + signature and partition number in the hard drive device path to match + it to a device in the system. If the drive supports the GPT + partitioning scheme the GUID in the hard drive media device path is + compared with the UniquePartitionGuid field of the GUID Partition + Entry [...]. If the drive supports the PC-AT MBR scheme the signature + in the hard drive media device path is compared with the + UniqueMBRSignature in the Legacy Master Boot Record [...]. If a + signature match is made, then the partition number must also be + matched. The hard drive device path can be appended to the matching + hardware device path and normal boot behavior can then be used. If + more than one device matches the hard drive device path, the boot + manager will pick one arbitrarily. Thus the operating system must + ensure the uniqueness of the signatures on hard drives to guarantee + deterministic boot behavior. + + Edk2 implements and exposes the device path completion logic in the + already referenced "IntelFrameworkModulePkg/Library/GenericBdsLib" + library, in the BdsExpandPartitionPartialDevicePathToFull() function. + + (d) Filtering and reordering the boot options based on fw_cfg + + Once we have an "all-inclusive", partly preexistent, partly freshly + auto-generated boot option list from bullet (b), OVMF loads QEMU's + requested boot order from fw_cfg, and filters and reorders the list from + (b) with it: + + PlatformBdsPolicyBehavior() [OvmfPkg/.../BdsPlatform.c] + TryRunningQemuKernel() [OvmfPkg/.../QemuKernel.c] + BdsLibConnectAll() [IntelFrameworkModulePkg/.../BdsConnect.c] + BdsLibEnumerateAllBootOption() [IntelFrameworkModulePkg/.../BdsBoot.c] + SetBootOrderFromQemu() [OvmfPkg/.../QemuBootOrder.c] + + According to the (preferred) "-device ...,bootindex=N" and the (legacy) + '-boot order=drives' command line options, QEMU requests a boot order + from the firmware through the "bootorder" fw_cfg file. (For a bootindex + example, refer to the "Example qemu invocation" section.) + + This fw_cfg file consists of OpenFirmware (OFW) device paths -- note: not + UEFI device paths! --, one per line. An example list is: + + /pci@i0cf8/scsi@4/disk@0,0 + /pci@i0cf8/ide@1,1/drive@1/disk@0 + /pci@i0cf8/ethernet@3/ethernet-phy@0 + + OVMF filters and reorders the boot option list from bullet (b) with the + following nested loops algorithm: + + new_uefi_order := + for each qemu_ofw_path in QEMU's OpenFirmware device path list: + qemu_uefi_path_prefix := translate(qemu_ofw_path) + + for each boot_option in current_uefi_order: + full_boot_option := complete(boot_option) + + if match(qemu_uefi_path_prefix, full_boot_option): + append(new_uefi_order, boot_option) + break + + for each unmatched boot_option in current_uefi_order: + if survives(boot_option): + append(new_uefi_order, boot_option) + + current_uefi_order := new_uefi_order + + OVMF iterates over QEMU's OFW device paths in order, translates each to a + UEFI device path prefix, tries to match the translated prefix against the + UEFI boot options (which are completed from relative form to absolute + form for the purpose of prefix matching), and if there's a match, the + matching boot option is appended to the new boot order (which starts out + empty). + + (We elaborate on the translate() function under bullet (e). The + complete() function has been explained in bullet (c).) + + In addition, UEFI boot options that remain unmatched after filtering and + reordering are post-processed, and some of them "survive". Due to the + fact that OpenFirmware device paths have less expressive power than their + UEFI counterparts, some UEFI boot options are simply inexpressible (hence + unmatchable) by the nested loops algorithm. + + An important example is the memory-mapped UEFI shell, whose UEFI device + path is inexpressible by QEMU's OFW device paths: + + MemoryMapped(0xB,0x900000,0x10FFFFF)/ + FvFile(7C04A583-9E3E-4F1C-AD65-E05268D0B4D1) + + (Side remark: notice that the address range visible in the MemoryMapped() + node corresponds to DXEFV under "comprehensive memory map of OVMF"! In + addition, the FvFile() node's GUID originates from the FILE_GUID entry of + "ShellPkg/Application/Shell/Shell.inf".) + + The UEFI shell can be booted by pressing ESC in OVMF on the TianoCore + splash screen, and navigating to Boot Manager | EFI Internal Shell. If + the "survival policy" was not implemented, the UEFI shell's boot option + would always be filtered out. + + The current "survival policy" preserves all boot options that start with + neither PciRoot() nor HD(). + + (e) Translating QEMU's OpenFirmware device paths to UEFI device path + prefixes + + In this section we list the (strictly heuristical) mappings currently + performed by OVMF. + + The "prefix only" nature of the translation output is rooted minimally in + the fact that QEMU's OpenFirmware device paths cannot carry pathnames + within filesystems. There's no way to specify eg. + + \EFI\fedora\shim.efi + + in an OFW device path, therefore a UEFI device path translated from an + OFW device path can at best be a prefix (not a full match) of a UEFI + device path that ends with "\EFI\fedora\shim.efi". + + - IDE disk, IDE CD-ROM: + + OpenFirmware device path: + + /pci@i0cf8/ide@1,1/drive@0/disk@0 + ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ + | | | | master or slave + | | | primary or secondary + | PCI slot & function holding IDE controller + PCI root at system bus port, PIO + + UEFI device path prefix: + + PciRoot(0x0)/Pci(0x1,0x1)/Ata(Primary,Master,0x0) + ^ + fixed LUN + + - Floppy disk: + + OpenFirmware device path: + + /pci@i0cf8/isa@1/fdc@03f0/floppy@0 + ^ ^ ^ ^ + | | | A: or B: + | | ISA controller io-port (hex) + | PCI slot holding ISA controller + PCI root at system bus port, PIO + + UEFI device path prefix: + + PciRoot(0x0)/Pci(0x1,0x0)/Floppy(0x0) + ^ + ACPI UID (A: or B:) + + - Virtio-block disk: + + OpenFirmware device path: + + /pci@i0cf8/scsi@6[,3]/disk@0,0 + ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ + | | | fixed + | | PCI function corresponding to disk (optional) + | PCI slot holding disk + PCI root at system bus port, PIO + + UEFI device path prefixes (dependent on the presence of a nonzero PCI + function in the OFW device path): + + PciRoot(0x0)/Pci(0x6,0x0)/HD( + PciRoot(0x0)/Pci(0x6,0x3)/HD( + + - Virtio-scsi disk and virtio-scsi passthrough: + + OpenFirmware device path: + + /pci@i0cf8/scsi@7[,3]/channel@0/disk@2,3 + ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ + | | | | LUN + | | | target + | | channel (unused, fixed 0) + | PCI slot[, function] holding SCSI controller + PCI root at system bus port, PIO + + UEFI device path prefixes (dependent on the presence of a nonzero PCI + function in the OFW device path): + + PciRoot(0x0)/Pci(0x7,0x0)/Scsi(0x2,0x3) + PciRoot(0x0)/Pci(0x7,0x3)/Scsi(0x2,0x3) + + - Emulated and passed-through (physical) network cards: + + OpenFirmware device path: + + /pci@i0cf8/ethernet@3[,2] + ^ ^ + | PCI slot[, function] holding Ethernet card + PCI root at system bus port, PIO + + UEFI device path prefixes (dependent on the presence of a nonzero PCI + function in the OFW device path): + + PciRoot(0x0)/Pci(0x3,0x0) + PciRoot(0x0)/Pci(0x3,0x2) + +Virtio drivers +.............. + +UEFI abstracts various types of hardware resources into protocols, and allows +firmware developers to implement those protocols in device drivers. The Virtio +Specification defines various types of virtual hardware for virtual machines. +Connecting the two specifications, OVMF provides UEFI drivers for QEMU's +virtio-block, virtio-scsi, and virtio-net devices. + +The following diagram presents the protocol and driver stack related to Virtio +devices in edk2 and OVMF. Each node in the graph identifies a protocol and/or +the edk2 driver that produces it. Nodes on the top are more abstract. + + EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL EFI_SIMPLE_NETWORK_PROTOCOL + [OvmfPkg/VirtioBlkDxe] [OvmfPkg/VirtioNetDxe] + | | + | EFI_EXT_SCSI_PASS_THRU_PROTOCOL | + | [OvmfPkg/VirtioScsiDxe] | + | | | + +------------------------+--------------------------+ + | + VIRTIO_DEVICE_PROTOCOL + | + +---------------------+---------------------+ + | | + [OvmfPkg/VirtioPciDeviceDxe] [custom platform drivers] + | | + | | + EFI_PCI_IO_PROTOCOL [OvmfPkg/Library/VirtioMmioDeviceLib] + [MdeModulePkg/Bus/Pci/PciBusDxe] direct MMIO register access + +The top three drivers produce standard UEFI abstractions: the Block IO +Protocol, the Extended SCSI Pass Thru Protocol, and the Simple Network +Protocol, for virtio-block, virtio-scsi, and virtio-net devices, respectively. + +Comparing these device-specific virtio drivers to each other, we can determine: + +- They all conform to the UEFI Driver Model. This means that their entry point + functions don't immediately start to search for devices and to drive them, + they only register instances of the EFI_DRIVER_BINDING_PROTOCOL. The UEFI + Driver Model then enumerates devices and chains matching drivers + automatically. + +- They are as minimal as possible, while remaining correct (refer to source + code comments for details). For example, VirtioBlkDxe and VirtioScsiDxe both + support only one request in flight. + + In theory, VirtioBlkDxe could implement EFI_BLOCK_IO2_PROTOCOL, which allows + queueing. Similarly, VirtioScsiDxe does not support the non-blocking mode of + EFI_EXT_SCSI_PASS_THRU_PROTOCOL.PassThru(). (Which is permitted by the UEFI + specification.) Both VirtioBlkDxe and VirtioScsiDxe delegate synchronous + request handling to "OvmfPkg/Library/VirtioLib". This limitation helps keep + the implementation simple, and testing thus far seems to imply satisfactory + performance, for a virtual boot firmware. + + VirtioNetDxe cannot avoid queueing, because EFI_SIMPLE_NETWORK_PROTOCOL + requires it on the interface level. Consequently, VirtioNetDxe is + significantly more complex than VirtioBlkDxe and VirtioScsiDxe. Technical + notes are provided in "OvmfPkg/VirtioNetDxe/TechNotes.txt". + +- None of these drivers access hardware directly. Instead, the Virtio Device + Protocol (OvmfPkg/Include/Protocol/VirtioDevice.h) collects / extracts virtio + operations defined in the Virtio Specification, and these backend-independent + virtio device drivers go through the abstract VIRTIO_DEVICE_PROTOCOL. + + IMPORTANT: the VIRTIO_DEVICE_PROTOCOL is not a standard UEFI protocol. It is + internal to edk2 and not described in the UEFI specification. It should only + be used by drivers and applications that live inside the edk2 source tree. + +Currently two providers exist for VIRTIO_DEVICE_PROTOCOL: + +- The first