gentleknife / rpms / libgcrypt

Forked from rpms/libgcrypt 4 years ago
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Blame SOURCES/libgcrypt-1.8.4-fips-keygen.patch

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diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.4/cipher/dsa.c.fips-keygen libgcrypt-1.8.4/cipher/dsa.c
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--- libgcrypt-1.8.4/cipher/dsa.c.fips-keygen	2017-11-23 19:16:58.000000000 +0100
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+++ libgcrypt-1.8.4/cipher/dsa.c	2019-02-12 14:29:25.629513989 +0100
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@@ -457,11 +457,22 @@ generate_fips186 (DSA_secret_key *sk, un
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                                              &prime_q, &prime_p,
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                                              r_counter,
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                                              r_seed, r_seedlen);
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-      else
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-        ec = _gcry_generate_fips186_3_prime (nbits, qbits, NULL, 0,
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+      else if (!domain->p || !domain->q)
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+        ec = _gcry_generate_fips186_3_prime (nbits, qbits,
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+                                             initial_seed.seed,
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+                                             initial_seed.seedlen,
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                                              &prime_q, &prime_p,
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                                              r_counter,
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                                              r_seed, r_seedlen, NULL);
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+      else
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+        {
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+          /* Domain parameters p and q are given; use them.  */
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+          prime_p = mpi_copy (domain->p);
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+          prime_q = mpi_copy (domain->q);
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+          gcry_assert (mpi_get_nbits (prime_p) == nbits);
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+          gcry_assert (mpi_get_nbits (prime_q) == qbits);
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+          ec = 0;
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+        }
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       sexp_release (initial_seed.sexp);
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       if (ec)
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         goto leave;
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@@ -855,13 +866,12 @@ dsa_generate (const gcry_sexp_t genparms
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       sexp_release (l1);
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       sexp_release (domainsexp);
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-      /* Check that all domain parameters are available.  */
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-      if (!domain.p || !domain.q || !domain.g)
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+      /* Check that p and q domain parameters are available.  */
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+      if (!domain.p || !domain.q || (!domain.g && !(flags & PUBKEY_FLAG_USE_FIPS186)))
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         {
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           _gcry_mpi_release (domain.p);
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           _gcry_mpi_release (domain.q);
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           _gcry_mpi_release (domain.g);
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-          sexp_release (deriveparms);
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           return GPG_ERR_MISSING_VALUE;
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         }
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diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.4/cipher/rsa.c.fips-keygen libgcrypt-1.8.4/cipher/rsa.c
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--- libgcrypt-1.8.4/cipher/rsa.c.fips-keygen	2017-11-23 19:16:58.000000000 +0100
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+++ libgcrypt-1.8.4/cipher/rsa.c	2019-02-12 14:29:25.630513971 +0100
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@@ -389,7 +389,7 @@ generate_fips (RSA_secret_key *sk, unsig
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   if (nbits < 1024 || (nbits & 0x1FF))
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     return GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE;
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-  if (_gcry_enforced_fips_mode() && nbits != 2048 && nbits != 3072)
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+  if (fips_mode() && nbits < 2048)
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       return GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE;
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   /* The random quality depends on the transient_key flag.  */
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@@ -696,7 +696,7 @@ generate_x931 (RSA_secret_key *sk, unsig
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   *swapped = 0;
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-  if (e_value == 1)   /* Alias for a secure value. */
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+  if (e_value == 1 || e_value == 0)   /* Alias for a secure value. */
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     e_value = 65537;
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   /* Point 1 of section 4.1:  k = 1024 + 256s with S >= 0  */