isaacpittman-hitachi / rpms / openssl

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Blame SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-seclevel.patch

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diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c.seclevel openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
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--- openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c.seclevel	2020-04-21 14:22:39.000000000 +0200
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+++ openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c	2020-06-05 17:16:54.835536823 +0200
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@@ -3225,6 +3225,7 @@ static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *c
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 }
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 static const int minbits_table[] = { 80, 112, 128, 192, 256 };
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+static const int minbits_digest_table[] = { 80, 80, 128, 192, 256 };
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 static const int NUM_AUTH_LEVELS = OSSL_NELEM(minbits_table);
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 /*
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@@ -3276,6 +3277,11 @@ static int check_sig_level(X509_STORE_CT
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     if (!X509_get_signature_info(cert, NULL, NULL, &secbits, NULL))
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         return 0;
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-
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-    return secbits >= minbits_table[level - 1];
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+    /*
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+     * Allow SHA1 in SECLEVEL 2 in non-FIPS mode or when the magic
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+     * disable SHA1 flag is not set.
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+     */
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+    if ((ctx->param->flags & 0x40000000) || FIPS_mode())
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+        return secbits >= minbits_table[level - 1];
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+    return secbits >= minbits_digest_table[level - 1];
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 }
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diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_security_level.pod.seclevel openssl-1.1.1g/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_security_level.pod
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--- openssl-1.1.1g/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_security_level.pod.seclevel	2020-04-21 14:22:39.000000000 +0200
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+++ openssl-1.1.1g/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_security_level.pod	2020-06-04 15:48:01.608178833 +0200
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@@ -81,8 +81,10 @@ using MD5 for the MAC is also prohibited
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 =item B<Level 2>
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-Security level set to 112 bits of security. As a result RSA, DSA and DH keys
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-shorter than 2048 bits and ECC keys shorter than 224 bits are prohibited.
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+Security level set to 112 bits of security with the exception of SHA1 allowed
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+for signatures.
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+As a result RSA, DSA and DH keys shorter than 2048 bits and ECC keys
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+shorter than 224 bits are prohibited.
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 In addition to the level 1 exclusions any cipher suite using RC4 is also
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 prohibited. SSL version 3 is also not allowed. Compression is disabled.
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diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/ssl_cert.c.seclevel openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/ssl_cert.c
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--- openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/ssl_cert.c.seclevel	2020-04-21 14:22:39.000000000 +0200
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+++ openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/ssl_cert.c	2020-06-05 17:10:11.842198401 +0200
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@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
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 static int ssl_security_default_callback(const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx,
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                                          int op, int bits, int nid, void *other,
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                                          void *ex);
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+static unsigned long sha1_disable(const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx);
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 static CRYPTO_ONCE ssl_x509_store_ctx_once = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
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 static volatile int ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx = -1;
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@@ -396,7 +397,7 @@ int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_
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     X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_auth_level(param, SSL_get_security_level(s));
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     /* Set suite B flags if needed */
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-    X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(ctx, tls1_suiteb(s));
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+    X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(ctx, tls1_suiteb(s) | sha1_disable(s, NULL));
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     if (!X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data
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         (ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(), s)) {
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         goto end;
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@@ -953,12 +954,33 @@ static int ssl_security_default_callback
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             return 0;
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         break;
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     default:
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+        /* allow SHA1 in SECLEVEL 2 in non FIPS mode */
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+        if (nid == NID_sha1 && minbits == 112 && !sha1_disable(s, ctx))
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+            break;
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         if (bits < minbits)
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             return 0;
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     }
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     return 1;
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 }
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+static unsigned long sha1_disable(const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx)
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+{
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+    unsigned long ret = 0x40000000; /* a magical internal value used by X509_VERIFY_PARAM */
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+    const CERT *c;
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+
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+    if (FIPS_mode())
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+        return ret;
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+
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+    if (ctx != NULL) {
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+       c = ctx->cert;
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+    } else {
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+       c = s->cert;
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+    }
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+    if (tls1_cert_sigalgs_have_sha1(c))
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+        return 0;
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+    return ret;
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+}
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+
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 int ssl_security(const SSL *s, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other)
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 {
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     return s->cert->sec_cb(s, NULL, op, bits, nid, other, s->cert->sec_ex);
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diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/ssl_local.h.seclevel openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/ssl_local.h
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--- openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/ssl_local.h.seclevel	2020-06-04 15:48:01.602178783 +0200
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+++ openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/ssl_local.h	2020-06-05 17:02:22.666313410 +0200
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@@ -2576,6 +2576,7 @@ __owur int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, PAC
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 __owur int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s);
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 __owur int tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(SSL *s, const EVP_PKEY *pkey);
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 __owur int tls1_lookup_md(const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu, const EVP_MD **pmd);
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+int tls1_cert_sigalgs_have_sha1(const CERT *c);
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 __owur size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, int sent, const uint16_t **psigs);
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 #  ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
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 __owur int tls_check_sigalg_curve(const SSL *s, int curve);
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diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/t1_lib.c.seclevel openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/t1_lib.c
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--- openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/t1_lib.c.seclevel	2020-06-04 15:48:01.654179221 +0200
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+++ openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/t1_lib.c	2020-06-05 17:02:40.268459157 +0200
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@@ -2145,6 +2145,36 @@ int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int
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     return 0;
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 }
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+static int tls1_sigalgs_have_sha1(const uint16_t *sigalgs, size_t sigalgslen)
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+{
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+    size_t i;
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+
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+    for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i++, sigalgs++) {
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+        const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*sigalgs);
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+
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+        if (lu == NULL)
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+            continue;
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+        if (lu->hash == NID_sha1)
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+            return 1;
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+    }
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+    return 0;
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+}
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+
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+
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+int tls1_cert_sigalgs_have_sha1(const CERT *c)
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+{
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+    if (c->client_sigalgs != NULL) {
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+        if (tls1_sigalgs_have_sha1(c->client_sigalgs, c->client_sigalgslen))
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+            return 1;
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+    }
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+    if (c->conf_sigalgs != NULL) {
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+        if (tls1_sigalgs_have_sha1(c->conf_sigalgs, c->conf_sigalgslen))
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+            return 1;
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+        return 0;
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+    }
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+    return 1;
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+}
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+
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 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(SSL *s, X509 *x, int default_nid)
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 {
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     int sig_nid, use_pc_sigalgs = 0;
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diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t.seclevel openssl-1.1.1g/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t
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--- openssl-1.1.1g/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t.seclevel	2020-04-21 14:22:39.000000000 +0200
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+++ openssl-1.1.1g/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t	2020-06-04 15:48:01.608178833 +0200
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@@ -346,8 +346,8 @@ ok(verify("ee-pss-sha1-cert", "sslserver
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 ok(verify("ee-pss-sha256-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"], ),
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     "CA with PSS signature using SHA256");
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-ok(!verify("ee-pss-sha1-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"], "-auth_level", "2"),
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-    "Reject PSS signature using SHA1 and auth level 2");
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+ok(!verify("ee-pss-sha1-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"], "-auth_level", "3"),
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+    "Reject PSS signature using SHA1 and auth level 3");
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 ok(verify("ee-pss-sha256-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"], "-auth_level", "2"),
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     "PSS signature using SHA256 and auth level 2");