one is the "more traditional" virtio-pci backend, implemented by + OvmfPkg/VirtioPciDeviceDxe. This driver also complies with the UEFI Driver + Model. It consumes an instance of the EFI_PCI_IO_PROTOCOL, and, if the PCI + device/function under probing appears to be a virtio device, it produces a + Virtio Device Protocol instance for it. The driver translates abstract virtio + operations to PCI accesses. + +- The second provider, the virtio-mmio backend, is a library, not a driver, + living in OvmfPkg/Library/VirtioMmioDeviceLib. This library translates + abstract virtio operations to MMIO accesses. + + The virtio-mmio backend is only a library -- rather than a standalone, UEFI + Driver Model-compliant driver -- because the type of resource it consumes, an + MMIO register block base address, is not enumerable. + + In other words, while the PCI root bridge driver and the PCI bus driver + produce instances of EFI_PCI_IO_PROTOCOL automatically, thereby enabling the + UEFI Driver Model to probe devices and stack up drivers automatically, no + such enumeration exists for MMIO register blocks. + + For this reason, VirtioMmioDeviceLib needs to be linked into thin, custom + platform drivers that dispose over this kind of information. As soon as a + driver knows about the MMIO register block base addresses, it can pass each + to the library, and then the VIRTIO_DEVICE_PROTOCOL will be instantiated + (assuming a valid virtio-mmio register block of course). From that point on + the UEFI Driver Model again takes care of the chaining. + + Typically, such a custom driver does not conform to the UEFI Driver Model + (because that would presuppose auto-enumeration for MMIO register blocks). + Hence it has the following responsibilities: + + - it shall behave as a "wrapper" UEFI driver around the library, + + - it shall know virtio-mmio base addresses, + + - in its entry point function, it shall create a new UEFI handle with an + instance of the EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL for each virtio-mmio device it + knows the base address for, + + - it shall call VirtioMmioInstallDevice() on those handles, with the + corresponding base addresses. + + OVMF itself does not employ VirtioMmioDeviceLib. However, the library is used + (or has been tested as Proof-of-Concept) in the following 64-bit and 32-bit + ARM emulator setups: + + - in "RTSM_VE_FOUNDATIONV8_EFI.fd" and "FVP_AARCH64_EFI.fd", on ARM Holdings' + ARM(R) v8-A Foundation Model and ARM(R) AEMv8-A Base Platform FVP + emulators, respectively: + + EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL + [OvmfPkg/VirtioBlkDxe] + | + VIRTIO_DEVICE_PROTOCOL + [ArmPlatformPkg/ArmVExpressPkg/ArmVExpressDxe/ArmFvpDxe.inf] + | + [OvmfPkg/Library/VirtioMmioDeviceLib] + direct MMIO register access + + - in "RTSM_VE_CORTEX-A15_EFI.fd" and "RTSM_VE_CORTEX-A15_MPCORE_EFI.fd", on + "qemu-system-arm -M vexpress-a15": + + EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL EFI_SIMPLE_NETWORK_PROTOCOL + [OvmfPkg/VirtioBlkDxe] [OvmfPkg/VirtioNetDxe] + | | + +------------------+---------------+ + | + VIRTIO_DEVICE_PROTOCOL + [ArmPlatformPkg/ArmVExpressPkg/ArmVExpressDxe/ArmFvpDxe.inf] + | + [OvmfPkg/Library/VirtioMmioDeviceLib] + direct MMIO register access + + In the above ARM / VirtioMmioDeviceLib configurations, VirtioBlkDxe was + tested with booting Linux distributions, while VirtioNetDxe was tested with + pinging public IPv4 addresses from the UEFI shell. + +Platform Driver +............... + +Sometimes, elements of persistent firmware configuration are best exposed to +the user in a friendly way. OVMF's platform driver (OvmfPkg/PlatformDxe) +presents such settings on the "OVMF Platform Configuration" dialog: + +- Press ESC on the TianoCore splash screen, +- Navigate to Device Manager | OVMF Platform Configuration. + +At the moment, OVMF's platform driver handles only one setting: the preferred +graphics resolution. This is useful for two purposes: + +- Some UEFI shell commands, like DRIVERS and DEVICES, benefit from a wide + display. Using the MODE shell command, the user can switch to a larger text + resolution (limited by the graphics resolution), and see the command output + in a more easily consumable way. + + [RHEL] The list of text modes available to the MODE command is also limited + by ConSplitterDxe (found under MdeModulePkg/Universal/Console). + ConSplitterDxe builds an intersection of text modes that are + simultaneously supported by all consoles that ConSplitterDxe + multiplexes console output to. + + In practice, the strongest text mode restriction comes from + TerminalDxe, which provides console I/O on serial ports. TerminalDxe + has a very limited built-in list of text modes, heavily pruning the + intersection built by ConSplitterDxe, and made available to the MODE + command. + + On the Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7.1 host, TerminalDxe's list of modes + has been extended with text resolutions that match the Spice QXL GPU's + common graphics resolutions. This way a "full screen" text mode should + always be available in the MODE command. + +- The other advantage of controlling the graphics resolution lies with UEFI + operating systems that don't (yet) have a native driver for QEMU's virtual + video cards -- eg. the Spice QXL GPU. Such OSes may choose to inherit the + properties of OVMF's EFI_GRAPHICS_OUTPUT_PROTOCOL (provided by + OvmfPkg/QemuVideoDxe, see later). + + Although the display can be used at runtime in such cases, by direct + framebuffer access, its properties, for example, the resolution, cannot be + modified. The platform driver allows the user to select the preferred GOP + resolution, reboot, and let the guest OS inherit that preferred resolution. + +The platform driver has three access points: the "normal" driver entry point, a +set of HII callbacks, and a GOP installation callback. + +(1) Driver entry point: the PlatformInit() function. + + (a) First, this function loads any available settings, and makes them take + effect. For the preferred graphics resolution in particular, this means + setting the following PCDs: + + gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdVideoHorizontalResolution + gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdVideoVerticalResolution + + These PCDs influence the GraphicsConsoleDxe driver (located under + MdeModulePkg/Universal/Console), which switches to the preferred + graphics mode, and produces EFI_SIMPLE_TEXT_OUTPUT_PROTOCOLs on GOPs: + + EFI_SIMPLE_TEXT_OUTPUT_PROTOCOL + [MdeModulePkg/Universal/Console/GraphicsConsoleDxe] + | + EFI_GRAPHICS_OUTPUT_PROTOCOL + [OvmfPkg/QemuVideoDxe] + | + EFI_PCI_IO_PROTOCOL + [MdeModulePkg/Bus/Pci/PciBusDxe] + + (b) Second, the driver entry point registers the user interface, including + HII callbacks. + + (c) Third, the driver entry point registers a GOP installation callback. + +(2) HII callbacks and the user interface. + + The Human Interface Infrastructure (HII) "is a set of protocols that allow + a UEFI driver to provide the ability to register user interface and + configuration content with the platform firmware". + + OVMF's platform driver: + + - provides a static, basic, visual form (PlatformForms.vfr), written in the + Visual Forms Representation language, + + - includes a UCS-16 encoded message catalog (Platform.uni), + + - includes source code that dynamically populates parts of the form, with + the help of MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiHiiLib -- this library simplifies + the handling of IFR (Internal Forms Representation) opcodes, + + - processes form actions that the user takes (Callback() function), + + - loads and saves platform configuration in a private, non-volatile + variable (ExtractConfig() and RouteConfig() functions). + + The ExtractConfig() HII callback implements the following stack of + conversions, for loading configuration and presenting it to the user: + + MultiConfigAltResp -- form engine / HII communication + ^ + | + [BlockToConfig] + | + MAIN_FORM_STATE -- binary representation of form/widget + ^ state + | + [PlatformConfigToFormState] + | + PLATFORM_CONFIG -- accessible to DXE and UEFI drivers + ^ + | + [PlatformConfigLoad] + | + UEFI non-volatile variable -- accessible to external utilities + + The layers are very similar for the reverse direction, ie. when taking + input from the user, and saving the configuration (RouteConfig() HII + callback): + + ConfigResp -- form engine / HII communication + | + [ConfigToBlock] + | + v + MAIN_FORM_STATE -- binary representation of form/widget + | state + [FormStateToPlatformConfig] + | + v + PLATFORM_CONFIG -- accessible to DXE and UEFI drivers + | + [PlatformConfigSave] + | + v + UEFI non-volatile variable -- accessible to external utilities + +(3) When the platform driver starts, a GOP may not be available yet. Thus the + driver entry point registers a callback (the GopInstalled() function) for + GOP installations. + + When the first GOP is produced (usually by QemuVideoDxe, or potentially by + a third party video driver), PlatformDxe retrieves the list of graphics + modes the GOP supports, and dynamically populates the drop-down list of + available resolutions on the form. The GOP installation callback is then + removed. + +Video driver +............ + +OvmfPkg/QemuVideoDxe is OVMF's built-in video driver. We can divide its +services in two parts: graphics output protocol (primary), and Int10h (VBE) +shim (secondary). + +(1) QemuVideoDxe conforms to the UEFI Driver Model; it produces an instance of + the EFI_GRAPHICS_OUTPUT_PROTOCOL (GOP) on each PCI display that it supports + and is connected to: + + EFI_GRAPHICS_OUTPUT_PROTOCOL + [OvmfPkg/QemuVideoDxe] + | + EFI_PCI_IO_PROTOCOL + [MdeModulePkg/Bus/Pci/PciBusDxe] + + It supports the following QEMU video cards: + + - Cirrus 5430 ("-device cirrus-vga"), + - Standard VGA ("-device VGA"), + - QXL VGA ("-device qxl-vga", "-device qxl"). + + For Cirrus the following resolutions and color depths are available: + 640x480x32, 800x600x32, 1024x768x24. On stdvga and QXL a long list of + resolutions is available. The list is filtered against the frame buffer + size during initialization. + + The size of the QXL VGA compatibility framebuffer can be changed with the + + -device qxl-vga,vgamem_mb=$NUM_MB + + QEMU option. If $NUM_MB exceeds 32, then the following is necessary + instead: + + -device qxl-vga,vgamem_mb=$NUM_MB,ram_size_mb=$((NUM_MB*2)) + + because the compatibility framebuffer can't cover more than half of PCI BAR + #0. The latter defaults to 64MB in size, and is controlled by the + "ram_size_mb" property. + +(2) When QemuVideoDxe binds the first Standard VGA or QXL VGA device, and there + is no real VGA BIOS present in the C to F segments (which could originate + from a legacy PCI option ROM -- refer to "Compatibility Support Module + (CSM)"), then QemuVideoDxe installs a minimal, "fake" VGA BIOS -- an Int10h + (VBE) "shim". + + The shim is implemented in 16-bit assembly in + "OvmfPkg/QemuVideoDxe/VbeShim.asm". The "VbeShim.sh" shell script assembles + it and formats it as a C array ("VbeShim.h") with the help of the "nasm" + utility. The driver's InstallVbeShim() function copies the shim in place + (the C segment), and fills in the VBE Info and VBE Mode Info structures. + The real-mode 10h interrupt vector is pointed to the shim's handler. + + The shim is (correctly) irrelevant and invisible for all UEFI operating + systems we know about -- except Windows Server 2008 R2 and other Windows + operating systems in that family. + + Namely, the Windows 2008 R2 SP1 (and Windows 7) UEFI guest's default video + driver dereferences the real mode Int10h vector, loads the pointed-to + handler code, and executes what it thinks to be VGA BIOS services in an + internal real-mode emulator. Consequently, video mode switching used not to + work in Windows 2008 R2 SP1 when it ran on the "pure UEFI" build of OVMF, + making the guest uninstallable. Hence the (otherwise optional, non-default) + Compatibility Support Module (CSM) ended up a requirement for running such + guests. + + The hard dependency on the sophisticated SeaBIOS CSM and the complex + supporting edk2 infrastructure, for enabling this family of guests, was + considered suboptimal by some members of the upstream community, + + [RHEL] and was certainly considered a serious maintenance disadvantage for + Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7.1 hosts. + + Thus, the shim has been collaboratively developed for the Windows 7 / + Windows Server 2008 R2 family. The shim provides a real stdvga / QXL + implementation for the few services that are in fact necessary for the + Windows 2008 R2 SP1 (and Windows 7) UEFI guest, plus some "fakes" that the + guest invokes but whose effect is not important. The only supported mode is + 1024x768x32, which is enough to install the guest and then upgrade its + video driver to the full-featured QXL XDDM one. + + The C segment is not present in the UEFI memory map prepared by OVMF. + Memory space that would cover it is never added (either in PEI, in the form + of memory resource descriptor HOBs, or in DXE, via gDS->AddMemorySpace()). + This way the handler body is invisible to all other UEFI guests, and the + rest of edk2. + + The Int10h real-mode IVT entry is covered with a Boot Services Code page, + making that too inaccessible to the rest of edk2. Due to the allocation + type, UEFI guest OSes different from the Windows Server 2008 family can + reclaim the page at zero. (The Windows 2008 family accesses that page + regardless of the allocation type.) + +Afterword +--------- + +After the bulk of this document was written in July 2014, OVMF development has +not stopped. To name two significant code contributions from the community: in +January 2015, OVMF runs on the "q35" machine type of QEMU, and it features a +driver for Xen paravirtual block devices (and another for the underlying Xen +bus). + +Furthermore, a dedicated virtualization platform has been contributed to +ArmPlatformPkg that plays a role parallel to OvmfPkg's. It targets the "virt" +machine type of qemu-system-arm and qemu-system-aarch64. Parts of OvmfPkg are +being refactored and modularized so they can be reused in +"ArmPlatformPkg/ArmVirtualizationPkg/ArmVirtualizationQemu.dsc". diff --git a/SPECS/edk2.spec b/SPECS/edk2.spec new file mode 100644 index 0000000..562882d --- /dev/null +++ b/SPECS/edk2.spec @@ -0,0 +1,1177 @@ +ExclusiveArch: x86_64 aarch64 + +%define GITDATE 20190829 +%define GITCOMMIT 37eef91017ad +%define TOOLCHAIN GCC5 +%define OPENSSL_VER 1.1.1c + +Name: edk2 +Version: %{GITDATE}git%{GITCOMMIT} +Release: 9%{?dist} +Summary: UEFI firmware for 64-bit virtual machines +Group: Applications/Emulators +License: BSD-2-Clause-Patent and OpenSSL and MIT +URL: http://www.tianocore.org + +# The source tarball is created using following commands: +# COMMIT=%{GITCOMMIT} +# git archive --format=tar --prefix=edk2-$COMMIT/ $COMMIT \ +# | xz -9ev >/tmp/edk2-$COMMIT.tar.xz +Source0: http://batcave.lab.eng.brq.redhat.com/www/edk2-%{GITCOMMIT}.tar.xz +Source1: ovmf-whitepaper-c770f8c.txt +Source2: openssl-rhel-d6c0e6e28ddc793474a3f9234eed50018f6c94ba.tar.xz +Source3: ovmf-vars-generator +Source4: LICENSE.qosb +Source5: RedHatSecureBootPkKek1.pem + +Source10: edk2-aarch64-verbose.json +Source11: edk2-aarch64.json +Source12: edk2-ovmf-sb.json +Source13: edk2-ovmf.json + +Patch0001: 0001-CryptoPkg-OpensslLib-Update-process_files.pl-to-gene.patch +Patch0002: 0002-CryptoPkg-Upgrade-OpenSSL-to-1.1.1d.patch +Patch0006: 0006-advertise-OpenSSL-on-TianoCore-splash-screen-boot-lo.patch +Patch0007: 0007-OvmfPkg-increase-max-debug-message-length-to-512-RHE.patch +Patch0008: 0008-OvmfPkg-QemuVideoDxe-enable-debug-messages-in-VbeShi.patch +Patch0009: 0009-MdeModulePkg-TerminalDxe-add-other-text-resolutions-.patch +Patch0010: 0010-MdeModulePkg-TerminalDxe-set-xterm-resolution-on-mod.patch +Patch0011: 0011-OvmfPkg-take-PcdResizeXterm-from-the-QEMU-command-li.patch +Patch0012: 0012-ArmVirtPkg-QemuFwCfgLib-allow-UEFI_DRIVER-client-mod.patch +Patch0013: 0013-ArmVirtPkg-take-PcdResizeXterm-from-the-QEMU-command.patch +Patch0014: 0014-OvmfPkg-allow-exclusion-of-the-shell-from-the-firmwa.patch +Patch0015: 0015-ArmPlatformPkg-introduce-fixed-PCD-for-early-hello-m.patch +Patch0016: 0016-ArmPlatformPkg-PrePeiCore-write-early-hello-message-.patch +Patch0017: 0017-ArmVirtPkg-set-early-hello-message-RH-only.patch +Patch0018: 0018-OvmfPkg-enable-DEBUG_VERBOSE-RHEL-only.patch +Patch0019: 0019-OvmfPkg-silence-DEBUG_VERBOSE-0x00400000-in-QemuVide.patch +Patch0020: 0020-ArmVirtPkg-silence-DEBUG_VERBOSE-0x00400000-in-QemuR.patch +Patch0021: 0021-OvmfPkg-QemuRamfbDxe-Do-not-report-DXE-failure-on-Aa.patch +Patch0022: 0022-OvmfPkg-silence-EFI_D_VERBOSE-0x00400000-in-NvmExpre.patch +Patch0033: 0033-CryptoPkg-OpensslLib-list-RHEL8-specific-OpenSSL-fil.patch +# For bz#1536624 - HTTPS enablement in OVMF +Patch34: edk2-MdePkg-Include-Protocol-Tls.h-Add-the-data-type-of-E.patch +# For bz#1536624 - HTTPS enablement in OVMF +Patch35: edk2-CryptoPkg-TlsLib-Add-the-new-API-TlsSetVerifyHost-CV.patch +# For bz#1536624 - HTTPS enablement in OVMF +Patch36: edk2-CryptoPkg-Crt-turn-strchr-into-a-function-CVE-2019-1.patch +# For bz#1536624 - HTTPS enablement in OVMF +Patch37: edk2-CryptoPkg-Crt-satisfy-inet_pton.c-dependencies-CVE-2.patch +# For bz#1536624 - HTTPS enablement in OVMF +Patch38: edk2-CryptoPkg-Crt-import-inet_pton.c-CVE-2019-14553.patch +# For bz#1536624 - HTTPS enablement in OVMF +Patch39: edk2-CryptoPkg-TlsLib-TlsSetVerifyHost-parse-IP-address-l.patch +# For bz#1536624 - HTTPS enablement in OVMF +Patch40: edk2-NetworkPkg-TlsDxe-Add-the-support-of-host-validation.patch +# For bz#1536624 - HTTPS enablement in OVMF +Patch41: edk2-NetworkPkg-HttpDxe-Set-the-HostName-for-the-verifica.patch +# For bz#1789797 - Backport upstream patch series: "UefiBootManagerLib, HttpDxe: tweaks for large HTTP(S) downloads" to improve HTTP(S) Boot experience with large (4GiB+) files +Patch42: edk2-MdeModulePkg-UefiBootManagerLib-log-reserved-mem-all.patch +# For bz#1789797 - Backport upstream patch series: "UefiBootManagerLib, HttpDxe: tweaks for large HTTP(S) downloads" to improve HTTP(S) Boot experience with large (4GiB+) files +Patch43: edk2-NetworkPkg-HttpDxe-fix-32-bit-truncation-in-HTTPS-do.patch +# For bz#1789335 - VM with edk2 can't boot when setting memory with '-m 2001' +Patch44: edk2-UefiCpuPkg-PiSmmCpuDxeSmm-fix-2M-4K-page-splitting-r.patch +# For bz#1751993 - DxeImageVerificationLib handles "DENY execute on security violation" like "DEFER execute on security violation" [rhel8] +Patch45: edk2-SecurityPkg-Fix-spelling-errors-PARTIAL-PICK.patch +# For bz#1751993 - DxeImageVerificationLib handles "DENY execute on security violation" like "DEFER execute on security violation" [rhel8] +Patch46: edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeImageVerificationHandler-simplify-Ver.patch +# For bz#1751993 - DxeImageVerificationLib handles "DENY execute on security violation" like "DEFER execute on security violation" [rhel8] +Patch47: edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeImageVerificationHandler-remove-else-.patch +# For bz#1751993 - DxeImageVerificationLib handles "DENY execute on security violation" like "DEFER execute on security violation" [rhel8] +Patch48: edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeImageVerificationHandler-keep-PE-COFF.patch +# For bz#1751993 - DxeImageVerificationLib handles "DENY execute on security violation" like "DEFER execute on security violation" [rhel8] +Patch49: edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeImageVerificationHandler-narrow-down-.patch +# For bz#1751993 - DxeImageVerificationLib handles "DENY execute on security violation" like "DEFER execute on security violation" [rhel8] +Patch50: edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeImageVerificationHandler-fix-retval-o.patch +# For bz#1751993 - DxeImageVerificationLib handles "DENY execute on security violation" like "DEFER execute on security violation" [rhel8] +Patch51: edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeImageVerificationHandler-remove-super.patch +# For bz#1751993 - DxeImageVerificationLib handles "DENY execute on security violation" like "DEFER execute on security violation" [rhel8] +Patch52: edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeImageVerificationHandler-unnest-AddIm.patch +# For bz#1751993 - DxeImageVerificationLib handles "DENY execute on security violation" like "DEFER execute on security violation" [rhel8] +Patch53: edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeImageVerificationHandler-eliminate-St.patch +# For bz#1751993 - DxeImageVerificationLib handles "DENY execute on security violation" like "DEFER execute on security violation" [rhel8] +Patch54: edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeImageVerificationHandler-fix-retval-f.patch +# For bz#1751993 - DxeImageVerificationLib handles "DENY execute on security violation" like "DEFER execute on security violation" [rhel8] +Patch55: edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeImageVerificationHandler-fix-imgexec-.patch +# For bz#1751993 - DxeImageVerificationLib handles "DENY execute on security violation" like "DEFER execute on security violation" [rhel8] +Patch56: edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeImageVerificationHandler-fix-defer-vs.patch +# For bz#1801274 - CVE-2019-14563 edk2: numeric truncation in MdeModulePkg/PiDxeS3BootScriptLib [rhel-8] +Patch57: edk2-MdeModulePkg-Enable-Disable-S3BootScript-dynamically.patch +# For bz#1801274 - CVE-2019-14563 edk2: numeric truncation in MdeModulePkg/PiDxeS3BootScriptLib [rhel-8] +Patch58: edk2-MdeModulePkg-PiDxeS3BootScriptLib-Fix-potential-nume.patch +# For bz#1806359 - bochs-display cannot show graphic wihout driver attach +Patch59: edk2-OvmfPkg-QemuVideoDxe-unbreak-secondary-vga-and-bochs.patch + + +# python3-devel and libuuid-devel are required for building tools. +# python3-devel is also needed for varstore template generation and +# verification with "ovmf-vars-generator". +BuildRequires: python3-devel +BuildRequires: libuuid-devel +BuildRequires: /usr/bin/iasl +BuildRequires: binutils gcc git + +%ifarch x86_64 +# Only OVMF includes 80x86 assembly files (*.nasm*). +BuildRequires: nasm + +# Only OVMF includes the Secure Boot feature, for which we need to separate out +# the UEFI shell. +BuildRequires: dosfstools +BuildRequires: mtools +BuildRequires: genisoimage + +# For generating the variable store template with the default certificates +# enrolled, we need qemu-kvm. +BuildRequires: qemu-kvm >= 2.12.0-89 + +# For verifying SB enablement in the above variable store template, we need a +# guest kernel that prints "Secure boot enabled". +BuildRequires: kernel-core >= 4.18.0-161 +BuildRequires: rpmdevtools + +%package ovmf +Summary: UEFI firmware for x86_64 virtual machines +BuildArch: noarch +Provides: OVMF = %{version}-%{release} +Obsoletes: OVMF < 20180508-100.gitee3198e672e2.el7 + +# OVMF includes the Secure Boot and IPv6 features; it has a builtin OpenSSL +# library. +Provides: bundled(openssl) = %{OPENSSL_VER} +License: BSD-2-Clause-Patent and OpenSSL + +# URL taken from the Maintainers.txt file. +URL: http://www.tianocore.org/ovmf/ + +%description ovmf +OVMF (Open Virtual Machine Firmware) is a project to enable UEFI support for +Virtual Machines. This package contains a sample 64-bit UEFI firmware for QEMU +and KVM. + +%else +%package aarch64 +Summary: UEFI firmware for aarch64 virtual machines +BuildArch: noarch +Provides: AAVMF = %{version}-%{release} +Obsoletes: AAVMF < 20180508-100.gitee3198e672e2.el7 + +# No Secure Boot for AAVMF yet, but we include OpenSSL for the IPv6 stack. +Provides: bundled(openssl) = %{OPENSSL_VER} +License: BSD-2-Clause-Patent and OpenSSL + +# URL taken from the Maintainers.txt file. +URL: https://github.com/tianocore/tianocore.github.io/wiki/ArmVirtPkg + +%description aarch64 +AAVMF (ARM Architecture Virtual Machine Firmware) is an EFI Development Kit II +platform that enables UEFI support for QEMU/KVM ARM Virtual Machines. This +package contains a 64-bit build. +%endif + +%package tools +Summary: EFI Development Kit II Tools +Group: Development/Tools +License: BSD-2-Clause-Patent +URL: https://github.com/tianocore/tianocore.github.io/wiki/BaseTools +%description tools +This package provides tools that are needed to +build EFI executables and ROMs using the GNU tools. + +%package tools-doc +Summary: Documentation for EFI Development Kit II Tools +Group: Development/Tools +BuildArch: noarch +License: BSD-2-Clause-Patent +URL: https://github.com/tianocore/tianocore.github.io/wiki/BaseTools +%description tools-doc +This package documents the tools that are needed to +build EFI executables and ROMs using the GNU tools. + +%description +EDK II is a modern, feature-rich, cross-platform firmware development +environment for the UEFI and PI specifications. This package contains sample +64-bit UEFI firmware builds for QEMU and KVM. + +%prep +%setup -q -n edk2-%{GITCOMMIT} + +%{lua: + tmp = os.tmpname(); + f = io.open(tmp, "w+"); + count = 0; + for i, p in ipairs(patches) do + f:write(p.."\n"); + count = count + 1; + end; + f:close(); + print("PATCHCOUNT="..count.."\n") + print("PATCHLIST="..tmp.."\n") +} + +git init -q +git config user.name rpm-build +git config user.email rpm-build +git config core.whitespace cr-at-eol +git config am.keepcr true +git add -A . +git commit -q -a --author 'rpm-build ' \ + -m '%{name}-%{GITCOMMIT} base' + +COUNT=$(grep '\.patch$' $PATCHLIST | wc -l) +if [ $COUNT -ne $PATCHCOUNT ]; then + echo "Found $COUNT patches in $PATCHLIST, expected $PATCHCOUNT" + exit 1 +fi +if [ $COUNT -gt 0 ]; then + for pf in `cat $PATCHLIST`; do + git am $pf + done +fi +echo "Applied $COUNT patches" +rm -f $PATCHLIST + +cp -a -- %{SOURCE1} %{SOURCE3} . +cp -a -- %{SOURCE10} %{SOURCE11} %{SOURCE12} %{SOURCE13} . +tar -C CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib -a -f %{SOURCE2} -x + +# Format the Red Hat-issued certificate that is to be enrolled as both Platform +# Key and first Key Exchange Key, as an SMBIOS OEM String. This means stripping +# the PEM header and footer, and prepending the textual representation of the +# GUID that identifies this particular OEM String to "EnrollDefaultKeys.efi", +# plus the separator ":". For details, see +# comments 2, 7, 14. +sed \ + -e 's/^-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----$/4e32566d-8e9e-4f52-81d3-5bb9715f9727:/' \ + -e '/^-----END CERTIFICATE-----$/d' \ + %{SOURCE5} \ + > PkKek1.oemstr + +# Done by %setup, but we do not use it for the auxiliary tarballs +chmod -Rf a+rX,u+w,g-w,o-w . + +%build +export PYTHON_COMMAND=%{__python3} +source ./edksetup.sh +make -C "$EDK_TOOLS_PATH" \ + EXTRA_OPTFLAGS="%{optflags}" \ + EXTRA_LDFLAGS="%{__global_ldflags}" + +SMP_MFLAGS="%{?_smp_mflags}" +if [[ x"$SMP_MFLAGS" = x-j* ]]; then + CC_FLAGS="$CC_FLAGS -n ${SMP_MFLAGS#-j}" +elif [ -n "%{?jobs}" ]; then + CC_FLAGS="$CC_FLAGS -n %{?jobs}" +fi + +CC_FLAGS="$CC_FLAGS --cmd-len=65536 -t %{TOOLCHAIN} -b DEBUG --hash" +CC_FLAGS="$CC_FLAGS -D NETWORK_IP6_ENABLE" +CC_FLAGS="$CC_FLAGS -D NETWORK_HTTP_BOOT_ENABLE -D NETWORK_TLS_ENABLE" + +%ifarch x86_64 +# Build with neither SB nor SMM; include UEFI shell. +build ${CC_FLAGS} -D TPM2_ENABLE -D FD_SIZE_4MB -a X64 \ + -p OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc + +# Build with SB and SMM; exclude UEFI shell. +build -D SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE -D EXCLUDE_SHELL_FROM_FD ${CC_FLAGS} \ + -a IA32 -a X64 -p OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc -D SMM_REQUIRE \ + -D TPM2_ENABLE -D FD_SIZE_4MB + +# Sanity check: the varstore templates must be identical. +cmp Build/OvmfX64/DEBUG_%{TOOLCHAIN}/FV/OVMF_VARS.fd \ + Build/Ovmf3264/DEBUG_%{TOOLCHAIN}/FV/OVMF_VARS.fd + +# Prepare an ISO image that boots the UEFI shell. +( + UEFI_SHELL_BINARY=Build/Ovmf3264/DEBUG_%{TOOLCHAIN}/X64/Shell.efi + ENROLLER_BINARY=Build/Ovmf3264/DEBUG_%{TOOLCHAIN}/X64/EnrollDefaultKeys.efi + UEFI_SHELL_IMAGE=uefi_shell.img + ISO_IMAGE=UefiShell.iso + + UEFI_SHELL_BINARY_BNAME=$(basename -- "$UEFI_SHELL_BINARY") + UEFI_SHELL_SIZE=$(stat --format=%s -- "$UEFI_SHELL_BINARY") + ENROLLER_SIZE=$(stat --format=%s -- "$ENROLLER_BINARY") + + # add 1MB then 10% for metadata + UEFI_SHELL_IMAGE_KB=$(( + (UEFI_SHELL_SIZE + ENROLLER_SIZE + 1 * 1024 * 1024) * 11 / 10 / 1024 + )) + + # create non-partitioned FAT image + rm -f -- "$UEFI_SHELL_IMAGE" + mkdosfs -C "$UEFI_SHELL_IMAGE" -n UEFI_SHELL -- "$UEFI_SHELL_IMAGE_KB" + + # copy the shell binary into the FAT image + export MTOOLS_SKIP_CHECK=1 + mmd -i "$UEFI_SHELL_IMAGE" ::efi + mmd -i "$UEFI_SHELL_IMAGE" ::efi/boot + mcopy -i "$UEFI_SHELL_IMAGE" "$UEFI_SHELL_BINARY" ::efi/boot/bootx64.efi + mcopy -i "$UEFI_SHELL_IMAGE" "$ENROLLER_BINARY" :: + mdir -i "$UEFI_SHELL_IMAGE" -/ :: + + # build ISO with FAT image file as El Torito EFI boot image + genisoimage -input-charset ASCII -J -rational-rock \ + -efi-boot "$UEFI_SHELL_IMAGE" -no-emul-boot \ + -o "$ISO_IMAGE" -- "$UEFI_SHELL_IMAGE" +) + +# Enroll the default certificates in a separate variable store template. +%{__python3} ovmf-vars-generator --verbose --verbose \ + --qemu-binary /usr/libexec/qemu-kvm \ + --ovmf-binary Build/Ovmf3264/DEBUG_%{TOOLCHAIN}/FV/OVMF_CODE.fd \ + --ovmf-template-vars Build/Ovmf3264/DEBUG_%{TOOLCHAIN}/FV/OVMF_VARS.fd \ + --uefi-shell-iso UefiShell.iso \ + --oem-string "$(< PkKek1.oemstr)" \ + --skip-testing \ + OVMF_VARS.secboot.fd + +%else +# Build with a verbose debug mask first, and stash the binary. +build ${CC_FLAGS} -a AARCH64 \ + -p ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemu.dsc \ + -D DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR_LEVEL=0x8040004F +cp -a Build/ArmVirtQemu-AARCH64/DEBUG_%{TOOLCHAIN}/FV/QEMU_EFI.fd \ + QEMU_EFI.verbose.fd + +# Rebuild with a silent (errors only) debug mask. +build ${CC_FLAGS} -a AARCH64 \ + -p ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemu.dsc \ + -D DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR_LEVEL=0x80000000 +%endif + +%install + +cp -a OvmfPkg/License.txt License.OvmfPkg.txt +mkdir -p $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_datadir}/qemu/firmware + +%ifarch x86_64 +mkdir -p \ + $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_datadir}/OVMF \ + $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_datadir}/%{name}/ovmf + +# We don't ship the SB-less, SMM-less binary. +%if 0 +install -m 0644 Build/OvmfX64/DEBUG_%{TOOLCHAIN}/FV/OVMF_CODE.fd \ + $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_datadir}/%{name}/ovmf/OVMF_CODE.fd +ln -s ../%{name}/ovmf/OVMF_CODE.fd $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_datadir}/OVMF/ +%endif +install -m 0644 Build/Ovmf3264/DEBUG_%{TOOLCHAIN}/FV/OVMF_CODE.fd \ + $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_datadir}/%{name}/ovmf/OVMF_CODE.secboot.fd + +install -m 0644 Build/OvmfX64/DEBUG_%{TOOLCHAIN}/FV/OVMF_VARS.fd \ + $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_datadir}/%{name}/ovmf/OVMF_VARS.fd +install -m 0644 OVMF_VARS.secboot.fd \ + $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_datadir}/%{name}/ovmf/OVMF_VARS.secboot.fd +install -m 0644 UefiShell.iso \ + $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_datadir}/%{name}/ovmf/UefiShell.iso + +ln -s ../%{name}/ovmf/OVMF_CODE.secboot.fd $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_datadir}/OVMF/ +ln -s ../%{name}/ovmf/OVMF_VARS.fd $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_datadir}/OVMF/ +ln -s ../%{name}/ovmf/OVMF_VARS.secboot.fd $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_datadir}/OVMF/ +ln -s ../%{name}/ovmf/UefiShell.iso $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_datadir}/OVMF/ + +install -m 0644 Build/Ovmf3264/DEBUG_%{TOOLCHAIN}/X64/Shell.efi \ + $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_datadir}/%{name}/ovmf/Shell.efi +install -m 0644 Build/Ovmf3264/DEBUG_%{TOOLCHAIN}/X64/EnrollDefaultKeys.efi \ + $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_datadir}/%{name}/ovmf/EnrollDefaultKeys.efi + +install -m 0644 edk2-ovmf-sb.json \ + $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_datadir}/qemu/firmware/40-edk2-ovmf-sb.json +install -m 0644 edk2-ovmf.json \ + $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_datadir}/qemu/firmware/50-edk2-ovmf.json + +%else +mkdir -p \ + $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_datadir}/AAVMF \ + $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_datadir}/%{name}/aarch64 + +# Pad and install the verbose binary. +cat QEMU_EFI.verbose.fd \ + /dev/zero \ +| head -c 64m \ + > $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_datadir}/%{name}/aarch64/QEMU_EFI-pflash.raw + +# Pad and install the silent (default) binary. +cat Build/ArmVirtQemu-AARCH64/DEBUG_%{TOOLCHAIN}/FV/QEMU_EFI.fd \ + /dev/zero \ +| head -c 64m \ + > $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_datadir}/%{name}/aarch64/QEMU_EFI-silent-pflash.raw + +# Create varstore template. +cat Build/ArmVirtQemu-AARCH64/DEBUG_%{TOOLCHAIN}/FV/QEMU_VARS.fd \ + /dev/zero \ +| head -c 64m \ + > $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_datadir}/%{name}/aarch64/vars-template-pflash.raw + +ln -s ../%{name}/aarch64/QEMU_EFI-pflash.raw \ + $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_datadir}/AAVMF/AAVMF_CODE.verbose.fd +ln -s ../%{name}/aarch64/QEMU_EFI-silent-pflash.raw \ + $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_datadir}/AAVMF/AAVMF_CODE.fd +ln -s ../%{name}/aarch64/vars-template-pflash.raw \ + $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_datadir}/AAVMF/AAVMF_VARS.fd + +chmod 0644 -- $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_datadir}/AAVMF/AAVMF_*.fd + +install -m 0644 QEMU_EFI.verbose.fd \ + $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_datadir}/%{name}/aarch64/QEMU_EFI.fd +install -m 0644 Build/ArmVirtQemu-AARCH64/DEBUG_%{TOOLCHAIN}/FV/QEMU_EFI.fd \ + $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_datadir}/%{name}/aarch64/QEMU_EFI.silent.fd +install -m 0644 Build/ArmVirtQemu-AARCH64/DEBUG_%{TOOLCHAIN}/FV/QEMU_VARS.fd \ + $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_datadir}/%{name}/aarch64/QEMU_VARS.fd + +install -m 0644 edk2-aarch64.json \ + $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_datadir}/qemu/firmware/60-edk2-aarch64.json +install -m 0644 edk2-aarch64-verbose.json \ + $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_datadir}/qemu/firmware/70-edk2-aarch64-verbose.json + +%endif + +cp -a CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/LICENSE LICENSE.openssl + +# install the tools +mkdir -p %{buildroot}%{_bindir} \ + %{buildroot}%{_datadir}/%{name}/Conf \ + %{buildroot}%{_datadir}/%{name}/Scripts +install BaseTools/Source/C/bin/* \ + %{buildroot}%{_bindir} +install BaseTools/BinWrappers/PosixLike/LzmaF86Compress \ + %{buildroot}%{_bindir} +install BaseTools/BuildEnv \ + %{buildroot}%{_datadir}/%{name} +install BaseTools/Conf/*.template \ + %{buildroot}%{_datadir}/%{name}/Conf +install BaseTools/Scripts/GccBase.lds \ + %{buildroot}%{_datadir}/%{name}/Scripts + +%ifarch x86_64 +%files ovmf +%else +%files aarch64 +%endif + +%defattr(-,root,root,-) +%license License.txt +%license License.OvmfPkg.txt +%license License-History.txt +%license LICENSE.openssl +%dir %{_datadir}/%{name}/ +%dir %{_datadir}/qemu +%dir %{_datadir}/qemu/firmware + +%ifarch x86_64 +%doc OvmfPkg/README +%doc ovmf-whitepaper-c770f8c.txt +%dir %{_datadir}/OVMF/ +%dir %{_datadir}/%{name}/ovmf/ +%if 0 +%{_datadir}/%{name}/ovmf/OVMF_CODE.fd +%{_datadir}/OVMF/OVMF_CODE.fd +%endif +%{_datadir}/%{name}/ovmf/OVMF_CODE.secboot.fd +%{_datadir}/%{name}/ovmf/OVMF_VARS.fd +%{_datadir}/%{name}/ovmf/OVMF_VARS.secboot.fd +%{_datadir}/%{name}/ovmf/UefiShell.iso +%{_datadir}/OVMF/OVMF_CODE.secboot.fd +%{_datadir}/OVMF/OVMF_VARS.fd +%{_datadir}/OVMF/OVMF_VARS.secboot.fd +%{_datadir}/OVMF/UefiShell.iso +%{_datadir}/%{name}/ovmf/Shell.efi +%{_datadir}/%{name}/ovmf/EnrollDefaultKeys.efi +%{_datadir}/qemu/firmware/40-edk2-ovmf-sb.json +%{_datadir}/qemu/firmware/50-edk2-ovmf.json + +%else +%dir %{_datadir}/AAVMF/ +%dir %{_datadir}/%{name}/aarch64/ +%{_datadir}/%{name}/aarch64/QEMU_EFI-pflash.raw +%{_datadir}/%{name}/aarch64/QEMU_EFI-silent-pflash.raw +%{_datadir}/%{name}/aarch64/vars-template-pflash.raw +%{_datadir}/AAVMF/AAVMF_CODE.verbose.fd +%{_datadir}/AAVMF/AAVMF_CODE.fd +%{_datadir}/AAVMF/AAVMF_VARS.fd +%{_datadir}/%{name}/aarch64/QEMU_EFI.fd +%{_datadir}/%{name}/aarch64/QEMU_EFI.silent.fd +%{_datadir}/%{name}/aarch64/QEMU_VARS.fd +%{_datadir}/qemu/firmware/60-edk2-aarch64.json +%{_datadir}/qemu/firmware/70-edk2-aarch64-verbose.json +%endif + +%files tools +%license License.txt +%license License-History.txt +%{_bindir}/Brotli +%{_bindir}/DevicePath +%{_bindir}/EfiRom +%{_bindir}/GenCrc32 +%{_bindir}/GenFfs +%{_bindir}/GenFv +%{_bindir}/GenFw +%{_bindir}/GenSec +%{_bindir}/LzmaCompress +%{_bindir}/LzmaF86Compress +%{_bindir}/Split +%{_bindir}/TianoCompress +%{_bindir}/VfrCompile +%{_bindir}/VolInfo +%dir %{_datadir}/%{name} +%{_datadir}/%{name}/BuildEnv +%{_datadir}/%{name}/Conf +%{_datadir}/%{name}/Scripts + +%files tools-doc +%doc BaseTools/UserManuals/*.rtf + +%check + +%ifarch x86_64 +# Of the installed host kernels, boot the one with the highest Version-Release +# under OVMF, and check if it prints "Secure boot enabled". +KERNEL_PKG=$(rpm -q kernel-core | rpmdev-sort | tail -n 1) +KERNEL_IMG=$(rpm -q -l $KERNEL_PKG | egrep '^/lib/modules/[^/]+/vmlinuz$') + +%{__python3} ovmf-vars-generator --verbose --verbose \ + --qemu-binary /usr/libexec/qemu-kvm \ + --ovmf-binary Build/Ovmf3264/DEBUG_%{TOOLCHAIN}/FV/OVMF_CODE.fd \ + --ovmf-template-vars Build/Ovmf3264/DEBUG_%{TOOLCHAIN}/FV/OVMF_VARS.fd \ + --uefi-shell-iso UefiShell.iso \ + --kernel-path $KERNEL_IMG \ + --skip-enrollment \ + --no-download \ + OVMF_VARS.secboot.fd + +%else +true + +%endif + +%changelog +* Fri Mar 27 2020 Miroslav Rezanina - 20190829git37eef91017ad-9.el8 +- edk2-OvmfPkg-QemuVideoDxe-unbreak-secondary-vga-and-bochs.patch [bz#1806359] +- Resolves: bz#1806359 + (bochs-display cannot show graphic wihout driver attach) + +* Tue Feb 18 2020 Miroslav Rezanina - 20190829git37eef91017ad-8.el8 +- edk2-MdeModulePkg-Enable-Disable-S3BootScript-dynamically.patch [bz#1801274] +- edk2-MdeModulePkg-PiDxeS3BootScriptLib-Fix-potential-nume.patch [bz#1801274] +- Resolves: bz#1801274 + (CVE-2019-14563 edk2: numeric truncation in MdeModulePkg/PiDxeS3BootScriptLib [rhel-8]) + +* Tue Feb 11 2020 Miroslav Rezanina - 20190829git37eef91017ad-7.el8 +- edk2-SecurityPkg-Fix-spelling-errors-PARTIAL-PICK.patch [bz#1751993] +- edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeImageVerificationHandler-simplify-Ver.patch [bz#1751993] +- edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeImageVerificationHandler-remove-else-.patch [bz#1751993] +- edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeImageVerificationHandler-keep-PE-COFF.patch [bz#1751993] +- edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeImageVerificationHandler-narrow-down-.patch [bz#1751993] +- edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeImageVerificationHandler-fix-retval-o.patch [bz#1751993] +- edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeImageVerificationHandler-remove-super.patch [bz#1751993] +- edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeImageVerificationHandler-unnest-AddIm.patch [bz#1751993] +- edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeImageVerificationHandler-eliminate-St.patch [bz#1751993] +- edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeImageVerificationHandler-fix-retval-f.patch [bz#1751993] +- edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeImageVerificationHandler-fix-imgexec-.patch [bz#1751993] +- edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeImageVerificationHandler-fix-defer-vs.patch [bz#1751993] +- Resolves: bz#1751993 + (DxeImageVerificationLib handles "DENY execute on security violation" like "DEFER execute on security violation" [rhel8]) + +* Tue Jan 21 2020 Miroslav Rezanina - 20190829git37eef91017ad-6.el8 +- edk2-UefiCpuPkg-PiSmmCpuDxeSmm-fix-2M-4K-page-splitting-r.patch [bz#1789335] +- Resolves: bz#1789335 + (VM with edk2 can't boot when setting memory with '-m 2001') + +* Thu Jan 16 2020 Miroslav Rezanina - 20190829git37eef91017ad-5.el8 +- edk2-MdeModulePkg-UefiBootManagerLib-log-reserved-mem-all.patch [bz#1789797] +- edk2-NetworkPkg-HttpDxe-fix-32-bit-truncation-in-HTTPS-do.patch [bz#1789797] +- Resolves: bz#1789797 + (Backport upstream patch series: "UefiBootManagerLib, HttpDxe: tweaks for large HTTP(S) downloads" to improve HTTP(S) Boot experience with large (4GiB+) files) + +* Wed Dec 11 2019 Miroslav Rezanina - 20190829git37eef91017ad-4.el8 +- edk2-redhat-set-guest-RAM-size-to-768M-for-SB-varstore-te.patch [bz#1778301] +- edk2-redhat-re-enable-Secure-Boot-varstore-template-verif.patch [bz#1778301] +- Resolves: bz#1778301 + (re-enable Secure Boot (varstore template) verification in %check) + +* Thu Dec 05 2019 Miroslav Rezanina - 20190829git37eef91017ad-3.el8 +- Update used openssl version [bz#1616029] +- Resolves: bz#1616029 + (rebuild edk2 against the final RHEL-8.2.0 version of OpenSSL-1.1.1) + +* Mon Dec 02 2019 Miroslav Rezanina - 20190829git37eef91017ad-2.el8 +- edk2-MdePkg-Include-Protocol-Tls.h-Add-the-data-type-of-E.patch [bz#1536624] +- edk2-CryptoPkg-TlsLib-Add-the-new-API-TlsSetVerifyHost-CV.patch [bz#1536624] +- edk2-CryptoPkg-Crt-turn-strchr-into-a-function-CVE-2019-1.patch [bz#1536624] +- edk2-CryptoPkg-Crt-satisfy-inet_pton.c-dependencies-CVE-2.patch [bz#1536624] +- edk2-CryptoPkg-Crt-import-inet_pton.c-CVE-2019-14553.patch [bz#1536624] +- edk2-CryptoPkg-TlsLib-TlsSetVerifyHost-parse-IP-address-l.patch [bz#1536624] +- edk2-NetworkPkg-TlsDxe-Add-the-support-of-host-validation.patch [bz#1536624] +- edk2-NetworkPkg-HttpDxe-Set-the-HostName-for-the-verifica.patch [bz#1536624] +- edk2-redhat-enable-HTTPS-Boot.patch [bz#1536624] +- Resolves: bz#1536624 + (HTTPS enablement in OVMF) + +* Fri Nov 29 2019 Miroslav Rezanina - 20190829git37eef91017ad-1.el8 +- Rebase to edk2-stable201908 [bz#1748180] +- Resolves: bz#1748180 + ((edk2-rebase-rhel-8.2) - rebase edk2 to upstream tag edk2-stable201908 for RHEL-8.2) + +* Mon Aug 05 2019 Miroslav Rezanina - 20190308git89910a39dcfd-6.el8 +- edk2-ArmVirtPkg-silence-DEBUG_VERBOSE-masking-0x00400000-.patch [bz#1714446] +- edk2-OvmfPkg-QemuRamfbDxe-Do-not-report-DXE-failure-on-Aa.patch [bz#1714446] +- edk2-ArmPkg-DebugPeCoffExtraActionLib-debugger-commands-a.patch [bz#1714446] +- Resolves: bz#1714446 + (edk2-aarch64 silent build is not silent enough) + +* Tue Jul 02 2019 Miroslav Rezanina - 20190308git89910a39dcfd-5.el8 +- edk2-redhat-add-D-TPM2_ENABLE-to-the-edk2-ovmf-build-flag.patch [bz#1693205] +- Resolves: bz#1693205 + (edk2: Enable TPM2 support) + +* Tue Jun 11 2019 Miroslav Rezanina - 20190308git89910a39dcfd-4.el8 +- edk2-OvmfPkg-raise-the-PCIEXBAR-base-to-2816-MB-on-Q35.patch [bz#1666941] +- edk2-OvmfPkg-PlatformPei-set-32-bit-UC-area-at-PciBase-Pc.patch [bz#1666941] +- Resolves: bz#1666941 + (UEFI guest cannot boot into os when setting some special memory size) + +* Tue Apr 09 2019 Danilo Cesar Lemes de Paula - 20190308git89910a39dcfd-2.el8 +- edk2-redhat-provide-firmware-descriptor-meta-files.patch [bz#1600230] +- Resolves: bz#1600230 + ([RHEL 8.1] RFE: provide firmware descriptor meta-files for the edk2-ovmf and edk2-aarch64 firmware images) + +* Mon Apr 08 2019 Danilo Cesar Lemes de Paula - 20190308git89910a39dcfd-1.el8 +- Rebase to edk2-20190308git89910a39dcfd + +* Mon Jan 21 2019 Danilo Cesar Lemes de Paula - 20180508gitee3198e672e2-9.el8 +- edk2-BaseTools-Fix-UEFI-and-Tiano-Decompression-logic-iss.patch [bz#1662184] +- edk2-MdePkg-BaseUefiDecompressLib-Fix-UEFI-Decompression-.patch [bz#1662184] +- edk2-IntelFrameworkModulePkg-Fix-UEFI-and-Tiano-Decompres.patch [bz#1662184] +- edk2-git-Use-HTTPS-support.patch [] +- Resolves: bz#1662184 + (backport fix for (theoretical?) regression introduced by earlier CVE fixes) + +* Wed Nov 21 2018 Danilo Cesar Lemes de Paula - 20180508gitee3198e672e2-8.el8 +- edk2-NetworkPkg-UefiPxeBcDxe-Add-EXCLUSIVE-attribute-when.patch [bz#1643377] +- Resolves: bz#1643377 + (Exception when grubx64.efi used for UEFI netboot) + +* Tue Nov 06 2018 Danilo Cesar Lemes de Paula - 20180508gitee3198e672e2-5.el8 +- edk2-MdeModulePkg-Variable-Fix-Timestamp-zeroing-issue-on.patch [bz#1641436] +- edk2-MdePkg-Add-more-checker-in-UefiDecompressLib-to-acce.patch [bz#1641449 bz#1641453 bz#1641464 bz#1641469] +- edk2-IntelFrameworkModulePkg-Add-more-checker-in-UefiTian.patch [bz#1641453 bz#1641464 bz#1641469] +- edk2-BaseTools-Add-more-checker-in-Decompress-algorithm-t.patch [bz#1641445 bz#1641453 bz#1641464 bz#1641469] +- Resolves: bz#1641436 + (CVE-2018-3613 edk2: Logic error in MdeModulePkg in EDK II firmware allows for privilege escalation by authenticated users [rhel-8]) +- Resolves: bz#1641445 + (CVE-2017-5731 edk2: Privilege escalation via processing of malformed files in TianoCompress.c [rhel-8]) +- Resolves: bz#1641449 + (CVE-2017-5732 edk2: Privilege escalation via processing of malformed files in BaseUefiDecompressLib.c [rhel-8]) +- Resolves: bz#1641453 + (CVE-2017-5733 edk2: Privilege escalation via heap-based buffer overflow in MakeTable() function [rhel-8]) +- Resolves: bz#1641464 + (CVE-2017-5734 edk2: Privilege escalation via stack-based buffer overflow in MakeTable() function [rhel-8]) +- Resolves: bz#1641469 + (CVE-2017-5735 edk2: Privilege escalation via heap-based buffer overflow in Decode() function [rhel-8]) + +* Tue Sep 04 2018 Danilo Cesar Lemes de Paula - 20180508gitee3198e672e2-5.el8 +- edk2-BaseTools-footer.makefile-expand-BUILD_CFLAGS-last-f.patch [bz#1607906] +- edk2-BaseTools-header.makefile-remove-c-from-BUILD_CFLAGS.patch [bz#1607906] +- edk2-BaseTools-Source-C-split-O2-to-BUILD_OPTFLAGS.patch [bz#1607906] +- edk2-BaseTools-Source-C-take-EXTRA_OPTFLAGS-from-the-call.patch [bz#1607906] +- edk2-BaseTools-Source-C-take-EXTRA_LDFLAGS-from-the-calle.patch [bz#1607906] +- edk2-BaseTools-VfrCompile-honor-EXTRA_LDFLAGS.patch [bz#1607906] +- edk2-redhat-inject-the-RPM-compile-and-link-options-to-th.patch [bz#1607906] +- Resolves: bz#1607906 + (edk2-tools: Does not use RPM build flags) + +* Wed Aug 08 2018 Danilo Cesar Lemes de Paula - 20180508gitee3198e672e2-4.el8 +- edk2-redhat-provide-virtual-bundled-OpenSSL-in-edk2-ovmf-.patch [bz#1607801] +- Resolves: bz#1607801 + (add 'Provides: bundled(openssl) = 1.1.0h' to the spec file) + +* Tue Jul 24 2018 Danilo Cesar Lemes de Paula - 20180508gitee3198e672e2-3.el8 +- edk2-redhat-Provide-and-Obsolete-OVMF-and-AAVMF.patch [bz#1596148] +- edk2-ArmVirtPkg-unify-HttpLib-resolutions-in-ArmVirt.dsc..patch [bz#1536627] +- edk2-ArmVirtPkg-ArmVirtQemu-enable-the-IPv6-stack.patch [bz#1536627] +- edk2-advertise-OpenSSL-due-to-IPv6-enablement-too-RHEL-on.patch [bz#1536627] +- edk2-redhat-add-D-NETWORK_IP6_ENABLE-to-the-build-flags.patch [bz#1536627] +- edk2-redhat-update-license-fields-and-files-in-the-spec-f.patch [bz#1536627] +- Resolves: bz#1536627 + (IPv6 enablement in OVMF) +- Resolves: bz#1596148 + (restore Provides/Obsoletes macros for OVMF and AAVMF, from RHEL-8 Alpha) + +* Tue Jul 10 2018 Danilo C. L. de Paula - 20180508gitee3198e672e2-2.el8 +- Rebase edk2 on top of 20180508gitee3198e672e2 + +* Fri Jun 08 2018 Miroslav Rezanina - 20180508-2.gitee3198e672e2 +- OvmfPkg/PlatformBootManagerLib: connect consoles unconditionally [bz#1577546] +- build OVMF varstore template with SB enabled / certs enrolled [bz#1561128] +- connect Virtio RNG devices again [bz#1579518] +- Resolves: bz#1577546 + (no input consoles connected under certain circumstances) +- Resolves: bz#1561128 + (OVMF Secure boot enablement (enrollment of default keys)) +- Resolves: bz#1579518 + (EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL no longer produced for virtio-rng) +* Wed Dec 06 2017 Miroslav Rezanina - 20171011-4.git92d07e48907f.el7 +- ovmf-MdeModulePkg-Core-Dxe-log-informative-memprotect-msg.patch [bz#1520485] +- ovmf-MdeModulePkg-BdsDxe-fall-back-to-a-Boot-Manager-Menu.patch [bz#1515418] +- Resolves: bz#1515418 + (RFE: Provide diagnostics for failed boot) +- Resolves: bz#1520485 + (AAVMF: two new messages with silent build) + +* Fri Dec 01 2017 Miroslav Rezanina - 20171011-3.git92d07e48907f.el7 +- ovmf-UefiCpuPkg-CpuDxe-Fix-multiple-entries-of-RT_CODE-in.patch [bz#1518308] +- ovmf-MdeModulePkg-DxeCore-Filter-out-all-paging-capabilit.patch [bz#1518308] +- ovmf-MdeModulePkg-Core-Merge-memory-map-after-filtering-p.patch [bz#1518308] +- Resolves: bz#1518308 + (UEFI memory map regression (runtime code entry splitting) introduced by c1cab54ce57c) + +* Mon Nov 27 2017 Miroslav Rezanina - 20171011-2.git92d07e48907f.el7 +- ovmf-MdeModulePkg-Bds-Remove-assertion-in-BmCharToUint.patch [bz#1513632] +- ovmf-MdeModulePkg-Bds-Check-variable-name-even-if-OptionN.patch [bz#1513632] +- ovmf-MdeModulePkg-PciBus-Fix-bug-that-PCI-BUS-claims-too-.patch [bz#1514105] +- ovmf-OvmfPkg-make-it-a-proper-BASE-library.patch [bz#1488247] +- ovmf-OvmfPkg-create-a-separate-PlatformDebugLibIoPort-ins.patch [bz#1488247] +- ovmf-OvmfPkg-save-on-I-O-port-accesses-when-the-debug-por.patch [bz#1488247] +- ovmf-OvmfPkg-enable-DEBUG_VERBOSE-RHEL-only.patch [bz#1488247] +- ovmf-OvmfPkg-silence-EFI_D_VERBOSE-0x00400000-in-QemuVide.patch [bz#1488247] +- ovmf-OvmfPkg-silence-EFI_D_VERBOSE-0x00400000-in-NvmExpre.patch [bz#1488247] +- ovmf-Revert-redhat-introduce-separate-silent-and-verbose-.patch [bz#1488247] +- Resolves: bz#1488247 + (make debug logging no-op unless a debug console is active) +- Resolves: bz#1513632 + ([RHEL-ALT 7.5] AAVMF fails to boot after setting BootNext) +- Resolves: bz#1514105 + (backport edk2 commit 6e3287442774 so that PciBusDxe not over-claim resources) + +* Wed Oct 18 2017 Miroslav Rezanina - 20171011-1.git92d07e48907f.el7 +- Rebase to 92d07e48907f [bz#1469787] +- Resolves: bz#1469787 + ((ovmf-rebase-rhel-7.5) Rebase OVMF for RHEL-7.5) +- Resolves: bz#1434740 + (OvmfPkg/PciHotPlugInitDxe: don't reserve IO space when IO support is disabled) +- Resolves: bz#1434747 + ([Q35] code12 error when hotplug x710 device in win2016) +- Resolves: bz#1447027 + (Guest cannot boot with 240 or above vcpus when using ovmf) +- Resolves: bz#1458192 + ([Q35] recognize "usb-storage" devices in XHCI ports) +- Resolves: bz#1468526 + (>1TB RAM support) +- Resolves: bz#1488247 + (provide "OVMF_CODE.secboot.verbose.fd" for log capturing; silence "OVMF_CODE.secboot.fd") +- Resolves: bz#1496170 + (Inconsistent MOR control variables exposed by OVMF, breaks Windows Device Guard) + +* Fri May 12 2017 Miroslav Rezanina - 20170228-5.gitc325e41585e3.el7 +- ovmf-OvmfPkg-EnrollDefaultKeys-update-SignatureOwner-GUID.patch [bz#1443351] +- ovmf-OvmfPkg-EnrollDefaultKeys-expose-CertType-parameter-.patch [bz#1443351] +- ovmf-OvmfPkg-EnrollDefaultKeys-blacklist-empty-file-in-db.patch [bz#1443351] +- ovmf-OvmfPkg-introduce-the-FD_SIZE_IN_KB-macro-build-flag.patch [bz#1443351] +- ovmf-OvmfPkg-OvmfPkg.fdf.inc-extract-VARS_LIVE_SIZE-and-V.patch [bz#1443351] +- ovmf-OvmfPkg-introduce-4MB-flash-image-mainly-for-Windows.patch [bz#1443351] +- ovmf-OvmfPkg-raise-max-variable-size-auth-non-auth-to-33K.patch [bz#1443351] +- ovmf-OvmfPkg-PlatformPei-handle-non-power-of-two-spare-si.patch [bz#1443351] +- ovmf-redhat-update-local-build-instructions-with-D-FD_SIZ.patch [bz#1443351] +- ovmf-redhat-update-OVMF-build-commands-with-D-FD_SIZE_4MB.patch [bz#1443351] +- Resolves: bz#1443351 + ([svvp][ovmf] job "Secure Boot Logo Test" failed with q35&ovmf) + +* Fri Apr 28 2017 Miroslav Rezanina - 20170228-4.gitc325e41585e3.el7 +- ovmf-ShellPkg-Shell-clean-up-bogus-member-types-in-SPLIT_.patch [bz#1442908] +- ovmf-ShellPkg-Shell-eliminate-double-free-in-RunSplitComm.patch [bz#1442908] +- Resolves: bz#1442908 + (Guest hang when running a wrong command in Uefishell) + +* Tue Apr 04 2017 Miroslav Rezanina - 20170228-3.gitc325e41585e3.el7 +- ovmf-ArmVirtPkg-FdtClientDxe-supplement-missing-EFIAPI-ca.patch [bz#1430262] +- ovmf-ArmVirtPkg-ArmVirtPL031FdtClientLib-unconditionally-.patch [bz#1430262] +- ovmf-MdeModulePkg-RamDiskDxe-fix-C-string-literal-catenat.patch [bz#1430262] +- ovmf-EmbeddedPkg-introduce-EDKII-Platform-Has-ACPI-GUID.patch [bz#1430262] +- ovmf-EmbeddedPkg-introduce-PlatformHasAcpiLib.patch [bz#1430262] +- ovmf-EmbeddedPkg-introduce-EDKII-Platform-Has-Device-Tree.patch [bz#1430262] +- ovmf-ArmVirtPkg-add-PlatformHasAcpiDtDxe.patch [bz#1430262] +- ovmf-ArmVirtPkg-enable-AcpiTableDxe-and-EFI_ACPI_TABLE_PR.patch [bz#1430262] +- ovmf-ArmVirtPkg-FdtClientDxe-install-DT-as-sysconfig-tabl.patch [bz#1430262] +- ovmf-ArmVirtPkg-PlatformHasAcpiDtDxe-don-t-expose-DT-if-Q.patch [bz#1430262] +- ovmf-ArmVirtPkg-remove-PURE_ACPI_BOOT_ENABLE-and-PcdPureA.patch [bz#1430262] +- Resolves: bz#1430262 + (AAVMF: forward QEMU's DT to the guest OS only if ACPI payload is unavailable) + +* Mon Mar 27 2017 Miroslav Rezanina - 20170228-2.gitc325e41585e3.el7 +- ovmf-MdeModulePkg-Core-Dxe-downgrade-CodeSegmentCount-is-.patch [bz#1433428] +- Resolves: bz#1433428 + (AAVMF: Fix error message during ARM guest VM installation) + +* Wed Mar 08 2017 Laszlo Ersek - ovmf-20170228-1.gitc325e41585e3.el7 +- Rebase to upstream c325e41585e3 [bz#1416919] +- Resolves: bz#1373812 + (guest boot from network even set 'boot order=1' for virtio disk with OVMF) +- Resolves: bz#1380282 + (Update OVMF to openssl-1.0.2k-hobbled) +- Resolves: bz#1412313 + (select broadcast SMI if available) +- Resolves: bz#1416919 + (Rebase OVMF for RHEL-7.4) +- Resolves: bz#1426330 + (disable libssl in CryptoPkg) + +* Mon Sep 12 2016 Laszlo Ersek - ovmf-20160608b-1.git988715a.el7 +- rework downstream-only commit dde83a75b566 "setup the tree for the secure + boot feature (RHEL only)", excluding patent-encumbered files from the + upstream OpenSSL 1.0.2g tarball [bz#1374710] +- rework downstream-only commit dfc3ca1ee509 "CryptoPkg/OpensslLib: Upgrade + OpenSSL version to 1.0.2h", excluding patent-encumbered files from the + upstream OpenSSL 1.0.2h tarball [bz#1374710] + +* Thu Aug 04 2016 Miroslav Rezanina - OVMF-20160608-3.git988715a.el7 +- ovmf-MdePkg-PCI-Add-missing-PCI-PCIE-definitions.patch [bz#1332408] +- ovmf-ArmPlatformPkg-NorFlashDxe-accept-both-non-secure-an.patch [bz#1353494] +- ovmf-ArmVirtPkg-ArmVirtQemu-switch-secure-boot-build-to-N.patch [bz#1353494] +- ovmf-ArmPlatformPkg-NorFlashAuthenticatedDxe-remove-this-.patch [bz#1353494] +- ovmf-ArmVirtPkg-add-FDF-definition-for-empty-varstore.patch [bz#1353494] +- ovmf-redhat-package-the-varstore-template-produced-by-the.patch [bz#1353494] +- ovmf-ArmVirtPkg-Re-add-the-Driver-Health-Manager.patch [bz#1353494] +- ovmf-ArmVirtPkg-HighMemDxe-allow-patchable-PCD-for-PcdSys.patch [bz#1353494] +- ovmf-ArmVirtPkg-ArmVirtQemuKernel-make-ACPI-support-AARCH.patch [bz#1353494] +- ovmf-ArmVirtPkg-align-ArmVirtQemuKernel-with-ArmVirtQemu.patch [bz#1353494] +- ovmf-ArmVirtPkg-ArmVirtQemu-factor-out-shared-FV.FvMain-d.patch [bz#1353494] +- ovmf-ArmVirtPkg-factor-out-Rules-FDF-section.patch [bz#1353494] +- ovmf-ArmVirtPkg-add-name-GUIDs-to-FvMain-instances.patch [bz#1353494] +- ovmf-OvmfPkg-add-a-Name-GUID-to-each-Firmware-Volume.patch [bz#1353494] +- ovmf-OvmfPkg-PlatformBootManagerLib-remove-stale-FvFile-b.patch [bz#1353494] +- ovmf-MdePkg-IndustryStandard-introduce-EFI_PCI_CAPABILITY.patch [bz#1332408] +- ovmf-MdeModulePkg-PciBusDxe-look-for-the-right-capability.patch [bz#1332408] +- ovmf-MdeModulePkg-PciBusDxe-recognize-hotplug-capable-PCI.patch [bz#1332408] +- ovmf-OvmfPkg-add-PciHotPlugInitDxe.patch [bz#1332408] +- ovmf-ArmPkg-ArmGicLib-manage-GICv3-SPI-state-at-the-distr.patch [bz#1356655] +- ovmf-ArmVirtPkg-PlatformBootManagerLib-remove-stale-FvFil.patch [bz#1353494] +- ovmf-OvmfPkg-EnrollDefaultKeys-assign-Status-before-readi.patch [bz#1356913] +- ovmf-OvmfPkg-EnrollDefaultKeys-silence-VS2015x86-warning-.patch [bz#1356913] +- ovmf-CryptoPkg-update-openssl-to-ignore-RVCT-3079.patch [bz#1356184] +- ovmf-CryptoPkg-Fix-typos-in-comments.patch [bz#1356184] +- ovmf-CryptoPkg-BaseCryptLib-Avoid-passing-NULL-ptr-to-fun.patch [bz#1356184] +- ovmf-CryptoPkg-BaseCryptLib-Init-the-content-of-struct-Ce.patch [bz#1356184] +- ovmf-CryptoPkg-OpensslLib-Upgrade-OpenSSL-version-to-1.0..patch [bz#1356184] +- Resolves: bz#1332408 + (Q35 machine can not hot-plug scsi controller under switch) +- Resolves: bz#1353494 + ([OVMF] "EFI Internal Shell" should be removed from "Boot Manager") +- Resolves: bz#1356184 + (refresh embedded OpenSSL to 1.0.2h) +- Resolves: bz#1356655 + (AAVMF: stop accessing unmapped gicv3 registers) +- Resolves: bz#1356913 + (fix use-without-initialization in EnrollDefaultKeys.efi) + +* Tue Jul 12 2016 Miroslav Rezanina - OVMF-20160608-2.git988715a.el7 +- ovmf-ArmPkg-ArmGicV3Dxe-configure-all-interrupts-as-non-s.patch [bz#1349407] +- ovmf-ArmVirtPkg-PlatformBootManagerLib-Postpone-the-shell.patch [bz#1353689] +- Resolves: bz#1349407 + (AArch64: backport fix to run over gicv3 emulation) +- Resolves: bz#1353689 + (AAVMF: Drops to shell with uninitialized NVRAM file) + +* Thu Jun 9 2016 Laszlo Ersek - ovmf-20160608-1.git988715a.el7 +- Resolves: bz#1341733 + (prevent SMM stack overflow in OVMF while enrolling certificates in "db") +- Resolves: bz#1257882 + (FEAT: support to boot from virtio 1.0 modern devices) +- Resolves: bz#1333238 + (Q35 machine can not boot up successfully with more than 3 virtio-scsi + storage controller under switch) +- Resolves: bz#1330955 + (VM can not be booted up from hard disk successfully when with a passthrough + USB stick) + +* Thu May 19 2016 Laszlo Ersek - ovmf-20160419-2.git90bb4c5.el7 +- Submit scratch builds from the exploded tree again to + supp-rhel-7.3-candidate, despite FatPkg being OSS at this point; see + bz#1329559. + +* Wed Apr 20 2016 Laszlo Ersek - ovmf-20160419-1.git90bb4c5.el7 +- FatPkg is under the 2-clause BSDL now; "ovmf" has become OSS +- upgrade to openssl-1.0.2g +- Resolves: bz#1323363 + (remove "-D SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE" from AAVMF) +- Resolves: bz#1257882 + (FEAT: support to boot from virtio 1.0 modern devices) +- Resolves: bz#1308678 + (clearly separate SB-less, SMM-less OVMF binary from SB+SMM OVMF binary) + +* Fri Feb 19 2016 Miroslav Rezanina - OVMF-20160202-2.gitd7c0dfa.el7 +- ovmf-restore-TianoCore-splash-logo-without-OpenSSL-advert.patch [bz#1308678] +- ovmf-OvmfPkg-ArmVirtPkg-show-OpenSSL-less-logo-without-Se.patch [bz#1308678] +- ovmf-OvmfPkg-simplify-VARIABLE_STORE_HEADER-generation.patch [bz#1308678] +- ovmf-redhat-bring-back-OVMF_CODE.fd-but-without-SB-and-wi.patch [bz#1308678] +- ovmf-redhat-rename-OVMF_CODE.smm.fd-to-OVMF_CODE.secboot..patch [bz#1308678] + +* Tue Feb 2 2016 Laszlo Ersek - ovmf-20160202-1.gitd7c0dfa.el7 +- rebase to upstream d7c0dfa +- update OpenSSL to 1.0.2e (upstream) +- update FatPkg to SVN r97 (upstream) +- drive NVMe devices (upstream) +- resize xterm on serial console mode change, when requested with + -fw_cfg name=opt/(ovmf|aavmf)/PcdResizeXterm,string=y + (downstream) +- Resolves: bz#1259395 + (revert / roll back AAVMF fix for BZ 1188054) +- Resolves: bz#1202819 + (OVMF: secure boot limitations) +- Resolves: bz#1182495 + (OVMF rejects iPXE oprom when Secure Boot is enabled) + +* Thu Nov 5 2015 Laszlo Ersek - ovmf-20151104-1.gitb9ffeab.el7 +- rebase to upstream b9ffeab +- Resolves: bz#1207554 + ([AAVMF] AArch64: populate SMBIOS) +- Resolves: bz#1270279 + (AAVMF: output improvements) + +* Thu Jun 25 2015 Miroslav Rezanina - OVMF-20150414-2.gitc9e5618.el7 +- ovmf-OvmfPkg-PlatformPei-set-SMBIOS-entry-point-version-d.patch [bz#1232876] +- Resolves: bz#1232876 + (OVMF should install a version 2.8 SMBIOS entry point) + +* Sat Apr 18 2015 Laszlo Ersek - 20150414-1.gitc9e5618.el7 +- rebase from upstream 9ece15a to c9e5618 +- adapt .gitignore files +- update to openssl-0.9.8zf +- create Logo-OpenSSL.bmp rather than modifying Logo.bmp in-place +- update to FatPkg SVN r93 (git 8ff136aa) +- drop the following downstream-only patches (obviated by upstream + counterparts): + "tools_def.template: use forward slash with --add-gnu-debuglink (RHEL only)" + "tools_def.template: take GCC48 prefixes from environment (RHEL only)" + "OvmfPkg: set video resolution of text setup to 640x480 (RHEL only)" + "OvmfPkg: resolve OrderedCollectionLib with base red-black tree instance" + "OvmfPkg: AcpiPlatformDxe: actualize QemuLoader.h comments" + "OvmfPkg: AcpiPlatformDxe: remove current ACPI table loader" + "OvmfPkg: AcpiPlatformDxe: implement QEMU's full ACPI table loader interface" + "OvmfPkg: QemuVideoDxe: fix querying of QXL's drawable buffer size" + "OvmfPkg: disable stale fork of SecureBootConfigDxe" + "OvmfPkg: SecureBootConfigDxe: remove stale fork" + "Try to read key strike even when ..." + "OvmfPkg: BDS: remove dead call to PlatformBdsEnterFrontPage()" + "OvmfPkg: BDS: drop useless return statement" + "OvmfPkg: BDS: don't overwrite the BDS Front Page timeout" + "OvmfPkg: BDS: optimize second argument in PlatformBdsEnterFrontPage() call" + 'OvmfPkg: BDS: drop superfluous "connect first boot option" logic' + "OvmfPkg: BDS: drop custom boot timeout, revert to IntelFrameworkModulePkg's" + "Add comments to clarify mPubKeyStore buffer MemCopy. ..." + "MdeModulePkg/SecurityPkg Variable: Add boundary check..." + "OvmfPkg: AcpiPlatformDxe: make dependency on PCI enumeration explicit" + "MdePkg: UefiScsiLib: do not encode LUN in CDB for READ and WRITE" + "MdePkg: UefiScsiLib: do not encode LUN in CDB for other SCSI commands" +- merge downstream AAVMF patch "adapt packaging to Arm64", which forces us to + rename the main package from "OVMF" to "ovmf" +- drop the following ARM BDS specific tweaks (we'll only build the Intel BDS): + "ArmPlatformPkg/Bds: generate ESP Image boot option if user pref is unset + (Acadia)" + "ArmPlatformPkg/Bds: check for other defaults too if user pref is unset + (Acadia)" + "ArmPlatformPkg/ArmVirtualizationPkg: auto-detect boot path (Acadia)" + "ArmPlatformPkg/Bds: initialize ConIn/ConOut/ErrOut before connecting + terminals" + "ArmPlatformPkg/Bds: let FindCandidate() search all filesystems" + "ArmPlatformPkg/Bds: FindCandidateOnHandle(): log full device path" + "ArmPlatformPkg/Bds: fall back to Boot Menu when no default option was found" + "ArmPlatformPkg/Bds: always connect drivers before looking at boot options" +- drop patch "ArmPlatformPkg/ArmVirtualizationPkg: enable DEBUG_VERBOSE (Acadia + only)", obsoleted by fixed bug 1197141 +- tweak patch "write up build instructions (for interactive, local development) + (RHELSA)". The defaults in "BaseTools/Conf/target.template", ie. + ACTIVE_PLATFORM and TARGET_ARCH, are set for OVMF / X64. The AAVMF build + instructions now spell out the necessary override options (-p and -a, + respectively). +- extend patch "build FAT driver from source (RHELSA)" to the Xen build as well + (only for consistency; we don't build for Xen). +- drop the following downstream-only AAVMF patches, due to the 77d5dac -> + c9e5618 AAVMF rebase & join: + "redhat/process-rh-specific.sh: fix check for hunk-less filtered patches" + "redhat/process-rh-specific.sh: suppress missing files in final 'rm'" + "ArmVirtualizationQemu: build UEFI shell from source (Acadia only)" + "MdePkg: UefiScsiLib: do not encode LUN in CDB for READ and WRITE" + "MdePkg: UefiScsiLib: do not encode LUN in CDB for other SCSI commands" + "ArmVirtualizationPkg: work around cache incoherence on KVM affecting DTB" + "Changed build target to supp-rhel-7.1-candidate" + "ArmVirtualizationPkg: VirtFdtDxe: forward FwCfg addresses from DTB to PCDs" + "ArmVirtualizationPkg: introduce QemuFwCfgLib instance for DXE drivers" + "ArmVirtualizationPkg: clone PlatformIntelBdsLib from ArmPlatformPkg" + "ArmVirtualizationPkg: PlatformIntelBdsLib: add basic policy" + "OvmfPkg: extract QemuBootOrderLib" + "OvmfPkg: QemuBootOrderLib: featurize PCI-like device path translation" + "OvmfPkg: introduce VIRTIO_MMIO_TRANSPORT_GUID" + "ArmVirtualizationPkg: VirtFdtDxe: use dedicated VIRTIO_MMIO_TRANSPORT_GUID" + "OvmfPkg: QemuBootOrderLib: widen ParseUnitAddressHexList() to UINT64" + "OvmfPkg: QemuBootOrderLib: OFW-to-UEFI translation for virtio-mmio" + "ArmVirtualizationPkg: PlatformIntelBdsLib: adhere to QEMU's boot order" + "ArmVirtualizationPkg: identify "new shell" as builtin shell for Intel BDS" + "ArmVirtualizationPkg: Intel BDS: load EFI-stubbed Linux kernel from fw_cfg" + 'Revert "ArmVirtualizationPkg: work around cache incoherence on KVM affecting + DTB"' + "OvmfPkg: QemuBootOrderLib: expose QEMU's "-boot menu=on[, splash-time=N]"" + "OvmfPkg: PlatformBdsLib: get front page timeout from QEMU" + "ArmVirtualizationPkg: PlatformIntelBdsLib: get front page timeout from QEMU" + "ArmPkg: ArmArchTimerLib: clean up comments" + "ArmPkg: ArmArchTimerLib: use edk2-conformant (UINT64 * UINT32) / UINT32" + "ArmPkg: ArmArchTimerLib: conditionally rebase to actual timer frequency" + "ArmVirtualizationQemu: ask the hardware for the timer frequency" + "ArmPkg: DebugPeCoffExtraActionLib: debugger commands are not errors" + "ArmPlatformPkg: PEIM startup is not an error" + "ArmVirtualizationPkg: PlatformIntelBdsLib: lack of QEMU kernel is no error" + "ArmVirtualizationPkg: expose debug message bitmask on build command line" +- tweak patch "rebase to upstream 77d5dac (Acadia only)": update spec changelog + only +- tweak patch "spec: build AAVMF with the Intel BDS driver (RHELSA only)": + apply "-D INTEL_BDS" to manual build instructions in redhat/README too +- tweak patch "spec: build and install verbose and silent (default) AAVMF + binaries": apply DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR_LEVEL setting to interactive build + instructions in redhat/README too +- install OVMF whitepaper as part of the OVMF build's documentation +- Resolves: bz#1211337 + (merge AAVMF into OVMF) +- Resolves: bz#1206523 + ([AAVMF] fix missing cache maintenance) + +* Fri Mar 06 2015 Miroslav Rezanina - AAVMF-20141113-5.git77d5dac.el7_1 +- aavmf-ArmPkg-DebugPeCoffExtraActionLib-debugger-commands-a.patch [bz#1197141] +- aavmf-ArmPlatformPkg-PEIM-startup-is-not-an-error.patch [bz#1197141] +- aavmf-ArmVirtualizationPkg-PlatformIntelBdsLib-lack-of-QEM.patch [bz#1197141] +- aavmf-ArmVirtualizationPkg-expose-debug-message-bitmask-on.patch [bz#1197141] +- aavmf-spec-build-and-install-verbose-and-silent-default-AA.patch [bz#1197141] +- Resolves: bz#1197141 + (create silent & verbose builds) + +* Tue Feb 10 2015 Miroslav Rezanina - AAVMF-20141113-4.git77d5dac.el7 +- aavmf-ArmPkg-ArmArchTimerLib-clean-up-comments.patch [bz#1188247] +- aavmf-ArmPkg-ArmArchTimerLib-use-edk2-conformant-UINT64-UI.patch [bz#1188247] +- aavmf-ArmPkg-ArmArchTimerLib-conditionally-rebase-to-actua.patch [bz#1188247] +- aavmf-ArmVirtualizationQemu-ask-the-hardware-for-the-timer.patch [bz#1188247] +- aavmf-ArmPkg-TimerDxe-smack-down-spurious-timer-interrupt-.patch [bz#1188054] +- Resolves: bz#1188054 + (guest reboot (asked from within AAVMF) regressed in 3.19.0-0.rc5.58.aa7a host kernel) +- Resolves: bz#1188247 + (backport "fix gBS->Stall()" series) + +* Mon Jan 19 2015 Miroslav Rezanina - AAVMF-20141113-3.git77d5dac.el7 +- aavmf-OvmfPkg-QemuBootOrderLib-expose-QEMU-s-boot-menu-on-.patch [bz#1172756] +- aavmf-OvmfPkg-PlatformBdsLib-get-front-page-timeout-from-Q.patch [bz#1172756] +- aavmf-ArmVirtualizationPkg-PlatformIntelBdsLib-get-front-p.patch [bz#1172756] +- Resolves: bz#1172756 + ([RFE]Expose boot-menu shortcut to domain via AAVMF) + +* Wed Jan 14 2015 Miroslav Rezanina - AAVMF-20141113-2.git77d5dac.el7 +- aavmf-ArmVirtualizationPkg-VirtFdtDxe-forward-FwCfg-addres.patch [bz#1172749] +- aavmf-ArmVirtualizationPkg-introduce-QemuFwCfgLib-instance.patch [bz#1172749] +- aavmf-ArmVirtualizationPkg-clone-PlatformIntelBdsLib-from-.patch [bz#1172749] +- aavmf-ArmVirtualizationPkg-PlatformIntelBdsLib-add-basic-p.patch [bz#1172749] +- aavmf-OvmfPkg-extract-QemuBootOrderLib.patch [bz#1172749] +- aavmf-OvmfPkg-QemuBootOrderLib-featurize-PCI-like-device-p.patch [bz#1172749] +- aavmf-OvmfPkg-introduce-VIRTIO_MMIO_TRANSPORT_GUID.patch [bz#1172749] +- aavmf-ArmVirtualizationPkg-VirtFdtDxe-use-dedicated-VIRTIO.patch [bz#1172749] +- aavmf-OvmfPkg-QemuBootOrderLib-widen-ParseUnitAddressHexLi.patch [bz#1172749] +- aavmf-OvmfPkg-QemuBootOrderLib-OFW-to-UEFI-translation-for.patch [bz#1172749] +- aavmf-ArmVirtualizationPkg-PlatformIntelBdsLib-adhere-to-Q.patch [bz#1172749] +- aavmf-ArmVirtualizationPkg-identify-new-shell-as-builtin-s.patch [bz#1172749] +- aavmf-ArmVirtualizationPkg-Intel-BDS-load-EFI-stubbed-Linu.patch [bz#1172749] +- aavmf-spec-build-AAVMF-with-the-Intel-BDS-driver-RHELSA-on.patch [bz#1172749] +- aavmf-Revert-ArmVirtualizationPkg-work-around-cache-incohe.patch [bz#1172910] +- Resolves: bz#1172749 + (implement fw_cfg, boot order handling, and -kernel booting in ArmVirtualizationQemu) +- Resolves: bz#1172910 + (revert Acadia-only workaround (commit df7bca4e) once Acadia host kernel (KVM) is fixed) + +* Fri Dec 05 2014 Miroslav Rezanina - OVMF-20140822-7.git9ece15a.el7 +- ovmf-MdePkg-UefiScsiLib-do-not-encode-LUN-in-CDB-for-READ.patch [bz#1166971] +- ovmf-MdePkg-UefiScsiLib-do-not-encode-LUN-in-CDB-for-othe.patch [bz#1166971] +- Resolves: bz#1166971 + (virtio-scsi disks and cd-roms with nonzero LUN are rejected with errors) + +* Tue Nov 25 2014 Miroslav Rezanina - OVMF-20140822-6.git9ece15a.el7 +- ovmf-OvmfPkg-AcpiPlatformDxe-make-dependency-on-PCI-enume.patch [bz#1166027] +- Resolves: bz#1166027 + (backport "OvmfPkg: AcpiPlatformDxe: make dependency on PCI enumeration explicit") + +* Tue Nov 18 2014 Miroslav Rezanina - OVMF-20140822-4.git9ece15a.el7 +- ovmf-Add-comments-to-clarify-mPubKeyStore-buffer-MemCopy.patch [bz#1162314] +- ovmf-MdeModulePkg-SecurityPkg-Variable-Add-boundary-check.patch [bz#1162314] +- Resolves: bz#1162314 + (EMBARGOED OVMF: uefi: INTEL-TA-201410-001 && INTEL-TA-201410-002 [rhel-7.1]) + +* Thu Nov 13 2014 Laszlo Ersek - AAVMF-20141113-1.git77d5dac +- rebased to upstream 77d5dac + +- patch "ArmVirtualizationPkg: FdtPL011SerialPortLib: support UEFI_APPLICATION" + is now upstream (SVN r16219, git edb5073) + +* Thu Nov 13 2014 Miroslav Rezanina - OVMF-20140822-3.git9ece15a.el7 +- ovmf-Revert-OvmfPkg-set-video-resolution-of-text-setup-to.patch [bz#1153927] +- ovmf-Try-to-read-key-strike-even-when-the-TimeOuts-value-.patch [bz#1153927] +- ovmf-OvmfPkg-BDS-remove-dead-call-to-PlatformBdsEnterFron.patch [bz#1153927] +- ovmf-OvmfPkg-BDS-drop-useless-return-statement.patch [bz#1153927] +- ovmf-OvmfPkg-BDS-don-t-overwrite-the-BDS-Front-Page-timeo.patch [bz#1153927] +- ovmf-OvmfPkg-BDS-optimize-second-argument-in-PlatformBdsE.patch [bz#1153927] +- ovmf-OvmfPkg-BDS-drop-superfluous-connect-first-boot-opti.patch [bz#1153927] +- ovmf-OvmfPkg-BDS-drop-custom-boot-timeout-revert-to-Intel.patch [bz#1153927] +- ovmf-OvmfPkg-set-video-resolution-of-text-setup-to-640x48.patch [bz#1153927] +- Resolves: bz#1153927 + (set NEXTBOOT to uefi setting failed from Windows Recovery console) + +* Tue Nov 11 2014 Miroslav Rezanina - OVMF-20140822-2.git9ece15a +- ovmf-redhat-process-rh-specific.sh-suppress-missing-files.patch [bz#1145784] +- ovmf-Revert-RH-only-OvmfPkg-QemuVideoDxe-fix-querying-of-.patch [bz#1145784] +- ovmf-Revert-RH-only-OvmfPkg-AcpiPlatformDxe-implement-QEM.patch [bz#1145784] +- ovmf-Revert-RH-only-OvmfPkg-AcpiPlatformDxe-remove-curren.patch [bz#1145784] +- ovmf-Revert-RH-only-OvmfPkg-AcpiPlatformDxe-actualize-Qem.patch [bz#1145784] +- ovmf-Revert-RH-only-OvmfPkg-resolve-OrderedCollectionLib-.patch [bz#1145784] +- ovmf-OvmfPkg-QemuVideoDxe-work-around-misreported-QXL-fra.patch [bz#1145784] +- ovmf-OvmfPkg-resolve-OrderedCollectionLib-with-base-red-b.patch [bz#1145784] +- ovmf-OvmfPkg-AcpiPlatformDxe-actualize-QemuLoader.h-comme.patch [bz#1145784] +- ovmf-OvmfPkg-AcpiPlatformDxe-remove-current-ACPI-table-lo.patch [bz#1145784] +- ovmf-OvmfPkg-AcpiPlatformDxe-implement-QEMU-s-full-ACPI-t.patch [bz#1145784] +- ovmf-spec-build-small-bootable-ISO-with-standalone-UEFI-s.patch [bz#1147592] +- ovmf-OvmfPkg-allow-exclusion-of-the-shell-from-the-firmwa.patch [bz#1147592] +- ovmf-spec-exclude-the-UEFI-shell-from-the-SecureBoot-enab.patch [bz#1147592] +- ovmf-OvmfPkg-EnrollDefaultKeys-application-for-enrolling-.patch [bz#1148296] +- ovmf-spec-package-EnrollDefaultKeys.efi-on-UefiShell.iso-.patch [bz#1148296] +- ovmf-OvmfPkg-disable-stale-fork-of-SecureBootConfigDxe.patch [bz#1148294] +- ovmf-OvmfPkg-SecureBootConfigDxe-remove-stale-fork.patch [bz#1148294] +- Resolves: bz#1145784 + (OVMF sync with QXL and ACPI patches up to edk2 7a9612ce) +- Resolves: bz#1147592 + (the binary RPM should include a small ISO file with a directly bootable UEFI shell binary) +- Resolves: bz#1148294 + (drop OvmfPkg's stale fork of SecureBootConfigDxe) +- Resolves: bz#1148296 + (provide a non-interactive way to auto-enroll important SecureBoot certificates) + +* Wed Oct 15 2014 Laszlo Ersek - AAVMF-20141015-1.gitc373687 +- ported packaging to aarch64 / AAVMF + +* Fri Aug 22 2014 Laszlo Ersek - 20140822-1.git9ece15a.el7 +- rebase from upstream 3facc08 to 9ece15a +- update to openssl-0.9.8zb +- update to FatPkg SVN r86 (git 2355ea2c) +- the following patches of Paolo Bonzini have been merged in upstream; drop the + downstream-only copies: + 7bc1421 edksetup.sh: Look for BuildEnv under EDK_TOOLS_PATH + d549344 edksetup.sh: Ensure that WORKSPACE points to the top of an edk2 + checkout + 1c023eb BuildEnv: remove useless check before setting $WORKSPACE +- include the following patches that have been pending review on the upstream + list for a long time: + [PATCH 0/4] OvmfPkg: complete client for QEMU's ACPI loader interface + http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.bios.tianocore.devel/8369 + [PATCH] OvmfPkg: QemuVideoDxe: fix querying of QXL's drawable buffer size + http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.bios.tianocore.devel/8515 +- nasm is a build-time dependency now because upstream BuildTools has started + to call it directly + +* Wed Jul 23 2014 Laszlo Ersek - 20140723-1.git3facc08.el7 +- rebase from upstream a618eaa to 3facc08 +- update to openssl-0.9.8za +- drop downstream-only split varstore patch, rely on upstream's + +* Tue Jun 24 2014 Miroslav Rezanina - 20140619-1.gita618eaa.el7 +- Initial version